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cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution
330, and his colleagues on the Senate
Judiciary Committee. It was through
their special effort that the bill was
reported out of that committee for full
Senate consideration. I would also like
to express my' appreciation to the
other 31 cosponsors of the bill for
their support.
It was on June 28, 1984, that I introduced Senate Joint Resolution 330 on
behalf of nearly 1.5 million Americans
who have a condition that is relatively
unknown.
Approximately
125,000
people join their ranks each year.
These individuals are ostomates. They
have in common an "ostomy," a type
of surgery required when a person has
lost the normal function of the bowel
or bladder, due to birth defect, disease,
injury, or other disorder. Such operations include colostomy, ileostomy,
and urostomy. Ostomates are of all
ages, and represent every race, occupation, and ethnic background. They do
return to normal living and community responsibility, but not without first
overcoming the trauma associated
with this radical surgery.
Public awareness and education efforts can help. Mutual aid and support
groups can also be of great assistance
to ostomates and their families. The
first local ostomy association Was
formed in 1949, and in 1962 the United
Ostomy Association was established.
This association, with over 625 chapters—three in the State of Hawaii—
and international affiliation, is dedicated to helping every ostomy patient
return to normal living through
mutual support, education in proper
ostomy care, exchange of ideas, assistance in improving ostomy equipment
and supplies, advancement of knowledge of gastrointestinal diseases, and
public education about ostomy.
The Visiting Program is the most
important activity of the United
Ostomy Association. The volunteer
members of local chapters, composed
primarily of ostomates, provide preoperative preparation and support as
well as postsurgical followthrough on
a person-to-person basis. These trained
and certified members are carefully selected to visit a new patient in the hospital or at their home, ijpon request
and with the consent of the surgeon.
As one member of a team whose task
is to return the patient to health and
activity, the visitor provides help
which cannot be duplicated. To a new
patient, a successful ostomate symbolizes good outcome.
At regular monthly meetings, open
to anyone who is interested, members
can exchange practical and personal
experiences, see ostomy equipment
displayed, and hear speakers. Through
the Visiting Program and chapter
meetings, thousands of people have returned to active and productive lives
by adjusting to their new way of life.
Without greater public understanding of this type of surgery, the fear of
those about to undergo the surgery
and of family members and loved ones

who are so important to the rehabilitation process tends to increase. For
the reasons I have stated, together
with Senator GRASSLEY and other concerned cosponsors of the measure, I
urge the adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 330.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President,
today we are considering a resolution,
which has already passed in the House
of Representatives, designating this
month, August 1984, as "Ostomy
Awareness Month"; 1.5 million people
have undergone an ostomy due to the
loss of the normal function of their
bowel or bladder. Fortunately, all of
these people are able to resume their
previous lifestyles after the surgery.
The United Ostomy Association has
50,000 members whom the association
counsels through the trauma of surgery and the readjustment that is necessary after surgery. Not only does the
association help ostomates, but they
also assist the families and friends in
gaining understanding and support for
their friend or family member.
Many well-known people have had
one of the three types of ostomies, a
colostomy, an urostomy or an ileostomy, and have become spokespersons
for ostomates. We can do our part too
by designating this month as "Ostomy
Awareness Month" and thereby promoting the education of the American
population and commending the
people who have had an ostomy and
continue to live as they had before the
surgery. I urge you to support this important resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
joint resolution is open to amendment.
If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and the third reading of the
joint resolution.
The joint resolution was ordered to
be engrossed for a third reading and
was read the third time.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent that the pending
measure be laid aside and the Senate
turn to the consideration of House
Joint Resolution 587, Calendar Order
No. 1132.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
joint resolution will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
A joint resolution (H J. Res. 587) designating the month of August 1984 as "Ostomy
Awareness Month."
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to the consideration of the
joint resolution.
Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. President,
inasmuch as the language of the
House joint resolution is exactly the
same as that of the Senate Joint Resolution 330, I rise in full support of the
measure and ask for its immediate passage.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
joint resolution is before the Senate
and open to amendment. If there be
no amendment to be offered, the question is on the third reading and passage of the joint resolution.
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The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 587)
was ordered to a third reading, was
read the third time, and passed.
The preamble was agreed to.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I moi e
to reconsider the vote by which the
joint resolution was passed.
Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. President, I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. BAKER. "Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Senate Joint
Resolution 330 be indefinitely postponed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC ACT AMENDMENT
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, could I
inquire next of the minority leader if
it is possible for him to clear for action
by unanimous consent Calendar Order
No. 1115, S. 2926, the drug bill.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President,
reserving the right to object, and I
shall not' object, I wish to address
myself for one moment to the minority leader.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am ad
vised now that it may take a few additional moments to get that in shape.
I withdraw my request of the minority leader.
Mr. President, I believe now that the
earlier matter may be cleared.
Let me renew my inquiry of the minority leader.
I wish now to go to Calendar No.
1115, S. 2926, if the minority leader
can clear that.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the
matter has been cleared on this side,
and there is no objection.
Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority
leader.
Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay
before the Senate Calendar Order No
1115, S. 2926.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
bill will be stated by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
A bill (S. 2926) to amend the Federal
Pood. Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the
procedures for new drug applications, to
amend title 35. United States Code, to authorize the extention of the patents for certain regulated products, and for other put
poses.
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, we have
before us the most important pharmaceutical legislation to come before
Congress in many years. This bill. S.
2926, is the final version of S. 2748.
the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act 6f 1984.
This is a groundbreaking compromise
in the public interest. It reconciles the
opposing, competitive interests of two
segments of the pharmaceutical industry -which have often stymied each
other's attempts to improve the law.
The research-based drug industry ob-
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tains an extension of patents for new Further negotiations ensued yesterdrug discoveries to compensate them day with Congressman WAXMAN, the
for the time spent off-market in Food House sponsor, in an attempt to develand Drug Administration review. The op a final position which would be satgeneric drug industry gets the ability isfactory to everyone. I am pleased to
to bring generic copies of off-patent report that these negotiations bore
drugs to market as soon as the patent fruit and that a compromise set of
expires, without the needless redupli- amendments has been incorporated
cation of studies and tests already in into this new bill and into the technical amendment I am proposing today.
FDA's files.
The public receives the best of both The bill, S. 2926, as amended has
worlds—cheaper drugs today and drawn the support of almost all of the
better drugs tomorow. The prolifera- companies opposing S. 2748, and has
been
accepted
by Congressman
tion of new generics for some of the WAXMAN
and by the administration.
most important drugs on the market
Before continuing my remarks, let
will save consumers an estimated $1
billion or more over the next decade. me acknowledge the good offices of
The added patent life will restore to the many people who assisted in these
our domestic drug companies some of negotiations, especially Mr. Joe Wilthe incentive for innovation which has liams, president of Warner-Lambert
weakened as Federal pre-market ap- and chairman of the Pharmaceutical
Association; Mr. Jack
proval requirements have become Manufacturers
chief executive officer of
more expensive and time-consuming. Stafford,
American Home Products; Mr. Bill
That incentive will produce both the Haddad, president of the Generic
investment and commitment to re- Pharmaceutical Industry Association;
seach and development that will again Mr. William Greif, vice president of
place the United States in unques- Bristol Myers; and Mr. William Ryan
tioned leadership in the field. And it assistant general counsel of Johnson
will generate an increase in the & Johnson. Above all, I express my apnumber of important new drugs, preciation for the flexibility and leadamong the most vital causes for this ership of Chairman WAXMAN. We have
century's dramatic increase in the enjoyed a close and amicable working
length and quality of life.
relationship during the progress of
Now, those who have been following this legislation through the Congress.
this bill know this is a vastly simpliThe elements of the compromise are:
fied account of the bill and its effect.
There
is to be a prospective 5-year
It is involved and is carefully balanced
period for filing of ANDA's
at a number of points in ways only waiting
following approval by FDA of a new
lawyers could have devised. But it is a chemical
entity new drug application
good bill, one which I have heartily [NDA3. For
other NDA's involving
endorsed and promoted in the Senate. new clinical all
tests, there will be a 3It is backed by a wide range of organi- year period during which no ANDA
zations including the Pharmaceutical approval may be made effective. This
Manufacturers' Association, the AFL- protects products whose development
CIO and numerous individual unions, has taken much time and money in
the American Association of Retired FDA testing and review, but which
Persons, and the National Council of have little for no patent life left when
Senior Citizens.
they are finally allowed on the
As you are probably also aware, sev- market.
eral research-based pharmaceutical
Further, the 10-year ANDA moratocompanies have felt that the compro- rium for products approved between
mise embodied in S. 2748 was not ade- January 1.1982, and the date of enactquate and have pressed for changes in ment is supplemented by a similar prothe bill. During the past 3 months I vision for 2 years for non-new-chemihave met with many of these compa- cal-entity drugs.
nies to discuss their concerns as has The period of time during which an
Congressman HENRY WAXMAN, the abbreviated new drug application is
bill's House sponsor, and indeed as not to be made effective, during the
have many members of my committee. pendency of a patent challenge under
While I believe S. 2748 enjoys over- the statute, is extended from 18 to 30
whelming support in the Senate, it has months from the date of submission of
certainly been my belief that it is pref- an ANDA application containing bioeerable to accommodate requests for quivalency data. This increases the
changes which do not disturb balances likelihood that the litigation will be
essential to the bill.
concluded within the time period
As the time remaining during this during which ANDA's are not allowed.
session has decreased, discussions over , Some of the complicated current rethese concerns have
intensified. strictions on the nature of patents
Hoping that I could catalyze a final which can be extended are removed,
agreement among the interested par- with the provision that one patent on
ties, we met Tuesday and Wednesday a product, not necessarily the first,
and conducted many hours of intense can be extended but that total exclunegotiation. We discussed and placed sive market life of the product cannot
on the table issues relating both to the exceed 14 years.
abbreviated new drug application
The authority of the Secretary of
<ANDA) and patent portions of the Health and Human Services to deny a
bill.
petition for filing an ANDA for a prod-
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uct not exactly similar to the original
drug will be expanded to include cases
where the proposed generic is a combination drug, one of whose active ingredients is different from those of
the original combination drug. This
will make sure that FDA retains the
authority to prevent drugs from
coming to market without proper tests
to establish the unforeseen interactions that substituted active ingredients may have on each other.
The concern was raised that FDA
might be forced under the bill to approve an ANDA, even if FDA had
started proceedings to remove the
original drug from the market but had
not completed the process. Language
was adopted which would remedy this
loophole.
The treatment of animal drugs contained in S. 2748 is deleted in this bill.
I would also like to address a comment to one issue which arose during
the discussion of the bill. The Patent
Commissioner has expressed concern
that he is required to verify the contents of applications for patent extension. This was not intended, and a
wording change in the bill clarifies
that he may rely wholly on the required information as represented by
the applicant.
Mr. President, the United States
waits for this bill.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
express my strong endorsement of S.
2926, the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.
This important compromise measure
builds upon legislation which was reported by the Judiciary Committee
and passed by the Senate in the 97th
Congress. I was a cosponsor of that
bill and its successors, and I am
pleased to join the distinguished chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, Senator ORRIN
HATCH, in cosponsoring this measure.
Mr. President, patent term restoration makes eminently good sense and
is fair to business and consumers alike.
It encourages inventiveness by making
the patent term a real and useful one.
This bill adds an additional feature relating to approval procedures for
drugs coming off patent, which will
expedite the availability of generic
drugs. This is a balanced package
which addresses legitimate needs in a
reasonable manner.
Mr. President, after a long delay, we
are finally able to bring this important
legislation before the Senate. I want
to commend Senator HATCH for his
persistence in this matter. I also want
to express my congratulations to representatives of the various interested
groups who worked together to resolve
their differences so that the public interest would be served. Although, as
with any compromise, everyone did
not get everything that he wanted,
this package represents a fair balance
of interests.
I urge my colleagues to support S.
2926 so that we can enact patent term
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provisions by section 104 of the bill, Is amended by
striking out, beginning with ", including",
all matter through "financial information".
AMENDMENT 110. 3 7 0 7
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, the
(Purpose: To make certain technical
amendment clarifies the data release
changes to the bills)
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President. I now provision and the 3-year moratorium
send to the desk a technical amend- for ANDA's [Abbreviated New Drug
ment to S. 2926 on behalf of myself Applications]. It would protect only
and the other cosponsors and Senator those new drug applications which involve new clinical investigations.
METZENBAUM.
The effect on changes to existing
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
NDA's would be to restrict coverage to
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows: only those alterations, like some
The Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH], for changes in strength, indications, and
himself and Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. DECON- so forth, which require considerable
CINI, Mrs. HAWKINS. Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. time and expense in FDA required
DENTON, and Mr. THURMOND proposes clinical testing.
Mr. President, I move that the
amendment numbered 3707.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President. I ask amendment be adopted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If
unanimous consent that reading of the
there be no further debate, the quesamendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- tion is on agreeing to the amendment
of the Senator from Utah.
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 3707) was
The amendment is as follows:
Clause (iii) of section 505(JX4MD) of the agTeedto.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move
Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as
added by section 101(a) of the biU. is amend- to reconsider the vote by which the
ed by striking
out "(or supplement to an ap- amendment was agreed to.
plication )M and "(or supplement thereto)",
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move
and by inserting after "approved under sub- to lay that motion on the table.
section (b)" the following "and which conThe motion to lay on the table was
tains reports of new clinical investigations agreed to.
(other than bioavailability studies) sponAMENDMENT NO. S 7 0 8
sored by the applicant".
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President,-at this
Clause (iv) of section 505(JX4)(D) of the
Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act. as time, I submit an amendment on
added by section 101(a) of the bill, redesig- behalf of Senator THURMOND and ask
nated as clause (v). and the following new for its immediate consideration.
clause (iv) is Inserted immediately after
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clause (iii):
"(iv) If a supplement to an application ap- amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
proved under subsection (b) includes reports
The Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH] for
of new clinical investigations (other than
bioavailability studies) sponsored by the ap- Mr. THURMOND proposes an amendment
plicant and is approved after the date of en- numbered 3708.
actment of this subsection, the Secretary
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask
may not make the approval of an applica- unanimous consent that the reading of
tion submitted under this subsection which the amendment be dispensed with.
Tefers to the drug for which such suppleThe PRESIDING OFFICER. Withment was submitted effective before the expiration of three years from the date of the out objection, it is so ordered. ^
approval of the supplement under subsecThe amendment is as follows: tion (b).
At the end of the bill insert the following
Clause (iii) of section 505(c)(3XD) of the new title:
Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act. as
TITLE —
added by section 101(b) of the bill, is amendSrc. - . (a) Title 35 of the United States
ed by striking out "(or supplement to an ap- Code
is amended by adding immediately folplication)" and "(or supplement thereto)"
and by inserting after "approved under sub- lowing section 155 the following new secsection (b)" the following "and which con- tion:
M
tains reports of new clinical investigations 8155A. Patent extension.
"(a) Notwithstanding section 154 of this
(other than bioavailability studies) spontitle, the term of any patent which encomsored by the applicant".
Clause (iv) of section 505(c)(3XD) of the passes within its scope a composition of
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as matter which is a new drug product, if such
added by section 101(b) of the bill, is redes- new drug product is subject to the labeling
ignated as clause (v), and the following new requirements for oral hypoglycemic drugs
clause (iv) is inserted immediately after of the sulfonylurea class as promulgated by
the Food and Drug Administration in' its
clause (iii);
"(iv) If a supplement to an application ap- final rule on March 22. 1984 (FR Doc. 84proved under subsection (b) includes reports 9640) and was approved by the Food and
of new clincial investigations (other than Drug Administration for marketing after
bioavailability studies) sponsored by the ap- promulgation of such final rule and prior to
plicant and is approved after the date of en- the date of enactment of this law, shall be
actment of this subsection, the Secretary extended until April 21,1992.
may not make the approval of an applica"(b) The patentee or licensee or authortion submitted under this subsection which ized representative of any patent described
refers to the drug for which such supple- in such subsection (a) shall, within ninety
ment was submitted effective before the ex^ days after the date of enactment of such
piration of three years from the date of the subsection, notify the Commissioner of Patapproval of the supplement under subsec- ents and Trademarks of the number of any
tion (b).
patent so extended. On receipt of such
Subsection (1) of section 505 of the Feder- notice, the Commissioner shall confirm such
al Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as added extension by placing a notice thereof in the
restoration and ANDA
without further delay.
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official file of such patent and publishing an
appropriate notice of such extension in the
Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office.".
(b) The table of sections for chapter 14 of
title 35, United States Code is amended by
adding after the item relating to section 155
the following new item:
"155A. Patent extension.".
Section 25(a) of the bill, as redesignated,
is amended by striking out "9 and 10" and
inserting in lieu thereof "9,10, and 24".
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I would
like to share with my colleagues a
statement by Senator THURMOND on
this amendment.
This amendment passed the Senate without objection on June 29 as an amendment
to 8. 1538. It would provide limited patent
extension for certain oral diabetic drugs.
Such relief is necessary because the FDA
unduly delayed final approval for these
drugs while it developed class labeling. This
would restore some of the patent life lost
because of the government's undue delay.
Mr. President, it is my understanding that Members of the House are
willing to take this amendment, as
well, so we are adding it to this bill.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Will the
manger of the bill be good enough just
to repeat what this amendment is?
This is not the Thurmond textile
amendment?
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, this has
nothing to do with textiles. This is an
amendment that provides limited
patent extensions for certain oral diabetic drugs. Such relief is necessary
because the Food and Drug Administration unduly delayed final approval
for these drugs while it developed
class labeling. This would restore some
of the patent life lost because of the
Government's undue delay.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President,
I have to say to my colleague from
Utah that this amendment is not
agreeable at all. I have jiot heard of
this amendment before. This is the
first time I have heard about a patent
extension with respect to diabetic
drugs. We have many patent extensions proposed.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield for just a moment.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President,
I have to advise my colleague that although apparently one of my staff
members saw fit to clear it, it does not
reflect my views. But if he did so, I am
not going to renege on that understanding. I withdraw my objection.
Mr. HATCH. I appreciate the distinguished Senator from Ohio doing that.
I might add that this is part of the
package that has been considered and
accepted by, I believe, Representatives
in the House and the Senate. I understood that it had been cleared. I appreciate that kindness on the part of the
distinguished Senator from Ohio.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Is the Senator
finished with the amendment?
Mr. HATCH. I have not moved the
amendment yet.
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Mr, METZENBAUM. I would like to or $50 billion. I am frank to admit I do It will revolutionize the drug industry
be heard on the bill when the Senator not know the amount. But I know that and the drug market. It is a boon to
it is a large amount and the drug com- both consumers and producers, and I
from Utah is finished.
Mr. HATCH. I am not quite through panies will clap with enthusiasm and know of no group which opposes it as
excitement when this bill becomes law. amended.
yet.
Then there is another provision in
The support is bipartisan, and it is
Mr. President, I move the amendthis bill that breaks even further more overwhelming.
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is new ground, and that is it is a totally
Mr. President, I cannot tell you how
there further debate on the amend- new concept. It provides that the much t h e distinguished Member of
ment? If not, the question is on agree- FDA, upon approval of a drug, may Congress, Congressman WAXMAN, has
ing to the amendment of the Senator grant exclusivity, exclusive rights to done to help bring this bill about.
use that drug for 5 years. Then if you Without his tireless, unrelenting leadfrom Utah £Mr. HATCH].
The amendment (No. 3708) was read it closely enough, you will learn it ership, I do not know that we would
really is not 5 years, it is closer to 6 ever have had this bill. And there has
agreed to.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move years because of the date and the been a lot of work here in the Senate,
to reconsider the vote by which the manner in which it is written.
and especially in the Labor and
Well, that was enough and that was Human Resources Committee, as well.
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. BAKER. I move to lay that sufficient reason to be concerned
I was pleased to join in the effort
about the passage of this legislation. with Congressman WAXMAN in this bimotion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was But then we learned just in the last partisan effort.
few minutes that the language of the
agreed to.
I want to thank the people in indusMr. HATCH. Mr. President, I yield S-year exclusive marketing provision try, the consumer groups, the people
the floor to the distinguished Senator which the FDA can give may also, in in the generic pharmaceutical indussome way, detour or detract from the try, the people in the Pharmaceutical
from Ohio.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, right of generic drug manufacturers Manufacturers Association, and all of
I spent the last couple of days on this and perhaps others as well to chal- those who have worked with us. I want
bill, and I am frank to admit that I lenge the patent during that period.
t o thank the Senator from Ohio. I
I have received an iron-clad assur- would like to thank the distinguished
have grave misgivings about it. I have
misgivings about it because it provides ance from the man primarily responsi- Member of Congress, Congressman
the Senate with the horns of a di]em- ble for the passage of this legislation, WAXMAN.
the distinguished and well-respected
ma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
from
California
One part of the bill provides a good Congressperson
legislative approach to the use of ge- HENRY WAXMAN, who said if this is a bill having been read the third time,
neric drugs, and it breaks some new problem, he will see to it that it is the question is, Shall the bill pass?
The bill (S. 2926) was passed, as
ground in that area. I support the con- taken care of in the House. I want at
cept of the use of generic drugs. I this point to say very publicly that one amended as follows:
8.2926
think it helps senior citizens as well as of the reasons that I have withdrawn
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
all people in our society if you can buy any objection to this bill is because of
drugs that are not merely by reason of the distinguished record that the Con- Representatives of the United States of
their name and the advertising but gressperson from California, Congress- America in Congress assembled, That this
man WAXMAN, has had and the confi- Act may be cited as the "Drug Price Compebased upon the content.
and Patent Term Restoration Act of
But there is another part of the bill dence that I have in his legislative ap- tition
1984".
that gives me great concern; that is proach.
TITLE I-ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG
that portion of the bill that provides
I still have reservations. I still have
APPLICATIONS
for an extension of patents under vari- concerns. I will not oppose this legislaSKC. 101. Section 505 of the Federal Food,
ous and sundry circumstances.
tion. I am not at all certain that the Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 UJS.C. 355) is
I have seen a proliferation of legisla- Senate, when it passes it this evening, amended
by redesignating subsection (j) as
tion in this session of Congress calling will be doing the right thing, but I will subsection (k) and inserting after subsection
for the extension of patents. Some not stand in the way of the passage.
U) the following:
brilliant lawyer or lobbyist came to
There are some fine groups, generic
"(j)U) Any person may file with the Secthe conclusion that if we went to the groups, retired senior citizens .groups, retary an abbreviated application for the
Congress we could get patents ex- Congress Watch, other groups of that approval of a new drug.
"(2XA> An abbreviated application for a
tended beyond their usual 17-year kind, consumer groups, who have inditerm. So we have seen bills having t o cated their support. I hope they are new drug shall contain—
"(i) information to show that the condido with pharmaceuticals and chemi- right. I hope they are not making a
tions of use prescribed, recommended, or
cals, and agriculture chemicals, specif- mistake. I hope that they have not suggested
in the labeling proposed for the
ic drugs, various and sundry drugs, given away too much of the ball game new drug have
been previously approved for
some described rather generally, and to the big drug manufacturers of this a drug listed under paragraph (6) (hereinin each instance there was a strong country, and only time will tell wheth- after in this subsection referred to as a
case made, "Well, the FDA delayed it er or not I am right
'listed drug');
"(iiXI) if the listed drug referred to in
' or whatever and there should be an
On one other subject, there are
extension."
many people asking what this bill is clause (!) has only one active ingredient, inThis bill is not specific in that re- all about; what it means; how do you formation to show that the active ingrediof the new drug is the same as that of
spect. It provides for a more general interpret it. Let me say. for one, that I ent
the listed drug,
extension of patents. In that respect, I interpret it in only one manner.
'•(II) if the listed drug referred to in
have grave reservations about it.
Nobody can change the language of clause (i) has more than one active ingrediThen there are provisions of this bill the legislation. It speaks for itself. So ent, information to show that the active inthat provide for specific extensions. notwithstanding anybody who may gredients of the new drug are the same as
And each day of extension, it should feel that they can interpret the lan- those of the listed drug, or
be pointed out. costs the American jruage of this legislation in one way or "(III) if the listed drug referred to in
consumers literally hundreds of thou- another, I want the courts to under- clause (i) has more than one active ingredisands, and in some instances millions, stand that the legislation speaks for ent and if one of the active ingredients of
new drug is different and the applicaof dollars. When I attempted to deter- itself and the -interpretation which the
tion is filed pursuant to the approval of a
mine how much the extension rights anyone may make on the floor does petition filed under subparagraph (C). inforfor the patent extensions provided in not really add anything to that inter- mation to show that the other active ingrethis bill were worth, I was unable to pretation.
dients of the new drug are the same as the
get a figure. Nobody can say whether
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I cannot active ingredients of the listed drug, information to show that the different active init was $1 billion, $2 billion,
$5 billion, overstate
of this
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"(B) injunctive relief may be granted
product development protocol was initially
submitted under section 515(f)(5) and against an infringer to prevent the commerending on the date the protocol was de- cial manufacture, use, or sale of an apclared completed under section 515(f)(6).
proved drug, and
"(4) A period determined under any of the
"(C) damages or other monetary relief
preceding paragraphs is subject to the fol- may be awarded against an infringer only if
lowing limitations:
ther has been commerical manufacture, use,
4,
(A) If the patent involved was issued or sale of an approved drug.
after the date of the enactment of this sec- The remedies prescribed by subparagraphs
tion, the period of extension determined on (A). (B). and (C) are the only remedies
the basis of the regulatory review period de- which may be granted by a.court for an act
termined under any such paragraph may of infringement described in paragraph (2),
not exceed five years.
except that a court may award attorney fees
"(B) If the patent involved was issued under section 285.".
before the date of the enactment of this secSEC. 203. Section 282 of title 35, United
tion and—
"(i) no request for an exemption described States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following: "Invalidity of the extenin paragraph (1KB) was submitted.
"(ii) no major health or environmental ef- sion of a patent term or any portion thereof
fects test described in paragraph (2) was ini- under section 156 of this title because of the
tiated and no petition for a regulation or ap- material failure—
"(1) by the applicant for the extension, or
plication for registration described in such
"(2) by the Commissioner,
paragraph wa* submitted, or
* <u*> id* tusae^X tAvesugaiu/ft described in to comply with the requirements of such
paragraph <'*> was begun or product devel- section shall be a defense in any action inopment protocol described in such para- volving the infringement of a patent during
graph was submitted.
the period of the extension of its term and
before such date for the approved product shall be pleaded. A due diligence determinathe period of extension determined on the tion under section 156(d)(2) is not subject to
basis of the regulatory review period deter- review in such an action.*'.
mined under any such paragraph may not
TITLE III-SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
exceed five years.
SEC.
301. If any provision of this Act is de"(C) If the patent involved was issued
before the date of the enactment of this sec- clared unconstitutional or the applicability
tion and if an action described in subpara- thereof to any person or circumstances is
graph (b) was taken before the date of the held invalid, the constitutionality of the reenactment of this section with respect to mainder of this Act and the applicability
the approved product and the commercial thereof to other persons and circumstances
marketing or use of the product has not shall not be affected thereby.
been approved before such date, the period
TITLE IV-MISCELLANEOUS PATENT
of extension determined on the basis of the
EXTENSIONS
regulatory review period determined under
SEC. 401. (a) Title 35 of the United States
such paragraph may not exceed two years.
Code is amended by adding immediately fol"(h) The Commissioner may establish lowing section 155 the following new secsuch fees as the Commissioner determines tion:
appropriate to cover the costs to the Office
of receiving and acting upon applications "8155A. Patent extension.
"(a) Notwithstanding section 154 of this
under this section.".
(b) The analysis for chapter 14 of title 35 title, the term of any patent which encomof the United States Code is amended by passes within its scope a composition of
matter which is a new drug product, if such
adding at the end thereof the following:
new drug product is subject to the labeling
"156. Extension of patent term/'.
SEX:. 202. Section 271 of title 35, United requirements for oral hypoglycemic drugs
States Code is amended by adding at the of the sulfonylurea class as promulgated by
the Food and Drug Administration in its
end the following:
"(e)(1) It shall not be an act of infringe- final rule of March 22. 1984 (FR Doc. 84ment to make, use, or sell a patented inven- 9640) and was approved by the Food and
tion (other than a new animal drug or vet- Drug Administration for marketing after
erinary biological product (as those terms promulgation of such final rule and prior to
are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and the date of enactment of this law, shall be
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) extended until April 21.1992.
"(b) The patentee or licensee or authorsolely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information ized representative of any patent described
in
such subsection (a) shall, within ninety
under a Federal law which regulates the
days after the date of enactment of such
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.
"(2) It shall be an act of infringement to subsection, notify the Commissipner of Patsubmit an application under section 505(j) ents and Trademarks of the number of any
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic patent so extended. On receipt of such
Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use notice, the Commissioner shall confirm such
of which is claimed in a patent, if the pur- extension by placing a notice thereof in the
pose of such submission is to obtain approv- official file of such patent and publishing an
al under such Act to engage in the commeri- appropriate notice of such extension in the
cal manufacture, use, or sale of a drug Official Gazette of the Patent and Tradeclaimed in a patent or the use of which is mark Office.".
claimed in a patent before the expiration of
(b) The table of sections for chapter 14 of
such patent.
title 35. United States Oode is amended by
"(3) In any action for patent infringement adding after the item relating to section 155
brought under this section, no injunctive or the following new item:
other relief may be granted which would"155A. Patent extension.".
prohibit the making, using, or selling of a
SEC. 402. Section 25(a) of the bill, as redespatented invention under the paragraph (1).
is amended by striking out "9 and
"(4) For an act of infringement described ignated,
10" and inserting in lieu thereof "9. 10, and
in paragraph (2>—
"(A) the court shall order the effective 24".
Mr. METZENBAUM addressed t h e
date of any approval of the drug involved in
the infringement to be a date which is not Chair.
earlier than the date of the expiration of
T h e P R E S I D I N G OFFICER. T h e
the patent which has been infringed,
Senator from Ohio is recognized.
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Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President.
I would like the RECORD to reflect the
fact that the Senator from Ohio voted
in the negative.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
bill was passed.
Mr. HATCH. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. DECONCINI. I would like to
engage in a colloquy with my friend,
Senator HATCH. I understand that S.
2926. as amended, statutorily codifies
FDA's current regulation and practice
with reference to standards for the release of trade secret, confidential commercial and financial information contained in NDA files, is that correct?
Mr. HATCH. Tea, the bill carries
over from the existing regulation the
provision that information is releasable—if other requirements are met—
unless extraordinary circumstances
are shown. Under current practice,
which will be the practice under this
bill, extraordinary circumstances are
present for example when the information is trade secret or confidential
commercial or financial information.
As one specific example, release would
not be permitted if the information
has never been previously released and
would support the application of a
competitor for approval before a foreign regulatory agency. As another example, safety and efficacy data contained in an application that was not
approved will not be released if the
data retains possible commercial, competitive value. In short, the provision
retains the applicability of the (b)(4)
exemption under the Freedom of Information Act.
Mr. DECONCINI. That is my understanding also.
Mr. BAKER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader is recognized.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I wish
to express my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Utah for
work well done. The work was long,
hard, and done diligently. There were
moments even as recently as 30 minutes ago when I thought it would be
impossible for him to get this bill
cleared for passage before we go out.
But he did.
I think that is remarkable. I extend
to the Senator my heartiest congratulations for doing so.
Mr. President, I thank the minority
leader for his willingness to consider
this matter, and the Senator from
Ohio for agreeing to go forward without objection.
There is one other point, Mr. President, that I would like to make. The
distinguished Senator from South
Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], is not here.
He is necessarily absent from the floor
at this point. He had originally
planned to offer a textile amendment
to this bill. He feels very keenly about
that. Many Members know of the
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great interest he has in that, and the
dedication that he has for the purposes to be served. But the Senator
from South Carolina in his characteristically generous way agreed not to
offer that amendment in order to facilitate the passage of this bill.
I wish to acknowledge that at the
conclusion of this &ECORD.
Mr. President, as well I am told that
in addition to myself, the distinguished Senator from Ohio IMr. METZENBAUM], had indicated to the President pro tempore that in his absence
we would offer that amendment. We
were released from the obligation. I
thank the Senator for doing so.
Senator GORTON, and others, had indicated their objection. They all were
withdrawn. I thank all Members for
making it possible.for us to proceed in
this manner at this time.
Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Utah is recognized.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President. I would
express my gratitude to the distinguished majority and minority leaders
of this great body, and for the cooperation they have given to me and to
other Members to try to get this bill
passed this evening. It is historic. It is
important.
I want to personally express my personal gratitude to both of them, and
to everybody else who has worked to
make this possible.

this matter. But we have not been able
to clear such a time agreement with
only the amendment by Mr. DOLE to
be offered. There are Senators on this
side of the aisle, I believe, who have
amendments on the enterprise zone
itself, and we have been attempting to
clear the bill. We are trying to determine the nature of other possible
amendments as well. But on behalf of
the other Senators on this side of the
aisle, I regrettably would have to
object at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I now
have a list of items that I would like to
take up. May I say to the minority
leader that it is a considerable list,
running to more than one page. Perhaps I could run through them, and
he might be in a position then to tell
me whether he could clear all or any
part of these matters that would expedite that consideration.
I would propose, Mr. President, to
indefinitely postpone Calendar Order
1117; pass Calendar No. 1118; indefinitely postponed Calendar No. 1119;
Pass Calendar Nos. 1120, 1121, and
1122; to indefinitely postpone Calendar No. 1123. to pass Calendar Nos.
1124. 1125. 1126/1127, and 1128; to indefinitely postpone Calendar No. 1129;
to pass Calendar Nos. 1130, 1133, 1134,
1135, 1136. 1137, 1138. 1139, 1140, 1141,
1143. 1146.1147, and 1148; and, finally,
to pass Calendar No. 1150.
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
FEDERAL BOAT SAFETY ACT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
AMENDMENT
minority leader is recognized.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have no
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I have
discussed this with the minority objection to proceeding with the calleader. He is aware of the request I am endar orders mentioned by the distinguished majority leader.
about to make.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now turn to the NATIONAL SPINA BIFIDA MONTH
consideration of Calendar No. 571,
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 275)
H.R. 2163. the Boat Safety Act. and
that it be considered under the follow- to designate the month of October
1984,
as "National Spina Bifida
ing time agreement:
was considered, ordered to be
That 30 minutes of total debate, to Month",
for third reading, read the
be equally divided between the chair- engrossed
man of the Finance committee and the third time, and passed.
The preamble was agreed to.
ranking minority member, or their
The joint resolution, and the preamdesignees; that the committee reported amendment in the nature of a sub- ble, are as follows:
S J. RES. 275
stitute be withdrawn; and that only
Whereas spina bifida is a birth defect in
one amendment be in order, to be offered by the Senator from Kansas the spinal column which occurs in one of
one thousand births in the United
[Mr. DOLE] and the Senator from New every
States;
Jersey [Mr. BRADLEY], which is the
Whereas spina bifida is the most common
text of the Enterprise zone amend- crippler of newborns, resulting when one or
ment which was agreed to in H.R. more bones in the back (vertebrae) fail to
close completely during prenatal develop4170;
And that the agreement be in the ment;
Whereas while the cause of spina bifida is
usual form.
not known, it appears to be the result of
Mr. President, I further ask unani- multiple
environmental and genetic factors;
mous consent that following final pasWhereas although most of the March of
sage of H.R. 2163, it be in order for the Dimes and Easter Seal poster children have
chairman of the Finance committee or spina bifida, many people have not heard of
his designee to amend the title of H.R. the defect;
Whereas only a few cities in the United
163 appropriately.
States have proper care centers and specialMr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
professionals that can provide the most
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ized
effective, aggressive treatment for children
minority leader is recognized.
and adults with sfcina bifida;
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am
Whereas an increase in the national
sorry to have to object in regard to awareness of the problem of spina bifida
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may stimulate the interest and concern of
the American people, which may lead, in
turn, to increased research and eventually
to the discovery of a cure for spina bifida.
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled. That the month of
October 1984 is designated "National Spina
Bifida Month", and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation
calling upon the people of the United States
to observe that month with appropriate
ceremonies and activities.
MYASTHENIA GRAVIS
AWARENESS WEEK
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 295)
to provide for the designation of the
week of October 14, through October
20, 1984, as "Myasthenia Gravis
Awareness Week", was considered, ordered to be engrossed for third reading, read the third time, and passed.
The preamble was agreed to.
The joint resolution, and the preamble, areas follows:
- SJ. RES. 295
Whereas the incidence and prevalence of
myasthenia gravis presents a significant
health problem in the United States;
Whereas myasthenia gravis is a severe
neuromuscular disorder, characterized by
weakness of the voluntary muscles of the
body;
Whereas an estimated one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand diagnosed.
and over one hundred thousand undiagnosed, Americans of both sexes, and all
races and ages, are afflicted with the disease;
Whereas the Nation faces a continuing
need to support innovative research into the
causes, treatment, and cure of myasthenia
gravis; and
Whereas it is appropriate to focus the Nation's attention upon the problem of myasthenia gravis: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That the week of
October 14, through October 20, 1984. is
designated as "Myasthenia Gravis Awareness Week" and the President of the United
States is authorized and requested to issue a
proclamation calling upon all Government
agencies and the people of the United
States to observe the week with appropriate
programs, ceremonies and activities.
NATIONAL DIABETES MONTH
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 299)
to designate November 1984, as "National Diabetes Month/' was considered, ordered to be engrossed for third
reading, read the third time, and
passed.
The preamble was agreed to.
The joint resolution, and the preamble, are as follows:
S J. Res. 299
Whereas diabetes kills more than all other
diseases except cancer and cardiovascular
diseases;
Whereas eleven million Americans suffer
from.diabetes and five million seven hundred thousand of such Americans are not
aware of their illness;
Whereas $10,100,000,000 annually are
used for health care costs, disability pay-
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Mr. ENGMAN. I don't have any vote. You have one, so you are
one up on me. [General laughter.]
Senator HAWKINS. DO you consider the provision permitting the
generic manufacturers to begin testing prior to the expiration of
the patent a critical amendment which goes to the heart of this
compromise?
Mr. ENGMAN. That was an issue that was initially put to us in
January of this year, and at that time the board made a decision
that that was one of the tradeoffs that we were prepared to give up
to achieve other purposes of this legislation.
Senator HAWKINS. Thank you very much for your participation
on this panel.
I will now call the third panel. Mr. Verne Willaman, a member
of Johnson & Johnson's executive committee, accompanied by Mr.
Stafford and Mr. Lerner.
The third panel consists of three witnesses for whom we have the
highest regard. Mr. Verne Willaman, a member of the executive
committee and Johnson & Johnson, heads all of Johnson & Johnson's pharmaceutical divisions. He will be testifying on behalf of 10
pharmaceutical companies which have identified provisions of the
bill which they feel pose problems and require correction.
He will be accompanied by Mr. John Stafford, president of American Home Products, and Mr. Irwin Lerner, president and CEO of
Hoffman-LaRoche.
Mr. Willaman, welcome, and please begin.
STATEMENT OF VERNE WILLAMAN, MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN R.
STAFFORD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS, AND
IRWIN LERNER, PRESIDENT/CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
HOFFMAN-LAROCHE, INC.
Mr. WILLAMAN. Thank you, Senator Hawkins.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee
to discuss S. 2748. You have already introduced the other people at
the table. Let me also just begin by naming the other companies in
our group: Bristol-Myers, Carter-Wallace, Merck, Norwich Eaton
Pharmaceuticals—a Procter & Gamble company—Schering-Plough
Corp., Squibb Corp., and Stuart Pharmaceuticals, a division of ICI
Americas.
These companies have much in common. We are all committed
to pharmaceutical research and development. We represent about
half of the private pharmaceutical research and development investment in this country, an investment which over the years has
propelled our country into the world technological leadership position.
In today's costly health care environment, prescription drugs, to
quote a recent study, are the "least expensive form of medical therapy and greatly reduce health care costs" by cutting back the need
for surgery and hospitalization. The medicines we discover and develop in our laboratories are absolutely essential to continued medical progress in this century and beyond. In human terms, the
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Our companies have been responsible for some of the most significant pharmaceutical breakthroughs of the last several decades. We
recognize that each time we begin to develop a new drug we are
undertaking a multimillion-dollar investment A large amount of
our research never culminates in a marketed product because
there are many uncertainties associated with medical research. On
average, the cost of developing a new medicine in this country is
now in the $70 to $85 million range, taking an average of 7 to 10
years and often longer to complete all the rigorous scientific protocols and secure FDA approval. Incentives provided by the patent
system are the cornerstone of pharmaceutical research and development.
For many years, the patent system has not worked for our industry as it was intended. By the time new drugs are cleared by FDA,
they have far less than 17 years of patent life. For example, FDA
reported that of 205 drug products approved between 1962 and
1978, 51, or a quarter, had little or no patent life at the time of
approval. We have long believed that this is a situation that merits
remedy by the Congress, and indeed, efforts in this direction have
b*en made in past years.
At the same time, Senator Hatch recently identified the need to
resolve the question of how FDA approves generic versions of post1962 drugs. A workable system must be established for approving
these generics and for assuring their safety, effectiveness, and quality. But the legislation must not have the unintended effect of discouraging original research.
We fully support the objectives of the legislation that has been
introduced. And furthermore, we would like to commend the committee for holding hearings on this important piece of legislation.
The leadership on this issue, and advocacy of drug export legislation is an example of the kind of leadership necessary in the health
care field. Expanding drug exports will encourage American technology and job opportunities. Unfortunately, the ANDA/patent
term proposal in its current form will have the opposite effect.
Senator Hawkins, while we support the objectives of S. 2748, we
are convinced that amendments are necessary. The amendments
we are proposing are designed to achieve a fair balance between
streamlining the generic drug approval process, while, at the same
time, assuring patent protection for pioneer medicines. Efforts to
stimulate research leading to important new therapies merit at
least as much consideration as accelerating the approval process
for generic copies.
This bill raises many difficult patent issues. Yesterday, at a hearing before a House Judiciary Subcommittee, Patent Commissioner
Gerald Mossinghoff identified some of these issues. He said they
pose such a major obstacle that despite his fervent support for
patent term restoration for pharmaceuticals, he and the Patent
Office oppose enactment of this legislation in its present form. Also
at yesterday's hearing, Prof. Norman Dorsen, a recognized expert
in constitutional law, noted that at least one central provision of
this legislation raises serious constitutional questions. In light of
this testimony, it is our viow that hearings be held before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
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Additionally, Commissioner Novitch testified this morning that
FDA believes that additional changes need to be made to this bill.
Senator Hawkins, we do have a common constituent—the American consumer. Consumers should not only have access to safe and
effective generic drugs. They also should have the lifesaving benefits of the innovative therapies discovered in our laboratories.
These objectives can be achieved by addressing the concerns of the
Patent Office and the FDA, which are the same concerns that we
have identified.
We are concerned that this legislation, as drafted, would have
the effect of reorienting FDA priorities toward approval of generic
drugs and answering freedom of information inquiries rather than
focusing, as it should, we believe, on important new therapies for
American patients.
Our written testimony describes the specific amendments we are
seeking. I would like to summarize them for you. In keeping with
the committee's jurisdiction, I will focus on health and regulatory
problems raised by the legislation.
Our first public health concern is that the bill, in its current
form, could restrict FDA's ability to assure that all drugs are
shown, before marketing, to be safe and effective. For most generic
copies, FDA would be precluded from requesting information
beyond the limited information specifically set forth in the bill. For
these drugs, FDA has no authority to reject an application on the
grounds that the copied drug ha* not been shown to be safe or effective.
We strongly feel that FDA should have clear authority to assure
the safety and effectiveness of every drug on the market. We,
therefore, favor an amendment that would make this FDA authority explicit.
Another major concern relates to the public disclosure of safety
and effectiveness data contained in the new drug applications for
pioneer drugs. Such data represents a huge research investment by
the originating firm. This legislation, if enacted in its present form,
would permit public disclosure of all safety and effectiveness data,
and information about a drug as soon as it becomes eligible for an
ANDA.
These proprietary data retain commercial value for the pioneering drug firm in the worldwide marketplace. They are of significant value to competitors abroad, and their release would erode the
U.S. technological leadership. The data are particularly valuable in
countries that do not provide adequate patent protection. We believe that this provision, unless amended, would have serious adverse effcjcte on this Nation's pharmaceutical leaderRhip.
Earlier this year, Senator Hatch made efforts to amend the Freedom of Information Act, and drove home the usefulness of U.S.-p-oduced technical data. It is these same technical data that would be
made available to foreign competitors under S. 2748. And, as I have
already noted, the disclosure provision would add to FDA's already
enormous burden under the Freedom of Information Act. It is difficult to see how the public benefits by having FDA resources diverted to giving foreign competitors valuable research information at
the expense of approving drug applications.
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Our next concern relates to the transition provisions in S. 2748.
As drafted, it permits marketing exclusivity for 10 years only for
new active ingredients first approved between January 1, 1982, and
the date the bill is enacted. We believe this transition provision is
too limited in scope. It does not apply to new uses for the drug, new
dosage forms or innovative formulations, all of which require full
new drug applications. Those innovations frequently are as important and contribute as much to public health as the active ingredients covered under the provision. Yet companies that invested in
these important areas would be penalized by their exclusion from
the transition provisions.
A second part of this concern relates to the 4-year period of marketing exclusivity for unpatentable active ingredients approved
after the bill becomes effective. As FDA has made clear in previous
testimony, this period is needed to evaluate patient experience
with a new therapy in the first few years after its introduction.
This experience often provides new insights into the drug's safety
profile and appropriate use. As with the other transition period,
this provision should be broadened to include all new drug approvals for products that are not patentable.
Senator Hawkins, we understand that concern also has been expressed about two other health-related issues. One is the many new
burdens that this bill imposes on FDA which, among other things,
would also involve the agency in patent matters for the first time.
And Commissioner Novitch talked about that, this morning. The
second concern relates to the reversal of FDA's longstanding policy
concerning combination drugs. We share these concerns with Dr.
Novitch and urge that your committee consider them.
To conclude, Senator Hawkins, our 10 companies support the leg^ , ialative objectives of S. 2748. But the problems we have raised here
today and in our more detailed written comments must be resolved
to afford maximum public health protection, as well as to continue
research incentives for the pharmaceutical industry.
U.S. pharmaceutical companies always have been preeminent in
developing and disseminating lifesaving and life-extending pharmaceutical products. But recent statistics indicate this leadership is
declining. The U.S. share of world pharmaceutical research and development expenditures has fallen from more than 30 percent
before I960, to less than 15 percent today. The number of new
drugs entering clinical trials and owned by U.S. firms has steadily
dropped in the past 20 years.
Further, the percentage of world pharmaceutical production occurring in the United States has fallen from 50 percent in 1962 to
30 percent in 1968, to 27 percent in 1978. From 1955 to 1962, an
average of 46 new drugs were introduced each year in the United
States. Today, the average is 17.
I recite these figures to demonstrate that the pace of America's
drug innovation is slowing. Our leadership is in jeopardy^ Our
amendments could help reverse this trend.
Congress not only must provide a better generic approval system,
it also must provide meaningful incentives for pioneering pharmaceutical research in this country. We urge you to incorporate our
changes into this complex legislation so that a bill can emerge that
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truly accomplishes all of its objectives, and that will benefit our
mutual constituent, the American consumer.
We stand ready to work with you, the committee, your staff and
others in the Senate to enact such legislation.
Thank you, Senator Hawkins. We would be pleased to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Willaman follows:]
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In this country, bethanidine and dcbrisoquine have not been approved for
marketing. Although propranolol is available, it has not been approved for the
treatment of hy|H»rtension. Applications for approval of these drug* for hypertension were submitted to our Food and Drug Administration (FDA) many
vears ago. Dcbrisoquine was disapproved. Bethanidine and propranolol for
hypertension have not been acted on as yet. Reasons given for delay have included, primarily, lack of sufficient evidence of therapeutic benefit. It is possible,
however, that if Kuropean trials were admitted as evidence propranolol could
be approved for such treatment. Until r.ow, foreign trails could not be used to
support a new drug application.
The withholding of approval of useful new drugs in the cardiovascular field
has been glaringly appan nt for at least ten years. Such negativity does not
seem,to exist in all sections of the FDA. Especially, it is not seen at the administrative level. The fault seems to lie in the individual reviewing officer who is either
unable or unwilling to arrive at a fair judgment of the benefit-risk ratio of a new
drug. This reluctance results in endless delay and procrastination.
Of course, the public must be protected against toxicity, so far as this is possible.
We also must be certain that the effectiveness of a new drug has i>een adequately
•demonstrated. Once this information has been obtained, however, a decision
to approve or disapprove the new drug should be carried out as expeditiously
as possible. If the FDA reviewing officers are unable to do this then they should be
circumvented by another mechanism. One suggestion is to utilize review committees of outside consultants. The latter can be selected in such a way as to
obviate criticism as to possible conflict of interest. Such review committees could
begin by considering cardiovascular drugs that have been under consideration
without decision for three vears or longer. At a time when the drug treatment of
hypertension has assumed great importance, our colleagues from Britain are
telling us that we are falling behind. Patients are being deprived of such apparently
useful drugs as debrisoquine and bethanidine, and propranolol has not yet received
official approval as an antihypertensive agent. If the British physicians have
access to these drugs, then American physicians should have them also.
STATEMENT BY J. RICHARD CROUT, M.D., DIRECTOR, BuREAr OF DRUGS, FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OP
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your
Subcommittee to discuss the "drug lag'* from the viewpoint of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).
Let me begin by stating that there is no question that a "drug lag" exists in
the United States in the sense that a significant number of drugs marketed in
foreign countries are not available here. In testimony presented to thi* Subcommittee on August 16, 1974. Commissioner Schmidt indicated that 307 now chemical entities were marketed in the United States between 1064) and 1073. In the
same period 590 additional drugs, not available in the United State*, were marketed in either England.. France, Germany, Italy, or Japan. Thu* of all the drugs
introduced somewhere in the world during that period, only alx»ut one third
appeared in the United States. I would like to submit a copy of our August 16,
1974. testimony for the record.
I might add that the United States is not unique in this regard. Xo country
in this survey (which i* ha*ed on data collected by Paul de linen, Inr.> had more
than 48 |iercent of the drugs i»-#t available in the United State* and Kngland has
only 32 percent available. (K the*e .100 drugs marketed overseas, only 106 are of
sufficient interest to inanuf icturers for them to have submitted a:» IND in the
United State*, and only 124 of these IXD's are currently active. The important
is*ue i* therefore not the numl>er of new drugs marketed in thi* country hut
whether any are of thera|»eutie importance, given the many valuable drugs
•already available in the t'nited State*.
In the testimony of August 10, 1074. we presented a listing of every new
chemical entity approved in the k United States from 1950 through 1073. We
furthermore classified each of th' *c drugs as to whether it was an important
therat>cutic gain (e.g., new treatment for a disease not adequately tn-atcd previously), a modest therapeutic gain <<*.g., somewhat greater effect iveti:*** or lesser
*ide effects in relation to available therapy at the time) or no therui>eutic gain
over other dru^s available at the time of introduction. An important conclusion
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from this analysis is that drugs representing modest or important therapeutic
gains have bi»eii introduced into the United States at a relatively constant rate
since the mid-1950V. There has been a marked decline in the rate'of introduction
of new chemical entities in general ever since the peak year of 1959, but this decline
has been limited, for all practical purposes, to those agents offering little or no
therapeutic advantage over already marketed product*.
In the August 16 testimony we also indicated that we had gone over every
drug li*ted bv Mr. Paul de Haen or Dr. William Wardell as possibly important
and marketed overseas, and we promise a status report on all such drugs for which
an IND had ever l>een submitted in the United States. Ihis listing is now available. Our conclusion from study of this list is that there are not therapeutic
breakthroughs currently marketed overseas for which an acceptable alternative
therapy docs not exist* in the United States. There are, however, a number of
drugs on the list which represent modest therapeutic gains in the sense that they
may have somewhat greater effectiveness, fewer side effects, or convenience
gains over available alternative therapies in this country.
I would like then to place the "drug lag" in persjiective, as we see it. We do not
dispute in any way the fact that a large numl>er of pharmaceuticals marketed
in countries outside of the United States are not available here. Indeed, we point
to that fact as evidence that the high standards for safety and effectiveness
mandated by the Congress and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are
being carried out vigorously and honorably. On the other hand, there are selected
drugs, which api>car to offer modest advantages over currently available therapies,
Inking marketed in many foreign countries earlier than occurs in the United States.
In some case.*, but fortunately a relatively few, drugs still marketed overseas
have been withdrawn from study in the united States for reasons of safety,
usually animal toxicity. These examples were cited by Dr. Henry E. Simmons,
former Director of the Bureau of Drugs, in his testimony before the Subcommittee
on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business on February 5, 1973.
In the vast majority of instances, however, the delay of introduction in the United
Stares is related to the time required to conduct controlled clinical trials in support of safety and effectiveness and to conduct the extensive Phase III testing
we deem necessary to permit the drug to be released, with full and proper labeling,
for general use.
There is, therefore, a societal cost for strong effectiveness and labeling requirements in that drugs are introduced more slowly into this country than certain
other countries. It is important that we maintain balance and perspective on this
problem so that the overall net effect is beneficial to the health of the American
public. Wc strongly believe that this is the case now. The "drug lag" is, therefore,
:i real phenomenon and worth continuing attention: but when viewed in perspective, it must be appreciated that it does not involve any drugs which are important
therapeutic gains and is an expected consequence of high regulatory standards.
It is relatively easy to understand why the "drug lag" exists. Most new drugs
today are developed by large multi-national pharmaceutical firms which can pick
and choose the nation* in which they wish to do clinical research. The countries
of the world vary greatly in their regulatory requirements, and very few in fact
have anything comparable to our own iftD process which regulate? clinical
researchon new drugs. Drug firms can thus engage in early testing of new drugs
far more easily in Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland, for example, than
they can in the United Kingdom, Sweden/ Canada, or the United States.
Similarly, they can test marketing opportunities in a variety of countries before
making the decision to go through the regulatory process in the United States.
In the case of drugs which appear very promising from the start, an IND is
usually submitted in the United States* before the drug is marketed elsewhere,
and, indeed, there are a number of important drugs currently under investigation
in the U.S. which may be marketed here ahead of, or simultaneously with, their
appearance in other countries. These are the drugs which, by and large, are in
thr class of important gains.
At this time, I would like to make several points in regard to the "drug lag"
issues as it relates to public policy:
1. It is important to recognize*that regulatory requirements are an important
influence on the availability of new drugs in this country. This Is an inevitable
result of th<* exacting standards s-t by the law for the effectiveness nnd safety of
new drugs. In a complex technological society such as ours, it is essential that we
exercise public control over the new drugs proposed a<* therapeutic agents for the
treatment of disease. We believe there is basic societal agreement on this point.
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While some may call for repeal of the Kef auvcr-H arris Amendments of 1902,
such calls are in fact not widespread nor very powerful. We do not perceive these
Amendments as being fundamentally threatened and hope that the perception of
the Congress is likewise.
2. We must also recognize that our goal in the United States is a therapeutic
armamentarium which is composed in totality of drugs which are safe and
effective. We must have a single standard for all drugs, including those marketed
in the years before the effectiveness requirement was adopted. We believe the
United States Is well ahead of all other countries in the world in meeting this overall
gnal. The Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as passed by the Congress and
administered by the Food and Drug Administration, has been a pioneering
venture in drug regulation for the world. The law has required, quite properly,
the removal of ineffective drugs as will as the approval of those new drugs which
are safe and effective. The United States is the leading nation of the world, not
the lagging nation, in achieving a comprehensive approach to a// drugs and a
single high standard for every drug on the market.
3. We must recognize that the laws of this country presume that every new
drug is a health gain in the sense that its benefits must exceed its risks. If a drug
meets appropriate standards it should be approved, and if it fails to meet these
standards it should be disapproved. For some time, the Agency hns been under
criticism by the medical profession and the drug indnstrv for its alleged failure
to approve drugs which are available in other countries. To the extent that this
failure* of timely approval is due to administrative delays in the FDA, the Agency
hns reappraised its way of doing things. We believe we have done this honorably
in the past several years with resulting important gains in internal procedures
and the quality of decisions. But, to the extent that the "drug lag" results from
the failure of the industry to provide data of appropriate quality, or the failure
of investigators to conduct adequate well-controlled trials, then then* is little th<*
FDA can do to correct the situation. The quality of the data in support of safety
and effectiveness is now, and always has been, the central issue in determining
whether a drug meets appropriate standards.
4. We must also recognize that the deep societal question to which the "drug
lag*' issue relates is the benetit-risk question. Of basic concern is the degree of
risk our society is willing to take in ordvr to have an ever increasing supply of
new drug therapies. We point out that the FDA role in this matter is primarily a
judicial one. We evaluate carefully the data presented to us, li>ten to physicians,
scientists and consumers, and then make decisions. Those decisions must be made
in accordance with legal standards laid down by the Congress. Those who wi*h to
influence our decisionmaking must therefore follow the same ground rules we arc
required to follow if they wish to be persuasive. Those who want us to net solely on
the basis of testimonial evidence thus can never be satisfied with FDA decisions.
At the other extreme, those who would essentially exclude all new drugs except
important breakthroughs, cannot be satisfied either. While I respect this kind
of basic conservatism in medical practice and indeed taught that philosophy
during my years in university life, we mast recognize that the law as written by
Congress is not intended to constrain the supply of new drugs in this country to
the minimum essential drugs needed for a parsimonious style of medical practice.
It is intended to permit the marketing of all drugs which meet appropriate standards of safety ana effectiveness.
In regard to this is*ue of benefit-risk judgments, I would like to remind the
Subcommittee of a point made by Commissioner Schmidt in his testimony before
this Subcommittee on September 25, 1974. This testimony said, "By'fai the
greatest pressure that the Bureau of Drugs of the Food and Drug Administration
receives with respect to the new drug approval process is that brought to bear
through Congressional hearings. In all of our history, we are unable to find one
instance where a Congressional hearing investigated the failure of FDA to approve
a new drug. The occasion on which hearings have been held to criticize approval
of a new drug have l>ecn so frequent in the past ten years that we have not even
attempted to count them.
"At both the staff level and managerial level, the mi> age conveyed by this
situation could not be clearer. Whenever a difficult or controversial"issue*is resolved by approval, the Agency and th'» individuals involved- will l>e publicly
'investigated. Whenever it i* resolved by disapproval, no inquiry will be made.
The < ongressional pressure for negative action is therefore intense, and ever
increasing."
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Mr. Chairman, in considering th<% factors which influence l>cni»<it-ri^k decision*
in regard to new drugs 1 would seek your considered and sensitive appraisal of
this double standard in oversight function which has lieon applied to the Agency
ever since the passage of the Kef an ver-ll arris Amendments. It is essential tiuit
every regulatory agency, including the FDA, !*• held accountable for its decisions,
but such accountability mu>t be sought for «// decisions. Only in this way can
the Agency maintain over the long term the balance, strength, and per>peeti%e
required to administer the law in the even-handed manner as intended by Congress.
The health issues involved are too important for as to seek any uther course.
Appendixes follow.
Arpr.Nuix A
YKAttLY INTKODVCTION OF NKW DRUG rUODfCTS, W50-73

The data in these lists are derived from FDA files and from the publications
of Paul lie llaen. FDA l>elieves that the list represents the most accurate data
available to date, but there may be a small number of errors remaining, particularly in the 19f>0's. Like the lists of pjiul de llaen, these lists contian drug products
that are new salts or esters of previously marketed drugs(N). New dosage forms,
etc, are not generally included unless they involves a new salt or ester. In some
cases a drttg available for many years was tirst approved in the 19">0*s, in which
case it is listed (e.g. acetaminophen, 1950).
In evaluating the degree of therapeutic gain arising from the availability of a
therapuetic gain deemed to have been offered by the drug at the time of its
introduction, considering available therapeutic alternatives at the time, without
reference to subsequent experience or current status. Thus, certain drugs no
longer marketed may be designated as representing important gains. Our
criteria were:
A. Important Therapeutic Gain.—Drug may provide effective therapy or
diagnosis (by virtue of greatly increased efficacy or safety) for a disease not*adequately treated or diagnosed by any marketed drug, or provide markedly
improved treatment of a dfsease through improved efficacy or safety (including
decreased abuse potential).
B. Modest Therapeutic Gain.—Drug has a modest, but real advantage over other
available marketed drugs; e.g., somewhat greater effectiveness, decreased adverse
reactions, less frequent dosing in situations where frequent dosage is a problem,
etc.
These evaluations are tentative, pending further study which is in progress.
Ratings given here are, for the most part, by Bureau of Drugs personnel, and
are being refined through consultation with authorities in various fields. We are
aware that many specific ratings will be controversial, but we believe that the
present ratings are useful beginnings, In any case, the ratings are available for
criticism and comment and it is possible for any analyst to develop his own lists
of important, modest, and no-gain drugs.
1950
Drug name:
Acetaminophen
Acetoxan
Alkavervir
Amphetamine P0 4 dibasic ( N ) . .
Bipncnamine HC1
Corticotropin
Cortisone acetate
Cyclamate sodium
Dicyclomine HC1
Dimethyl tubocurarine CI (N)
Disodium tetrathiodiglycolatc
Kthyl biscoumacctale
Khellin
Levarartcrenol bitartrate..
Mercumatilin
Methafurylene Br (N)
Methafurylene fumarnte (N)
Met
hunt lieline Br
,.
47-005—75
10
Mcthdihuinc hydrochloride

Rating
;
A
B
A
A—
B
-
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The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New Drugs
Martin M. Daman and William M. WtrdaU

/
" The effective patent life for new chemical entity drugi has fallen $harply
I in recent years as a result of an increase in ths clinical testing period,
\ later starting of clinical testing after the patent application, and qulcher issue of patents, f

In a racant atatamant of eonoara about tha atata of
domaitlc industrial innovation, tha Praaidant
racommandad strengthening tha patant syetem (J).
That atatamant impUad that tha hiitorical role of
tent protaetion aa a major atimulua for innovation
d weakened. To datarmina tha extent to which tha
problem affaeta pharmaoeuUcala, thia papar as*
amlnaa tha atata of patant protaetion afforded naw
drugs,
Tha Patant Act of 1886 waa adoptad bacauaa of a
parcalvad naad to encourage innovation by
aliminating tha reluctance to diacloaa an invention.
At incantiva for disclosure, tha Patant Act grantad
tha invantor a 17-year exclusive right to hia invantion. Aa tha innovativa prooaaa became unoartain,
lengthy, and expenaive, patant protaetion acquired
avan graatar importance.
In tha research-based prescription pharmacautical Industry, patanta play an important rola.
Approximately one out of 10,000 compounds initially examined aurvivee tha intanee scrutiny and
demonstrate* tha potential to justify marketing.
Tha Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association
surveyed its member companies in 1962,1967, and
1970 asking for "an eetlmata of the number of
chemicals, compounds, mixtures, filtrates, or other
substances obtained, prepared, extracted or isolated
for a medical research purpose, and subjected to
biological tests or screens," Thia included material
obtained from outside tha company. Tha eetimatee
ware 144,669 for 1962,176.760 for 1967 and 126,060
for 1970. averaging 148,798 items ieeted per year.
Our studies showed that an average of 16.8 New
Chemical Entities (NCEs) ware introduced annually
from 1962 to 1978. Using these average*, tha ratio

C

Dr. E l a a u It M AOOOCMU b U M DoporUMat of Pfconoacowty
aad Toikolofjr. Uai rwtity of RacbtiUr School of ModkiM aad
DoatUtry. Dr. WardoU It aa AsoodaU Profotaor of Pkar*
•Mcekfy. Toxicology and of Modktoa. sad DtracUr of U M
Cantor for U M 8todjr of Dreg DOVOIOOBMSU tt U M UaJveratty of
RoeoMtor School of ModJdaa aad DoaUatry. H« It abo CaaJa*
muk of U M CommKtot oa Oevoraawnt Attain of U M A w r k a a
Sockty f » CMakal Paana«oology aod Tkorttpostles. .

of chemicals taated par year to NCEs introduced par
year is 9726:1.
Bringing that eingle drug to market haa bean
aatlmatad to coat 864 million in 1976 dollars (*).
Bacauaa of thia uncertainty and high coat, patant
protaetion is a neeeeaary incantiva for tha infuaion
of capital to atimulate research and development
Since drugs are technically easy to copy, tha patant
provides tha primary protaetion against imitation
and competition.
Another form of protaetion against competition
— one probably not Intended by Congreea ia afforded by tha regulatory system of tha Food and
Drug Administration. The expense involved in seeing a naw drug through tha demanding system of
regulatory review to demonstrate eafety and efficacy creates a substantial barrier to entry into tha
industry.
However, while certain aspects of tha regulatory
process may offer some protaetion against competition, other aspects reduce the duration of patant
protection that ia of commercial value to the original
patent holder. Most drug patanta are filed whan
biological activity ia first observed (&4). Since thia
occurs long before tha drug receives regulatory approval for marketing, tha "effective" patant life will
be reduced considerably from Its nominal period of
17 years. We will now examine the axtant of thia
reduction, and ita change with time.
Time Trend In Effective Patant Ufa (EPU

Effective Petent life (EPU ia defined ea the
period of patent protection remaining for a drug at
the time of U.S. NDA approval (I.e., the time from
NDA approval to expiration of the patent). Recant
studies 1&5,6) show that EPL has declined eubetantially over the peat 16 to 20 year* Thia trend Is
generally attributed to the concomitant Increase in
the time required for human investigation and NDA
approval (&6). To examine this hypothesis, wa need
to analyze the time trends in both EPL and tha
period from the start of clinical Investigation to U A
NDA approval
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Mtthod* — Tht analysis it based on til patented
Btw chtmictl tntltltt (NCEe) rtcaiving NDA approval from 1966 through 1979 (a). Tht information
Bttdtd to dtUnnint EPL indudsd dattt of tht itart
of clinical Utting in tht U.S., NDA approval and
ptttnt application and iatut (©).
Data wtrt available for nearly all variabltt from
1966 throuch 1979 id
8ourctt for tht ptttnt dttt indudtd tht ptttnt
consultant Louia Loaman, SmithKlint Corporation,
dirtct turvtyt of individual pharmactutical eonv
paniee, and varoJut reference touroat, including
Ckomtcal AbitneU and Official Oaiotu of tha U.S.
PaUnt OffUa, For mulU-tourct drugt (la., tht taint
drug marktttd undar dlfftrtnt brand namtt by dlfftrtnt eompanitt) only tht drag of tht original ptttnt bolder waa indudtd in the averages. Of tU 191
NCEa approved from 1966 through 1979,168 had
patents. The data from thoet 166 drugs were need
to calculate EPL.
.x-Of tht three typee of drug patents (new compound, medical use, and ehtmical process), a ptttnt
on tht new compound provides the moot reliable
protection. To calculate EPL, wt used tht earliest
compound patent listed for a drug. If no compound
patent existed, wt used the earliest patent,
-ttftrdltrfs of type.
DtU art grouped according to year of NDA approval. For each variable (e.g., time from start of
clinical testing to NDA approval), tht time difference was calculated for each drug, and those differences averaged for all drugs approved during
that year. The averages wtrt plotted and tht rtw
plots smoothed (Figures 1 and 8) according to tht
"moving median of three" technique of Tukey (7).
Drugi UtUd boforo 19S& Ungtk of eUnical (nvottigation pha§§ — Tht IND filing dates assigned
retrospectively to drugs in clinical trial before
August 1962 do not represent the start of clinical
testing in tht U.S. (d). .
Thus, tht true period of clinical investigation for
pre-1963 drugt began earlier than the date
represented by retrospective INDfilings.Of the 168
patented NCEa approved from 1966 through 1979,
43 had been assigned retrospective INDfilingdates.
We were able to obtain the date offirstVS. clinical
testing in man in tht US. for 21 of tht 43 retrospective filing dattt. From this information, we have
derived a standard value of 24 months to apply as a
correction to the remaining 22 drugs for which this
information was unobtainable («).
BfftcUvo Patont Ltf§ - Figure 1. displays tht
relationship between the patent and drug development processes, showing the times of NDA approval and the start of clinical testing in relation to
the time of patent issue. The data are plotted
according to year of NDA approval EPL, the time
from NDA approval to patent expiration, can be
read directly from the right-hand ordinate. As
shown in the Figure, EPL for pharmaceuticals was

Flgert VNDA opproval (ovwogod 0 ; smeotfee?
f
o*d9t*rtofcU*tc*lU$t(*g(*t»ngid CX'amootW —A
oomcud for wtroijwcft'i* INDflUngt,on piotud t* reistion to patont tone. Smoothing mo* don* by Tukty'i
"moving modtan of tam" tockniquo (7).
consJdsrabry lets than 17 years, tvtn at tht beginning of the 14-year study period. It declinedfrom18.6
years in 1966 to 9.6 years in 1979, a decrease of 4.1
years.
Tlmt from itart of U.S. clinical tnvosttgatton to
NDA approval — Figure 1 also shows tht pattern
(after smoothing (7)) of the period from the start of
clinical Utting to NDA approval during tht 14
years from 1966 to 1979. During the 12-year period
from 1968 to 1979, EPL dropped by 4.0 years, from
13.6 years to 9.6 years (/). The timefromthe start of
U.S. clinical testing to NDA approval increased by
1.4 years (It., from 6.9 to 8.3 years) from 1968 to
1979, acconnting for 60% of ths decrease in EPL {gi
Thus the increase in the period from the start of
clinical totting to NDA approval accounted for only
slightly more than half of the decline in EPL.
Therefore, we need to examine the components of
EPL in more detail to determine where the remainder of its decline occurred.
Effective Potent Ufe and tht Drug
Drug Development Procttt

From our data (presented later in this paper) wt
know that the sequence of events in the process of
drug development is generally as shown in Figure 2.
Hie sequence begins with thefilingof e potent application during the preclinical phase, and continues
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Flgtrt 2/ Bfftttivt Pottnt Lift (BPU U a function of tht
fifmtaf of tht pottnt oppUcotton, tht ptndtncy ptriod, ond
tht duration o/ fat cUnieoi ond rtgutotory period, at wtU
t i tAt 11-yoorptriod of pottnt protection. Tht ptndtncy
ptriod it tht timt from paUnt oppUeotion to pottnt is***.

with tht atari of clinical tatting, pttant issos, NDA
approval, and finally pattnt aspiration.
From thia pattarn and Figurt 2, wt att that EPL
(La., tht ptriod from NDA approval to pattnt txpiration) It a function of tht timing of tht ptttnt application, tht ptndtncy ptriod, and tht duration of
tht clinical and rtgulttory ptriodt, aa wall at tht
17-yaar ptriod of pattnt protection.
Thus, in addition to itt dtptndtnct on tht dura*
Uon of tht clinical and rtgulttory ptriodt, EPL
dtptndt on two othtr important factor*. It
dtcrtataa if clinical tatting it btgun latar in rtlation
to tht pttant application, and convartaly will in*
ertttt if tht pttant ptndtncy ptriod Ineraaaaa. Tht
final EPL dtptndt on tht algtbraic turn of tht
changtt in tht cornponanta,
Tht changtt that occurrtd la tht two additional
eomponantt of EPL art ahown in Figurt 9. For tht
yttrt 1968 and 1979, tht two yttrt t»*t rtprtttn
Utivt of tht gtnaral trtnd during tht study ptriod,
tht timt from ptttnt application to tht start of VJB.
clinical tatting incrtaatd 0.5 yttrt (accounting for
13% of tht dtcrttat in EPL). Tht timt from aarliatt
pattnt application to pattnt itsut Utcrttttd 1.1
yttrt (accounting for 27% of tht dtcrtttt in EPL)
ihl Coupltd with tht 2.4 ytar incrtatt in tht ptriod
from tht ttart of clinical tatting to NDA approval,
thttt changas account for tht antlrt 4.0 ytar
dtcrtttt in EPL from 1968-1979. (i)
DIteuttlon/Conclutlona
EPL was 18.6 yttrt at tht htginning of our study
ptriod, 1966. This is oonsidarably Itts than tht
17-year nominal ptriod of ptttnt prottction. At timt
progressed, EPL fell furthar. This trtnd it tlmilar to
that reported by othtr invtstigators 1,3,5,$. Tht
dtcrtttt ovtr timt hts gtnerally betn tttributtd entirely to an increoee in tht timt bttwatn tht beginning of clinical tatting and NDA approval (5,5),
although Statman tuggttta that thia may bt
rttpontiblt for only part of tht dtcrtttt (61.
Our tnalytls thows that in tht sptdfic tamplt of
NCEs analyzed, almott half of tht dtclint in EPL
wat cauttd by two tdditiontl ftctors: An incrtatt in
tht timt bttwatn pattnt filing tnd clinical tatting

Yt*a or it* tmow.
Ftf«rt HAvtrogtd ond tmoothtd volutt for NDA opprovoi, ttort ofcUnkot totting, ondpotont oppUeotion on
plottod im motion to pottnt ittuo. 7*- tymbolt ond
tmootking Oft dtfintd ot in Figurt J, mtn tht oddition of
oorUttt pottnt fUing (outrogtd G; tmootktd — • -V ond
ttort of ctinicoi totting, unoorrtettd for rttrotpoctivt IND
fiUngtO.'-l-

and a reduction in thtjptndancy ptriod. It should bt
noted, aa attn in tht Figures, that tht ralativt coo*
tribuUon of tach of tht thrtt eomponantt dtptndt
to soma extant on tht yeare compared.
For tht 12-year ptriod from 1968 to 1979, tht
declining EPL can bt txplaintd by two trends. Tha
clinical/rtgulttory ptriod Incrtaatd (with all of tht
incrttat bting in tht clinical ptriod), and mora of tht
clinical/rtgulttory ptriod fail within tht ptriod of
ilent protection (i.e., afttr tht dttt of pattnt
sut). TTiie lattar trtnd wat ctutad by quickar itsut
of tht ptttnt by tht Pttant Offica (thtrtby starting
tht pattnt clock aoontr in tht drug dtvtlopmtnt
procttt), and by latar ttarting of tht clinical tasting.
It should bt daarly undarttood that tht "start of
clinical tatting" bting dttcribtd in thit analysis is
clinical tasting In tht U.S. onJy. Although appro*imataly half of tha drugi approved in tht U.S.
originttt tbrotd UOj, and a tignificant fraction of
U.S.-originttad NCEt art now alto firtt tattad
dinictily abroad {8,91, this study is limited to tht
U.S. component of tht dVug dtvtlopmtnt procttt.
Although t dtcrtttt in tht ptndtncy ptriod
rttultt in aarlltr ittut of ptttntt, it contributtt to
tht trotion of EPL by placing a grttttr proportion
of tht clinical/regulatory procttt within tht ptriod
of pttant prottction.
It is not dear why U.S. clinical tasting la starting

S
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latar in tha drug dtvalopmant precast raaitiva to tha
data of patant application, although ona possibla
ration it tha incraata in prsclinical data rt>
qulrsmants prior to first human tatting. Ralattd factors, such as complianca with tha Good Laboratory
Prtctict (OLP) rtgulations, could also rtouirt mora
time. Another possibility is that mora prolonged initial clinical tatting it baing dona ovarsaas — aithar
by U.8. firms, or baeausa a graatar proportion of
furlegn-originstad drugs art getting U.S. INDs now
than prtviously, aithar by licsnsing to U.S. firms, or
through foraign-ownsd sponsoring firms. Further
raflnamant of tha data into tubsata for aalforiginatad and licanaad drugs of VS. and fortignownad firms will anabla ua to axamint tha Utttr
poaaibllity.
Thus it is daar that tha dadina in EPL is a rasult
of factors in both tht drug dtvalopmant and patant
procasaas. Taking tha preclinical and clinical compontntt togtthar, a poaslbU 73% (2.9 yaars) of tha
dadina in EPL batwaan 1968 and 1979 was a *
eounttd for by an ixtcraas? in eompontnts infiutnead
by tha IND-NDA regulations, with tha ramaindar of
tha dadina infiutnead by tha Patant Offiea.

(t)
(f)

(g)

(h)
0)
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Footnotes
(a) la this study wt dtflnt NCEt as compounds of
moloculax structurt not prtviously marketed in tht
U A , excluding ntw salts or eaters, vaccines, antigens, antlsera, immunogiotyo% surgied products,
and diagnostic agaata.
(b) For NCEs with INDs fOtd afttr 1I6S. wt ustd tht
dsU of IND filing si tht start d clinical totting in
tht U.&. Tht 30-day waiting poriod required tinet
August 1670 has s eonttrvstivt influtnot on our
ttttlng d tht hypothesis. As dtaeribtd ltttr. for
NCEs thst prtctdtd tht 1963 IND retirement, wt
osod tht actual data of first human administration
in tha U.&, where avaJQablt.
(e) All data art oomplttt for NCEstpproved from 1966
• to 1979. txctpt for tht following. Data on start d
dinkal tatting art bastd on 61% (13 d 16) d
patsntad NCEs for 1977. and 69% (11 of 16) for
1976. Two drugi wort excluded from tht pendency
tvtragtt baeausa thtir ptndtndat wtrt taxeeaive
eompartd to all othtr drugs approvtd during tht
samt yaart (La^ 1978 and 1979).
(d) Tha final IND regulation* (Procadurd and Inter*
prttivt ReguUUons, Ntw Drugs for Investigational
Use) printed in tha Ftdemi Rtgitfr of January 6,
1963 rtquirad all drug sponsors to submit complatad INDs by Junt 9,1963 for all drugs in dinkal
trials as d August 10, 1962. Approximately 1100
drugs wtrt assigntd 1963 (Lt^ retroepectivel IND
filing dtttt during tht initid poriod.

1.
1

I.
4.
I.
f.

7.
9.

9.

10.

Tht valut of 24 months was obtained by cakultting
tht mttn d tht svaiiabk valuta after eliminating
two outlier drugs.
Tht gtritra! trends over the study period art better
represented by comparing 1979 with 1966 rather
than with 1966. This is shown more dearly in Figure
9.
This period is made up d two components, tht IND
phase and tht NDA phase, whkh wt have tismintd
in detail in othtr publkatkms (9,9). For tht sptdfic
set of drugs used In this paper, the mean valut of tht
period from NDA submission to spproval was 2.4
years from 1966 to 1972, and 1 2 yttrs from 1973 to
1979. Tht period of clinical testing Increased from a
mean of 3.3 years in 1966-1972. to a moan d 4 4
yttrs in 1973-1979.
She used tht date of aarliatt pattat f & ^ Oscfediag
data of foreign claims priority) ss an indicator d tha
company's initid active interest in tht NCE.
Tht dotted Una to Figure 3 represents tht start d
dinkal tasting, uncorrected for retrospective IND
filings. Faillnf to correct for tht retrospective IND
filings would substantially underestimate tha
period d dinkal tatting and regulatory review (by
more than one year from 1966 to 1970*. Thus, tht
uncorrected estimate d tht increase in tht
dinieal/rtgulatory period would be artifactually
high by that amount This could account for the apparent agreement previous authors observed ^between the decline in EPL and the increese in
clinical/regulatory time for tht period 1966 to 1976
(J).
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March 18, 1981
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Members of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice

FROM:

Bruce Lehman, Chief Counsel,
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice

SUBJECT:

The Patent Term Restoration Issue

You may have been contacted recently by persons seeking
your cosponsorship of H.R. 1937, relating to patent
term restoration.
You or your staff may find the enclosed article from
Research Management Magazine helpful in independently
evaluating the issue.
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RcprintBd1 wuh psrmbiioA from
1981.

The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New Drugs
Martin M. Daman and William M. Wardall

The effective patent life for new chemical entity drug* hat fatten sharply
In recent yean as a remit of an increase in the clinical testing period,
later starting of clinical testing after the patent application, and quicker issue of patents,

In a ractnt ttatamant of concarn about tha statt of
domtsUc industrial innovation* tha Prasidant
rtcommandtd strengthening the patent system (J).
That statement implied that the historical role of
tent protection as a major stimulus for Innovation
d weakened. To determine tht extent to which tht
problem effects pharmaceuticals, this paper ex*
. amines tha state of patent protection afforded new
drugs.
Tht Patent Act of 1838 was adopted because of a
perceived need to encourage innovation by
eliminating the reluctance to disclost an invention.
As incentive for disclosure, tht Patent Act granted
tht inventor a 17-year exclusive right to his Invention. At tha innovative process became uncertain,
lengthy, and expensive, patent protection acquired
even greater importance.
In tht research-based prescription pharmaceutical industry, patents play an important role.
Approximately one out of 10,000 compounds initially examined survives the intense scrutiny and
demonstrates the potential to justify marketing.
(The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers* Association
surveyed Ite member companies in 1962, 1967, and
1970 asking for *'an estimate of tha numbar of
chemicals, compounds, mixtures, filtrates, or other
substances obtained, prepared, extracted or Isolated
for a medical research purpose, and subjected to
biological tests or screens." This included material
obtained from outside the company. The estimates
ware 144,559 for 1962.176,760 for 1967 and 126.060
for 1970, averaging 148,793 items tasted par ymr.
(Our studies showed thst an average of 15.3 New
Chemical Entities (NCEs) were introduced annually
from 1962 to 1978. Using these averages, the ratio

G

Dr. Clam** b a * AatorlaU \m tha Dttartmmt ef Pharmacology
•ad Teakotofy. University of Rochtttar School of Madkina and
Dantlatry. Dr. W.nfcU it •» AtsocUU ProftMor ef Phar**cology. ToBlrology sad of Mtdiriiw. and Diroctor ef Ida
Ctftiar for tot Stod> of Drug DavatopmoM. al tha Uoivtrslty of
"•chatter School of MHfcUt e»4 Dentistry. Ht b aloe Choir*
Je» of tho Commitu* on Ceveromtot Affaire of too America*
•eclety for Omkel Pharmecolefy a«d Theraoeotka.

of chemicals tasted par year to NCEs introducad par
year ia 9725:1.)
Bringing that tingle drug te market hae been
estimated to coat 854 million in 1976 dollars (*).
Because of this uncertainty and high cost, patent
protection It t necessary incentive for the infusion
of capital to stimulate research and development
Since drugs art technically easy to copy, the patent
provides the primary protection egalnst imitation
and competition.
Another form of protection against competition
— one probably not Intended by Congress is afforded by the regulatory system of the Pood and
Drug Administration. The expense involved in seeing a new drug through tht demanding system of
regulatory review to demonstrate safety and efficacy creates a substantial barrier to entry into the
Industry.
However, while certain aspects of the regulatory
process may offer some protection against competition, other aspects reduce the duration of patent
protection that is of commercial value to the original
patent holder. Most drug petents are filed when
biological activity la first observed (&4). Since this
occurs long before the drug receives regulatory approval for marketing, the "effective" patent life will
be roducad considarebly from Its nominal period of
17 years. We will now examine the extent of this
reduction, end its change with time.
Time Trend In Effective Patent Ufe (EPL)

Effective Patent Ufa (EPLJ ia denned na tha
period of patent protection remaining for a drug at
the time of U.S. NDA approval (t.e^ the time from
NDA approval to expiration of the patent). Recent
studies iXS.6) show that EPL has declined substan*
tlally over tht past 15 to 20 years. This trend it
generally attributed to the concomitant increase in
the time required for human investigation and NDA
approval (J,5). To examine this hypothesis, we need
to analyse the time trends in both EPL and tha
period from tha start of clinical investigation to U.S.
NDA approval
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Methods - The analysis is based on all patented
oew chemical entitles (NCEs) receiving NDA approval from 1966 through 1979 (a). The information
needed to determine EPL Included dates of the start
of clinical testing in tht U.S., NDA approval, and
patent application and issue (6).
Data were available for nearly all variables from
1960 through 1979 (e).
Sources for the .patent data included the patent
consultant Louis Let man, SmithKline Corporation,
direct surveys of individual pharmaceutical companies, snd varoius reference sources, including
Chemical Abstracts and Official Gatette of the U.S.
Patent Office. For multi-source drugs (I.e., the same
drug marketed under different brand names by different companies) only the drug of the original patent holder was included in the averages. Of all 191
NCEs approved from 1966 through 1979, 168 had
*J patents. The data from those 168 drugs were used
to calculate EPL.

nan or MO* neeeom.

rmraigmfiYtiET

—

7-7-

-Datrarrgio«iped according to year of NDA approval For each variable (e.g.. time from start of
clinical testing to NDA approval), the time difference waa calculated for each drug, and thoao differences averaged for all drugs approved during
that you. The averages were plotted and the raw
plots smoothed (Figures 1 and 3) according to the
"moving median of three" technique of Tukey (7).
Drugi tested before 1961 Length of clinical inMitigation phase — The IND filing dates assigned
retrospectively to drugs in clinical trial before
August 1962 do not represent the start of clinical
testing in the U.S. (</).
Thus, the true period of clinical investigation for
pre-1963 drugs began earlier than the date
represented by retrospective IND filings. Of the 168
patented NCEs approved from 1966 through 1979,
43 had been assigned retrospective IND filing dates.
%/ We were able to obtain the date of first U.S. clinical
testing In man in the U.S. for 21 of the 43 retrospective filing dates. From this information, we have
derived a standard value of 24 months to apply aa a
correction to the remaining 22 drugs for which this
informstion wss unobtainable (#).
Effective Patent Life — Figure 1 displays the
relationship between the patent and drug development processes, showing the times of NDA approval and the start of clinical testing in relation to
the time of petent fosue. The daU are plotted
according to year of NDA approval. EPL, the time
from NDA approval to patent expiration, can be
read directly from the right-hand ordinate. As
shown In the Figure, EPL for pharmaceuticals waa

FJgurt VNDA approval (outraged 0; smoothed
}
one'start ofclinicol tes ting (outraged O,' smoothed———I
corrected for retrospective INDfilings,are plotted in relation to patent issue. Smoothing wot don* by Tukey's
"moving median of three** technique fTJL
,/considerably less than 17 years, even at the beginning of the 14-year atudy period. It declined from 13.6
years in 1966 to 9.6 years in 1979, a decrease of 4.1
years.
Time from ttart of U.S. clinical investigation to
NDA approval — Figure 1 also shows the pattern
(after smoothing (7)) of the period from the start of
clinical testing to NDA approval during the 14
years from 1966 to 1979. During the 12-year period
from 1968 to 1979, EPL dropped by 4.0 years, from
13.5 years to 9.5 years (/). Th»t{m»frAm th»«t«rtnf
U.S. clinical testing to NDA approval increased by
2.4 yiuira ll.e.. from S 9 tn A 3 y r . ) f™„» lOftA >^
1979. accounting for 6Qfr nf thrrirrrtatein EPL (§1
Thus the increase in the period from the start of
clinical testing to NDA approval accounted for only
slightly more than half of the decline in EPL.
Therefore, we need to examine the components of
EPL in more detail to determine where the remainder of its decline occurred.
Effective Patent Ufa and the
Drug Development Process

From our data (presented later in this paper) we
know that the aequence of events in the process of
drug development Is generally as shown io Figure 2.
The sequence begins with the filing of a patent application during the preclinical phase, and continue*
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Flgere If JE/Zwdt* Pafeat Zi^# f E W U e /nfKlie* o/ tae
timing of the potent application, the pendency period, ond
the duration of rat clinicol ond regulatory period, as well
as the 17-yeer period of potent protection. 'The pendency
period is the time from potent application to potent tune.

with the atari of clinical testing, patent issue, NDA
approval, and finally patent expiration.
From thia pattern and Figure 2, wt tea that EPL
4L#M the period from NDA approval to patent expiration) Is a function of the timing of the patent application, the pendency period, and the duration of
the clinical and regulatory period*, aa wall aa the
17-year period of patent protection.
Thua, in addition to ita dependence on the dura*
Uoo of the clinical and regulatory periods, EPL
depends on two other important factor*. It
decrease* if clinical tasting la begun later in relation
to the patent application, and conversely will increase if the patent pendency period increase*. The
final EPL depend* on the algebraic aum of the
change* in the components.
The change* that occurred in the two additional
component* of EPL are ahown in Figure S. For the
yaara 1968 and 1979, the two year* moat representative of the general trend during the study period,
the time from patent application to the atart of U.S.
clinical testing increased10.6jMri (accounting for
}3% of the decrease in EP1A The time from garliast
patent application to patent isiua rlmrrtmnod 1.1

t w i littountlni for 27* of the decrease in EPL)
(A). Coupled with the 2.4 year increase in the period
from the atari of clinical testing to NDA approval,
these changea account for the entire 4.0 year
decrease in EPL from 19681979. (i)
Discussion/Conclusions
EPL waa 13.6 years at the beginning of our study
period, 1966. Thia is considerably leaa than the
17-year nominal period of patent protection. Aa time
progressed, EPL fell further. This trend is similar to
(hat reported by other investigators ($5,6). The
decrease over time has generally been attributed entirely to en increase in the time between the beginning of clinical testing and NDA approval (&5).
^though Stetman suggests that r'is may be
r
*tponsible for only pert of the decrease (6).
Our analyih ihnwi that in the apcrlfic sample of
WCE* .n«1y»»H «1m*«» K»lf nf th.

A~Unm

in E P L

»§• cauirrl hy t wn arlrlit Innal far torn AD ioueaasJa
the tim* h»rw—n naunt filing and clinical testing,

Figure VAvenged end smoothed values for NDA op*
pro vol stort of clinical testing, end potent application ore
plotted in relation to potent issue. The symbols ond
smoothing ore defined m$ in Figure I uAth the addition of
eoriiest potent filing (averaged © ; smoothed — • —) ond
stort ofcUnlceJ testing, u.icorrected for retrospective IHD
filing*<---l
and a reduction in tha tendency period. It ahould be

noted, aa aeen in the Figures, that the relative contribution of each of the three componenta depends
to pome extent on the years compared.
For the 12-year period from 1968 to 1979, the
declining EPL can be explained by two trends. The
clinic al/regulatory period increased (with aU of the
increese being in the clinical period), and more of the
clinical/regulatory period fell within the period of
patent protection (i.e., after the data of patent
iaaue). Thia latter trend was caused by quicker issue
of the patent by the Patent Office (thereby starting
the patent clock sooner in the drug development
process), and by later starting of the clinical testing.
It should be clearly understood that the "start of
clinical testing" being described in this analysis is
clinical testing in the U.S. only. Although approx- e<
Imately half of the drugs approved in the U.S.
originate abroad (70), and a significant fraction of
U.S.-originated NCEa are now also first tested
clinically ebroed (fi.9), this study is limited to the
U.S. component of the drug development process.
Although a decrease in the pendency period
results In earlier issue of patents, it contributes to
the erosion of EPL by piecing a greater proportion
of the clinical/regulatory process within the period
of patent protection.
It is not clear why U.S. clinical testing b starting
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later In the drug development process realtlve to the
date of patent application, although one possible
reason fa the increase In preclinical data requirements prior to first human testing. Related factors, such as compliance with the Good Laboratory
Practice (OLP) regulations, could also require mora
time. Another possibility (a that more prolonged initial clinical testing is being dona overseas — either
by U.S. Arms, or because a greater proportion of
foriegn-orlginated drugs art getting U.S. INDs now
than previously, either by licensing to U.S. firms, or
through foreign-owned sponsoring firms. Further
J refinement of the data Into subsets for selforiginated and licensed drugs of U.S. and foreignowned firms will enable us to examine the latter
possibility.
Thus it Is dear that the decline In EPL la a reault
of factors in both the drug development and patent
processes. Taking the preclinical and clinical components together, a. pnsalbla 73% (2.9 veers) of the
j decline in EPL between 1968 and 1979 was ac;
counted for bv en Increase in components influenced

by tht IND'-NHA regulations, with the remainder of
thff flftfllnft influrnrftri hy tht Pitrnt. fiffirn
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Footnotea
(a)

(b)

j

(c)

(d)

In this study we define NCEs as compounds of
molecular structure not previously ma/kated In the
U.S.. excluding new salts or esters, vaccines, antlgtna, antiatra, immunogloblns, surgical products,
and diagnostic agents.
For NCEs with INDs filad after 1963. we ussd the
date of IND filing as the start of clinical testing in
the U.S. The 30-day waiting period required tinea
Auguat 1970 haa a conservedve influence on our
testing of the hypothesis. As described later, for
NCEs that preceded the 1963 IND requirement, we
used the actual <1ate of first human administration
in the U.S.. where availably
AU daU are Complete for NCEs approved from 1966
to 1979. except for the following. DaU on start of
clinicsl toting are based on 61% (13 of 16) ot
patented NCEs for 1977, end 69% (11 of, 16) for
1978. Two druga were excluded from the pendency
overages becsuse their pendencies were excessive
compared to all other drugs approved during the
same years (I.e., 1978 and 1979).
The Final IND regulations (Procedural and Inter*
retive Regulations, New Drugs for Investigational
lee) printed in the Ftdtrat RtgitUr of January 8,
1963 required all drug sponsors to submit completed INDs by June 9.1963 for all drugs in clinical
trials as of Auguat 10, 1962. Approximately 1100
drugs were assigned 1963 (I.e.. retrospective) IND
filing dates during the initial period.

C

(e)
•

(0

(g)

The value of 24 months was obtained by calculating
the mean of the available values after eliminating
two outlier drugs.
The general trends over the study period are better
represented by comparing 1979 with 1966 rather
than with 1966. This is shown more dearly In Figure
This period le mode up of two components, the IND
and the ND A phase, which we have examined
{nmass
detail in other publications (819). For the specific

set of drugs used in this paper, the mean value of the
period from NDA submission to approval was 2.4
years from 1966 to 1972, kid 2.2 years from 1973 to
1979. The period of clinicsl testing increased from s
mean of 3.3 yeara in 1966-1972, to e mean of 4.8
years in 19731979.
(h) We used the date of earliest patent flUng (including
date of foreign claims priority) as an Indicator of the
company's Initial active Interest in the NCE.
U)
The dotted line In Figure 3 represents the start of
clinical testing, uncorrected for retrospective IND
Tilings. Falling to correct for the retrospective IND
filings would substantially underestimate the
period of clinical testing and regulatory review (by
v/more then one year from 1966 to 1970). Thus, the
uncorrected estimate of the increase la the
clinical/regulatory period would be ertifactually
high by that amount. This could account for the apparent agreement previous authors observed between the decline in EPL end the Increase in
clinical/regulatory time for the period 1966 to 1976
U).
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The Assistant Secretary for Health

through* js/nis

mow t

;

•

--^HLL. B7$

Director
Center for Disease Control
.

• —

suajnert

Attached Action rfeaorandtn to Secretary, CtD*'9 on Federal tele in
Vaccine-Associated Disability - ACTIO:;
In follov-up of discussions with you and your staff concerning the
rapidly fount inf. loplleatlona of vaccine-associated disability end
at your request, the attached action cerorendio for Secretary David
Hatheva la offered for your review and action.
fACTS
largely beeaust of court opinlonr dranatlzing the inherent risk* of
vaccines and vaecine-assocletcd disability, patterns of immunization
yrogracalng by State and local her.lth agencies and vaccination orac" ticca of private cedlcal professionals are beine rodlfled. Calledfor warnings of Inherent risks in vaccines are lifcely to al*ra
potential vneelne recipients and result in diminished insunlsa'.lea
program effectiveness. Kaeufacturer liability for vacelae-rssociatcd
disability, retularly assigned by courts, threatens a predictable
vaccine supply—especially of oral polio vaccine—and diminishes the
chances of significant independent manufacturer-sponsored research
and devolopoent of new biologies.
%
the action tteeorendua for the Secretary recocnends legislation'
copovoring the Pepartrent to nssuw. responsibility in Managing
clalcts of vaccine-associated disability. This is base J on th*
concept that Federal licencing of biologies, nationally rrcorremled
for use In tlie publie interest, irpor.es a reasonable duty on the
fcnvernitent to support perr.ons scrieunly injured A S a result et
risks inherent in vaccines rccorneiulud and t.lten for both personal
and couaunlty protection.
jEfflpcncpxTyos, *

I t io reroznem'ed that the nennramhin l»c forwarded to the Secretary
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120
The Assistant Secretary for Health
.vaccine r e c i p i e n t s by canufncturcrs. and n.vmf.ncturcr p o l i c i e s an
f r>pHnuJup production and d i s t r i b u t i o n of hi o l e i c s arc r . t i l l in
{emulation* A decision oa the ftccrctarv's part t o pursue l e g i s l a t i o n for pvblic !u-:naj;cr.cnt of vaccine-n^r.ociatcc! c!ir.;:bility \:oitld
r e l i e v e the apprehension and anxiety of public health and c e d i c a l
professionals and of b i o l o g i e s producers

David J , 5y.ccr f K.D.
Assistontj^inxcon Ccnc-ral
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Calendar No. 856
99TH CONGRESS

2d Session

SENATE

REPORT

99-422

THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT

«fc

\l

AUGUST 15 (legislative day, AUGUST 11), 1986.—Ordered to be printed
£*•

Mr. DANFORTH, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, submitted the following

REPORT
[To accompany S. 2760]

together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
having considered an original bill (S. 2760) to regulate interstate
commerce by providing for a uniform product liability law, and for
other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the
bill do pass.

* Wi

•4--*

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

This original bill, S. 2760, as reported, preempts state law to
impose major reforms of product liability law in the United States.
The present system in the United States for resolving product liability disputes and compensating those injured by defective products is costly, slow, inequitable, and unpredictable. It does not benefit manufacturers, product sellers, or injured persons. The system's high transaction costs, which exceed the compensation paid
to victims, are passed on to consumers; moreover, the unpredictability, uncertainties, and inefficiencies of the system have been
linked to the increasing cost and unavailability of liability insurance. Because of the serious burden on interstate commerce created by these product liability problems, federal legislation is
needed.
S. 2760, as reported, addresses these problems by making a
number of significant reforms that are applicable in all product li62-986 O
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ability actions in State and Federal courts. These reforms, which
include the establishment of an expedited settlement system with
incentives for parties to settle claims quickly, will reduce transaction costs and provide greater certainty as to the rights and respor.
sibilities of all those involved in product liability disputes.
BACKGROUND AND NEED
INTRODUCTION

W*

r^r

«4

Traditionally, product liability has been a matter left to stnt<
law, but today the morass of product liability law is a problem of
national concern that requires Congressional action. The system of
compensating people injured by defective products is costly, slow,
inequitable, and unpredictable. It hurts business and consumers as
well as our competitive position in world markets.
Many consumers who are injured by defective products and de
serve compensation are unable to recover damages or must wait
years for recovery. They are caught up with manufacturers and
product sellers in a product liability litigation system that ha.*
often been characterized as a legal lottery, a system in which identical cases can produce startlingly different results. Moreover, injured victims with the severest injuries tend to receive far less
than their actual economic losses, while those with minor injuries
are overcompensated.
The inefficiency and unpredictability of the product liability
system have been linked to the increasing cost and unavailability
of liability insurance. An increasing number of companies, whether
they make such products are sporting goods, textile manufacturing
equipment, machine tools, medical devices or vaccines, cannot buy
adequate insurance coverage. Some have had their insurance cancelled or have experienced reduced coverage with increased deduc
tibles at higher prices. Others cannot obtain coverage at any price.
Thus, the present system has an adverse impact on plaintiffs and
defendants, manufacturers, product sellers and consumers. The individual states cannot fully address the problems of the product liability system. Reform at the Federal level is urgently needed.
The Present Product Liability System: Costly, Slow, Inequitable, and
Unpredictable
1. Costs

The present product liability system's transaction costs—the
costs of litigation, court costs, and attorney's fees—are enormous.
Today, plaintiff and defense lawyers collect almost as much from
the system as injured victims do; most of the money paid out by
manufacturers never reaches the victims at all. 1
The inefficiency of the present system has been noted often,2 and
has most recently been demonstrated by preliminary studv results
released July 29, 1986, by the Rand Institute for Civil" Justice,
which show that the annual overall transaction costs of the U.S.
tort system exceed compensation to plaintiffs. The Rand study

»

1

Footnotes at end.
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3
found that in 1985, net compensation totaled $13 to $15 billion, but
the transaction costs—including plaintiffs attorney's fees, defense
legal fees, public expenditures and the time of the litigants—were
between $15 billion and $19 billion. 3
The pattern in product liability cases, alone, is consistent with
these findings. According to calculations derived from a comprehensive 1977 survey of 24,452 closed claims conducted by the Insurance Service Office (ISO), for every dollar paid to claimants, insurers paid an average of 42 cents in defense costs.4 Moreover, for
every dollar awarded to a claimant, he or she typically pays a contingent fee of 33 cents in legal costs and therefore receives about 67
cents. Thus, on this basis (adding the average defense cost to the
contingent fee) one can estimate that the product liability tort litigation system appears to cost more in litigation and transaction
costs than the net recovery received by the claimant.
Not only do these transaction costs exceed compensation, but
they have risen dramatically in recent years. According to a 1986
study by economists at New York University, the tort system's administrative or transaction cost—the amount spent to adjust and
litigate claims made by injured parties—has been rising rapidly
since 1983.5 This study notes:
These increases portend trouble ahead if they are not
checked. If current rates of growth continue, we can
exoect that by 1990 we will be spending between $31 and
$38 billion per year simply administering the tort system. 6
With respect to general liability insurance, including product liability, ISO recently reported that the total legal defense expenses
incurred in 1984 were $2.7 billion, and that the proportion of general liability costs incurred by insurers that are consumed by legal
defense costs has nearly tripled between 1960 and 1984. Most of
this growth has occurred recently: the defense costs per dollar paid
to claimants doubled in the last decade.7
Ordinarily, legal defense costs for product liability claims are
paid by insurers; however, because defense costs have escalated so
rapidly, the insurance industry has proposed to change the commercial general liability form to include some defense costs within
the aggregate limits of the policy. Such a change would only increase the burden of product liability litigation on manufacturers
and product sellers, as well as consumers, to whom these costs will
ultimately be passed on.
Neither plaintiffs nor defendants benefit from the rapidly increasing and excessive costs of the present system for resolving
product liability disputes.
i. Delay
A second problem with the present product liability system is
delay. This is particularly a concern for seriously injured victims,
who are often in desperate financial straits and must wait years to
be compensated while litigation drags on.
One survey has shown that 36 percent of bodily injury losses in
product liability cases are not paid until at least 4 years after the
first report, and that it takes 5 years to pay the claim with the av-
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if*?

erage dollar amount of loss. This study also found that "larger
claims tend to take much longer to close than smaller ones/'8
Another, more recent insurance industry study found that the
victims of the severest injuries have to wait the longest. This study
found that in cases in which payment exceeded $100,000, 21.6 percent of claimants waited more than five years for payment. Only
2.1 percent were paid less than a year after they reported their
injury, and 62.6 percent took more than three years to be paid •
The chart below shows the results of this study, which compared
earlier data from 1975. (The 1975 figures are in parentheses.)
Claims over $100,000
Number of years between date claim reported to insurer and date claim dosed

1 year of less
Over 1 year to 2 years
Over 2 years to 3 years
Over 3 years to 4 years
Over 4 years to 5 years
Over 5 years to 10 years

*#'
<*#
f*4

if

Number of
daimants

4
21
46
41
37
41

(5)
(17)
(27)
(17)
(27)
(15)

Percent of
claimants

Percent o* \ U
pdyw.ii

2.1 (4.6)
1.6 (43>
11.1 (157) 10.9 (151.
24.2 (25.0) 23.0 (23 5)
21.6 (15.7) 18.5 (19*;
19 5 (25.0) 26.8 (20 7=
21.6 (13.9) 19.2 (16<;

The comparison with the 1975 data shows that the problem of
delay has actually worsened. In 1975, 54.6 percent of claimants
took more than three years to be paid; five years later that number
had risen to 62.7 percent.
Such delays plague even the many product liability cases which
are settled before trial. One plaintiffs attorney has explained that
even though most cases are settled, "most settlement negotiations
get serious only a week or so before trial is scheduled to begin."
The pattern has become so dependable that "each week the [lawyer's] firm projects cash flow by estimating10 the settlement value of
the cases set for trial the following week."
Delay also can result in undercompensation of victims. Because
many victims of injury—particularly those with the most severe injuries—have inadequate resources to pay for their medical and rehabilitation expenses, they are forced to settle for less than their
full losses in order to get some payment11 because they cannot afford
to wait longer without compensation. Studies have shown that
when rehabilitation has to be delayed, victims do not12 recover as
fully as they do when the problem is treated promptly.
3. Inequitable compensation
Not only does the present product liability system generate excessive costs and delays; it is unable to compensate fairly injured
victims in proportion to their losses. Numerous studies have found
that the tort system grossly overpays people with small losses,
while underpaying people with the most serious losses.
This disturbing pattern was revealed as early as 1983 by a Columbia University report on auto accidents, and the findings of this
report have been independently confirmed
in the years since by
more than a dozen detailed studies.13 More recently, the 1977 ISO
product liability study found that injured plaintiffs with losses between $1 and $1,000 received, on the average, 859 percent of their
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i

losses, while those with losses of over $1 million received, on the
average,
15 percent of their losses {before paying their attorney's
fees).14 In general, the study found, compensation exceeded economic loss when losses were below $100,000, and then dropped dramatically below economic loss when the claimant's loss exceeded
$100,000.15
A 1980 insurance industry study of the largest product liability
claims confirmed that the most severely injured victims do not
even receive full compensation for their pain and suffering. For
every dollar of past and future economic loss, the tort system paid
claimants $1.22, but if the standard 33 percent attorney's contingent fee is deducted, these claimants
were left with only about 81
cents for every dollar of loss.16
Other studies have shown that people with lower incomes and
lower educational levels recover far less than their middle class
counterparts because they have less access to attorneys, cannot
afford 17
to wait as long to recover, and often are not good witnesses.
Reform of the product liability system is essential to assure that
those who are injured by defective products are fairly compensated
in proportion to their losses.
i Unpredictability
The excessive costs, delays, and inequities of the product liability
system are exacerbated by the inherent uncertainties and unpredictability of the system. Indeed, the present product liability
system has been characterized as a latter, in which "[lawyers' talents, plaintiffs' demeanor, defendants' grit, and the idiosyncrasies
of jury composition
combine to hand similar victims altogether dissimilar results." 18
As Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has explained in testimony before
the Committee:
If you are badly injured in our society by a product and
you go to the highly skilled lawyer . . . in all honesty [the
lawyer] cannot tell you what you will be paid, when you
will be paid, or indeed if you will be paid.19
The present system's uncertainty is a problem for both manufacturers and consumers injured by defective products. Defendants
need greater certainty as to the scope of their liability under the
law. Plaintiffs need faster, more certain recovery that fully compensates them for their real losses.
The inherent uncertainty of the system has been linked by commentators to the diversity of legal standards applied in different jurisdictions and the doctrinal mixture
of contract and tort law applied in product liability cases.20 21In addition, it has been linked to
expanding doctrines of liability, the difficulties in establishing
causation and fault, as well as the difficulties in translating
nonpecuniary loss (pain and suffering) into pecuniary terms. 22
The uncertainties and unpredictability of the system affect settlements as well as judgments. Settlement negotiations are sabotaged by the lack of clear standards. With respect to punitive
damage claims, for example, uncertainties about liability 23standards
make it difficult for manufacturers to negotiate sensibly.
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The burden on American productivity and commerce
The present product liability litigation system has become an
enormous burden an American productivity and commerce. It deprives consumers of needed products, limits job opportunities, ar.d
weakens our competitive position in world markets.
This burden has been increased by what some have described as
a "litigation explosion". 24 The number of product liability case*
filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in 1974 to
13,554 in 1985, a 758 percent increase. 25 No corresponding figure ii
available from state courts, which do not maintain separate statistics on product liability claims, but overall civil caseloads have
been rising there as well. 26
The impact of increasing product liability litigation has been fell
by manufacturers for more than a decade, and it has been linked to
the present crisis with respect to the unavailability and unafford
ability of liability insurance. This crisis has been extensively docu
mented in the press, 27 and the Committee has held several hear
ings on the problem. 28 At those hearings, witnesses testified that
the insurance crisis stems in part from cyclical fluctuations in the
insurance industry, but many witnesses also cited as contributing
factors growing litigation and claim costs; they linked the insurance problem to the inherent unpredictability of the tort litigation
system, as well as the increasing difficulty of predicting potential
losses due to expanding concepts of liability.
It has been suggested that the business cycle of the insurance industry and industry practices are entirely to blame for current un
affordability and unavailability problems. This ignores the increase
in the overall costs of the tort litigation system—an increase which
has been felt as much by self-insurers as well as by those who purchase liability insurance. For example, the City of New York,
which is self-insured, has recorded total tort judgments and settlements of more than $100 million for almost every year since 1981,
although they never approached that level before. Moreover, the
dollar value of New York City's average personal injury settlement
rose from $7,127 in 1977 to $31,740 in 1985, an increase of 345 percent. 29
While insurance prices appear likely to stabilize eventually, analysts have concluded that unless the underlying tort system's costs
are reduced, they will do so at a very high level. "Prices will doubtless plateau at some point and at some level, but if current trends
continue, it seems clear that this will occur at a height that will
institutionalize the price shock that will have occurred in the
meantime/' 3 0 Numerous studies of the present insurance crisis
have independently reached the same conclusion: the rising cost of
the tort system is a fundamental cause of the crisis. 31
But the insurance crisis is only one element of the burden imposed on American productivity and commerce by the product liability litigation system and the overall tort system. The adverse
impact of this burden is felt in many ways, and it is not only a
matter of obtaining insurance coverage. Much of the cost of the
product liability system is borne today directly by manufacturers
and product sellers, because there has been a long, continuing
trend toward self-insurance among American businesses. In those
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policies that have been sold, deductibles have been increasing while
policy limits have been shrinking.
The expense of litigating claims diverts resources from productive efforts. Similarly, excessive management time is diverted from
production to assessment of legal claims, and the uncertainties of
the system deter the development of new products or product improvements. Clearly, the result is not in the best interest of manufacturers or consumers.
Moreover, faced with the costs and uncertainties of the present
system, manufacturers may eliminate a particular product line or
terminate operations altogether if the costs of product liability exposure become too burdensome. 32 One survey of the impact of
product liability on machinery industries found that 13.5 percent of
the companies had dropped product lines, while 11.5 percent had
decided not to develop a particular new product.33 One example illuminates the problem:
In Virginia, William Perry, an engineer, set up a company to design and build hand and foot controls for cars and
vans. Perry's son had been crippled in a motorcycle accident, and the father was appalled when he saw the devices
available to handicapped drivers. His company has never
been sued, but he recently stopped selling his product
nonetheless: his liability insurance premiums went up over
1,000% in one year. Says Perry, "I would have continued
this business even at a loss if I could have got a decent
" 34
premium
Many other examples have been brought to the attention of the
Committee, as well. Puritan-Bennett of Overland Park, Kansas, a
leading U.S. manufacturer of hospital equipment, stopped making
anesthesia gas machines in 1984 because of rising liability risks.
These life-saving machines were once made by half a dozen companies; now the only producers are two foreign-owned firms.35
Moreover, concerns about product liability appear to be a major
contributor to the dramatic decline in the number of manufacturers of vaccines, which has been accompanied by sharply rising
prices. During the 1960's, there were eight manufacturers of the
combined vaccine that is used to immunize children against diptheria, whooping cough, and tetanus. Today, only one remains, and
the cost of the vaccine has skyrocketed. The price per shot was 45
cents in 1982; no it is $11.40, and most of the increases goes into a
fund against lawsuits. 36 In the 1960's there were three manufacturers or oral polio vaccine; now there is one. 37 "If present trends
are any indication," one writer has concluded, "it appears that the
tort system's vagaries will ultimately drive mass immunization programs out of the private sector altogether. 38
The general aviation industry is another sector of the economy
that has been adversely affected by the product liability system. In
1985, insurance premiums averaged $70,000 per airplane, despite
the general aviation industry's best safety record in years. These
costs have had a devastating effect on sales—and on jobs. In 1979,
more than 17,000 general aviation aircraft were sold by United
States Manufacturers. In 1985, such sales has dropped by nearly 90
percent. As a result, tens of thousands of workers have been laid
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off, and unemployment in the industry is now over 50 percent.
Among only the seven largest manufacturers of general aviation
aircraft, employment dropped from 40,000 in 1980 to 13,500 in
June, 1986.39
The adverse effects of the product liability system have carried
over into international trade. American manufacturers and product sellers generally pay product liability insurance rates which
are 20 time higher than those in Europe. 40 This disparity is attributable in large part to the uncertainties and costs of the American
tort litigation system. 41 As a result of this disparity, American
manufacturers and product sellers may be at a competitive disadvantage in both foreign and domestic markets. Insurers generally do
not discount premiums where a manufacturer exports it goods, because there is always the possibility that a product-related suit will
be brought in the United States. Thus, each U.S. product shipped
abroad contains an insurance cost element greater than that of a
foreign competitor.42 With respect to domestic markets, the effect
of the current uncertainties in product liability law is similar. The
price of imported products can be lower because product liability
insurance rates for those products are lower. 43

m

The limitations of State efforts at reform
In 1978, the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, after conducting an 18-month study of the problem, issued a
report which suggested that a model product liability act be drafted
with the idea that reforms of the system would be enacted at the
Federal level. 44 A final version of this model law, known as the
Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA), was published on October
31, 1979.45
However, UPLA, which ultimately was offered as a model State
law, has not been adopted in full in any State. Over 30 States have
adopted some form of product liability statute, and others have enacted more general tort reform measures. 46 The States' efforts
have been helpful and are to be encouraged; however, those efforts
at State law reform have not resolved the overall problems of the
product liability tort litigation system. Most State statutes are not
comprehensive and fail to address all the key issues that arise in
product liability litigation. Even if an individual State adopted a
comprehensive product liability statute so that its own law was
clear and predictable, the legal rules would still vary from State to
State.
Individual States cannot address the problems of the product liability system effectively, because reform within one State does
little to resolve the tort litigation problems facing those who deal
in an interstate market. Products are manufactured, sold, used,
and insured in a nationwide market. Data show that most product*
manufactured in a given State are consumed or used outside that
State.41 As a result, manufacturers and product sellers may be involved in product liability actions governed by the law of any State
in which they do business. An attempt by any one State to reform
the system cannot relieve the overall burden imposed on interstate
commerce. 48 In New York State, the Governor's Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance recently reached the same conclusion*
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL AND SUMMARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE OK SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

Washington, B.C., November 26, 1980.
Hon. DON FUQUA,

Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology,
UJS. Howe of Representatives,
Washington, D.U.
DEAB MR. CHAIRMAN : As you know, on June 19,21 and July 11,1979,
the Science, Research and Technology Subcommittee of the Science
and Technology Committee held a series of oversight hearings on
"The FDA's Process for Approving New Drugs." Those hearings were
a continuation of an important effort in this area, begun by the Hon.
James H. Scheuer, former chairman of the Subcommittee on Domestic
and International Scientific Planning Analysis and Cooperation. The
speed with which Food and Drug Administration approves new drugs
for marketing in the U.S. today nas become a frequent target of criticism not only by drug manufacturers seeking to market the drugs but
also by physicians wanting to use drugs which they know have been
available in other technically advanced countries for months to years.
Consumers are also concerned about this process with patients generally wanting the early benefits of new therapeutic advances, but some
consumers are more concerned about being protected against possible
unforseen side effects of drugs.
I am pleased to submit to you this document based on the Subcommittee's oversight hearings and on the considerable effort of the General Accounting Office.
In general, the Subcommittee hearings confirmed earlier impressions
that there is, for certain categories of drugs, a "drug lag" within the
United States as compared with some other technically advantaged
countries. Examples of major, but not exclusive, factors for delays
encountered in the availability of therapeutically important new
chemical entities revolve about FDA's drug approval process and include: (1) internal management problems witnin the FDA, (2) complexity and extensiveness of FDA's guidelines and regulations, and
j8) adversarial relationships between FDA and the pharmaceutical
industry. The cumulative effect of these and other factors have resulted in well-documented drug availability delays. This has had an
impact not only upon the overall wellness of the United States population but also upon the ability and willingness of drug manufacturers
to invest in innovative approaches for the treatment of human
diseases. A number of recommendations were made by hearing
witnesses that would facilitate the FDA drug approval process while
still insuring the safety of patients and the public and tne efficacy of
new prescription drugs introduced into the market place.
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VI

As a consequence of these findings, the Subcommittee intends to
continue to exercise oversight on the scientific base and its application
in FDA, the drug approval process and related guidelines and
regulations.
With the cooperation in this endeavor of the FDA, other Congressional Committees, and outside experts, the Subcommittee believes that
shortcomings in FDA's drug approval process can be remedied and
the availability of therapeutic advances to the public can be
maximized.
Sincerely,
GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr. ;

Chairman, Subcommittee on Science,
Research and Technology.
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6. DRUGS FOR 0*HER DISEASES

A number of other drugs could have made significant improvements in therapeutics if they had been available earlier in the U.S.
Bromocryptine (Parlodel) was approved almost 8 years earlier in
Switzerland than its approval in the United States in June 1978. It was
approved in the United Kingdom in 1976. Bromocryptine is used to
treat an endocrine disorder of the uterus and breast (prolactin inhibition) , Parkinson's disease (a nervous system disease common in
older people), and acormegaly (an endocrine system disease with a
particular affect on the bones). FDA classifies it as an important
therapeutic gain for the temporary relief of amenorrhea and
galactorrhea.
Cyproterone, was approved 6 years ago in Germany and is used in
the treatment of sexual hyperactivity and precocious puberty. It is
not approved in the United States.
According to the FDA cyproterone acetate is a potent progestational agent of potential significance being investigated for various
indications including benign prostatic hypertrophy, sexual hyperactivity, sexual deviance, and central nervous system effects. IND's
were submitted by five sponsors during 1968, 1978, 1974. Clinical
trials are currently in progress in phases I and II, with the major
research being conducted by individual investigators under research
IND's. An alternative progestin available in the United States for
the endocrinologic indications only is medroxyprogesterone acetate
(Depo-Provera). Cyproterone has been used abroad as an anti-anctrogen for sexual offenders. Two IND's for this use were submitted
by individual research investigators in 1978. A drug useful in the
treatment of sexual criminals would be an important therapeutic
advance, but major questions of safety and efficacy for this use remain
to be clarified according to FDA.
Somatotropin (Asellacrin) is a drug FDA classified as important
(A). This drug, which is used to promote growth in children with
short stature due to a deficiency of pituitary growth hormone, was
approved on July 80,1976, about 15 months after an NDA was submitted to FDA. Somatotropin was approved for use in Sweden in 1971
and in the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 1972.
Bretyliwn toeylate is an adrenergic blocker.
Buptvacaine hydrochloride (Marcaine) is a longer-acting local anesthetic agent licensed by Sterling Drue from a Swedish firm. That
agent had been marketed in Europe at least since 1967, in the United
Kingdom since 1968. After extensive clinical trials sponsored by us in
the United States, an NDA wasfiledwith FDA in August, 1970; approval was granted in October, 1972 (26 months later).
Levodopa is an anti-Parkinson agent.
Baclofen (Lioresal), a muscle relaxant was introduced in the
United Kingdom in 1972 and approved in the United States in October 1977. It represents a modest therapeutic gain (B) according to
FDA.
Danazol (Danocrine) is a gonadotropin. An NDA wasfiledwith the
FDA on December 18, 1978 for use in endometriosis, a clinical disorder of women for which no satisfactory medical treatment previously existed. Approval was received on June 21,1976, a little more
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than 80 months later. A submission was made in the United Kingdom
on December 27,1978 and the Republic of Ireland on January 23,1974.
The non-domestic submissions contained only data, obtained from
studies in the United States, the same data submitted to the FDA.
Approval was granted in the United Kingdom on June 6,1974 (a few
days longer than 6 months after submission): approval was granted
in Ireland on May 24,1974 (4 months after submission).
A supplemental application was Hied with the FDA on March 6,
1978 for an additional indication,fibrocysticbreast disease, already
approved in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Action on this submission was still pending at the FDA 16 months later,
Dumovruiin (DDAVP), an antidiuretic (B), as introduced in the
United Kingdom in 1976 out not approved in the United States until
1978.
Calcitonin is a blood calcium regulator.
Dimethyl nUfowide (DMbO) can be derived from lignin, the cement
substances of trees or can be made from a number of organic chemicals. Although the chemical history of DMSO goes back to 1866,
promise of this chemical in the medical sciences was shown in 1959
with tho demonstration of its protective effective on red blood cells
and other tissues from freezing damage and later with its ability
to serve as a "carrier" drug in conveying other substances through
the skin and muoous membranes.
In early clinical studies, dimethyl sulfoxide was shown to relieve
pain, reduce swelling, slow the growth of bacteria, improve blood
supply, soften scar tissue, enhance the effectiveness of other pharmacologic agents, serve as a diuretic, and act as a muscle relaxant
Thefirstreport on the use of dimethyl sulfoxide as a pharmacologic agent was writen in 1968 and published February 1, 1964. The
first IND to study DMSO clinically in the United States was submitted on October 26,1963. Three NDA's on DMSO were submitted
to the FDA in 1966. All were turned down. A fourth NDA was submitted in 1970. It was also turned down by the FDA, in spite of
mounting evidence in the scientific and medical literature of the
potential pharmacological importance of DMSO.
According to Stanley Jacob:
Of major importance is the fact that DMSO has been
shown to be of value, not only in diseases for which there is
other known treatment, but in a number of illnesses for
which no other effective or low risk treatment is known, such
as the painful ulcers of the fingers in patients with scleroderma. . • •
The value of DMSO in other illnesses for which effective
pharmacologic treatment does not presently exist, includes
severe abacterial prostatitis, Dupuytren's contracture, subcutaneous scarring from cobalt irradiation, keloids, Peyronie's disease and potentially in otherwise "irreversible"
iniury to the brain and spinal cord....
Dimethyl sulfoxide is a useful adjunct in the treatment
of rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative arthritis and gouty
arthritis. It primarily will relieve pain, but will also reduce
inflammation and increase joint mobility. Due to its effec-
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tiveness in the treatment of arthritis, Americans by the
thousands areflockingto nations such as Mexico to receive
The effectiveness of DMSO has been demonstrated by comparative studies, by "double blind" studies, and by the din- ical impression type of evaluations in man.... (and)
A broader spectrum of primary pharmacology and clinical benefit, both actual and potential, has been described in
the scientific literature for DMSO than for any other substance with [which I am familiar.
In spite of the mounting evidence of the clinical importance of
DMSO, it is only prescriptive in the U.S. for interstitial, evstitis
(humans) and for acute musculoskeletal problems in large and small
animals. DMSO is prescriptive in Canada for scleroderma, in Great
Britain and Ireland for shingles when mixed with IDU, and in Germany, Austria and Switzerland for a ranjje of disorders for topical
administration. It is also widely prescriptive in South America and
has been prescriptive in the U.S.S.R. since 1971. An NDA submitted to the FDA in 1977 on DMSO for scleroderma is currently
in an administrative limbo.
In spite of much scientific literature to the contrary, FDA continues
to indicate that there is insufficient toxicological information available on DMSO and that the definitive double-masked study on this
drug has yet to be done.
Dinoproetone (Prostin E 2), a prostaglandin was introduced in the
United Kingdom in 1972. It is used for elective abortion, evacuation of
uterine contents in fetal death and the management of benign hydratidiform mole. FDA classifies the drug as a modest therapeutic advance (B) and did not approve it in the United States until August
1977.
Medrowyprooeeterone acetate (Depo-Provera), an injectable contraceptive agent, has been approved in Tiany countries around the world.
Its NDA for that use has been under consideration by the FDA for
over 12 years (since Feb. 1987). Depo-Provera has now been marketed
for contraception in over 60 countries and has been used safely for over
6 million woman-years. But on March 7,1978 FDA ruled it was non
approvable in the United States. The reasons why FDA haa not approved Depo-Provera have been the subject of another series of congressional hearings conducted by the Select Committee on Population.
("The Depo-Provera Debate", hearings before the Select Committee
on Population, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, second
session, August 8, 9, and 10,1978, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington: 1978).
Depo-Provera represents an approved indication lag. In 1972, FDA
approved this drug for adjunctive therapy and ralliative treatment of
certain types of inoperable cancer of the uterus.
Metri&mid* (Amipaque) is a breakthrough radiodiagnoetic agent
licensed by Sterling Drug from a Norwegianfirm.An NDA was filed
with the FDA on December 27,1976; approval was granted on August 22, 1978 (20 months later). That agent had been marketed in
Scandinavian countries since 1974 and was approved for marketing
in the United Kingdom in April 1977 (it is marketed there by the
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Norwegian firm). In France, Sterling made a submission on August 22,1977 and received approval in February 2,1978 (5V6 months
later).
Rifampin is an antituberculosis drug.
Trimethoprim is an antibacterial agent.
Vidarabine (VIRA-A) an antiviral, was approved by the FDA in
November 1976 but only as an ophthalmic ointment It is classified as
an important therapeutic gain (A) for the treatment of herpes keratoconjunctivitis.
The subcommittee finds that the numerous examples of important
or significant drugs which have been delayed and in some cases not yet
approved leave no doubt that U.S. patients have suffered a number of
significant therapeutic losses. FDA appears to raise safety issues on
many drugs which have been in use lor years in advanced countries
without any problems. These are countries which also are reported to
have good port-marketing surveillance programs in operation.
One is lend to the realization that, if the most up to date advances are
not available in the United States, there will be a therapeutic deficiency relative to other advanced countries which have these therapies.
It follows that some patients denied this benefit will die or suffer
unneoessarily. This automatically results in a diminution intihequality
of life and the health care of those who are ill.
The United States prescription drug laws were designed to protect
citizens bv preventing general public access to new drugs which could
result in harm to the recipient, if unsupervised. It must be remembered
that all drugs have serious potential side effects and all drugs are
capable of serious harm if misused or abused. Therefore, safety is rela-,
tive and both patients and regulators must assume some risk. Levels
of public expectations and regulatory goals must be modified to appreciate the necessary balancing of benefits and risks in advancing new
and effective drug therapies.
D. THE NEED FOR A VARIETY OF DRUGS

Although many disease areas have numerous drugs available for
their treatment, the subcommittee recognized the need for a variety
of drugs for optimum treatment. Drugs not being available simply
reduce a physician's and patient's option for the most beneficial treatment for the illness. Discussing sodium valproate, Dr. Farrendelli
stated:
Even with the 15 anticonvulsants available in the United
States at this time, only about 50 percent of epilepsy patients
could achieve complete control of their seizures. Another 30
percent oould achieve partial control and the remaining 20
percent little or no control. More drugs are needed to control
seizures in the 50 percent of the epilepsy population for whom
presently available therapy doses not provide complete
control.
Dr. Zipes summed it up as follows:
It is as naive to think that one antiarrhythmic drug will be
effective for patiente. as it is to think that one antibiotic will
cure all infections. Therefore, physicians need to be able to
choose from a wide selection of antiarrhythmic agents that
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have widely different electrophysiologic properties. No ideal
universally effective antiarrythmic agent exists. If it did, such
questions as to whom to treat and with what drug would not
occur. Different causes of an arryhthmia may allow a drug to
be effective in one patient but not in another*
Virtually all the available antiarrhythmic agents have significant side effects that may vary from patient to patient
One may produce crippling diarrhea in one patient, and be
tolerated without any problems in another. Clinicians must
oontinue to evaluate the benefit-to-risk ratio of any drug and
be able to select an effective drug that does not produce side
effects for any given patient To do this, there must be a wide
spectrum from which to choose.
Few if any drugs are effective in all patients. In fact, most drugs
are effective in only 30 to 75 percent of the patients. Even seemingly
unimportant drugs may help a few people and for those few people
they are very important.
The subcommittee concludes that the U.S. drug lag has an adverse
impact on medical treatment and hence health care in the United
States.
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DTP aupplv was threatened in 1984 when two major suppliers of DTP threatened to
withdraw from the market and production lots did not meet Quality control standards. The reports I have seen indicate that current problems related to the supply of
vaccines are due tc a number of factors including concentration of production in a
small number of manufacturers, limited stockpiling of vaccines and commercial
companies' participation in the relatively small market for vaccine products.
A third and final factor that threatens the supply of childhood vaccines in our
country is the product liability crisis in the area of vaccines. There are a number of
factors that need to be carefully evaluated before we make any changes here. First,
we need to review how much the current rise in product liability insurance is due to
the fluctuating market for insurance. Since 1984, the insurance market has ewung
from a buyers market to a sellers market Premium rates have increased by 800
percent and more. Second, we also need to review the impact our Nation's court
system, specificity our tort system, has had on the cost and availability of product
liability insurance.
I look forward to working with you Mr. Chairman and the other members of the
subcommittee in finding the answers to these major issues and moving ahead with
the proper legislation to ensure that we continue to have the necessary vaccines at
an affordable price.
Mr. WAXMAN. Our first panel of witnesses is comprised of vari-

ous health organizations that have long been interested in And involved in childhood immunizations and vaccine compensation. Dr.
Martin Smith is president of the American Academy of Pediatrics.
Malinda Carter is9 a community health nurse here on behalf of the
American Nurses Association. William Foege is president of the
American Public Health Association. Dr. Roy Schwarz is assistant
vice president of the American Medical Association. And Dr. Roberta Coffin is commissioner of health for the State of Vermont
and is appearing here today as a representative of the Association
of State and Territorial Health Officers.
I would like to have you please come forward. We want to welcome each of you to our hearing this morning. Your prepared statements will be made part of the record in full. What we would like
to ask each of you to do is to summarize your statement in no more
than 5 minutes. I am going to have to be very strict in terms of the
5-minute rule, in order to keep with the schedule that we have
planned for today. We will start with Dr. Smith.
STATEMENTS OF MARTIN H. SMITH, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS; MALINDA CARTER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, AMERICAN NURSES9 ASSOCIATION; WILLIAM H.
FOEGE, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION;
M. ROY SCHWARZ, ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION; AND ROBERTA COFFIN, ON
BEHALF OF ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL
HEALTH OFFICERS
Dr. SMITH. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I am Dr. Martin H. Smith,
president of the American Academy of Pediatrics, here today to
speak for the academy relative to H.R. 5184, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.
Mr. Chairman, the academy, first of all, wishes to commend you
for providing leadership in this area at a time when leadership is
so urgently needed. We also would like to acknowledge the leadership of Mr. Madigan and Mr. Tauke on this issue as well. We applaud your initiative in working with the interested parties to develop H.R. 5184 and putting it forth as a viable means of resolving
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the difficult crisis situation that we are facing with respect to our
ability to immunise our children against preventable disease.
The crisis has not gone away; it's only shifted from one of supply
to one of affordability. While the remaining three producers of our
childhood vaccines nave stayed in the marketplace, the costs of
these products have soared. It is the young parents of our patients
who carry this heavyfinancialburden. For example, the producers
of DTP vaccines have tacked an additional $8 charge per shot as a
set-aside for their potential liability problems. This means that
young parents—and for the most part out of their own pocketsare funding an $80 million liability reserve fund. This is more than
we spend as a nation on our entire childhood immunization program.
During the past 2 years particularly, we have had a series of
crises of supply and cost ana vet somehow the public and the private immunization programs have continued. Both the public and
private programs have been strained and this cannot continue.
I have already made reference to the tremendous escalation in
costs that has gone on during the past few years and particularly
during the past 2 rears. In other public statements the academy
has called repeated attention to the wide disparity in costs to the
private sector of medicine as compared to the costs in the public
sector. It is very evident that at the present time the private sector
is being forced to bear the largest part of the burden of liability
costs. It will inevitably follow that if this disparity continues, many
patients will be forced to the public sector for their immunizations
when they have been accustomed in the past to receiving them
from their own physicians.
The public sector is not capable at the present time of handling
this increased load. It has insufficient funding as well as insufficient personnel to manage a large new influx of patients. We recognize the reason for such a wide disparity in costs between the private and public sectors of medicine. The Government is able to purchase vaccines still on their old contracts. When these contracts
expire early next year, the Congress must expect that huge increases will also occur in the costs for all vaccines in the public
sector.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, vaccines are not
like other consumer products and must be treated differently from
all other products. Their use is mandated by every State in the
union and they are already heavily regulated by the Federal Government The traditional tort system has not served children well
in this limited instance and in fact has contributed to this critical
public health problem.
The facts are that the number of producers has dwindled, the
costs of vaccines have risen dramatically, and research efforts for
new and improved vaccines have been chilled. Parents wait for
years for the resolution of law suits while the immediate needs of
their child are compromised. A few eventually win settlements;
many others do not While we fully recognize the important role
the courts play in protecting our children from negligent acts, we
commend you for developing legislation which provides for a fair
balance between simple and quick compensation and the tort
system. You have preserved a parent's right to determine the best
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course for their child and you have expedited tlu, process so that
the child's needs can be met in an appropriate manner.
We are convinced that there are two steps that can reverse the
continually increasing costs of vaccines and the increasing crisis atmosphere surrounding vaccine liability:
First, Congress can push the research and field testing of an improved pertussis vaccine and can see to it that this occurs by incorporating these demands into legislation.
Second, Congress can move forward with a compensation legislation that provides for a prompt and reasonable compensation for
all justified claims resulting from vaccine injury.
H.R. 5184 addresses these issues in a fair, compassionate and fiscally responsible manner. We clearly recognize the compromises
that must be made. We do have some specific suggestions for modifications in our written statement and look forward to working
with the committee on the resolution of these issues.
Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Smith. We will look at
the suggestions that you have in your prepared statement for some
modifications.
Dr. SMITH. All right
Mr. WAXMAN. We appreciate your testimony.
[Testimony resumes on p. 139.]
[The prepared statement of Dr. Smith follows:]
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ttSTZNOIT
Presented by:
ftartla I. Sella, H.O., P.a.a.P.
Z an Dr. Hartin H. Saith, Praaldant of tha Aaerican
Academy of Pediatrlee, hara today to apeak for tha Aaerican
Acadeay of Pediatrlee ralatlva to H.R. 5184, tha National
Childhood Vaccina Injury Act of 1986.

-I

Mr. Chairman, flrat of all tha Acadeay vlahaa to coaaend
you for providing tha laadarahip in thia araa at a tlaa whan
laadarahip la ao urgantly naadad.

Ha applaud your initiatlva

in working with intaraatad partlaa to davalop H.R. 5184 and
putting it forth aa a viable aaana of raaolvlng tha crlaia
situation va ara facing with raapact to our ability to laaunlae
our childran agalnat pravantabla dlaeaaa.
Mr. Chairman, laat auaaar va vltnaaaad apot ahortagaa of
tha partuaala vaccina.

This experience daaonatratas that in

tha abaanca of protactiva legislation our national iaaunizatlon
prograa la extremely fragila indaad.

Lot aa point out tha

axparlanca of othar countries when partuaala laaunltatlon
dacllnadt
o

Tha laaunltatlon rata in England fall froa 79 pareant

in 1973 to 31 parcant in 1978.

Beginning in 1977 thare waa a

large outbreak of whooping cough, with an epideaie of 102,500
reported partuaala cases.

Between 1977 and 1980 36 partuaala

related deathe vara reported, aa vara SOOO hoapltal admissions
due to the dlaeaaa.

These figures aay be far too low since

pertussis caaea and partuaala deaths are underreported and
often Misdiagnosed.
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In Japan* following two daatha thought to ba aaao-

elatad with vaccina adainlatratlon, tha iaaunitation rata
dacllnad to batvaan 30 and 40 pareant aftar 197S.

In tha

Kid-1970a only 200-400 caaaa and flva or fawar daatha aaaociatad with partuaaia wara raportod.annually in Japan; in 1980,
13,105 partuaaia caaaa and 41 daatha wara rap©rtad. 1/
o

In Swadan, tha highaat nuabar of raportad caaaa of

partuaaia batwaan 1968-1976 waa 2,747, and tha avaraga waa auch
lowar.

Howavar, in 1979, tha govamaant atoppad routlna vacci-

nation, and vaceina waa not avallabia at all.
ainea roaa to 9,778 eaaaa in 1983.

Partuaaia eaaaa

Anothar paak la axpactad in

1986-67.
For tha aoaant tha crlaia hap ahlftad from ona of aupply
to ona of affordabillty.

Whila tha raaalning thraa producara

of our childhood vacelnaa hava atayad in tha aarkatplaca, tha
coata of thaaa producta hava aoarad.

Tha producara of DTP

vaccina hava tackad on an additional $8 charga par ahot as a
aat-aaida for thalr potantial liability problaaa.

Thla aaana

that young paranta ara funding an $80 aillion liability raaarva
fund (and for tha aoat part ara paying for it out of thalr own
pockata).

1/

Thia la aora than wa apand aa a nation on our antlra

Sinea 1981, tha Japanaaa hava baan uaing aavaral diffarant acallular vacelnaa. It la thalr praetlca to atart
iaaunizatlon latar than in tha U. 3., aoaatlaaa aa lata aa
24 aontha of aga. Liaitad afficacy data of thaaa vacelnaa
ara avallabia.
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- 3 childhood Immunisation program!

Wo faar that as a rosult of

prlco Increases many patlonts will bo forcod into public
clinics for thoir immunizations.

At present, tho public stctor

is not capablo of handling this lneroasod load, sinco it has
insufficient funding and porsonnsl to manage a largo now Influx
of patlonta.
Because of tho wldo disparity in costs of tho vaccina to
tho prlvato and public soctors of medicine, it is ovldont that
at tho prosont timo tho prlvato soetor is bolng forcod to boar
tho largost part of tho burdon of liability coots.

This

discrepancy in coats botwoon tho prlvato and tho public soctors
of modiclno is duo to tho ability of government to purchase
vaccines in bulk under relatively old contracts, which expire
•arly next yoar.

Thus, the Congress must anticipate a huge

increases in the costs for all vaccines in tho public sector in
tho near future.
Mr. Chairman, the Academy believes that the crisis
atmosphere surrounding childhood vaccinas can bo reversed only
through enactment of legislation containing throe key features.
First, the research and field testing of an improved
pertussis vaccine must be given the highest priority by
government.
Second, a simple, nonadversarial no-fault system providing
prompt and reasonable resolution of justified claims resulting
from vaccine injury must bo established, thus insuring simple
justice for children.
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- * Third, tha product• liability rulaa applicable to
childhood vaccinas must be changed in order to provide greater
predictability of loases to manufacturers.
Mr. Chairman, legislation supported by the Acsdemy in the
paat has concentrated on the flrat two points.

We now

recognise, baaed on the crista occurring the past two years,
that tort reform alao la an eaaential part of a permanent
solution.

While we acknowledge the important role the courts

play in protecting our children from negligent acts, we commend
you for developing legislation which provides for tort reform,
as well as a fair compensation system.

Vaccinae are not like

other consumer products and it la appropriate that they be
treated differently under products liability law.

Immunisation

is mandated by every atate in the Union and childhood vaccinae
are heavily regulated by the Federal Government.

The

traditional tort ayatern haa not served children well in this
limited instance and in fact has contributed to this critical
public health problem.

The facta are that directly as a result

of producte liability problema, the number of producers haa
dwindled, the costs of vaccinae have rieen dramatically, and
reaearch efforts for new and Improved vaccinae have been
chilled.

Parents wait for yeara for the resolution of lawsuits

while the Immediate needs of their children are compromised.

A

few eventually win lawsuits and aome gain settlements; many
others do not.
Mr. Chairman, the Academy believes that R.R. S184
addreeees the three issues outlined briefly above in a fair,
compaaslonate and fiscally responsible manner, and we are
supportive of the thruat of this legislation.

We do have

comments about some specific provisions of the bill and offer
euggested revisions for your consideration in the sttached
Appendix.
Mr. Chairman, we applaud your and Mr. Madlgan'a ef forte—
and thoae of other members of this Subcommittee—directed
toward preservation and enhancement of thla nation'a childhood
vaccination program, and the establishment of a fair and just
compensation program for injured victims.

Thank you for your

leaderahlp and your concern for children.
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M E K O R X N D U M

DZPARTKEHT OP HEALTH AND HHHAN SERVICES
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
POOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH

DATS:

September 11, 1989

TROK:

Director
Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, HFD-120

SUBJECT:

Interpreting' Post-marketing Surveillance Information en
Halcion.

TO:

Members, Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee

I.

The Halcion Question Delineated:

Halcion, the most commonly prescribed domestic hypnotic drug
product, has long been the object of recurring waves of adverse
publicity concerning its alleged potential to cause a unique
profile of adverse 'behavioral1 events.
Actually, the adverse
behavioral events1 attributed to Halcion (e.g., excessive sedation,
intoxication, bizarre behavior, paradoxical excitement, delirium,
psychosis, amnesia, dissociative states, agitation, anxiety,
depression, dependence and withdrawal reactions, seizure, even
death, etc.) are also reported in association with the use of other
benzodiazepine and non-benzodiazepine sedative/hypnotic drugs
(e.g., barbiturates, non-BBs). What is unusual about Halcion is
the large and sustained volume of reports of already 'labeled1
events that continue to be received now some 7 years after its
initial introduction into our domestic armamentarium.
Does this volume of reports represent a 'signal1 that Halcion is
an especially dangerous drug, perhaps one too dangerous to remain
on the market as has been implied by some of the drug's more
extreme critics? Obviously, after careful review, the agency does
not think that it does; to the contrary, despite the volume of
reports, we remain convinced that Halcion is a safe and effective
hypnotic drug product.
Nevertheless, given the adverse publicity and the anxiety that has
been raised among the laity, it seems prudent to have a group of
independent experts review the facts about Halcion and discuss
1

Importantly, these racovard phenomena ere not adverse risks nevly
discovered through the agency's post-marketing surveillance system. The events
enumerated were recognized as pocencUl or known risks of Halcion prior to i*s
domestic marketing and vere identified, and repeatedly cited, in Halcion s
prescription product labeling at the time of its initial marketing.
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t h e i r p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , candidly, i n an open p u b l i c forum.
Thus, we have cone t o the Committee.
Purposes, TJsms aixd Limitations of the Agency f s Post-Marketing
Voluntary Reporting System:

II.

Analyses based on data derived from FDA's voluntary spontaneous
r e p o r t i n g post-marketing surveillance system w i l l play a prominent
r o l e i n the Committee's deliberations on Halcion on September 22,
1989. Understanding how our post-marketing adverse event reporting
system works and what can and cannot be done with t h e data i t
g e n e r a t e s i s a necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e t o d i s c u s s i o n of these
analyses.
This memorandum i s w r i t t e n t o provide some b a s i c
i n s i g h t s i n t o the s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of the system. 2
To begin, in c o n s i d e r i n g the r e s u l t s of t h e s e a n a l y s e s , Committee
members should be mindful that FDA's voluntary spontaneous
reporting s u r v e i l l a n c e system i s primarily intended t o s i g n a l the
presence 3 of p r e v i o u s l y unappreciated drug a s s o c i a t e d adverse
events.
C r i t i c a l l y , the voluntary reporting system i s not capable of
determining the a c t u a l incidence of s p e c i f i c adverse e v e n t s , and
consequently, i t i s not capable of generating r e l i a b l e e s t i m a t e s
cf the r e l a t i v e r i s k of various drug products t o cause p a r t i c u l a r
types of adverse e v e n t s . 4
2

The accompanying memorandum by Dr. Charles Anello, Deputy Director cf che
Office of Epidemiology and Bioscacisticst
which conveys zhe reporting raze daza
and discusses our analyses of Halcion, provides addizional dezails abouz zhe
system.
Appendix I of zhis memorandum also provides addizional
information.
3

The need for posz-marketing surveillance
arises because even zhe most
elaborate and extensive of new drug developmenz and teszing programs cannoz
reliably identify drug induced events zhaz occur 1) ac low incidence [e.g.,
less
Chan 1 in 300 co 500 exposures], 2) only or primarily wichin unique subgroups
of che populacion chac were not adequacely represenzed in che drug development
clinical
ceszing program, or 3) only or primarily in associazion wizh condizions
of use not syscemacically
evaluaced during pre-marketing clinical cescing
[e.g..
in associaclon wich a particular
type of concomitant drug therapy or
illness].
4

This stacemenc refleccs currenc FDA policy abouc che legicimace uses of
daca derived from che agency's post-marketing voluntary spontaneous
reporting
system. In fact, when releasing information gathered in the system under Freedom
of Information, Che Division of Epidemiology and Surveillance routinely
encloses
a 'flier' which warns about potential misuses of daca derived from post-marketing
spontaneous voluntary reports.
(See Appendix I)
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The spontaneous reporting system cannot determine incidence 2
because 1) the nunber of reports accumulated by the system bear a
very uncertain r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the number of adverse events
a c t u a l l y occurring and 2) the s i z e of the population at r i s k ( i . e . ,
t h e number of i n d i v i d u a l s exposed t o drug and, t h e r e f o r e , at r i s k
t o s u f f e r an adverse drug induced event during the i n t e r v a l for
which r e p o r t s are being accumulated), i s unknown.
To e l a b o r a t e , counts of reports of adverse drug experience are not
counts of drug induced injury. A report of a drug a s s o c i a t e d event
i s i n almost every c a s e only a s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t a causal linkage
e x i s t s between the occurrence of the event and the administration
of t h e drug.
Admittedly,, in many c a s e s , the s p e c u l a t i o n i s
s e n s i b l e , l o g i c a l , and reasonably supported by the circumstances
in which the event occurred. Nonetheless, the linkage remains a
s p e c u l a t i o n based on a post hoc, ergo propter hoc l o g i c 6 .
As
Alvan F e i n s t e i n long ago pointed out, t h i s form of argument i s most
p e r s u a s i v e when the event observed i s v i r t u a l l y unheard of in the
absence of drug treatment ( e . g . , F e i n s t e i n gave the example of the
p a t i e n t who grows f e a t h e r s on h i s arm a f t e r taking a new drug).
However, when the p u t a t i v e drug induced adverse event occurs
commonly and spontaneously ( i . e . , in the absence of drug exposure)
in t h e t a r g e t ^patient population, the v a l i d i t y of the post hoc,
Incidence is a measure of the rate at vhlch new cases of a particular
type (i.e.,
individuals
developing a particular
disease or experiencing a
specific
class of an adverse event) emerge from the population of
individuals
'at risk.'
Typically,
incidence is expressed in terns of new cases per
individuals
'at risk' over some convenient interval of time. The calculation
of incidence for a particular
reporting interval,
therefore,
requires:
1) a
counc of all new cases occurring, 2) a count of all individuals in the population
who were at risk for becoaing cases, and 3) the actual duration of time for which
each individual counted at risk was actually at risk.
Using this
information,
an incidence estimate, expressed as cases or events per person-time,
can be
calculated.
Often, however, because information about each individual's
actual
duration at risk is often unknown, a surrogate incidence estimate, based on the
ratio of new cases to all individuals
at risk (for any duration of exposure)
during the interval of interest
is employed.
• In some cases, a reporter may have additional evidence to support the
hypothesis chat the observed event is drug induced. Rechallenge of the patient
who has recovered from a reversible
adverse event is an example of a subject own
control,
'n' of one, experiment co assess the question of event causality.
For
obvious reasons (risk, lack of clinical
importance, etc.),
rechallenge is not
common, however. It is ordinarily reserved for situations where the drug product
is unique in its therapeutic potential and especially important to the management
of the patient's
condition.
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•rgo propter hoc argument i s i t s e l f arguable.
Such a concern i s especially relevant to the interpretation of
untoward behavioral and/or psychiatric disturbances that are
reported after a drug i s used in a patient who may be especially
prone to exhibit the alleged drug induced behavior in the absence
of ^ drug treatment.
For example, disturbed sleep i s often the
i n i t i a l sign of major psychiatric i l l n e s s . If the prescriber and
patient are not aware of this p o s s i b i l i t y , the emergence of a full
blown psychiatric i l l n e s s or syndrome may be incorrectly attributed
to the hypnotic that was prescribed to treat the i n i t i a l signs of
the i l l n e s s 7 .
In t h i s regard,
publicity
about Halcicn
illness
that might not
serves as a near perfect
logic by an uncritical

i r is somewhat ironic that the recent
arose as the direct result of an alleged
t r u l y be due to Haicion.
Indeed,
the
illustration
of the misuse of post hoc
and laregly
inadequately
informed lay

wave of adverse
Halcien induced
particular
case
ergo propter hoc
media.

Cindy Ehrlich,
the prize winning author of a series of articles
highly
critical
of Haicion
that were published
in California
Magazine in the fall
of 1988,
unequivocally
attributes
a several month long episode (characterized
by insomnia,
agitation,
depression,
weight loss,
suicidal
thoughts,
and paranoia)
that she
experienced
to taking Haicion.
Her opinion as to the cause of her illness
was
and continues
to be given wide credence by the media (20-20, McSeil Lehrer,
etc.)
although the evidence
to support her attribution
is circumstantial,
primarily
tied to the fact that she became progressively
more disturbed
after Haicion was
prescribed
for her complaints
of insomnia and anxiety.
The possibility
that her
illness
had already begun before she took Haicion was never seriously
considered
by Ms. Ehrlich or the media.
In Ms. Ehrlich's
view, her insomnia was a result
of 'stress*
(she was facing a publisher's
deadline,
she was concerned about her
aging mother's housing, her young child's
crying was waking her up at night,
she
had house guests
etc.);
everything
else that subsequently
happened was caused
by the triazolam
her therapist
prescribed
in response to her initial
complaints
of insomnia.
Ms. Ehrlich's
therapist,
(who Ms. Ehrlich
carefully
tells
us
"..happens
to be an M.D."), evidently
did not consider Haicion to be the cause
of Ms. Ehrlich's
worsening clinical
state.
In fact, she presumably tho.ught the
episode was some form of atypical
anxiety because she treated Ms. Ehrlich,
first
with alprazolam
and then, when her symptoms worsened, with thioridazine,
albeit
at a near homeopathic
dose of lOmg, soon followed by a low dose (50mg) course
of amitryptllne.
One day, several months into her illness,
Ms. Ehrlich, by then
caking A different
psychotherapeutic
medicines,
abruptly
came to the
conclusion
that her difficulties
were caused by Haicion and decided to skip her next dose
of Haicion,
although she continued to take the other 3 medication
(i.e.,
Xanax.
Mellaril
and Elavil).
By the very next day Ms. Ehrlich claims she felt mif not
normal, at least
75% better,
even without sleep.'
Certainly,
Ms.
Ehrlich's
illness
might be a consequence of drug treatment
(e.g.,
some of her
complaints
are consistent
with the signs and symptoms of a treatment emergent
benzodiazepine
withdrawal
reaction),
but it is also possible
that Ms. Ehrlich's
illness
was
'spontaneous,
Haicion
being buc an innocent
suspect
unfairly
indicted
and
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Thus, t h e proportion of spontaneously reported adverse e v e n t s
a c t u a l l y caused by drug i s invariably unknown. When an e v e n t i s
both cornoon and p r e d i c t e d by the pharmacology of t h e drug, i t may
seem q u i t e reasonable t o assume t h a t most e v e n t s of t h e type
r e p o r t e d a r e caused by t h e drug, but, even in t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
a s u b s t a n t i a l f r a c t i o n of reports r e c e i v e d may a c t u a l l y r e p r e s e n t
spontaneous e v e n t s . •
I r a i s e t h e i s s u e of a t t r i b u t a b l e r i s k because a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
a d r u g ' s proper p l a c e i n the armamentarium must c o n s i d e r not merely
how o f t e n i t s use i s a s s o c i a t e d with some untoward e v e n t , but the
a b s o l u t e number of c a s e s a c t u a l l y induced by drug t r e a t m e n t .
Herein l i e s t h e d i f f i c u l t y .
The e s t i m a t i o n of a t t r i b u t a b l e r i s k
depends upon a knowledge of incidence which, as has been e x p l a i n e d ,
cannot be determined from spontaneous adverse event r e p o r x s .
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the inherent l i m i t a t i o n s of the system are o f t e n
ignored.
I t i s not uncommon, for example, t o s e e adverse event
r e p o r t i n g r a t e s 9 used as surrogates for the i n c i d e n c e of drug
convicted

chrough careless

investigative

reporting.

From an epidemiological perspective,
the issue can be thought of as one
involving a determination of the 'etiologic fraction' or 'attributable
risk. '
Etiologic fraction is defined as the proportion of all new cases detected in a
given period
that are attributable
to the risk factor
of
interest.
Unfortunately,
it is not possible to estimate the etiologic
fraction
without
knowledge of the incidence of the event in both the absence and the presence of
the risk factor (l.e, drug exposure).
9

A reporting race for a specific drug related ADR is an estimate of the
rate at which the agency receives reports of the ADR, the rate being
'adjusted'
for the extent of the use of the drug. The adjustment employed relies on an
indirect Index of drug use derived from the National Prescription
Audit (NPA),
a scientific
sampling of chain and independent pharmacies conducted by a
commercial drug information service.
Typically, a reporting rate is expressed
in terms of reports received per year per million scripts written.
The number
of scripts written, however, Is not a reliable means co estimate the size of the
population from which adverse drug events emerge. Because 'scripts
written,'
only reflects
the exposure of ambulatory domestic patients who obtain their drug
from scripts
filled
at pharmacies, it is an inappropriate
denominator for
calculating
reporting
rates for events occurring 1) in hospitals
or other
institutions
where a drug can be administered without a prescription
being
written or 2) in non-domestic settings.
It is especially important to consider
this fact when making a comparison between the reporting rates of different drug
products for the same ADR. Clearly, if one drug is used more commonly in a
hospital setting
than the one with which it is being compared, the use of agency
reporting rates may produce a systematically
biased estimate of relative
drug
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induced i n j u r y .
In f a i r n e s s , i f there were a way t o do the
experiment r we would probably discover t h a t the post-marketing
r e p o r t i n g r a t e for a given ADR-drug dyad • p r e d i c t s , • in the sense
t h a t s t a t i s t i c a l r e g r e s s i o n analysis p10
r e d i c t s , the actual incidence
of t h e injury induced by the drug.
However, without f u l l
knowledge of a l l t h e f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g r e p o r t i n g r a t e , there i s no
r e l i a b l e means t o c a l c u l a t e the absolute i n c i d e n c e of untoward
e v e n t s from information on reporting r a t e s , and, consequently, no
way t o e s t i m a t e t h e e t i o l o g i c * f r a c t i o n a t t r i b u t a b l e t o a s p e c i f i c
drug.
Without knowledge of the e t i o l o g i c f r a c t i o n , there i s r e a l l y no
f a i r way t o compare the r i s k of two d i f f e r e n t drugs t o cause a
given ADR.. Admittedly, i n theory at l e a s t , using the r a t i o of the
adverse event r e p o r t i n g r a t e s of two products as an i n d i c a t o r of
t h e i r r e l a t i v e r i s k t o cause a given ADR could be j u s t i f i e d i f the
linkage between adverse event incidence and reporting r a t e were
i d e n t i c a l for a l l products compared. Thar i s , a reporting rare
r a t i o would be proportional to r e l a t i v e r i s k i f the f r a c t i o n of
events d e t e c t e d and the f r a c t i o n of detected events reported were
i d e n t i c a l for a l l products compared.
Even then, the reporting
r a t e r a t i o s would not speak t o the r e l a t i v e i n t r i n s i c r i s k s of the
products compared u n l e s s the products were being used in the same

risk.

Again, critically,

a reporting

rate is NOT an

incidence.

l0

It is important to acknowledge that there is disagreement about the nature
of the probable relationship
between incidence and reporting rates.
Some drug
epidemiologists
assert that only a very small fraction of adverse events observed
are actually reported.
If this is so, the incidence of a drug related
event,
cited in terns of individuals suffering an event per individuals at risk (i.e. .
exposed to drug) would be expected to exceed the adverse reporting rate by an
order of numerical magnitude or more. For example, the reporting rate for
amnesia with Hale ion is about 6/10 • scripts per year; if we accept the argument
that only 10% of observed events are reported, the actual incidence of amnesia
would be 60 patients per million exposed per year.
This estimate assumes that
an average of one script
is written per patient.
If multiple scripts
are
written, the true incidence, at least as I have defined it. increases by a factor
approximating the average number of scripts written per patient.
On the other
hand, still other factors tend to make the reporting rate numerically larger than
the incidence.
First, not every case reported as amnesia actually is one.
Second, some proportion of the cases being reported in association with the use
of Halcion are probably not caused by Halcion but by other etiologic
agents
(e.g., illness,
concomitant drug use, alcohol, etc.).
For additional
discussicn
of this point, see the section of this memorandum describing the findings of my
review of a 101 sample of Amnesia reports.
[Appendix 2].
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way i n t h e same population a t e q u i - e f f e c t i v e d o s e s . 1 1
However, because f a c t o r s 1 2 i n f l u e n c i n g r e p o r t i n g r a t e s may NOT be
the sane for a l l drug products, i t i s hazardous t o use the r a t i o
of adverse event reporting r a t e s of tvo drugs as an index of t h e i r
r e l a t i v e c a p a c i t y t o cause a s p e c i f i c adverse e v e n t .
Consequently, a reporting r a t i o d i f f e r i n g from u n i t y must always
be t r e a t e d as a s i g n a l of a p o s s i b l e problem, not proof of the
e x i s t e n c e of one.
This p o i n t deserves emphasis because our intra-agency use of
comparisons based on the r a t i o of the r e p o r t i n g r a t e s of Halcion
to R e s t o r i l may seem i m p l i c i t l y to endorse, d e s p i t e our o f f i c i a l
statements t o the contrary, the r a t i o of post-marketing adverse
event r e p o r t i n g r a t e s as a v a l i d estimate of r e l a t i v e drug r i s k .
Not a t a l l ! We use reporting rate r a t i o s t o explore our l a r g e ADR
databases for s i g n a l s of p o t e n t i a l problems.
We have never
advocated t h a t such s i g n a l s be taken as compelling proof of a
d i f f e r e n t i a l r i s k a s s o c i a t e d with two drug products.
This i s
important t o bear i n mind because those who obtain FDA documents
under FOI are not always so c a r e f u l .
Indeed, even FDA s t a f f
sometimes disregard the important d i s t i n c t i o n between r e l a t i v e r i s k
and r e l a t i v e reporting r a t e s .
In any c a s e , i t behooves us t o bear i n mind t h a t the r a t i o of
r e p o r t i n g r a t e s s e r v e s only as a s i g n a l of a p o s s i b l e problem, not
as proof t h a t one e x i s t s !

11

The importance of s p e c i f y i n g a comparison of r i s k at e q u i - e f f e c t i v e doses
is often neglected.
The i n e q u i t y of comparing the r i s k s of one drug,
administered a t a r e l a t i v e l y subtherapeutic dose, say a t an EDlQt with one being
administered a t an £D90 should be obvious.
12

Any number of f a c t o r s might a f f e c t reporting r a t e s although I know of no
s y s t e m a t i c study of the q u e s t i o n .
I t i s g e n e r a l l y assumed, however, that
r e p o r t e r m o t i v a t i o n can be very important. So, t o o , l o g i c a l l y might be p u b l i c i t y
and awareness of the p o s s i b i l i t y that a drug can cause a p a r t i c u l a r event.
Experts i n the UK's CSM (personal communication) have offered t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y
as an e x p l a n a t i o n for the sudden increase i n the frequency of reports l i n k i n g
nomifensine and hemolytic anemia that occurred f o l l o w i n g CSH warnings about the
p o s s i b l e l i n k a g e i n 1984 and 1985, more than 7 years a f t e r nomifensine had been
marketed i n the UK.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence documenting the
e x i s t e n c e o f such f a c t o r s i s the dramatic f a l l of adverse reaction reporting on
a t y p i c a l drug i n the years f o l l o w i n g i t s i n i t i a l marketing (vide i n f r a ) .
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I I I . S p e c i f i c Caveats about the analyses presented vhich r e l y on
r a t i o s of Ealcion t o R e s t o r i l reporting r a t e s :
Our i n t e r - d i v i s i o n a l Task Force 13 recognized from t h e o u t s e t of i t s
e f f o r t s t h a t i t had no means t o e x t r a c t a b s o l u t e or r e l a t i v e
i n c i d e n c e information from the post-marketing spontaneous reporting
data b a s e . 1 4
.We recognized, however, t h a t even i f ve could not t e s t the c r i t i c a l
i m p l i c i t assumptions t o v a l i d a t e a reporting r a t e r a t i o a n a l y s i s ,
ve ought t o carry one out. Based on our knowledge t h a t R e s t o r i l
was marketed only tvo years e a r l i e r than Halcion, ve e l e c r e d t o use
i t f r a t h e r than Dalmane, which had f i r s t been marketed in 1970,
more than a decade e a r l i e r , as the index for our comparison.
Dalmane was a l s o considered a bad choice f o r a comparison aceni
because of i t s long a c t i n g a c t i v e m e t a b o l i t e .
In any e v e n t , we reasoned that i f we found the reporting rare
r a t i o s t o be u n i t y , the e n t i r e i s s u e of Halcion*s a l l e g e d excess
r i s k would be r e s o l v e d .
As i t turned out, our a n a l y s i s of the reporting r a t e r a t i o s found
t h a t over a l l years of t h e i r j o i n t marketing, more adverse events
were reported for Kalcion than for R e s t o r i l .
Aware t h a t the
13

In the fa.ll of 1988, the surge of publicity surrounding the publication
of the Ehrlich articles
led the agency to form a special task force, an interdivisional
work group
with
representatives
from
the
Divisions
of
Heuropharmacological Drug Products and the Division
of Epideniology and
Surveillance,
co undertake a systematic review to determine if the charges being
made about the alleged excessive risks of Halcion were valid ones. In pursuit
of its charge, the task force commissioned a series of analyses, examining, for
the first time, annual reporting trends for a series of ADR for both Halcion and
Restoril from both direct and manufacturer sources.

u

Other sources can provide such estimates, at least in theory.
In fact.
UpJohn has conducted a prospective study employing a cohort formed from patients
who filled prescriptions
in a group of Canadian pharmacies for hypnotics.
This
study was generally negative,
although it did identify
an increased risk of
amnesia with Halcion.
Given our low estimates of the incidence of serious
Halcion associated ADRs, however 9 this is not especially surprising.
If Halcion
does pose a relatively
greater risk than other hypnotics, it is for events that
affect only a small proportion of those who use hypnotics.
Consequently, the
Canadian pharmacy study, because of its small size, and perhaps also because of
the fact that 2/3's of the participants
were repeat users, was probably incapable
by design (i.e, it had inadequate power) of detecting sufficient
numbers of these
adverse events co gain an estimate of comparative risk.
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interpretation of the analysis depended, in part r upon the
assumption that both drugs were being prescribed in the sane
manner, for the same use, and in the sane populations, ve attempted
to determine i f s e l e c t i v e prescribing-of Halicon by psychiatrists,
or i t s s e l e c t i v e use in a uniquely vulnerable population, or the
pattern of i t s actual usage might account for the r 13
e s u l t s . We also
examined the p o s s i b i l i t y that the relative zeal
of Halcion's
manufacturer for reporting adverse events might account for the
differences in observed reporting rates for Halcion and Restoril.
Each of these analyses failed to identify a factor that might
explain Halcion's higher reporting rate, but failure to identify
the presence of a source of systematic bias in an analysis does not
preclude the existence of one.
Our analyses of Kalcion and
Rescoril entail comparisons betveen croups formed without benefit
of randomization and must, therefore,* be treated with considerable
caution.
One good reason for exercising caution i s the fact, mentioned
e a r l i e r , that factors other than absolute ADR incidence exist which
strongly affect reporting ratios•
Indeed, they are not simply
t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s but factors with a potency sufficient to
cause more than ten fold fluctuations in the reporting rate for the
same ADR for a given product over the course of i t s marketing
history. 1 8
13

Compared across all products, UpJohn, the sponsor of Halcion. tends to
report twice as many adverse events per product as Sandoz, Restoril's
sponsor.
At one point, agency analysts thought this difference was important and adjusted
our Halcion to Restoril reporting rate comparisons accordingly.
Our special task
force cocsiissioned
an analysis of the subset of reports made by physicians
directly
to the agency to assess the validity
of this adjustment.
Ve reasoned
that if a sponsor's behavior was affecting reporting rates, an analysis of direct
reports would discover different ratios of reporting rates than would one based
on manufacturer's
reports.
As it turned out, our analysis revealed
that
reporting rate ratios of direct to FDA adverse reporting rates for the two
products roughly paralleled the ratios obtained from manufacturer derived reports
for all ADRs examined, save deaths.

18

In general, reporting rates tend to be high in the first year or two
following
the introduction
of at drug and then typically
decrease over time,
reaching some relatively
stable asymptotic level of reporting several years after
their introduction
to the market.
Because the pharmacological properties of
a drug do not change over time, such changes in reporting rates must be explained
by changing patterns of use (e.g., a better understanding within the medical
community of how to use the drug or the use of the drug in a less
vulnerable
population) or a change in event ascertainment and/or
reporting.
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Restoril's pattern of reporting is more or less typical. During the
first two years following its initial marketing in 1981, its
overall ADR reporting rate, given in events per 105 scripts,
averaged 24.1.
From 1984 through 1987, the reporting rate
stabilized in the range of 4.1 to 6.7 events per 108 scripts, about
a 5 fold decrease in reporting rate from the period immediately
following its introduction. Somewhat atypically,
in 1988, the rate
fell even further to 1.5 events per 10s scripts, but this may be an
artifact of a change in the interval during which reports were
accumulated.
In any case, over time, without any known change in its pattern of
use, the reporting ratio for adverse events for a hypnotic with a
stable sales volume (approximately 5 million scripts have been
written annually for Restoril since 1984) has fallen 15 fold!
Surely, this historical trend in reporting rate persuasively
documents that non-drug related factors strongly affect the number
of reports received by the agency.
In contrast, Halcion's historical pattern of reporting is somewhat
atypical. Halcion's adverse event reporting rate has dropped only
two fold between 1983 and 1988. Importantly, when our Interdivisional Task Force first examined the annual data in detail (at
the end of 1988), the data through the end of 1987 suggested that,
like Restoril, Halcion adverse event reporting rates were
exhibiting a more typical progressive decrease (i.e., almost four
fold over the interval from 1984 through 1987).
Halcion had started
off with an average reporting rate of 87.2
events per 105 scripts during its first two years of marketing
(1983, and 1984), a rate 3.62 times greater than that observed for
Restoril during its first two years on the market.17
In recent years, however, the gap in reporting rates between
Halcion and Restoril has widened; the ratio of reporting rates for
was 5.8 in 1987 and 27.3 in 1988. These reporting rate ratios are
very unstable, showing wide year to year variation suggesting that
they are poor indicators of the relative ability of the two drugs
to cause adverse events.
Nonetheless, despite the questionable validity of a reporting rate
x7

Comparing these cvo produces at comparable times early in their marketing
history may be reasonable because Halcion has continued to suffer
adverse
publicity
throughout its marketing history that Restoril has not. A concern is
that adverse
publicity
might tend to increase
event reporting
rates.
Incidentally,
because the number of spontaneous adverse event reports being
received by the agency have increased annually throughout this decade, such an
approach is still
weighted against Halcion vhich came on the market rso years
later than
Restoril.
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ratio as an indicator of relative risk, the reporting ratio of
Halcion to Restoril is consistent with an hypothesis that Kalcion
is intrinsically a more troublesome drug than Restoril for a small
proportion of the population using hypnotics.
The Agencyfs Halcion Strategy:

IV.

Because Halcion appears to be a safe and effective drug for the
vast majority of those who use it, and because we had reason to
believe that several of Halcion*s more important ADRs were dose
related, we were not initially disposed to take any immediate
publicly visible steps in response to the wave of adverse publicity
that occurred in the fall of 1988. In 1987, UpJohn and the agency
had agreed that the
recommended hypnotic adult and geriatric doses
should be lowered l8 and Halcion1 s labeling had been revised to warn
about the possible dose related nature of certain ADRs. A Dear Dr.
letter had also been issued to call attention to the changes.
Consequently, when we met with UpJohn in early 1989 to discuss
plans tor intensifying our surveillance activities and to consider
possible additional remedial actions, we were persuaded that it
would be premature to take any additional steps until we had had
an opportunity to review the effect of the 1987 labeling changes
on 1988 adverse reporting rates. In light of these changes and the
decreasing trend in reporting rate observed over the 1983 to 198 6
interval, both the agency and UpJohn anticipated even further
reductions in Halcion1s adverse reporting rate for 1988.
As it has turned out, our expectations for a further decline in
reporting rate in 1988 were not met. Our 1989 analysis of the 1988
data shows that the reporting rate (41.6 per 10 scripts) was
nearly double the rates observed in 1987 and 1986 (circa 20 per 10
scripts).
Of course, this unexpected shift in reporting rate for
Halcion may9 well reflect the effects of a year of especially bad
publicity.
For example, an increased fraction of events being
detected (i.e., a prepared mind phenomena) and/or an increase in
the fraction of detected events being reported (i.e., an increased
11

typical
patient.

In 1987,
adult;

0.25ag, richer
correspondingly,

ch*n 0.5mg, was made the recommended dose for the
0.125mg vas recommended for the
geriatric

19

UpJohn has some evidence to support this hypothesis which they will
presumably present to the Committee. A study they commissioned found that m
the 4 weeks following a 20-20 broadcast about Halcion, reporting of Halcion
associated ADRs was nearly double what it was in the 4 weeks before the
broadcast. According to UpJohn, interviews with those reporting these events
revealed that the program was often credited with influencing the decision to
make the report.
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motivation to report) might be the result of increased adverse
publicity.
V.

What We are asking of the Committee:

First, ve would like to learn how the Committee's membership views
the signal given by Halcion's reporting rate data. Again, we do
not expect the Committee to be able to know precisely what the
signal means, but we very much would like its reactions to the
information. Risk assessment is always a matter of opinion that
depends not only upon expertise and knowledge of 'facts, • but upon
one's personal values and beliefs!
Second, we would like to learn what the Committee believes we ought
to do from a practical standpoint, if anything, about the reporting
rate signal.
As noted earlier, the comments of some of Halcion's more extreme
critics imply that Halcion is 'too dangerous' to remain on the
market. It seems appropriate to examine this suggestion directly.
Can this position be given any credit at all? Obviously, the
agency's actions indicate that we do not share this view which we
consider extreme and alarmist; as I noted earlier, we believe that
Halcion, for most users, is, despite the volume of reports being
received, a safe and effective drug. However, some of our critics
might argue that the agency's position is self-serving. Thus, it
would be useful to learn how you, as independent experts from
•outside' the agency, view the suggestion that Halcion is 'too
dangerous' to remain on the market.
Others, however, may hold a very different view, arguing that doing
anything will only make matters worse, further distorting the
reporting rate of Halcion. Is this a credible argument?.
Certainly, the adverse events and untoward phenomena being reported
in apparent excess to its market share are already enumerated ^ in
Halcion's labeling; consequently, what is the point of calling
further attention to them? Why attempt to manage the effects of
adverse publicity with labeling changes?
Of course, there is a broad middle ground between these two extreme
positions. In fact, a spectrum of possible remedial actions are
conceivable although it is impossible to know what effect they
might have.
Actions to be considered range from minor
rearrangements of labeling to major publicity campaigns.
One older proposal, once made for all benzodiazepines, that has
resurfaced is the adoption of a patient package insert that would
'sensitize' the user to the possibility that newly emerging
symptoms might be drug related.
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Certainly, we might provide the prescriber with additional guidance
in those areas where we now believe we understand the genesis of
ADRs better than we have in the past. For example, using Halcion
on West to East flights where the time available for sleep is
shortened might be cautioned against strongly.
The Committee^ views on such options, and any of their own design,
would be appreciated.
We would also like to learn what the Committee thinks about putting
information about reporting rates in the labeling. Should this '
information be presented? If so, how does one communicate what
they are and what they mean to the practitioner and patient who may
be unfamiliar with the technical complexities of the ratio?
Finally, of course, we would like to hear your thoughts on the
bread question of the nature of the risks that society must
tolerate if it is to have potent drugs in its Armamentarium.
VT. Summary
The Committee is being asked to review an issue of considerable
potential importance. Unfortunately, decisions must be made in the
face of uncertainty about issues of fact that are critical elements
in any rational analysis of the problem—specifically, knowledge
of the absolute incidence, attributabia—risk anji relative risk of
Halcion to cause behavioral ADRSj^^^^
y
^s'

Paul Leber, M.D.
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Abstract

Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the cause of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), now infects more than a million pwpie in the
United States and rn.tJicr.s more in other countries. The cases of AIDS
reported thus far *re only the beginning of the expected toll, because the
damage the virus inflicts on the immune system—and the resulting inability
of the victim to fight off infections and cancers—may not be apparent until
years after initial infection. The epidemic is growing every day, partly
because persons who may not know they are infected are spreading the
virus. HIV is spread in only a few ways: transmission by anal or vaginal
intercourse, by intravenous (IV) drug use, and from mother to fetus or
newborn infant now predominate. Infection occurs mostly in young adults,
usually the healthiest segment of the population.
A sizable proportion of those now infected will, in a few years, progress
to severe disease and death. If the spread of the virus is not checked, the
present epidemic could become a catastrophe. The Institute of MedicineNational Academy of Sciences Committee on a National Strategy ior AIDS
therefore proposes perhaps the most wide-ranging and intensive efforts ever
made against an infectious disease. The situation demands both immediate
action to stem the spread of infection and a long-term national commitment
to produce a vaccine and therapeutic drugs.
A massive, continuing campaign should begin immediately to increase
awareness of v*ays in which persons can protect themselves against
infection, such as using condoms, avoiding anal intercourse, and not sharing
drug injection equipment. The campaign should empioy all the skills and

1
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tactics of education and media persuasion, and its message should be
directed in language understandable to specific target groups, including
homosexual men, intravenous drug users, sexually active heterosexuals
(especially those who have had a number of partners), and adolescents. The
committee estimates that by the end of the decade approximately $1 billion
annually, much of it from federal sources, will be needed for education and
other public health measures that it recommends, such as blood screening,
voluntary confidential testing for infection, and increased efforts in the
treatment and prevention of intravenous drug use.
The other arm of the attack on the epidemic is research. The committee
believes that a vaccine is not likely to be developed for at least five years and
probably longer. One drug has recently shown benefits in the treatment of
AIDS, but agents that are acceptably safe for possible long-term treatment
and that effectively halt or cure the disease may also not be available for at
least five years. The committee calls for extensive basic and applied
biomedical investigations to better understand the disease and increase the
likelihood of producing a safe and effective drug or vaccine as soon as
possible. This program must involve both private industry and the public
sector working together. Within the overall research effort there is a need for
extensive epidemiologic investigations to assess the spread of infection and
the efforts to control it. Finally, there is a need for considerable research on
sexual behavior and drug use and factors that influence them.
The committee believes that such a program of research will require at
least $1 billion in public funds annually oy 1990 and a continuing
commitment over many years. These funds must be newly appropriated, not
money taken from other research, because the nation's general health efforts
as well as those directed against HIV need continuing progress in basic
biomedical science on a broad front.
The increasing need for care of patients with AIDS and other HIVassociated conditions, including those with AIDS-related complex and
HIV-related dementia, poses new and often difficult problems. These
problems will spread widely in the next few years from the populations now
affected. The $2- billion yearly expenditure proposed for responding to the
epidemic is a small fraction of the billions of dollars for care that the
epidemic is sure to cost, especially if it is not rapidly curbed. The optimal
organization of care has only begun to be studied in a few cities with the
heaviest case loads, but some evidence is emerging to support communityoriented care and minimal hospitalization. The provision of such care
should be designed to guarantee equity cf access, and the mechanisms for
more appropriately financing this care need further evaluation immediately
in light of various problems now apparent.
There are scientific and medical lesions to be learned about AIDS and
HIV infection elsewhere in the world and compelling reasons for US.
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involvement in efforts to control the disease worldwide. The committee
believes that the United States should be a full participant in international
efforts on the problem, both through the World Heaith Organization and
through bilateral efforts.
Federal agencies, notably the Centers for Disease Control, the National
Institutes of Health, and the Food and Drug Administration, have contributed enormously to the rapid acquisition of knowledge about AIDS and HIV
or to techniques to help in its control. They should continue their efforts, but
greater involvement of the academic and private sectors should be encouraged. Continuing evaluation of many matters will be needed, including the
spread of HIV, directions for research and development, the effectiveness of
various efforts to promote risk-reducing behavior, and the appropriate level
of national effort. There is also a need to mobilize existing resources and
encourage interaction of the public and private sectors. To fill these needs—
and also for informing the American public, Congress, and the executive
branch—the committee proposes a National Commission on AIDS, created
either as a presidential or joint presidential and congressional entity. The
commission should act in an advisory capacity, because the need for
integration of the nation's efforts is not presently such as to require central
control that supplants the existing administrative structures.
These and other of the committee's major recommendations are summarized at the conclusion of Chapter 1, with detailed recommendations
appearing at the ends of major sections within later chapters.
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of the manufacturers) was deleted/' and a joint and several liability provision has been modified
and now reflects legislation recently enacted in California.
1

Kimmelman suggested that reform legislation is not needed to enhance international competitiveness of U.S. industry. If product liability laws have forced manufacturing industries
overseas, as many proponents of the bill claim, most products would be launched overseas
before they are introduced here, the CFA lobbyist argued. However, he maintained that the
Roussel-Uclaf oral abortifacient, RU-486, is the only example of a such a product.
J

CFA has looked for instances of "products that are marketed somewhere else before they
are marketed here" and "only found one.. .and that's a special contraceptive in France/*
Kimmelman said. CFA "can't seem to find others/' Instead, "what we have been seeing is more
foreign manufacturers coming in and hiring American workers and manufacturing here under
our liability rules/' he said.
*> Commerce Department Secretary Robert Mosbacher testified that product liability concerns
caused Genentech to cancel research into an AIDS vaccine. "The potential liability for that
product was so great that [Genentech] abandoned their" research program, Mosbacher said.
"That is, in my view, a tragedy for this country/' Genentech testified two years ago before the
California legislature in support of a state bill to provide product liability protection for AIDS
vaccine developers. The firm said the risk of product liability exposure was among the concerns
that caused Genentech to drop its AIDS vaccine research project.
1

Kasten remarked that when Merrell Dow withdrew the anti-emetic Bendectin from the market, it had annual "sales of $20 mil/' but "legal and insurance costs of $18 mil." He
added that the decision to withdraw Bendectin was made "despite the petition of 12,000 doctors,
who said this product should remain on the market because they need it,"
1

Sen. Rockefeller (D-W,Va.), a cosponsor of the legislation, cited a 1990 Commerce Department "Industrial Outlook" survey of U.S. industry, which found that the current product
liability system competitively disadvantages "all" industries that rely on biotechnology. Affected
products, he continued, include "pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical devices, chemicals [and]
pesticides:"
-0FDA AMD EUROPEAN COMMISSION DISCUSSING GMP MEMOTAWOOM OF UOT6RSTAWMM6 agreement that would
—
" ~~
"
"
"" apply to all 12 countries that are members of the European Community. Representatives from FDA and the Commission of the
European Communities' Directorate General for the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs addressed the development of the good manufacturing practices agreement at the Second Bilateral meeting held March 29-30 at
FDA's headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.

©

f

A joint statement on the meeting says that the two groups agreed to "the initiation of
activities toward the development of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMPs)." According to FDA, the agency and the EC contingent concluded that they ought to "start working more diligently" in trying to create such an agreement.
One of the commission's highest priorities is to develop an inspection and enforcement system to
ensure that all member countries are complying with GMP standards.
The commission told FDA that it woufd discourage ft* member countries from
negotiating arty new MOUs wfth other countries, but that existing agreements
woufd remain In effect until the EC can develop one as a replacement.
f

FDA currently does not have any MOUs on GMPs with EC countries; however, the agency
has such arrangements with Switzerland, Sweden and Canada. FDA and the EC commission's discussion also applied to MOUs for Good Laboratory Practices (GLPs). FDA has GLP
© F-D-C Reports, Inc., 1990. Photocopyfng without permission Is strictly prohibited. See Page One.
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7 ) pflfCES OF B,00fl MOST PRESCRIBED DRUGS UP 9.1% W 1888, Medi-Span repons in its "1989 Inflation
y
"~~~
"
'
Report." The figure is in line with Bureau of
Labor Statistics' Producer Price Index figures for the year that put prescription drug inflation at 9.7% ("The
Pink Sheet'1 Jan. 22, p. 14). The PPI, however, is weighted for sales volume, while Medi-Span's data is not.
f

Of the 5,000 prescription drugs followed by the pharmaceutical tracking firm, Medi-Span
reported that 2,595 had price changes during the year. The average price increase for only
those items that had price changes is substantially higher, at 14.67*.
Price increases for the top 200 (most prescribed) prescription drug products,
however, were only 5.5%. The top 200 products include a total of 568 items
(or pack stee*), for which 329 had price changes during the year. The average
price hike for the 329 Items was 9.5%.
f

Medi-Span data on 10,000 hospital drug products indicate that prices changed for 4,931 of
the products during the year. The average price change for the 10,000 items was 7.2%,
while the average increase for the 4,931 products with price changes was 8.17a.
t

The firm's larger data base on approximately 59,000 prescription, OTC and drug sundries
that were marketed throughout the year showed an overall price rise of 5%» Among those
products, prices for single-source items rose 5.8%, while prices for multiple-source products rose
4*7%, Medi-Span reported.
-0-

©

'

S6MATE PRODUCT tUBHITV Bill WOUtP HAVE SUPPORT OF COMSOMEff FEDEBATfOW of America if "three or
four" additional changes
are made to the legislation, CFA Legislative Director Gene Kimmelman declared at an April 5 hearing before the
Senate Commerce/Consumer Subcommittee,
1

Responding to a comment by the bill's principal sponsor that S 1400 is a moderate and
reasonable measure, Kimmelman testified: "I agree with what Sen* Kasten fR-Wis,] said
about the changes in his bill. There have been a number of changes made" from the last bill
referred' to the full Senate by the Commerce Committee. "We think that probably three or four
more and we're there," he said. "We're not nearly so far apart as we used to b e / '
One of the additional change* CFA advocates is deletion of the provision for a
defense against punitive damages for firms whose products are approved or
rated generally recognized as safe and effective by FDA. The group afso opposes
the bill's provision^? amend the doctrine of joint and several liability.
T .„ • The Wisconsin Republican commented that the modifications made to his legislation since
the 99th Congress have "boxed in" consumer groups, who he suggested must eventually
relent in their opposition to the bill. "Increasingly, we are going to have consumers recognize that
we don't want to have impediments" to marketing quality products, Kasten said. At some point
"the consumer organizations are no longer going to be able to front for the trial lawyers; they're
going to have to be off on their own," he declared. At some point "we've got to separate that
link, just as we have separated the lawyers [the American Bar Association now supports modified reform legislation] from the [AmcricanJ Trial Lawyers'1 Association, which continues to
oppose the legislation in any form. "More and more, you're getting boxed in," he said.
J

Many changes have been made with the. approval of consumer advocates, the senator
pointed out. For example, he noted* "ail limits on damages have now been removed, an
expedited claims system has been added.. .compliance with [industry or government] standards
{as a defense against] compensatory damages has been removed...rules that would reduce a
worker's right to recover based on employer fault have been deleted, sules eliminating collateral
estoppel have been removed, the requirement that plaintiffs prove negligence (a major demand

d
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Foreword

Before a drug can be prescribed for use in the United States, it must meet minimum
statutory requirements for proof of its efficacy and safety as these have been established
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In premarketing testing, the numbers
and types of patients exposed to a drug are necessarily limited compared with the numbers
and types of patients who will eventually be prescribed the drug after it is marketed.
New uses, contraindications, and side effects of drugs will then inevitably be discovered.
Thus, various kinds of postmarketing surveillance have been proposed over the past
decade.
A background paper on postmarketing surveillance of prescription drugs was originally being prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment for the project on strategies
for medical technology assessment, as requested by the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. At the further
request of that committee and its subcommittee, that background paper was expanded
into this full report, Postmarketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs.
Current interest in drug regulation is also focused on the premarketing approval
process, because the process has been criticized as unnecessarily delaying the release
of valuable drugs in this country. As a result of such criticism, efforts are underway
to shorten the approval process through administrative changes within FDA's Office
of Drugs, and through revisions of the regulatory interpretations of the statutory requirements for "adequate tests" of a drug's safety and "substantial evidence" of its effectiveness.
This report describes the drug approval process, the history and objectives of postmarketing surveillance, the methods employed to accomplish it, and current activities
in postmarketing surveillance. The report provides guidelines to determine whether
shortening the drug approval process by various means would diminish its ability to
detect adverse drug reactions prior to a drug's release for marketing. The report also
identifies oversight issues and options for increased postmarketing surveillance both
in the case that Congress decides to relax premarket approval requirements and in the
case that it does not.

-ff XU*****—.
JOHN H. GIBBONS
Director
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1.
Summary
INTRODUCTION
To market a drug, the manufacturer must provide evidence of its efficacy and safety to the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Once these
premarketing requirements are met and the drug
has been released, FDA can remove a drug from
the market—after giving due notice and an opportunity for a hearing—because of new evidence on
the drug's eff.~acy and safety, the discovery that
the drug was approved on the basis of any untrue statement of a material fact, or the failure
of the drug to meet manufacturing standards. In
cases where a drug may be an "imminent hazard
to the public health," FDA can suspend 'he drug's
approval immediately, giving prompt notice of
the action and offering the opportum y for i»n expedited hearing.
In premarketing testing, the numbers and types
of patients used to demonstrate a drug's efficacy
and safety are limited compared with the numbers
and types of patients who will eventually be prescribed the drug after it is marketed. The initial
decision to approve a drug for use, however, must
be made on the basis of the available knowledge.
Although postmarketing surveillance cannot
provide knowledge of the safety or efficacy of
drugs at the time of their introduction on the market, various kinds of postmarketing surveillance
have been proposed over the past decade to monitor and aid in modifying the use of drugs. The
principal focus of postmarketing surveillance proposals has been on the safe use of prescription
drugs, even though the range of issues has encompassed both efficacy and safety considerations,
e.g., concern over refinements in use as well as
better definition of drug risks.

Current interest in prescription drug evaluation
and monitoring is focused on the premarketing
approval process and the length of time it takes
for a drug to be approved by FDA; postmarketing
surveillance appears to have waned as a policy
issue. Thus, policy formulation and implementation for the premarketing approval process is being pursued without parallel efforts for the postmarketing period.
However, postmarketing surveillance deserves
attention as a policy issue for both short- and
long-term objectives. Regarding short-term action, if current testing requirements for the premarketing approval process are reduced, pharmaceutical manufacturers could be required to maintain their drug evaluation responsibilities by increasing postmarketing surveillance. Regarding
long-term action, postmarketing surveillance remains a policy issue irrespective of current interest
in the premarketing approval process: it is only
after marketing that a drug's full therapeutic and
harmful potentials can be determined.
One way to shorten the premarketing period
of the drug approval process would be by reinterpreting the regulations for assessing safety and efficacy. This report provides theoretical and experiential criteria for evaluating how such changes
may affect the ability of current guidelines to
detect a drug's harmful and beneficial effects. It
also discusses the kinds of qualitative changes in
the evidence required for drug approval that FDA
is implementing. Finally, the report identifies options relating to FDA's postmarketing surveillance. These options could be implemented regardless of whether there is a change in current
premarketing drug approval requirements.
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THE DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
A drug's sponsor must provide: 1) "adequate
tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested;" and 2) "substantial evidence that the drug
will have the effect it purports or is represented
to have" (21 U.S.C., sec. 355 (d)). This statutory
language has led in practice to FDA's establishing
a premarketing phase of drug testing that consists
of two parts: 1) the investigational new drug
(IND) application process, and 2) the filing of a
new drug application (NDA).
The IND application describes the investigators'
qualifications and the planned clinical trials, the
chemical composition of the drug, and data on
the pharmacology and toxicology of the new drug
collected in animal studies and in prior human
studies, if any, such as those conducted in other
countries.

III usually consists of more than two controlled trials.

I
I

After completion of the testing required under I
the IND application, the sponsor may file an
NDA. At least two well-controlled studies establishing each indication for which the drug is intended are required. More than one indication can
be established in a single study. (These require- ]
ments are under review; see chs. 3 and 6.)
All INDs are classified by chemical type and
therapeutic potential, so that those drugs considered by FDA to be of particular therapeutic importance can receive priority review. The highest
classification is given to drugs that are new molecular entities (type 1) and that may represent important therapeutic gains (type A)—type 1A
drugs.

Several mechanisms are available to FDA to obtain information about drugs once they have been
approved for marketing. Once the NDA has been
The clinical investigations in the IND process
approved, the sponsor is required to monitor inare divided into three phases (24):
formation and submit reports about the drug.
• Phase I: Clinical Pharmacology is that phase Other information on adverse drug reactions
in which a drug is first used on humans to
(ADRs) is monitored by FDA in a number of
confirm dose ranges and pharmacologic efways:
fect. The number of subjects in phase I varies
depending on the drug, but is usually in the
• the Spontaneous Reaction Reporting Prorange of 20 to 80 (excluding control patients).
gram, in which information on ADRs is sent
Pharmacodynamic and metabolic studies, in
to FDA by physicians, pharmacists, and hoswhichever stage of investigation they are perpitals;
formed, are considered to be phase I clinical
• a monthly review of the medical literature
pharmacologic studies.
on ADRs (reports and letters to the editors
of medical journals, etc.);
• Phase II: Clinical Investigation consists of
• intensive surveillance and epidemiologic
controlled clinical trials to demonstrate a
studies of ADRs in selected hospitalized and
drug's effectiveness and relative safety. These
ambulatory populations;
are performed on closely monitored patients
• several specialized registries that collect and
of limited number, usually 100 to 200 paanalyze possible ADRs;
tients, with equal numbers of control pa• in-house monitoring and research studies of
tients.
such data bases as those of the Medicaid
• Phase III: Clinical Trials are expanded conMedical Information Systems of some States ,
trolled and uncontrolled trials to gather addiand those of commercial sources of drug use
tional evidence of a drug's effectiveness for
data; and
specific indications and to more precisely
• the World Health Organization, which exdefine its adverse effects. Phase III studies
changes reports with FDA, each summarizobserve a total of 500 to 3,000 patients in
ing the ADRs added to their systems in the
more natural settings—in clinics, outpatient
previous year.
hospital facilities, and private practice. Phase
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This postmarketing information is useful for
two purposes. First, it may provide the grounds
for FDA to remove a drug from the market, when
such action is appropriate. Second, it is used by
FDA to ensure that limits are placed on advertising and promotional claims and that the drug's
labeling is appropriate.

answered by the phase III studies, but which do
not warrant delaying the release of what promises
to be a useful new product (24). Although FDA
has no explicit authority to require such studies,
these "phase IV" studies are almost always performed, as the alternative would be nonapproval
of the drug.

FDA may request further studies when there are
questions about a drug that were not sufficiently

HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES OF F 5TMARKETING SURVEILLANCE
As a result of 1974 hearings before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources' Subcommittee on Health, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare formed a Review Panel
on New Drug Regulation. The panel issued its
report in May 1977 (16).
A bill was subsequently introduced in the Senate in early 1978 to revise the drug provisions of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. A revised bill,
S. 1075, the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979,
passed the Senate in September 1979. A similar
bill, H.R. 4258, was not acted on by the House
of Representatives. Included in the Senate bill
were the following specifications: 1) drug sponsors could be required to conduct postmarketing
surveillance of a drug for up to 5 years; 2) a
prescription drug could have its distribution
limited if the drug could not otherwise be found
to be safe and effective; 3) the standard for a
drug's immediate removal from the market would
be changed from the drug being an "imminent
hazard to the public health" to the less stringent
standard of "unreasonableriskof illness or injury
to any segment of the population;" and 4)
establishment of a "National Center for Drug
Science."
During this period, in a speech to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) suggested that a better
system was needed for monitoring the use and effects of prescription drugs after they were marketed. As a result, the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use was established in 1976,
funded largely by the drug industry, with the
mandate to design a postmarketing surveillance

system to detect, quantify, and describe the anticipated and unanticipated effects of marketed
drugs, and to recommend a means by which information on the epidemiology of prescription
drug use in the United States could be distributed
regularly to interested parties. The Joint Commission issued its report in January 1980 (42), but by
this time, interest in postmarketing surveillance
had waned, and the commission's report and recommendations were little noticed.
In 1976, the year in which the Joint Commission was formed, an interagency agreement was
signed between FDA and the Experimental Technology Incentives Program (ETIP) of the National
Bureau of Standards in the Department of Commerce. The purpose of ETIP was to provide incentives or reduce barriers to technological innovation through changes in the regulatory process.
ETIP's agreement with FDA was to jointly fund
a program to determine if improvement in postmarketing surveillance could help reduce the
regulatory requirements of the premarketing
period, principally those of phase III of the IND
process and those of the NDA process. The specific experiment was to develop postmarketing
surveillance systems and a method of managing
and evaluating the reform (11). The project concentrated on collecting the information required
to design these systems (12). By 1982, FDA had
assumed most of the funding, as ETIP was to be
phased out that year.
A Commission on the Federal Drug Approval
Process was convened in mid-1981 to examine
how FDA's procedures for the approval of new
drugs could be expedited without compromising
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public safety and to make recommendations on
the development of cost-effective postmarketing
surveillance to guarantee the quick withdrawal
from the market of drugs that cause significant
adverse effects. The commission had its genesis
in a joint hearing held in April 1981 by the House
Science and Technology Committee's Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research,
and Environment and its Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight. The first meeting was
held in July 1981. The commission completed its
work and announced its general findings in the
spring of 1982, and its printed report was to be
released in late 1982.
FDA is examining specific ways to speed up the
drug approval process. It is reviewing past phase
III trials to see if longer trials or those with large
samples have contributed useful information beyond that obtained in phase II and early phase
III testing. Past postmarketing studies that FDA
required are also being reviewed to see if they provided the information that they were designed to
obtain. Data on FDA approval time are being reviewed to see what other factors may slow the
approval process. And, as a pilot test, an FDA
committee is reviewing the pharmacologic and
clinical data on selected drugs at the end of phase
II testing, and will make recommendations about
the best time for gathering additional information
(e.g., phase III v. the postmarketing period) (11).

In March 1982, the FDA Commissioner began
a related organization by merging the Bureau of
Drugs with the Bureau of Biologies, and replacing the Director of the New Drug Evaluation Division. The merged bureaus have since been designated the National Center for Drugs and Biologics.
Finally, in a related development, the Senate
passed by a voice vote, in the first session of the
97th Congress, the Patent Term Restoration Act *
of 1981 (S. 255). The bill would restore to the term
of a patent the time lost in complying with the
Government's premarketing testing and review requirements, up to a maximum of 7 years. Patented
products eligible for extension would not be limited to human drugs, but would include "human ,
drugs and biologicals, antibiotic drugs, animal
drugs and biologicals, food additives, color additives, pesticides, other chemical substances,
medical devices, and any other product subject
to Federal premarket requirements" (72). In September 1982, the House of Representatives voted
on the bill under suspension of its rules. Under
such conditions, a two-thirds vote was required
for passage, and although the bill received a majority of the votes, it fell just short of the twothirds majority needed.

METHODS OF SURVEILLANCE
The primary objective cf postmarketing studies
is to develop information about drug effects under
customary conditions of drug use. Initial clues
about a drug's potential effects come from the experimental studies carried out with both animals
and humans in the premarketing period. Spontaneous or voluntary reporting (e.g., in letters to
the editors of medical journals) is the oldest, and
to date, the most productive source of new information about a drug's possible effects once a
drug is marketed. Other types of studies are used
to examine in more detail the possible effects of
a drug. In general, these other types of studies use
either cohort or case-control methods.

Thus, four types of studies are generally used
to identify drug effects: 1) controlled clinical trials,
2) spontaneous or voluntary reporting, 3) cohort
studies, and 4) case-control studies (23,50,61,77).
Controlled clinical trials match treatment and
control groups as closely as possible, minimize
bias through such methods as randomization and
"double-blinding," and directly monitor patients
for the duration of the study. Controlled clinical
trials are considered the most definitive method
for evaluating a drug's efficacy and safety, but
they are often costly or impractical in specific situations, for example, when a drug's effects are

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ch. 1—Summary • 7

rare, or appear only after long-term use or a long
latency period.
Voluntary reporting by physicians and other
health providers, hospitals, and consumers may
act to alert FDA and pharmaceutical firms to possible adverse effects of drugs, so that the inference
of an association between a drug and an observed
health condition may be further studied by cumulative, careful reporting, and confirmed or disaffirmed by more vigorous methods. Underreporting may be a serious deficiency of this method.
A drug may also be erroneously associated with
an adverse effect until the suspected association
fails to show up in repeated, statistically validated
studies.
Cohort studies follow a defined group of patients (the cohort) for a period of time. In this
method, patients are not randomly assigned to
groups, and there is no blinding. Cohort studies
are usually prospective and observe the cohort
from the beginning of drug use. A group of patients taking the drug of interest is assembled and
followed to see, for example, if adverse reactions
occur. A second group of patients (the controls)
with the same medical condition, who are not taking the drug and who may be receiving alternative
treatment, but who are otherwise matched as
closely as possible with the cohort, may also be
studied in parallel. The control group is used to
identify the frequency of occurrence of any condition observed in the drug-exposed group which
is due to causes other than the drug (i.e., the
"background incidence" of the condition). In this
method, patients can be directly monitored to ensure they take the drug appropriately, and to
observe the drug's effects; or monitoring can be
less controlled. With less control, a larger cohort
can be followed, but bias is thus increased.
Case-control studies identify patients with the
adverse effects to be studied (the cases), ancj compare them with a sample (the controls), drawn
from the same cohort that gave rise to the cases.
Controls are matched as closely as possible with
the cases, except with regard to the drug's suspected adverse effect, to examine whether exposure to the drug is the cause. Patients with conditions suspected of being associated with a certain drug would have their medical records re-

viewed or be interviewed concerning the use of
that drug. The histories of the controls would also
be studied for information about drug use in the
general population. By comparing the proportion
of drug users among the cases with the proportion of drug users in the general population, it is
possible to infer the relative frequency with which
adverse reactions occur in users of certain drugs
as compared with nonusers. A sufficient number
of appropriate cases must be identified and accurate histories of exposure to drugs must be obtained.
Controlled clinical trials and prospective cohort
studies can b«e used to determine a drug's beneficial
as well as adverse effects. Case-control studies are
usually used to trace adverse effects back to prior
drug use. Voluntary reporting can uncover additional uses of drugs as well as their adverse effects, but reporting of adverse effects is much
more common.
The ability of a particular surveillance method
to detect a drug's effect depends on two factors:
1) the time that transpires between use of that drug
and the occurrence of the drug's effect (the latency period), and 2) how often the effect occurs (its
frequency). There are many other determining
factors, such as accuracy of observation, and accuracy and completeness of medical records, tut
these factors present more of a problem in the
design of a study's details.
Controlled clinical trials, because of their relatively short duration, will detect only acute or
subacute effects. Long-term cohort studies can
detect delayed effects, but the data bases necessary
for such long-tenn, large studies are still sparse.
Voluntary reporting is usually the way in which
long-term effects are first identified. Long-term
effects are usually confirmed through retrospective case-control studies, but such studies' reliance
on historical data such as medical records can limit
their accuracy.
The chance that a particular study will discover
a drug effect also depends on the study's sample
size and the frequency of the drug effect. For example, in a cohort study, if a drug causes blindness in 1 out of every 100 users (1/100), how many
users must be observed to find one case of blind-
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ness? If there are 1 miUion users of the drug, there
would be 10,000 users blinded. But in a small sample of only 100 users, the probability of finding
one or more cases of blindness would only be 63
percent. If the sample were 200 users, the probability of finding one or more cases would increase
to 86 percent. With a sample of 500, the probability would be 99 percent that at least one case
of blindness would be found in the observed users.
To state it another way, what number of users
would have to be observed to be 95 percent sure
of finding one or more cases of blindness when
they occur at a frequency of 1 in 100 users? The
answer is 300 users, and the general rule is that
the number of users in the sample must be three
times the reciprocal of the frequency; e.g., for a
frequency of 1 in 1,000, the sample would have
to be 3,000 to be 95 percent sure of observing at
least one case.
Except for some effects that are unique to a specific drug, many drug effects (e.g., stroke, bleeding, skin rashes) are indistinguishable from conditions due to other causes. Tne "background incidence" of a condition must be known before purported drug effects observed in a study can rightly
be attributed to a drug.
Larger sample sizes are needed to determine a
drug's effect as the background incidence of a condition increases and as the frequency of a drug's
contribution to a condition decreases. For example, given a background incidence of 1/100, as
the incidence of a drug's added effect decreases
from 1/100 to 1/10,000, the sample size would
have to increase from 1,600 to 11 million to remain 95 percent sure of observing at least one case
of the added effect. The relationship between

b.'tckground and added incidences is also revealed
in: considering sample sizes at the extremes. For
a known background incidence of 1/1,000 and an
added incidence of 1/100, the sample size needed
to observe at least one case of the added effect
is only 500. But when the background incidence
is 1/10 and the added incidence is only 1/10,000,
the sample size must be 98 million. These illustrations merely indicate what sample size is required
to observe an effect when background incidence
is known.
Controlled clinical trials are used primarily for
evaluating drug efficacy, not safety, because they
are carried out on hundreds, or, at the most, a
few thousand drug users. Their use for evaluating
drugs already on the market is also limited by
their high cost and logistical problems. In fact,
the use of controlled clinical trials for determining efficacy alone is already constrained by these
two factors (9,46).
These limitations of controlled clinical trials in
evaluating the safety of marketed drugs have led
to relying on cohort and case-control methods for
postmarketing studies. While these latter methods
can only indicate an association between a drug
and observed conditions, not that the relation is
causal (49,77), the cumulative experience of multiple cohort and case-control studies showing consistent associations between a drug and such an
effect can lead to a high degree of confidence that
the relationship is causal. The most prominent
examples of drug studies showing consistent
associations are those on oral contraceptives and
the risks of cardiovascular disease; similar examples of nondrug studies are those on the risks
of smoking.

ISSUES AND OPTIONS
Revising premarketing tests and shortening the drug approval process.

ess have focused not on the statutory language
but on the regulations issued by FDA to implement the law. Thus, the focus here is on oversight
issues, not on legislative changes.

The efficacy and safety tests in animals and humans specified in FDA regulations for premarketing approval are based on broad statutory lanCiage. Efforts to shorten the drug approval proc-

Proposals to curtail or eliminate phase III premarketing tests, or shift them to the postmarketing
period, can be evaluated both theoretically and
experientially.

Issue 1:
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Theoretically, phase III testing is significantly
more sensitive than phase II testing. Adverse effects with an incidence of 1/100 or more are more
likely than not to be detected in the 100 to 200
patients given a drug in phase II. But the theoretical sensitivity of detection rises in phase III to
1/500 with 500 patients and to 1/1,000 with 1,000
to 3,000 patients (see ch. 4, table 5).
These observations are relevant to the detection
of adverse reactions, but they are not so relevant
to the detection of therapeutic effects. Since a drug
that helps only 1 in 100 patients would not be very
effective, efficacy should be established in phase
II. Phase III is intended to gather additional evidence on a drug's effectiveness for specific indications.
If phase III testing were curtailed or eliminated,
there is also the question of whether premarketing evaluations would test sufficient numbers of
patients to reasonably ensure a drug's safety or
give substantial evidence of its efficacy. Even
under current regulations, the use of a drug on
human subjects is very limited before the drug is
released for market: 20 to 80 patients in phase I;
100 to 200 patients in phase II; and 500 to 3,000
patients in phase HI—a range of only 620 to 3,280
patients per drug (excluding controls).
In addition to theoretical criteria, experiential
criteria could be applied in considering proposals
to curtail or eliminate phase III tests. The diminished power to observe adverse drug effects that
such changes theoretically entail may not in fact
be found, judging on the basis of actual experience
in phase III testing, or if it is, it may only concern infrequent, minor effects/Agreement of the
experiential data with the differences theoretically
expected would strengthen the hypothesis that
curtailing phase III would lower the capacity of
current premarketing tests to identify adverse
reactions. If the experiential data fail to detect the
theoretical differences, then a better case can be
made for curtailing phase III, with or without
transfer of some of its testing to the postmarketing
period.
Current interpretations of the statutory requirements for "adequate tests" of safety and "substantial evidence" of efficacy emphasize methodology,
as reflected in the requirement that each indica-

tion for which a drug is intended be supported
by at least two well-controlled clinical trials. But
FDA can alter the criteria by which it approves
drugs. For example, propanolol, the first betablocking drug approved for use in the United
States, was approved by an advisory committee
on the basis of all the evidence presented to FDA,
even though no one study was found to be adequate and well controlled (21). And in late 1981,
timolol, another beta-blocker, was approved, on
the basis of evidence from * foreign study, for use
in preventing death and recurrent heart attacks
in patients who have survived initial heart attacks
(26).
The approval of propanolol and timolol illustrates that FDA can grant exceptions to its usual
requirement of two well-controlled U.S.-based
clinical trials. In such cases, expert judgment relies
on qualitative, not quantitative, criteria in approving a drug, and such an approach falls outside the theoretical and experiential guidelines outlined above. If FDA is to rely increasingly on such
qualitative criteria through increased use of advisory committees, it will be necessary for FDA to
develop general guidelines to aid the advisory
committees in their deliberations. Otherwise, in
a case-by-case analysis, evidence of the same quality may lead to approval for one drug and nonapproval for another.

Issue 2:
Improving postmarketing surveillance
and its role in the drug approval process.
Even if phase III testing were not curtailed or
eliminated, FDA's powers in the postmarketing
period could be strengthened to enhance its surveillance role.
Postmarketing surveillance "systems" that have
been advocated are not systems in the formal
sense, but a series of related activities oriented
toward several purposes, with the regulatory approval process being-only one. Three activities are
most frequently mentioned. First is the building
of a resource base through training of additional
experts and improving epidemiologic tools such
as methods for cohort and case-control studies.
Second, unless a drug effect has a sufficient fre-
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quency of occurrence (usually identified as 1/
1,000) and for delayed effects of, for example,
greater than 1 year, strengthened voluntary reporting is the most realistic method of identifying possible adverse drug reactions. Once such
reactions are suspected, clinical trials, casecontrol, and cohort studies could be used to determine whether an association with drug use in fact
exists. Third is the development of an efficient
method for monitoring selected drugs after their
release into the market. The most frequently mentioned mechanism is formation of prospective
cohorts of drug users.

A variation of this option is for FDA to use its
existing regulatory powers over advertising and
promotional practices to "certify" an industrysponsored postmarketing study.

These aforementioned components of a postmarketing surveillance "system" and FDA's role
in supporting and using them are oversight issues.

Option 3: Change the standard for a drug's removal from the market from "imminent hazard
to the public health" to "unreasonable risk of illness to any segment of the population" or some
other less stringent standard.

There are also several legislative options that
could strengthen FDA's powers in the postmarketing period. The following legislative options are
presented for congressional consideration.

Option 2: Give FDA the power to restrict the
distribution, dispensing, and administration of a
drug.
A variation of this option is for FDA to use its
existing regulatory powers to develop a parallel
approval process for the use of a limited group
of c.ngs during phay III testing, such as for drugs
of unusual need and promise.

Option 1: Give FDA the power to require postmarketing studies.
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313
1
2
3
4
5

kind of amnestic effect.

This happens to me now and then with

other drugs and there are rare times when the telephone rings
in the night and I do not remember it, and it does not disturb
me.

So I really cannot become particularly concerned about

those side effects. I agree that it would be well to monitor

6 them more closely in the clinical studies that follow.
7

If I have any concerns or questions, I think there

8 does need to be a restriction or warning against the use of
9

this drug in the daytime —

it does not seem to be an anti-

to anxiety drug that one would want to take and drive an automobil
11 or things like that.

I am wondering if we have adequate

12 studies in older individuals and I would ask Dr. Woo that.
13

DR. WOO:

They have done some geriatric studies. In

14 the geriatric, the dose cannot go beyond .5 —

they never gave

15 it beyond '.5.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

DR. OVERALL:
sedative potency —

It would seem to me a drug of this

it might be particularly "important to have

some concern about the older individuals, and apart from that
I really have no concerns about it and I am actually extremely
impressed with the amount of work that has been done, the high
potency and the short half-life of this compound.
DR. UHLENHUTH:

I would also just like to take this

23 opportunity to compliment the company on the job they have done
i
24 It seems to me that the quantity and quality of the data
25 addressing the general question is really outstanding.
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1
2
3
4
5
6

in addiction-prone individuals as for all hypnotics and
prescriptions should be limited to those patients who are under
medical supervision.
DR. ENDICOTT:

Yes, but that does not meet my concern

that there be a warning that it is easier to overdose, or
some indication that the therapeutic dose and the overdose

7 dosage are relatively close, and patients should be discouraged
8 from taking more than some upper limit.
9

DR. HAYES:

In regard to my cursory review, the things

10 I thought needed attention are the scheduling, which will be
11 considered by the committee, the basis of which Dr. Kennedy
12 has given you his early appraisal, and some revisions in the
13 package insert which I think we would be willing to consider
14 when that as well as other bits of data are finally evaluated.'
15 But other than I do not have anything.
16

DR. KORNETSKY:

At the present time we have not

17 concerned ourselves with the specifics of the package insert.
18

DR. SCHIELE: The question is whether the drug is

19 approvable or not, and the package insert details would be
20
21
22

1 23
S 24

I

25

hammered out.
DR. KORNETSKY:
page 461.

It says —

Let me just ask one question regarding

physical and psychological dependence

have not occurred in patients taking .5 milligrams per day for
90 days or in normal human volunteers taking one milligram per
day for 42 days.

How does that fit with ;feh^\*t£rial that
1

J 0375214
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1 !! basically for certain information.
2 :.! the patient.
3 !l suspected.

W e get information about

W e get information about the drug that is

W e get information about the reaction and w e get

4 i! information about other relevant medical features and other
•i

5 ji drugs.

W e also can contact the firm o r the physician and get]

•I
6 •;( additional information if that is deemed necessary.
*i

7 ;;

But what I am going to tell you about is a system

8 '"of analysis which computerizes these forms.

W e have a

9 :j standardized way of taking the information on the 1639 form
.J

10 .'and computerizing i t .

We c u r r e n t l y have 450,000 reports in

;j
11 jj our computer file.

W e put 50,000 reports in every year. We

12 «! get; the reports in within 1 week of receipt within the Food
13 || and Drug Administration.

So this is a current system that w^

14 !! are dealing with. There is no backloo.
j
15 l!"
(Slide) •
16 jj

"

The reports come from any of these sources.

They

17 i may go from the physician o r nurse to the manufacturer to tlwf
18 !j FDA o r they may come directly to FDA.

ii
19 :

(Slide)

I
II

20 -I

•i

When w e look at our entire system, we see that 90

i

21 ,i percent of the reports come from the manufacturer.

That is,

!l
22 •• they come indirectly to the manufacturer and to us. When we
23 ;i look at the data w e are going to look at today, we see
24 «i roughly the same proportions,

w© know that health profes-

MILIX*ftEFOftTlNQCO.. I|

>0? C Sum.

Si

Tuhintion. D C

73 i| sipnals provide only about 10 percent of the reports directlji ^

:D002
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Summary Basis of Approval

/

NDA 18-163

Drug Generic Name:

Applicant:
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals
East Hanover, New Jersey

Trade Name:

!•

temazepam

Restoril

07936

Indications for Use:
Restoril** (temazepam) is indicated for the relief of insomnia associated
vith the complaints of difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal
awakenings, and/or early morning awakenings. Although clinical studies
show effects on sleep induction, sleep laboratory studies have not
confirmed a reduction in sleep latency when the drug was administered
within thirty minutes of retiring.

Since insomnia is often transient and intermittent, the prolonged
administration of RestorilR is generally not necessary or recommended.
Restoril has been emp"^yed for sleep maintenance for up to 35 consecutive
nights of drug admin: /.ration in sleep laboratory studies.
•
!!• Dosage Form, Dosage, and Administration:
Oral Capsules, 15 and 30 mg, one of either strength before retiring.
III.Manufacturing and Controls:
A.

Finished dosage form is adequately controlled by suitable
methodology: IR, dissolution g . c , manufacturing processing is
adequately described.

B.

Stability studies: 5 years stability is established by appropriate
methodology: TLC, differential polarography.

C.

Method Validation: Has been satisfactorily completed in May, 1979
(Chicago District Laboratories) and the revised dissolution
methodology has been satisfactorily validated in October, 1980.
Labeling: Labeling is technically satisfactory.

**•
' E.

F.

Establishment Impact Analysis:
occur.
Establishment Inspection:

No adverse environmental effect will

EIR 11/3/79, profile 12/24/80

IV. Pharmacology:
A*

Temazepam it a benzodiazepine derivative that differs structurally
from diazepam only by a hydroxy1 at the 3-position of the diazepine
ring and from oxazepam by a methyl group at the 1-potition of the
-diazepine ring.
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Sandoz has submitted toxicity/carcinogenicity studies in mice at 10,
80 and 160 mg/kg/day and in rats at 10t 40, 160 mg/kg/day (equivalent
to 20, 80, 320 times the recommended human dose) as veil as a chronic
toxicity study in dogs at 15, 45, and 135 mg/kg/day. " Mice receiving
the highest dose had increased incidences of hyperplastic liver
nodules and telangiectasis compared to controls. Rats ingesting the
high dose exhibited hepatocellular hypertrophy with cytoplasmic
lipidosis and a somewhat higher incidence and enhanced severity of
kidney pathology including epithelial hyperplasia and cortical
cysts. Esophageal distention also occurred in some high dose rats.
Although mortality was greater relative to controls in all treated
males and in females receiving the low dose, a causal relationship of
drug treatment to mortality is doubtful because of the lack of dose
response and the absence of consistent toxicity in the lower dosage
groups. The incidence of total or specific tumors was not increased
in mice or rats after long term temazepam treatment. All dogs
receiving temazepam in the 1 year study showed dose-related
uncoordination but no consistent toxicity or organ pathology that
could be associated with drug treatment. Reproduction studies were
conducted in rats and rabbits. In a perinatal-postnatal study
(segment III) in rats doses of 60 and 120 mg/kg/day but not 30
mg/kg/day resulted in higher nursing deaths. Teratology studies in
rats demonstrated increased fetal resorptions at doses of 30 and 120
mg/kg/day and an increased incidence of rudimentary ribs, which are
considered skeletal varients, at doses of 240 mg/kg or higher. In
pregnant rabbits doses of 40 mg/kg/day resulted in the increased
occurrance of rudimentary 13th ribs.. No major fetal malformations
were seen in any study that could be attributed to temazepam
treatment.
Drug metabolism studies with temazepam in mice, rats, dogs, and man
showed that conjugated temazepam and conjugated oxazepam were the two
principal urinary metabolites. Studies in absorption and excretion
of temazepam in man indicated that the drug is well absorbed through
the GI tract. Peak plasma levels were reached within 2-3 hours and
declined with biphasic T half values of 0.6 and 9 hours. Similar
absorption, time to peak plasma levels and plasma T half life were
found in mice, rats and dogs. When temazepam was given to pregnant
rats, temazepam and its metabolites were found in the fetus and also
detected in the mother's milk.
The relevant toxicities in rodents after chronic treatment with high
doses of temazepam involve liver changes of hypertrophy, lipidosis,
and hyperplasia and kidney pathology including enhanced nephritis,
epithelial hyperplasia and cortical cysts. The firm has recommended
in the event of repeated temazepam use in patients that liver and
kidney function testa be performed and that the usual precautions
should be observed in patients with impaired renal or hepatic
function.
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Medical Portion:
A.

Restoril is a 1, 4-benzodiazepine structurally related to marketed
benzodiazepines such as flurazepam, diazepam, oxazepam, and
chlordiazepanu The clinical efficacy of temazepam as a hypnotic was
demonstrated in double blind studies involving 508 adult patients.
Most of the clinical studies used subjective methodology, i.e.
patient and physician questionnaires and simple numerical rating
scales. A sleep laboratory setting was used for 3 other clinical
studies.

B.

Substantial efficacy was shown by three major subjective clinical
trials and one objective study (sleep lab). The following parameters
were measured in all subjective studies contained in the NDA:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(A)
,(5)
(6)
(7)

sleep induction
frequency of nocturnal awakenings
sleep duration
effect on early morning awakenings
quality of sleep
residual effects of medication noted the following morning
patients general opinion of the study medication compared to
previous sleep medications used
(8) physicians' global evaluation of patients' responses

Pivotal Clinical studies for efficacy and safety proof - Heffron,
Rosen, Fillingim, Dement.
(1)

Heffron study - 55 outpatients aged 18-59, males and females
with chronic insomnia for at least one year. Double blind
placebo controlled parallel groups. Temazepam was significantly
better than placebo (ps 0.05) in five of five measured
parameters: sleep induction, nocturnal awakenings, sleep
duration, early morning awakenings and sleep quality. The study
length was four consecutive nights using the 30 mg dosage.
Drowsiness and fatigue occurred frequently and were of a mild
degree.

(2)

Rosen study - 82 adult outpatients age 18-59, double blind
placebo control, comparison group using 30 mg. Dalmane.
Diagnosis - chronic insomnia for at least one year. Temazepam
was significantly better than placebo in three of five
parameters: nocturnal awakenings, early morning awakenings, and
sleep quality. The efficacy pattern was similar to that of the
Dalmane group. No safety problems occurred in the study.
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Fillingim study - 75 adult outpatients with chronic insomnia of
at least one year, ages 18*59* Double blind placebo controlled
with a third group taking 500 mg Doriden per day, duration 4
consecutive nights* 30 mg temazepam was significantly more
effective (p 0.05) than placebo in five of five parameters:
sleep induction, nocturnal awakenings, sleep duration, early
morning awakenings, and sleep quality. Its efficacy profile
paralleled that of 500 mg Doriden in all parameters.

(4)

Dement study - method continuous nightly monitoring of sleep
pattern and sleep stages in * sleep laboratory. 8 adult
patients were studied for at least 6 wks. and had to meet strict
sleep lab confirmed entry criteria for the study. The study
consisted of placebo nights, analyzed nights with active drug,
and a recovery period using placebo for each dosage. Temazepam
in both dosages showed statistically significant increases in
total sleep time and significant reductions in wake time after
sleep onset. No significant withdrawal effects were noted after
administration of 30 mg temarepam for 35 consecutive nights.

Many other well controlled studies were supportive of efficacy of the
30 mg dosage in all age groups from age 18-96, both outpatients and
hospitalized. The Dement study was the only study showing a hypnotic
effect for the 15 mg dosage, other studies showing favorable trends
but not reaching statistical significance.
Two other sleep laboratory studies were performed. The Vogel study
utilized 23 consecutive drug nights followed by an eleven night
placebo (drug withdrawal) period. Temazepam significantly increased
total sleep time and significantly decreased both the number of
awakenings and the total wake time; the drug had no effect on sleep
latency in this study. Each of the six insomnia measures was tested
for insomnia during withdrawal; total sleep time was significantly
less during post-drug nights one through three, and this effect was
principally due to the values for the first drug withdrawal night.
In the Kales study, six patients received temazepam from night 8
through night 35 with placebo for the preceeding (baseline) week and
during two weeks following drug discontinuance. The number of
nocturnal awakenings was significantly decreased, but sleep latency
and total wake time after sleep onset were not significantly changed
from baseline values. When the three sleep laboratory studies were
reanalyzed using* non-parametric techniques, there was no
statistically significant median decrease from baseline for sleep
latency (over the entire treatment period) for any of the three
studies, and for the Kales study there was a significant median
increase. With regard to sleep disturbances following withdrawal,
the three studies did not follow a consistent pattern. For the
Dement and Vogel studies, both sleep latency and total sleep time had
large median deteriorations from baseline during the first withdrawal
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period, and these deteriorations disappeared during the second
withdrawal period. In the Kales study, there were small median
deteriorations during the first withdrawal period which became larger
during -the second withdrawal period.
Phase I studies in normal volunteers showed the drug to be veil
tolerated in single daily dosages up to 90 rug/day. Beyond this level
significant increases in standing pulse rates appeared. Drowsiness
and fatigue were common effects in all subjects. EKG's, eye
' examinations, clinical laboratory tests, and vital signs did not
deviate significantly.
D.

Safety evaluations were conducted in all of the clinical studies in
the NDA, the duration of treatment being A consecutive nights except
in the 35 night sleep lab study by Dement. A long term safety study
using double blind parallel groups was conducted in 82 adult
outpatients age 18-65 using 30 mg Dalmane for comparison, both drugs
being given daily for 12 weeks Evaluations of laboratory tests
including liver and kidney function showed no significant deviations
during the treatment period. No liver enzyme induction occurred in
this 12 week study. EKG's and eye examinations remain normal
throughout.
The pattern of occasional transient laboratory abnormalities, e.g.
slight SCOT rises, was noted in all of the 4 day efficacy studies.
Their occurences were transient and mild, occurring at the same rates
in drug and placebo groups. Adverse reactions which occurred in all
studies were rated as mild except for a few instances of severe
drowsiness and fatigue. In most studies there were no significant
differences in occurence rates between drug groups and placebo
groups. The overall frequency for adverse reactions in all clinical
studies (795 patients) including tolerance studies was: drowsiness
(172), dizziness (72), and lethargy (52). Other side effects
included confusion (2-32) and weakness (1-22). Rarely reported were
tremor, ataxia, lack of concentration, loss of equilibrium, falling
and palpitations (less than 12).

E.

The final draft of the new drug labeling was reviewed and found to be
adequate and complete.

IV. Copy of package insert attached.

Thomas A. Hayes, llty.
Croup Leader
Kj

oyce trcamcr
J°yc<
CorUumer Safety Officer
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•Sained on the third day.
INDICATIONS AND USAGE
ReMiiril (irniu/cpami is indicated lor the
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Ben/odia/rpincs ma> caus^ fetal damape
m"hcn adnuniMered dunnp pTepnanc\ An increaked risk of congenital nullitrmaiKHis astociated uith the use ol diazepam and
chtordiaicpoxidc dunnp the first trimester of
pregnane) ha* been tupcested in several
< studies Transplacental dtsirihutiitn has rcI Miked in ncorutai C'NS ds-ptessMnt l<»IUminp
I the inprstion oi theranctnic doses ol a benI lodta/epinr h>pnotk- durinp the last » r c k s
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In a perinatal post rut a I \tud> in rats, oral
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aurslinp m««rtaliiy. Terat<»lopy studies in rats
demonstrated increased fetal ivsorptMtns at
•Vtact vf MJ and 120 mp kp in one studs and
increased occurence of rudimentary ribs,
which art considered skeletal variants, in a
second study at doses of 2 4 0 mp kp or
higher. In rabbits, occasional abnormalHies
iuch as exencephaU and fusion or asymmetry of ribs were repnrted *ith«iut di*se rclaMonshtp AhltoKiph thesr abnormalities mere
not liHind in HK* corKurrcnt c«wtr«*l pttnip.
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prrpnafH women II there ts a likeliln««l ot
tfte patrnt becimiiiip nrcpnaiu while rtvciving trnu/epam. she should be warned i4 the
notentiat nsk h> the fetus Patients shtwjkj he
mstrucW to discontinue the druc p m v l o
becoming pregnant. The pmsihiiity that a
woman of childbcannp potential may be
pregnant at the time *4 institution t* therap)
abnuld be owsidered.
• lHlSandcu. »nc
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PRECAUTIONS
Germs I
Smct the risk of the development of overtedjlNtft. dizziness, contusion andor Mini
increases substantial!) with larger d«»ses of
bciwtuJu/rpino in clderlv and debilitated
patents. 15 mf irf ReMnril* ticma/rpam> is
tecomnicndcd as the m«ial dosage lor such
patients.
Rcttoril ttema/cpam) should he administered with caution in severely depressed pa*
lients OK thi** in whum there i> any evidence
of latent depressmn. it shook! he reenrm/ed
that suicidal tendencies may he present and
pnitcciivc measures may he necessary
II Krstitril itcrru/epaml t% to he combined
urrh other drugs having known h>pnotic
properties or CNS-deprrssant elfccts. consideration should he given to niteniia! additive effects.
Information for Patients

Patients receiving Rcstoril firmarepam)
should he cautMtncd about pmsihlc c«*mbincd
effects with alcohol and «*hcr C'NS depressants. Patients should he cautioned is* to i»perale machincrs «»r drive a imn.»i vehicle
after ingesting the drug. Patients should also
be advised that thc> max experience di>turhed nocturnal sleep for the hr\i or second
night alter discontinuing the drug.
Laboratory Tests

The usual precautions should he observed
m patients with impaired renal or hepatic
funcii«>n Abnormal liver function tests as
well a* blood dyscrasias have been reported
with benzodiazepine*.
Carcinogenesis. Impairmrtit of Fertility
No carcinogenic potential was demonstrated in k*np-term studies in mice and rats.
rVrtililv in nuk and lemak rai\ wa* IHM adversely affected by Kestonl ttenwepam).
Pregnancy
Pregnancy Category X. See Contratndi•cations.
t u n i n g Mothers
It is not known whether this drug is excreted in human milk, because many drugs
. aft excreted in human milk, caution should
• be exercised when kestonl ttema/cpamt is
• administered to a nursing woman.
•Pediatric I s e
Safety and effectiveness in children below
• the age of 18 years have not been established.
ADVERSE REACTIONS
* During clinical studies m which 7V5 palients received Restori! (tema/epamt. the
drug was w-ell utkratcd Side etlevt* were
Visually mild and transient. These "N< p*tiems included 175 subjects who received
Restoril (teiruzcnam) dunng daytime waking
hours, sometimes in excess of recommended
therapeutic dosage, in studies to evaluate
dosage leveU for safety and pharmacokinetic
profiles.
The most common adverse reactions were
drowsiness (1731, du/ines* t7*Sj, and lethargy (5*).
Other side etTcci* include confusion, euphoria and related feeling t2-J<r) Less
commonl* reported were weakness. anorrsta
and diarrhea il-2'«i Karclv reported were
tremor, atasta. tack «<t cofHcmrattor. k»%% ttf
equilibrium, tailing and palpitation* ties*
than IS |.
rUllucinattitm, horizontalftyaagmv*and
paradoxk*al rcaciiom. including excitement.
ftUittuUfcm and hvpcractivitv were tare tkss
thanU..V:i
f
DRUG ABUSE AMD DEPENDENCE
Controlled Subslaaxt
Rrvioiil ttema/epawi is a s—nuJhd sub*
stance MI Schcsluk IV.
AMise and llepewNwee
Withdrawal symptoms follow ine abrupt
divT>'t»limi.tiuM> ««< hi-n"«7»rT7!t»7-pn«^v_jLjic
^ v n K|»«u.t HI f\>h. tux t t . i-«v<" . N> . «-A L - ..
jjow> o»ct cvictwU1*! |VIM»U .«< itnij: t^'^t
s\ii.{n.Mnv nn> hi>hny y«i«uiitNH»ti»» arc sunt;
^ " P r i • II.»M- v i - n .ill »1- . I I M I H U I . - o ' u l u i - . w . ) ! .

~Alih-Mi\>* it>ru\HK-mK v v n miKt.'t m l h «liav\al %\ni|M«mtv li.«s«- JIM» K i n fv*|*»*x.lv*vi
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INTRODUCTION
AND
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October of last year the Attorney General established the
Tort Policy Working Group, an inter-agency working group
consisting of representatives of ten agencies and the White
House. One of the tasks the Working Group was asked to
undertake was to examine the rapidly expanding crisis in
liability insurance availability and affordability.
The following is the report of the Tort Policy Working Group on
the causes, extent and policy implications of this crisis. The
primary contributing agencies included the Department of
Justice, the Department of Commerce and the Small Business
Administration.
Chapter 1 of the report (The Crisis in Insurance Availability
and Affordability) describes in detail the significant problems
many businesses, professionals and municipalities are having
obtaining liability insurance. The Chapter documents a dramatic
change in the last two years in the availability,
affordability and adequacy of liability insurance. Where
insurance is available (and in some areas it simply is not),
premium increases of several hundred percent over the last year
or two have become commonplace. Few if any private or public
entities that rely on liability insurance have escaped the
problems generated by this crisis.
Part A of Chapter 2 (The Causes of the Crisis in Insurance
Availability and Affordability) reviews the current financial
condition of the insurance industry, and the economic factors
leading to that condition. The property-casualty industry' in
the past two years has suffered significant underwriting losses
($21 billion in 1984; $25 billion in 1985) which have limited
its ability to offer as much insurance as its customers desire,
and have made it reluctant to insure high risk activities which
may expose it to further substantial underwriting losses. These
underwriting losses appear to be largely a result of coverage
written in the late 1970's and early 1980vs which may have been
underpriced due to the industry's desire to obtain premium
income to invest at the then prevailing high interest rates.
Nonetheless, there is little to suggest that the recent massive
increases in premiums is related solely to these losses, or that
the cost of liability insurance will decline significantly as
the industry limits its underwriting losses and restores its
desired level of overall profitability. To the contrary,

1
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indications are that developments in tort law are a major cause
for the sharp premium increases. 1/
Part B of Chapter 2 reviews the contribution of tort law to the
insurance availability/affordability crisis. The Working Group
found that in the past decade there has been a veritable
explosion of tort liability in the United States. Four specific
problem areas are identified and discussed:
°

The movement toward no-fault liability, which
increasingly results in companies and individuals being
found liable even in the absence of any wrongdoing on
their part.

°

The undermining of causation through a variety of
questionable practices and doctrines which shift
liability to "deep pocket" defendants even though they
did not cause the underlying injury or had only a
limited or tangential involvement.

0

The explosive growth in the damages awarded in tort
lawsuits, particularly with regard to non-economic
awards such as pain and suffering or punitive
damages. And,

\

5 ' ° ", The excessive^transaction costs*of the tort .system, in .
which virtually two-thirds of every dollar paid out
;i
• 'through'the system is lost* to attorneys1 fees and
litigation expenses.
The Working Group was particularly struck by the extraordinary
growth over the last decade of the number of tort lawsuits and
the average award per lawsuit. A few examples amply illustrate
this point:
°

Between 1974 and 1985 there has been a 758% increase in
the number of product liability lawsuits filed in
federal district court.

0

The number of medical malpractice lawsuits per 100
physicians doubled between 1979 and 1983, and tripled
during that period for obstetricians/gynecologists.

°

According to a jury verdict reporting service, between
1975 and 1985 the average medical malpractice jury

1/ The Working Group also considered whether state regulation
of the insurance industry may be a cause of the crisis, and
found little compelling evidence that state regulation is a
major cause of these problems.
2
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verdict increased from $220,018 to $1,017,716, and the
average product liability jury verdict increased from
$393,580 to $1,850,452- 2/
0

A survey of punitive damage awards in Cook County,
Illinois indicates that the average personal injury
punitive damage award (measured in constant 1984
dollars) increased from $40,000 in 1970-74 to
$1,152,174 in 1980-84.

The above data demonstrates that the insurance industry was
selling coverage at constant or even reduced cost over a period
of years during which tort liability was undergoing a dramatic
expansion. This suggests that a major factor underlying the
availability/affordability crisis is the industry's attempt to
bring premiums quickly back into line with rapidly growing
liability risks. 3/ The high -- and in some areas unaffordable
— insurance premiums reflect the fact that tort law is now
placing a massive compensation burden on the private sector.
A second important contribution of tort liability to the
availability/affordability crisis is the tremendous uncertainty
that has been generated by rapidly changing standards of
liability and causation. The "rules of the game" have become so
unpredictable that the insurance industry often cannot assess
liability risks with any degree of confidence. This appears to
have severely ..exacerbated the,problem.
Chapter 3 of the report (Recent Insurance Industry
Developments) summarizes a number of responses of the insurance
industry/its customers and state regulators to the crisis.
These developments include the use of claims-made policies, the
inclusion within policy limits of all or part of defense costs,
the increasing use of self-insurance and captives, and more
exacting state regulation.
In Chapter 4 of the report (Tort Law Reform) the Working Group
concludes that while some of the above recent developments in
the insurance industry, along with a likely improvement in the
industry's financial condition, should relieve some of the
current availability/affordability problems, it is unlikely that
these changes will provide long-term, systemic relief without

2/ For purposes of comparison, the dollar lost approximately
half of its purchasing power during this period.
3/ While some have suggested that the dramatic premium
increases are an attempt by the industry to recoup its past
underwriting losses, for the reasons .discussed in the report
such a theory makes little economic sense.
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some fundamental reforms of tort lav. Indeed, there are good
reasons to believe that absent such reforms, particularly the
insurance affordability problem will remain a long-term fixture
of the American economy.
The Working Group recommends eight reforms of tort law that
should significantly alleviate the crisis in insurance
availability and affordability. The Working Group does not at
this time recommend how these reforms should be implemented
(whether at the federal or state level, or through legislative
or judicial modification of the law); nor are these reforms
meant,to be an exhaustive list of potential reforms. The
recommended reforms are:
°

Return to a fault-based standard for liability.

°

Base causation findings on credible scientific and
medical evidence and opinions.

°

Eliminate joint and several liability in cases where
defendants have not acted in concert.

°

Limit non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering,
mental anguish, or punitive damages) to a fair and
reasonable maximum dollar amount.

°

Provide for periodic (instead of lump-sum) payments of
damages for future medical; care or lost income..

°

Reduce awards in cases where a plaintiff can be
compensated by certain collateral sources to prevent a
windfall double recovery.

0

Limit attorneys' contingency fees to reasonable amounts
on a "sliding scale."

°

Encourage use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms to resolve cases out of court.

«»

,.**'."

Chapter 5 of the report (Government Insurance: A Non-Solution)
details the reasons why government insurance or indemnification
would be highly undesirable' and wpuld do nothing to remedy the
problems underlying the availability/affordability crisis. Such
a federal insurance or indemnification program would not only be
extremely expensive, but also could exacerbate the problems of
tort law by making the "deep pocket" of the taxpayer available
in many cases. In addition, such a program could undermine
public health and safety, require more extensive government
regulation of private sector activities, involve the government
in substantial litigation, lead to increased federal involvement
in state insurance regulation, and inhibit the ability of the
private sector to adapt insurance services to changing economic
.and social conditions.
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The Conclusion to the report lists five conclusions as to the
appropriate response of the federal government* to the current
crisis in insurance availability and affordability. In sum, the
Working Group concludes that while there are a number of factors
underlying the insurance availability/affordability crisis, tort
law is a major cause which the federal government can address in
various sensible and appropriate ways. As for some of the other
factors underlying the crisis, such as the insurance industry's
recent large underwriting losses, there is little the federal
government can or should do to remedy these problems.
In that both the tort liability and insurance developments in
this report are highly dynamic, and because more detailed data
and other studies undoubtedly will become available, the Working
Group will continue to follow developments in this area, and,
where appropriate, supplement its conclusions and
recommendations.
Richard K. Willard
Chairman
Tort Policy Working Group
Robert L. Willmore
Chairman
Task Force on Liability
Insurance Availability
February, 1986
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CHAPTER 1
THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY
Liability insurance is a linchpin in the operation of the United
States economy, yet many American businesses, professionals and
municipalities, both large and small, are encountering serious
insurance problems arising from premium increases, policy
cancellations and refusals to underwrite certain activities.
The liability insurance crisis has three separate but related
faces that individually or in various combinations make it
difficult for many entities to obtain the desired liability
insurance. These problems are availability of insurance,
affordability of insurance coverage and adequacy of coverage.
This Chapter describes
problems. The Chapter
encountered within the
on the effect of those
economy.
I.

the current nature and extent of these
focuses, first, on the problems
various lines of insurance, and, second,
problems on different sectors of the

INSURANCE COVERAGE SUMMARIES

The following are insurance summaries taken predominantly from
'insurance industry reports prepared by the Alliance of American
'Insurers or.published in Business Insurance. •
Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance ("EIL")
EIL covers pollution incidents stemming from gradual pollution
exposures (as opposed to "sudden and accidental11 pollution,
which traditionally has been covered under general liability
coverage). Two major companies dropped out of the market in
1985, and by the end of the year only two companies were
offering EIL coverage. Forty-seven companies were forced to
close hazardous-waste management facilities for lack of EIL
coverage. Most hazardous waste businesses currently are looking
toward captives and self-insurance. Brokers expect significant
price increases on the limited insurance still available.
Sudden and Accidental Pollution Coverage
Coverage for sudden and accidental pollution traditionally has
been provided as part of general liability coverage. New
general liability forms, however, specifically exclude all
pollution liability. This is due to court decisions
interpreting "sudden and accidental" coverage as also covering
gradual and intentional pollution. (See Chapter 3 for a
discussion of the new policy forms.) The London market
currently is excluding pollution coverage from the large risks
it insures.
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Directors and Officers Liability (WD & O w )
Premiums in 1985 rose 50% to 500%, and include larger
deductibles, lower limits, more restrictive endorsements and
shorter policy durations. Industries particularly affected
include financial institutions, electric (nuclear) utilities,
new high technology business, wildcat oil and gas companies,
research and development enterprises, real estate developers,
highly leveraged businesses, petrochemical companies and the
steel industry. Capacity constrictions have hurt larger risks
more than smaller risks. Traditional primary and reinsurance
capacity has been reduced, but Lloyd's of London, which has in
>. the past not been active in this line, is offering primary
coverage up to $20 million. Not surprisingly, business with
Lloyd's of London is up to 100% to 200%. Much of the
reinsurance market for such coverage has virtually dried up.
Bank Fidelity Bond Coverage
Premiums are up about 300%. A group of fifty banks are creating
a mutual insurer to provide D & 0 and bankers blanket bond
coverage.
Motor Carrier Liability Coverage
jpus^'and^trucking^companies^are having severe difficulties \ •• «
obtaining;the insurance xoverage required by federal daw*. -The ,*•
Motor/Carrier Act of 1980 requires^insurance minimums of from
.- $750,000 for carriers of non-hazardous cargo to $5 million for
carriers .of hazardous waste and most hazardous materials carried
in bulk. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 set insurance
minimums from $1.5 million to $5 million, depending on the
passenger capacity of the bus. Capacity is limited both in the
primary and reinsurance markets. Small trucking firms and
independent owner-operators have the most difficulty getting
insurance.
Liquor Liability Coverage
Liquor liability coverage may be available as part of a
commercial lines package, but is severely constrained and
virtually nonexistent in some parts of the country as monoline
coverage. This line has been affected by the bankruptcy of one
of the largest dram shop insurers, Ideal Mutual Insurance
Company.
Medical Malpractice Insurance
r

Availability problems are being encountered by nurse/midwives,
obstetricians/gynecologists, pediatricians and dentists.
Premiums are being raised and coverage limits are being reduced,
sometimes by as much as 50%. Reinsurers are also restricting
coverage in this line. St. Paul's Insurance Company, the
largest medical malpractice insurer, has placed a moratorium on
new policies. St. Paul's writes coverage for approximately 20%
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the Nation's doctors, and wrote an estimated $600 million in
malpractice business in 1985. It had a pure loss ratio
(excluding loss adjustment expenses and operating expenses) of
81.3% in 1984. Doctor-owned mutual insurance companies account
for more than half of the medical liability coverage in the
country.
Commercial General Liability ("CCL")
Commercial general liability insurance has undergone significant
premium increases. The Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), the
property-casualty insurers' statistical and ratemaking
organization, has filed a new CGL form which will limit coverage
and which contains certain exclusions and policy limitations
(see Chapter 3 ) .
Excess Coverage
Excess coverage capacity has been sharply reduced. This
coverage currently is offered primarily on a claims-made basis,
which may or may not mesh with the primary, reinsurance and
other excess layers.
Reinsurance
Reinsurance capacity for the United States market has been
severely limited, particularly with regard to Lloyd's of London,,
which has faced both its own problems and a disillusionment with
the American market. - This capacity problem is expected to ease
somewhat in 1986, but is likely to remain a problem for some
time longer.
II.

SECTORAL SUMMARIES

The following are summaries of the effect of the insurance
availability/affordability crisis on various sectors of the
United States economy. This information was obtained from
surveys conducted by business groups, articles in the trade
press and materials prepared by trade associations or provided
by industry representatives. While the following does not
include all of the available information, it summarizes the
major findings.
Municipalities
Municipalities are among the hardest hit groups by both
affordability and availability problems. Local officials
preparing their budgets for the next fiscal year report that the
market for public entities is "extremely limited" and
"diminishing to nothing." Those cities able to secure bids are
finding insurance companies' offers prohibitively expensive.
Renewal rates have climbed by as much as 400% -- and often for
lower coverages with higher deductibles. Some cities are facing
premium increases of up to 1,000%.
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The United States Conference of Mayors conducted a survey of 39
cities in the summer of 1985. Over half the cities were quoted
premium increases of over 100%, and 16 were quoted increases
greater than 200%. In addition, a recent report by the Wyatt
Company, Public Officials Liability Insurance: Understanding
the Market (1986), notes that local governments have reported
premium increases of 200% to 300% in the insurance purchased for
their officials.
Rather than renew, many cities have decided to "go bare." All
cities have been forced to reevaluate and sometimes limit the
services they provide their communities. Finally, in the wake
of policy cancellations, a number of city and county officials
have resigned, fearing personal exposure to lawsuits stemming
from their official duties.
Transportation
The American Public Transit Association, the nation's largest
organization of transit operators, reports that premiums for
those companies able to obtain insurance this year have gone up
500% to 1,000%, and sometimes more. In Los Angeles, the
Southern California Rapid Transit District's annual premium
jumped from $67,000 to $1.7 million, while coverage was
vreduced. . Transit problems were compounded by the bankruptcy of
: :cme o£',the_ largest ^companies, involved, in insuring mass, transit .
^systems./' .Some (locals transit ^ystepis have had .to suspend .,
operations.^ v
Publishing
Newspaper and magazine publishers are finding it more difficult
to obtain libel insurance.
Nurse-Midwives
The American College of Nurse-Midwives represents 2,500 members,
1,400 of whom were covered under a blanket policy through the
association. The policy was cancelled on July 1, 1985. The
.association lias been unable to obtain other coverage and has
been attempting to create a captive insurer. The captive was to
.. have started operation by April 1, 1986, but that deadline will
not be met.
Grocers
A survey by the National Grocers Association found that its
.members1 liability insurance premium rates had recently
increased from 25% to 500%. The survey covered 161 retailers
and 20 wholesalers.
Architects and Engineers
Most architectural and engineering firms, and particularly
smaller firms, are experiencing severe availability and
affordability problems. Insurance premium rate increases of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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200% to 300% have become the norm. Roughly 30% to 40% of
smaller firms are going bare. Engineering firms involved in
asbestos or other toxic substances abatement activities face
extreme difficulties in obtaining insurance, with rate
increases, where insurance is available, of 5,000% not uncommon.
Day Care Centers
The National Association for Education of Young Children
conducted a survey of day care providers. They covered family
day care providers who care for children in a home setting, day
care centers and headstart programs. The survey found that 40%
of the.respondents had had their insurance cancelled or not
renewed and the majority of those with coverage had premium
increases, most of which rose 200% to 300%.
Toy Manufacturers
The Toy Manufacturers of America recently surveyed its 243
members on insurance cost and availability problems. Final
results will not be available until April, but initial responses
are:
Members

^Increase in premiums

k
t
«.

2150
,9
50-100
- 12:
100-150
. 2 ;,
150-200
11
300-500
7
500-1000
1
over-1000
2
cannot
insurance
Companies that normally had three to four months obtain
to negotiate
a
policy renewal have been given only 72 hours to do so this
year. This permits insufficient time for policy shopping.
The association reports that it had recommended a captive to its
members a few years ago. Commercial insurers reduced prices
upon learning of the proposal, eliminating industry interest in
a captive.
Household Appliance Manufacturers
The household appliance industry has seen sharp reductions in
available coverage, and the Association of Home Appliance
Manufacturers has lost group coverage it had arranged in 1983.
Many companies have been able to obtain only about one-third of
the coverage sought for product liability, and the cost of that
coverage is increasing. Member companies are having similar
problems obtaining D & 0 insurance.
10
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Automobile Repair
The Automotive Services Councils, an association representing
automobile repair shops and garages, conducted a survey with 104
responses. Average premium increases were 70% to 80%. Some 13%
of the membership reported purchasing an average of 30% less
coverage. Approximately 41% had experienced policy cancellations and 26% were unable to find new carriers.
Medical Equipment
.The.medical equipment industry has had a captive, MedMarc, an
affiliate of the Health Industry Manufacturers Association,
since 1979. The captive started with 35 companies and has
recently reached 100 member companies. The rate of growth
increased in 1985 as the result of cancellations by commercial
insurers of about 20% of the Association's members and premium
increases of five to ten-fold.
Biotechnology
Biotechnology companies are having a particularly difficult time
in the tight market because they are generally new, small
companies dealing mostly in research and development in a field
- largely unknown to insurers* Their inability to obtain coverage
(causes?them, difficulty*in .obtaining bank financing, which, in •
;turn;vcauses some**of these companies to sell out or forego
promising-research. The industry &s exploring the creation of a
captive.
Oil and Gas Drilling
The International Association of Drilling Contractors represents
1,500 contractors operating drilling rigs. It estimates maritime liability premium increases of 300% to 700% and inland
liability premium increases of 100% to 150%.
Construction Contractors
Constructor magazine (October 1985) estimates average
increases in general liability coverage of 40% to 75%. For
contractors who were able to negotiate significant discounts in
past years increases currently are running up to 300%. In 1985
premium increases for umbrella coverage were approximately 300%
for less coverage.
Natural Gas Transportation
The National L-P Gas Association represents 4,100 firms that
prepare and transport liquefied petroleum gases for residential
and industrial users. According to a spokesman, as many as 25%
of the transporters are operating with less than the $5 million
in insurance coverage that is required of motor carriers by
federal law. Difficulties are attributed to unavailability and
prohibitive costs of umbrella insurance.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

General Manufacturing
The Machinery & Allied Products Institute ("MAPI") recently
conducted a survey of 81 companies producing a broad range of
products in the manufacturing industries and obtained an 80%
response rate. The typical respondent experienced increases for
every type of insurance covered in the survey. The survey
covered general liability, D & 0, environmental impairment
liability, products and other property and casualty coverages.
The size of the increases varied with the date of the renewal;
consequently, the survey results understate the problem since
many of the respondents are not up for renewal until early this
year. Significant survey results are shown in the table below.
MAPI Survey Results on Liability Coverages
Premiums
CGL-Primary
CGL-Excess
D & 0
EIL
Products
Other
Lower Limits
CGL-Primary
CGL-Excess
D & O
EIL
Products
Other
Deductibles
& Exclusions
GCL-Primary
GCL-Excess
D &O
EIL
Products
Other

% Higher

% Change (Median)

73
100
72
94
95
87

40
250
300
60
116
40
% Change (Median)

% Lower

-36
-50
-25
-50
-50
-25

13
66
27
59
33
18
% Higher
Deductible

% More Exclusions

34
25
49
50
50
28

97
96
95
89
100
100

In addition to the foregoing, 35% of the MAPI respondents
indicated that their general liability coverage excluded "sudden
and accidental" pollution coverage, while 49% indicated that it
was excluded in some layers and included in others. Some 65% of
the respondents indicated that they had some coverages cancelled
since January 1, 1985.
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Machine Tool Manufacturers
The National Machine Tool Association represents 300 to 400
businesses that manufacture heavy machinery which cuts, shapes
•and forms metal. Preliminary results of a survey indicated
product liability premiums have doubled since 1984, and that
about half of the respondents have been or expect to be put on
claims-made policy forms.
Battery Recycling & Smelting Companies
Battery recycling companies are typical of many industries where
processes create toxic wastes. Recycling 50 million scrap
batteries accounts for up to 50% of the annual lead smelter
production. If the batteries are not recycled, they will be
disposed of in landfills, leading to more serious toxic
exposure. One major smelting company was offered a $10 million
policy with a $2.5 million deductible at a cost of $650,000.
While it deems the policy uneconomic, it has not found an
alternative. The problem is widespread with smelters of various
metals. The uncertainty of the risk and size of pollution
liabilities has lead to substantial reductions in coverage with
sharp increases in deductibles and premiums.
Power Equipment Manufacturers
*K>utdbor* power?<equipmentMjnanuf acturers-had been reporting premium :
•increases of from 50% to 70% during the past year; At the end
- : rof the^year>* with many renewals coming due, some have experienced increases of 400% to 600%. The Association once
*again is considering establishment of a captive.
General Aviation Manufacturers
The General Aviation Manufacturers Association reports that the
cost of liability insurance per aircaft was $51 for the 6,778
business, commuter and private aircraft delivered in 1962, and
increased to $211 for the 9,774 delivered in 1972. Currently,
for the 2,000.planes delivered in 1985, the liability insurance
cost has increased to $70,000 per plane. The cost of liability
insurance to air frame manufacturers in 1985 was about $135
million, with a total cost of $175 to $200 million for the
entire industry that includes manufacturers of engines,
electronics and parts.
Ski Operators
Liability insurance premium increases of up to 400% have been
-reported by the National Ski Areas Association. Some small ski
areas have closed, and the average price of lift tickets has
increased substantially.
Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers
Aerospace equipment manufacturers are increasingly concerned
that the escalating cost of product liability insurance and
other associated costs are causing them to lose their ability to
compete with overseas manufacturers of similar equipment.
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III.

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS

The above examples of insurance availability, affordability and
adequacy problems demonstrate the broad scope of the liability
insurance crisis in the mid-1980*s. In a similar crisis in the
mid-1970*s, the problem areas were largely confined to medical
malpractice and product liability. Medical malpractice coverage
has been a continuing problem, with almost half that coverage
currently underwritten by doctors1 and hospitals1 mutuals and
other alternative markets. Product liability coverage, however,
was readily available at declining cost during the late 1970*s
and early 1980*s.
A growing capacity shortage over the last year or more has
. caused commercial insurers to review carefully their
•. .'•• underwriting standards and pricing policies in order to
determine where insurance capacity can be utilized most
profitably. The inevitable result of this reevaluation has been
a severe disruption for insurance buyers.
^Insurance Availability

i
^

Availability problems are occurring in certain specialty
commercial insurance markets. These include pollution, day
care, municipal, liquor, motor carrier and D & 0 liability
^coverages.; *. The bankruptcies- of some specialty insurers,
^particularly in the^lines of motor carrier and liquor liability,
have affected the capacity in these coverages.
•In each of these lines, insurers have perceived the possibility
of significant losses based on highly publicized verdicts and
settlements. General line insurers who ordinarily would fill
the gap left by specialty carriers are unwilling to do so
because they can use their scarcer dollars in less volatile and
more profitable lines.
Insurance Affordability
Premiums are increasing in virtually all commercial coverages.
Examples of affordability problems include nurse-midwives and
general aviation manufacturers, both of which face premium costs
which may be warranted by the experience, but are too expensive
for the buyers. Solutions to problems like these appear to lie
outside of the insurance system.
Insurance Adequacy
Problems of insurance adequacy are being experienced across all
commercial lines of coverage. The main problem seems to lie
with the fact that many buyers are unable to buy as much
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insurance as they desire. This is particularly true for large
firms which seek large amounts of excess and higher limits
coverage. These problems appear related in part to a capacity
crunch created both by the insurance cycle and the withdrawal of
capacity by the overseas reinsurers. The lack of capacity
related to the insurance cycle shows signs of abating as the
corner of the cycle has turned and surplus is increasing. But
many firms may have to use alternative market mechanisms for at
least a couple of years until this capacity fully returns. It
may take much longer to get reentry by overseas reinsurers who
have grave concerns about the American tort liability system. A
second.area of inadequacy lies in the growth of exclusions,
deductibles and other policy limitations that are just now being
introduced into the market. These are discussed in Chapter 3.
The Insurance Availability/Affordabilitv Crisis
•

.

.

'

•

.

.

.

•

*

Finally, it should be noted that the crisis in insurance
availability and affordability does not appear to be a crisis
for the insurance industry. While the industry (as discussed in
Chapter 2) is suffering substantial underwriting losses, the
Working Group does not perceive this crisis to be a major threat
-to the financial viability of the industry. Rather, it is a
crisis, for the insureds who cannot obtain or afford the
linsurance^they^believe;necessary^for their, on-going,activit
Jrties.;.;, And;•-', to , the extent -that entities are. forced .to operate
V - -without insurance or with inadequate insurance, it is a crisis ,
.;.
..for victims of .tortious conduct who may find that liable
'defendants cannot pay them their damages. ,
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CHAPTER 2
THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY
A number of reasons have been proffered for the crisis in the
availability, affordability and adequacy of liability
insurance. Many of these reasons relate to the economic
decisions and performance of the insurance industry over the
past decade. Other reasons focus on recent developments in tort
law. While the two in fact are closely related, this Chapter
discusses each of these areas separately. Part A deals with the
general economic reasons for the current crisis; Part B reviews
the contribution of tort law. 1/

1/ There have been suggestions that the availability/affordability
crisis may be caused by certain aspects of state regulation. While
some regulatory measures may have aggravated the problem, the Working
Group has found little compelling evidence that the crisis is the
resultsof a regulatory failure, either in the sense of insufficient
or inadequate regulation, or in the sense of ill-conceived
regulation. In this regard, it is worthwhile noting the 1977 report
of the. Department of Justice to the Task Group on Antitrust
-Immunities on >The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance, which .
Concluded that "in the commercial lines . . . state regulatory
schemes are-largely illusory and that insurers are generally free to
set their own prices." Id., at vii. The report further indicated
'that rigid state rate regulation, such as is found in automobile
insurance, may in fact aggravate an availability problem, id., at
vi.
In this regard, it is worth noting the conclusion of the Medical
Malpractice Policy Guidebook (1985), prepared by Henry Manne (general
editor) and Barry Anderson, Patricia Danzon, Clark Havighurst,
Charles Phelps and Frank Sloan (principal authors) for the Florida
Medical Association. The Guidebook concluded that it was difficult
to fault the state insurance regulatory system for the high medical
malpractice insurance premiums in Florida. Id., at 11. The report
concluded that premium increases lag claims costs, and that
"malpractice premiums are almost certainly not 'too high9 compared to
the increases in claims costs emerging over recent years." Id., at
149-50.Some have pointed to state insurance reserve requirements as a
cause of the insurance availability/affordability crisis, to the
extent that they believe these requirements to have exacerbated
capacity constraints. While the Working Group did not analyze
whether state reserve requirements are too high or too low, it
should be noted that these requirements exist to ensure the
sofvency of insurance carriers, and thereby to protect
insureds. It also should be noted that the only way that state
insurance reserve requirements conceivably could be modified to
(CONTINUED)
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A.
I. INSURANCE INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
Recent news accounts have presented a seemingly conflicting view
of the economic performance of the property-casualty insurance
industry. In order to understand the financial condition of the
industry itself and of some of its specific lines of business,
it is useful to compare the condition of the industry as a whole
to what has been happening to premiums in the lines which
present significant availability/affordability problems.
The table below presents premium and loss data for the propertycasualty insurance industry for the period 1981 through 1985.

Year

Net Premiums
Written
(000)

1981 $ 98,805,725
1982 103,115,653
1983 v 107,802-.698,
1984 .117,743,957v.
1985*;142,300,000

Loss and LAE

Expenses

(000)

(000)

$75,764,229
82.152,241
87,719,055
103,720,652
126,846,220

•Estimated

Statutory Underwriting Loss after
Policyholder Dividends
(000)

$- 6,323,534
$27,132,052
-10,415,751
28,996,122
-13,285,049
30,799,231
-21,455,300
7 32,980,082
-25,200,000
; 37,353,750
Source;
Best s Insurance
Management Reports

The most striking number in the table, of course, is the $25 billion
underwriting loss estimated for 1985. This number represents the
difference between premiums written and expenses, policyholder

1/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
produce lower premiums would be if the reserve requirements were
relaxed. It would be difficult to justify relaxing reserve
requirements, however, in light of the fact that both insurance
t company insolvencies and the number of insurance companies
reported to be in financial difficulty have increased
substantially in the last two years.
The Working Group is continuing to review the contribution, if
any, of state regulation to the insurance availability/
affordability crisis.
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dividends, 2/ estimated losses and loss adjustment expenses
("LAE").
The underwriting loss, however, while significant, represents only
part of the industry's overall financial picture. Since premiums are
collected well in advance of any anticipated payout, they are
invested and earn income. In addition, other income is -generated
which also must be considered in reviewing the industry's financial
condition. Overall income in 1985 resulted in the industry showing a
$7.6 billion gain in policyholders' surplus (the equivalent of net
worth), 3/ on an underwriting loss of $25.2 billion and net
investment and other income of $32.8 billion. Thus, the industry
appears to have made an overall profit in 1985, though at a lower
rate than historical levels or other sectors of the economy.
In discussing the overall financial review of the property/casualty
industry, Best's reported that:

~!
; "."• *

Investor interest in the property-casualty
industry cannot be denied. While the Dow
Industrial Average had made headlines by
surpassing the 1500 mark (a 25% gain for the
year), Best's Index of property/casualty
companies has jumped 50% at this writing, and
security analysts specializing in insurance-and cognizant of 1985's underwriting losses—
nevertheless'continue to-be optimistic about
the industry's prospects. 4/

Two factors must be taken into account in assessing the role of
the insurance industry's financial performance in the insurance
availability/affordability crisis. First, even though the
industry currently is making a profit, that profit is well below
the profitability of most other major industries, as well as the
insurance industry's historical average. For example, in 1984
the property-casualty insurance industry produced an annual rate

2/ Questions have been raised as to whether or not the $2.1
billion paid out in policyholder dividends should be included in the
underwriting loss. Policyholder dividends are offered to some
policyholders in some lines, and reduce the net cost of their
insurance coverage. Consequently, any reduction in such premiums
simply increases the net cost to policyholders.
3/ Policyholders' surplus is the difference between insurers1
assets and liabilities. It is considered "the financial Security
that stands behind every insurance policy and is that which provides
the cushion to support the shock of major catastrophe, stock market
declines and loss of reserve inadequacies." ISO, Financial Condition
of the Insurance Industry -- An Update (1985).
4/ Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985).
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of return on net income after taxes as a percent of net worth of
1.8%, whereas the median for Fortune 500 companies was 13.6%. 5/
The comparable rate of return for the property-casualty insurance
industry from 1975 to 1984 was 10.9%. 6/
Second, the insurance availability/affordability crisis has not
manifested itself across the entire spectrum of insurance
services, but only in specific lines. These lines account for a
. relatively small portion of the industry. For example, the
entire property-casualty insurance market accounts for only
approximately one-third of the overall insurance market in terms
of written premiums. 7/ The two property-casualty lines that
have:been the primary source of availability/affordability
problems — general commercial liability and medical malpractice
— amounted to only 7% of all the property-casualty lines in
terms of 1984 written premiums. 8/ (These two lines thus
represent approximately 2.5% of the entire industry's written
premiums in 1984.) But, as can be seen in Subsection II, about
one-fifth of the property-casualty industry's $21.5 billion 1984
underwriting loss came from these two lines. And in 1985, the
two lines accounted for almost one-quarter of the propertycasualty industry's estimated $25.2 billion underwriting loss.
These two lines, as well as the Commercial Multiple Peril
line, 9/ are discussed in greater detail in Subsection II.
II.

UNDERWRITING RESULTS BY MAJOR LINES

t While the industry overall has been profitable, certain lines
have made major contributions to the underwriting losses. This
section examines the major commercial lines in which
availability
and affordability problems have been most prominent.
v
•;

Commercial Multiple Peril
Commercial Multiple Peril ("CMP") is related to the general
liability line of insurance in that it is a packaged line of
business which includes some commercial general liability
coverage and its long-tail losses; that is, losses which may be

5/ Insurance Information Institute, 1985-86 Property/Casualty
Factbook, page 22.
6/ Id. The comparable statutory accounting rate of return was
11.9%. icL.
7/ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, page 150
(January 25, 1986).
8/ Insurance Information Institute, 1985-86 Property/Casualty
Factbook, page 16.
9/ If the Commercial Multiple Peril line is taken into account,
approximately 14% of the property-casualty industry (in terms of 1984
written premiums) accounted for about one-third of its underwriting
losses inDigitized
bothby the
1984
and 1985. Id.
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reported many years after the policy year, CMP experience over
the past five years is reflected in the chart below.
Commercial Multiple Peril
Net Premiums
Written
Year

Loss
and
LAE

(Billions)

Underwriting
Expenses

(Billions)

1981
$6.8
1982
6.9
1983
7.2
1984
8.2
1985*
11.7
•Estimated
~

"

$4.6
5.3
5.9
7.9
10.4
Source:

(Billions)

Statutory UnderWriting Loss After
Policyholder
Dividends
(Billions)

$2.5
$-0.5
2.7
-1.2
2.9
-1.7
3.2
-2.9
4.1
-3.0
Best's Insurance Management
Reports 12/30/85

While the underwriting losses for CMP rose to $3 billion in
1985, it is readily apparent that until recently there had been
little premium growth in the line. Best's predicts that the
short-tail, non-liability portion of CMP should provide the
ability for a fast turnaround for this line. It also notes that
ISO's new CGL claims-made form will be added to the standard CMP
form, but that market pressures should assure the availability
and'affordability of the smaller businessowner's package. 10/
v

'

Commercial General Liability

Commercial General Liability ("CGL") coverage includes most of
the commercial sectors which are experiencing serious
availability/affordability problems. It covers product
liability, municipalities, day care centers and other commercial
coverages. It is the line for which ISO has introduced its new
claims-made form. The experience of this line over the past
five years is summarized below.
General Liability
Net Premiums
Written
Year

(Billions)

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985*

$6.0
5.6
5.7
6.5
11.1

Loss
and
LAE

Underwriting
Expenses

(Billions)
$5.1
5.4
6.0
7.8
13.2

(Billions)
$1.8
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.7

Statutory UnderWriting Loss After
Policyholder
Dividends
(Billions)
$-1.0
-1.7
-2.1
-3.2
-4.6

* E s t i m a t e d ' S o u r c e : B e s t ' s
Insurance
Management Report
Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As is apparent, written premiums dropped in 1982 and 1983 and
rose slightly in 1984. The figures for 1985, however, show a
dramatic increase of 72% over the 1984 premium. Increases are
continuing to occur in the line as policies come up for
renewal. Losses increased throughout the period, but did so at
a relatively even pace until 1984, when losses increased by over
$1 billion dollars over the previous year's losses.
Medical Malpractice
Medical malpractice represents only about 1.8% of property/
casualty insurance written, but has been the source of major
availability/affordability problems. The following chart
summarizes the experience of the line over the past five years.
Medical Malpractice
,

Year

Net Premiums
Written
(Billions)

1981
1982 :
a983^
>
^1984 ' \ . - ~
1985*

$1.3
1.5 ..
1.6 \
1.8 V-.-- •'
2.6

Loss
and
LAE

Underwriting
Expenses

(Billions)
$1.6
2.0
2.1
2.8
3.6

•Estimated

.. '

(Billions)

Statutory Underwriting Loss After
Policyholder
Dividends
(Billions)

$0.2
0.2
0.2
;
0.3
< 0.3

Source:

$-0.5
-0.7
-0.8
-1.1
-1.4

Best's Insurance
Management Report

Medical malpractice experience is receiving considerable
attention at the state level. Unlike many lines of coverage
such as product liability, rates are based on ?tate claims
rather than national data.
III.

PREMIUM TRENDS

The recent rapid growth in premiums has been a major element in
the current availability/affordability crisis. This section
examines this trend. The following data was provided by the
ISO:
Cash-flow underwriting is generally acknowledged to have played
a role in causing the large underwriting losses presently being
experienced in the commercial lines. According to ISO, the
industry's current underwriting losses are a result of "a
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

prolonged period of underpricing and rapidly expanding tort
liabilities." 11/ In this regard, the ISO report states:
For the better part of seven years, the
insurance industry has been engaged in a
brutal price war. During the early 1980*8,
the price for commercial insurance was
decreasing, sometimes sharply, as insurers
vied for premium dollars to invest at the
high interest rates then in effect. At the
time, commercial customers did not
complain. Indeed, many realized that
commercial insurance in the United States was
being sold below cost, even when investment
income was considered. 12/
Chart A, based on ISO data, tracks commercial line premiums in
constant 1967 dollars. As can be noted from the chart, 1984
marked the first real increase in premiums (in constant
dollars) after five consecutive years of declining written
premiums. But 1984 written premiums were almost 20% less than
premiums collected in 1978, the year preceding the dramatic
decline in premiums. At the same time, losses and expenses in
1984 were at an all-time high. 13/
A similar comparison of the general liability premiums written,
premiums earned and line outgo over the past ten years (not in
constant dollars) is shown in Chart B.
Analyzing this data, the Best's report notes that during the
relevant period (1975 - 1985):
. . . the inflation of liability awards could
have been no secret to any underwriter. Had
the ascending line of premiums written that
was established in 1975 through 1978
continued to rise, the general liability
losses of $13 billion incurred in the last
six years largely would have been
avoided. 14/

11/ ISO, Financial Condition of the Insurance Industry -- An
Update (1985).
1 2 /

I d .

13/

Id.

--•

'

. , •

14/ Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985).
22 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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GENERAL LIABILITY

14
12CO

<x
CD

8-J

T

1975

r

1976 1977

Net Premiums Earned

T
1978

1979

T
1980

T

1981 1982

Net Premiums Written

—1
1983

r

1

1984

1985

Losses • LAE • UW Expenses

Source: Best's Insurance Management Report, 12/31/85
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.

THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS

The above discussion indicates that during the late 1970's and
early 1980fs the insurance industry engaged in significant
premium reductions while claim losses increased steadily. The
result, not surprisingly, has been massive underwriting losses
in recent years.
It is useful in considering the contribution of such economic
factors to the insurance availability/affordability crisis to
distinguish two different effects which frequently are
confused. The first is the inflationary effect on premiums of
the recent decline in interest rates. The second is the premium
cutting which took place in the late 1970's and early 1980fs as
a consequence of the industry's desire to take advantage of high
interest rates available during that period.
As to the first effect, there is an obvious inverse relationship
between premiums and the prevailing interest rate. A
significant portion of an insurer's profits stem from the return
on the premium income it invests between receipt of the premium
and payout of the incurred liabilities. When interest rates are
high, premiums tend to be lower since more of the insurer's
income;comes.from such.return on investment; and when interest
rates'are* low;- premiums-will- tend to be higher since the ..insurer
is more-dependent on the premium principal to cover the
anticipated payout. Thus, as interest rates fall ~ as they
have in the mid-1980's — insurance premiums inevitably increase.
This inverse relationship is illustrated by Chart C, which
compares the prime rate in 1976 through 1985 to the annual
percentage change of the total Commercial General Liability
(CGL) premiums written by the insurance industry in each of
those years. 15/ Chart C graphically demonstrates that the
rate of growth of the written premiums changes inversely with
the movement of the prime interest rate.
To the extent that the recent sharp premium increases are
related to the drop in interest rates, there is little the
federal (or any) government can or should do to mitigate this
market effect. Declining interest rates cause innumerable
economic realignments which, on the whole, are quite beneficial
to the economy. An increase in insurance premiums resulting
from such a reduction in interest rates, while of itself
undesirable, is a relatively minor side effect to the far more
significant economic consequences of a drop in the interest rate.

15/ The percentage change in 1976 through 1984 is obtained from
the Insurance Information Institute's most recent Property/Casualty
Factbook. The estimate for 1985 is obtained from the ISO data
discussed supra.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CHART C
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GCL PREMIUMS COMPARED TO INTEREST RATE
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Moreover, there is little that can be done to address this
source of premium volatility. It would be absurd to try to keep
interest rates high simply to keep insurance premiums as low as
possible. But as long as interest rates fluctuate, premiums
necessarily will reflect such changes.
A second economic factor related to interest rates is the extent
to which high interest rates may have triggered "excessive
competition11 in the insurance industry which led the industry to
sell its product too cheaply. For one thing, even assuming one
accepts the concept of "excessive competition,H it is unclear
how.such .losses in fact contribute to the insurance
availability/affordability crisis. As discussed later in this
Chapter, such losses are "sunk costs" which the industry cannot
recoup simply by charging higher premiums. If premiums in fact
.. r are higher than the insured risks and the currently available
investment return dictate, either other sources of capital
(including insurers who have suffered no losses or lower
losses) should offer the same insurance at a lower price, or
insureds will retain these "excess profits" for themselves
through self-insurance or the formation of captives. The fact
that there appears to be little insurance coverage being made
available by new or expanding underwriters, and that many
insureds are highly reluctant to self insure or form captives
(even though, many .with serious.availability problems may have no
alternative)/,: strongly,,indicates,that recoupment of losses is
... not a particularly compelling explanation for the current
** insurance, availability/affordability crisis.
*It is particularly puzzling that the proponents of this theory m
advocate the abolition of the insurance industry's antitrust
immunity contained in the McCarran-Ferguson Act (Public Law 7915) as an appropriate response to the asserted problem of the
industry's cash-flow "mismanagement." It is hard to reconcile
the argument that the current problems of the insurance industry
stem from "excessive competition" with the proffered solution of
removing the industry's antitrust immunity. Since the goal of
antitrust law is to enhance competition, if one truly believes
that the problems of the insurance industry are a result of too
.- much competition, the last thing one would advocate is a legal
change which would increase the level of competition. While the
Working Group did not review and takes no position on the
continuing validity of the industry's antitrust immunity, 16/
it is readily obvious that the suggestion that allegedly
"excessive competition" can be cured by even more competition is
patently absurd.

16/ Despite the assertions of some, the Working Group found no
evidence to suggest that the industry's antitrust immunity is a
significant factor in the insurance availability/affordability
crisis. It should be noted, however, that the immunity has been
criticized for a variety of other reasons. See the 1977 report of
the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities, footnote 1, supra.
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The reasons why the loss recoupment (or excessive pricing)
theories advocated by some make little economic sense can
•briefly be summarized as follows:

*
*
- *

0

Insurers, like all profit maximizing companies,
charge the price which maximizes their
profits. Past gains or past losses are
irrelevant to setting the price today which will
maximize profits tomorrow. 'The argument that
insurers are charging higher premiums to recoup
past losses suggests that absent such losses
their premiums would be lower -- that is, that
they would not be charging premiums that
maximize their profits. That makes little
sense.

0

Even if excessive premiums were being charged by some
insurers to recoup their past losses, for the reasons
discussed, other insurers would offer the same coverage
at lower prices reflecting the actual risk, or insureds
would retain such excess profits for themselves through
self-insurance or the formation of captives. 17/

0

The commercial lines of insurance, which are at the
center of the availability/affordability crisis, in
fact are relatively competitive. For example, the 1977
report of the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities (see
footnote 1, supra) found that the property-liability
insurance industry "appears to possess an atomistic
market structure," including over 900 companies..*
Id., at 7. 18/ The Task Force also found that the
restrictions to entry do not appear significant in the
property-liability insurance industry, id.,, at 9,
and that there appears to be price.competition in this
line as a result of "an industry structure that favors
competition." Id., at 27-28. 19/ It is, of course,

17/ Many insurance companies are mutuals, meaning that they are
owned by their policyholders. The suggestion that they are charging
their policyholder-owners unnecessarily high premiums makes even less
sense, since any such excess profits must be rebated through
policyholder dividends.
18/ The report states that 20 insurance groups account for 53% of
written premiums, and that no single group accounts for a major share
of the market. Id., at 8. This is consistent with the analysis of
the Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook (H. Manne, 1985), which
found the medical malpractice insurance market in Florida to be
"substantially and effectively competitive." IdL., at 166.
19/ See also page 348 of the report summarizing the Task Force's
(CONTINUED)
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difficult to conceive how premiums are being kept at
artificially high levels for a line of insurance in
which prices appear to be competitively determined.
0

Finally, many of the strongest proponents of the loss
recoupment theory also contend that these losses were
the result of excessive price competition in the
industry. Obviously, it is difficult to reconcile
these arguments. 20/

In sum, to the extent that purely economic factors underlie the
insurance-availability/ affordability crisis, they do not appear
to be the type of problems which can be cured by different or
more intensive forms of government regulation -- either at the
state or federal level — of the insurance industry. There,
however, is a cause of the availability/ affordability crisis at
the very heart of that crisis which the government is well
placed to address in a variety of constructive ways. That cause
is tort law, and its role in the crisis is discussed in Part B
of this Chapter.
B.
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The above^discussion-hasvfocusedvlargely^on the/current
financial condition'of the insurance industry, and the economic
;* v ' .factors leading to that condition. * The following discussion
examines the state 'Of tort law, and its central role in the
insurance availability/affordability crisis.
Unlike the above related economic data on the insurance
industry, it is difficult to obtain good empirical data
indicating precisely what has happened to tort liability in

19/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
conclusion that the "industry is structured in a manner conducive to
competition." It should be noted that these conclusions did not
appear to apply to some other lines of insurance such as life
insurance.
20/ These same points apply equally well to arguments that
premiums are set excessively high to recoup losses resulting from
mismanaged investment portfolios. Just as past losses are irrelevant
to determining the premiums which will maximize profits, investment
portfolio losses should have no bearing on premiums. In this regard,
however, it should be noted that the property-casualty industry made
$32.8 billion from net investment and other income in 1985. See
supra.
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recent years. 21/ It is plain, even to the most uninitiated
that tort law has changed dramatically in recent years — from a
relatively quiescent legal backwater into one of the most
important and dynamic areas of the law today. 22/ Moreover, a
growing body of case examples and empirical data suggest that
the current tort system has serious problems and is operating
quite poorly. The insurance availability/affordability crisis
is one symptom — albeit the most dramatic and acute symptom ~
of the dislocations and problems generated by a malfunctioning
tort system.
I.

PROBLEM AREAS IN TORT LAW

In attempting to understand what has happened to tort liability
in the United States, the Working Group has focused on four
interrelated areas: fault, causation, damages and transaction
costs. Each is discussed separately below.
The Movement Toward No-Fault Liability
One of the
the degree
While this
appears to

most disturbing aspects of the current tort system is
to which it has moved toward no-fault liability.
movement began in earnest over twenty years ago, it
have accelerated dramatically in recent years.

Beginning in the early to mid-1960's it became fashionable to
^reject the-twin pillarsupon which tort-law historically had
<been constructed -- deterrence and compensation ~ in favor of
^seemingly more enlightened theories based largely on concepts of
•societal insurance and risk spreading. 23/ While many of these

21/ The Rand Corporation, through its Institute for Civil
Justice, has produced the best empirical data and analyses
available in the area. While the Institute has only been able
to research discrete areas of civil justice, the conclusions
drawn from those analyses are invaluable to understanding many
broader problems. The recently published five-year overview of
the Institute's program offers an excellent summary of the
research, results and continuing work of the Institute's staff.
22/ For example, at the end of fiscal year 1975, what is now
the Torts Branch of the United States Department of Justice
contained 39 attorneys, who handled or supervised about 4,000
cases totalling approximately $1 billion in claims. At the end
of fiscal year 1985, the Torts Branch had grown to 124 attorneys
handling or supervising about 11,000 cases totalling
approximately $200 billion in claims;
23/ One of the most explicit statements of such a theory can
be found in the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447
A.2d 539 (1982), in which the Court expressly denied defendants
(CONTINUED)
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theories were couched in terms of economic efficiency, they
represented the beginning of a devastating, and to this day, ongoing challenge to the role of fault as a predicate of tort
liability. The long-term effect of this development has been
less to promote a more efficient or sensible tort system, 24/ than
to undermine the importance of fault (or wrongdoing) as a moral and
doctrinal justification for and limitation on tort liability. As
this limitation has been removed or undermined in certain areas of
tort liability, tort law increasingly has come to rest only on the
pillar of compensation, with compensation often awarded merely for
the sake of compensation.
As the tort system moves away from fault it increasingly imposes
liability upon persons and companies that have done nothing
wrong. This has been accomplished in a variety of ways: by
directly reducing ^or even eliminating the fault requirement; by

21/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
the opportunity to raise a "state of the art* defense. The
Court held that even if the danger at issue was scientifically
. unknowable at the relevant time, defendants nonetheless were
v s;till^iiable.;for.*having failed..to. warn of an unknowable risk. .,*•--'*
- As justification for*i,ts.holding, t*he Court relied heavily on ,, - i
*-- risk-spreading;, vln the words of the Court, "manufacturers and ,.
distributors .••»', can insure against liability and incorporate .
the cost of the insurance in the price of the product." 447
A.2d at 547. The Court went on to opine that the likely
increase in premiums to compensate for unanticipated risks was
"not a bad result." Id.
24/ The belief that tort liability should be no-fault so as
to serve as a risk spreading mechanism for all injuries is in
fact quite anti-consumer. Such a view of tort liability
effectively would mean that the price of every product and
service would include an insurance surcharge for the risk of any
. injury related -to the product or service. It has long been
understood, however, that because of the extraordinarily high
transaction costs of the tort system, such compulsory insurance
througtu.the tort system would be among the most inefficient and
costly ways for consumers to purchase insurance. Thus, for
every $1 of compensation, the tort system requires the consumer
to pay approximately $3 in premiums (assuming, as discussed
* infra, two-thirds transaction costs), while that same $1 of
compensation can be obtained through first-party health and
disability insurance for only $1.25. H. Marine, Medical
Malpractice Policy Guidebook 143 (1985). It is highly ironic
that many proponents of no-fault liability argue that such
liability is in the best interest of consumers. In fact, since
consumers ultimately pay the premiums of whatever Compensation
scheme is devised, quite the contrary is the case. See also
Epstein, "Products Liability as an Insurance Market," 14
J. Legal Stud. 645 (1985).
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defining new duties that effectively create fault where no fault
existed previously; and, by engaging in after-the-fact analyses
that "find" fault wherever there has been an injury. 25/ The
ultimate effect of these developments has been the same -- to
shift liability for compensation to "deep pocket" defendants
that have the resources to compensate plaintiffs generously. 26/
Fault has not, however, been openly (or completely) rejected as
part of our tort law. One reason is that fault remains the only
vehicle in tort law capable of distinguishing wrongful (or
undesirable) from beneficial (or desirable) conduct. If fault
were rejected altogether, it would mean that desirable
activities would be just as likely to incur liability as
wrongful conduct. An open rejection of fault thus necessarily
would result in a sweeping transformation in the public's
attitude toward tort law, which continues to be bottomed on the
concept of tort liability as a form of justified redress for
wrongful conduct. A second reason why fault continues to be
part of tort law (and why courts often will engage in amazing
distortions of relevant facts or legal doctrines to find fault
rather than simply reject the principle of fault) is that fault
is the basis of much of the structure and process of tort law.

* 25/ The duty>to warn.has-been-a particularly fertile ground
•for such after-the-fact compensation oriented findings of
'fault. - It is all too easy after the occurrence of an injury to
^postulate a warning that might have influenced the plaintiff to
*be more careful or to reconsider his action, no matter how
fanciful or unreasonable such a warning might appear prior to
the injury. Such analyses have been a major factor in the
medical malpractice and product liability litigation explosion.
26/ A recent and almost classic example of such compensation
oriented liability findings is the California Supreme Court's
decision in Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.3d 49,
665 P.2d 947 (1983). In that case, a man was injured when an
allegedly intoxicated driver lost control of her car, veered off
the street into a parking lot, and crashed into a telephone
booth in which the man was standing. Suit was brought against
the companies responsible for the design, location,
installation, and maintenance of the booth. The Court, in an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Rose Bird, found that the risk
that someone might veer off the road and crash into the phone
booth was not unforeseeable as a matter of law. The Court also
determined that it was of no consequence that the harm to
plaintiff came about through the negligent or reckless acts of
an allegedly intoxicated driver. In a concluding footnote,
Chief Justice Bird stated that "there are no policy
considerations which weigh against imposition of liability"
against the defendants even though their "conduct may have been
without 'moral blame,'" and referred specifically to "the
probable availability of insurance for these types of accidents
. . . . " 665 P.'2d at 953 n. 14.
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If fault were no longer a central element in determining
liability, the current tort system would in many ways be
wasteful, inefficient and unfair in the extreme. 21/
Tort law thus has gradually (with a marked acceleration in
recent years) been moving in the direction of no-fault liability
without an adequate acknowledgement of either the existence or
the implications of this development. The result is an
increasingly common and perverse combination of fault-based
levels of compensation based on no-fault liability.
The Undermining of Causation
Tort law traditionally has sought to place liability only upon
those actors whose wrongful conduct actually caused an injury.
-This principle is found in the concept of "proximate cause,"
which requires a reasonable relationship between a given cause
and effect. For some time, however, proximate cause has been
under systematic attack. No single doctrinal change can be
identified as the primary vehicle for this attack. Rather, the
challenge has come through a variety of questionable practices
and doctrinal innovations.

r

One such development has been the increasing use of joint and
several*liability .to. shift the cost of compensation to "deep
pockets.J'r Joint .and-severaLrliability developed in ,the context.
of defendants ^acting in concert. * 28/ Over the years, however,
it increasingly has been used to make a defendant with only a
limited role*in causing an injury bear the full- cost of
compensating plaintiff, even in some cases where the plaintiff
may have been largely responsible for his own injury. 29/ The
result has been that joint and several liability in the absence of
concerted action can and does lead to highly inequitable

27/ For example, the way in which damages are measured and
awarded can only be justified, if at all, on the basis of •
redressing wrongful conduct. Once wrongdoing is removed as an
element of liability, many of the principles involving damages
become-grossly unfair.
28/ See generally Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984),
Chapter 8. As may be obvious, as with so many other aspects of
tort law, fault remains a central and essential justification
for joint and several liability.
29/ The application of joint and several liability in cases
where there in fact is no concerted action is discussed in some
detail in Speiser, Krause & Gans, The American Law of Torts §
3:7 (1983). It is interesting to note that the English courts
apparently have maintained the traditional common law basis for
joint and several liability, and have refused to apply such
liability in the absence of concerted action. Id.'
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%

treatment of defendants, particularly
defendants. 30/

ff

deep pocket"

A related development is the way in which joint and several
liability has been applied by some courts to theories of
"enterprise" or "market share" liability for injuries caused by
generic products (e.g., DES). "Market share" liability, in
its pure theoretical sense, allocates liability among
manufacturers of a generic product on the basis of their share
of the relevant market. While there can be some serious
problems and inequities with this approach, as long as all
relevant manufacturers (and their respective market shares) are
accounted for, and the product is truly generic in nature, such
an allocation of liability may be the only way plaintiffs in
some cases can obtain compensation for injuries caused by
wrongdoing on the part of the manufacturers of such a product.
Serious problems with this approach arise, however, when not all
relevant manufacturers are accounted for, or where the product
is not truly generic in nature. Even more troublesome is the
approach of several courts which use some industry liability
allocation formula, but then apply joint and several liability
to all defendants. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418
Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert, denied., 105 S.Ct. 123
(1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d
37 (1984). This, in fact, represents a clear abuse of joint and
several liability, and cannot be justified on the basis of the
unique,difficulties, plaintiffs sometimes face in identifying the
manufacturer;of an injury causing generic product. *
A third means that has been used to undermine causation -- increasingly common in toxic torts cases -- is the use of
presumptions or burden-shifting techniques to force the
defendant to prove the lack of causation in order to avoid
liability. 31/ Frequently, this amounts to asking the defendant

30/ The legal doctrine of contribution in theory could serve
to mitigate some of those inequities. In certain areas of the
law, such as antitrust law, where joint and several liability
generally tends to be applied to established businesses,
contribution appears to function quite well. (And, in any
event, joint and several liability in antitrust cases is
virtually always based on concerted action -- the traditional
basis for such liability.) In personal injury cases, however,
many multi-defendant cases involve a "deep pocket" and one or
more defendants who are either judgment proof or have limited
assets or insurance coverage. In such cases, the belief that
contribution serves as a mitigating factor is largely illusory.
31/ A particularly dramatic example of such a practice can be
found in Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah
1984), a low-level radiation exposure case in which the court
shifted to the government the burden of proving that particular
cancers were not caused by radiation exposure.
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to meet an impossible burden of proving the negative.
*.

-

Another way in which causation often is undermined ~ also an
increasingly serious problem in toxic tort cases — is the
reliance by judges and juries on noncredible scientific or
medical testimony, studies or opinions. It has become all too
common for "experts" or "studies" on the fringes of or even well
beyond the outer parameters of mainstream scientific or medical
views to be presented to juries as valid evidence from which
conclusions may be drawn. The use of such invalid scientific
evidence (commonly referred to as "junk science") has resulted
in findings of causation which simply cannot be justified or
understood from the standpoint of the current state of credible
scientific and medical knowledge. 32/ Most importantly, this
development has led to a deep and growing cynicism about the
ability of tort>law to deal with difficult scientific and
medical concepts in a principled and rational way.
These are but four developing areas that are causing defendants
to be found liable for injuries they did not cause. The one
common attribute of these developments is that the defendants to
whom liability is shifted almost invariably happen to be those
with the deepest pockets.
*
-

-..--•

. The Explosive Growth in Damage Awards

Another area of great, concern./is th,e explosive, growth in tort *
damages awards over the last decade,. A few statistics will
illustrate ..this point. , ...
Jury Verdict Research, Inc.,. publishes data on the average jury
verdict in product liability and medical malpractice cases. The
service's latest report 33/ shows that the average medical

32/ An instructive decision in this regard is the district
court opinion in Johnston v. United States, 597 F.Supp. 374
v (D. Kansas 1984). The court there exhaustively reviewed the
theories and credentials of a number of plaintiffs' experts on
the effects of low-level radiation, and rejected their testimony
,as biased, contradictory and totally without scientific merit.
Of particular interest is the court's frustration that these
same experts had played prominent roles in major radiation cases
such as Silkwood and Allen, and that their testimony was being
used in numerous cases throughout the country. The court noted
its disappointment that such "so-called experts can take such
license from the witness stand [to] say and conclude things
which . . . they would not dare report in a peer-reviewed
format." Id. at 415.
33/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Injury Valuation; Current
Award Trends No. 304 (1986). The 1985 data provided by the
service is incomplete, and is subject to refinement. The
(CONTINUED)
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malpractice Jury verdict increased from $220,018 in 1975 to
$1,017,716 in 1985 (see Chart D), a 363% increase. 34/ Average
product liability jury verdicts during this same period increased
from $393,580 to $1,850,452, a 370% increase (see Chart E). 3£/
Interestingly, much of this increase can be attributed to a
remarkable growth in verdicts above $1 million. In 1975 there
were three million-dollar medical malpractice verdicts and nine
million-dollar product liability verdicts reported by Jury
Verdict Research, Inc. In 1984, the numbers had grown to 71

33/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
service indicates that it bases "its findings, values and
probabilities upon collected verdicts using accepted statistical
methods in their analysis and application." Nevertheless, the
reported average annual verdicts are not used by the Working
Group as an accurate statement (though they may very well be) of
the average jury verdict in any particular year. Rather, the
* Working Group found the Jury Verdict Research data useful for
purposes of showing the trend in jury verdicts over the last
decade. In this regard, it should be noted that the service has
oised the same basic methodology since well before the relevant
.reported-years.* Moreover, while there are different estimates ^
i'of average jury verdicts for particular areas and years, a
^number of other sources that have collected such data -including the Institute for Civil Justice -- corroborate the
overall trends reported by Jury Verdict Research, Inc.
34/ This percentage increase is consistent with a survey of
California Superior Court medical malpractice verdicts. That
survey shows the average medical malpractice award as increasing
from $152,970 in 1975 to $649,210 in 1983, a 324% increase.
American Medical Association Special Task Force on Professional
Liability and Insurance, Professional Liability in the f80s
(October 1984). Because the $250,000 cap in California on
awards for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases was
only recently affirmed as constitutional (see Chapter 4), it is
unclear what effect, if any, the cap has had on malpractice
verdicts in California. It is worth noting, however, that the
recent, insurance problems for medical malpractice have been far
less serious in California than in many other states, and that
in California the insurance crisis primarily has affected areas
other than medical malpractice (e.g., municipal liability).
35/ This remarkable increase is also reflected in the
Institute for Civil Justice study of civil jury verdicts in Cook
County, Illinois. For example, the average wrongful death award
in Cook County increased (in constant dollar terms) from
$166,000 in 1970-74 to $336,000 in 1975-79, a doubling over
roughly half a decade. M. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries:
Civil Jury Verdicts in Cook County 54 (1984).
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million-dollar medical malpractice verdicts and 86 milliondollar product liability verdicts (see Chart F), an increase of
over 1200% in the number of such verdicts. 36/ If these milliondollar verdicts are deleted, the increase in average verdicts is
reduced sharply. For example, the increase in the average medical
malpractice jury verdict from 1975 to 1985 drops to 26% and the
comparable average product liability verdict jury increase is
87%. 37/ This clearly suggests that the explosion in damages has
come largely at the high end of the awards scale.
The Jury Verdict Research data is of only limited value on the
absolute number of million-dollar payments, since in all
likelihood the vast majority of such payments are through
settlements rather than verdicts. The data is highly relevant,
however, in that it shows that the percentage rate of increase
of verdicts is far higher for large verdicts than for small or
medium-size verdicts. Since a significant distinguishing factor
between large verdicts and small or medium-size verdicts is that
large verdicts tend to be composed to a far greater extent of
non-economic damages, 38/ this strongly suggests that noneconomic damages play a major role in the explosive growth in
large verdicts (as compared to the much more moderate growth in
small and medium-size verdicts).
While it is not possible to quantify precisely how much
particular: elements* of ^damages.have contributed to this ...''
explosion, it* appears that non-economic damages are a
substantial-factor. * Such damages include non-pecuniary
compensatory damages for intangible injuries such as pain and
suffering and mental anguish, as well as punitive damages. Such
non-economic damages are inherently open-ended and subjective,
ancf, therefore, easily susceptible to dramatic inflation. Of
interest in this regard is a recent preliminary study by the
Institute for Civil Justice which indicates that the average
punitive damage award in Cook County, Illinois, increased from
$63,000 in 1970-74 to $489,000 in 1980-84 (see Chart G). 3j>/ Of

36/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra. The trend toward
million-dollar verdicts is also documented by the Institute for
Civil-Justice. M. Shanley & M. Peterson, Comparative Justice:
Civil Jury Verdicts in San Francisco and Cook Counties, 19591980 26-30 (1983).
37/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra.
38/ H. Marine, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 138-39
(1985). The study shows that for medical malpractice awards
between $100,000 and $200,000, non-economic damages account for
approximately 27% of the total award, while for awards above
$600,000, the non-economic share increases to 54%.
39/ M. Peterson, Punitive Damages;

Preliminary Empirical
(CONTINUED)
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*1984 Dollars

particular interest is that the average Cook County punitive
damage award in personal injury cases increased from $40,000 in
1970-74 to $1,152,174 in 1980-84 (see Chart H). 40/
This explosion in damage awards, particularly in the case of noneconomic damages, is vastly in excess of the rate of inflation
over the comparable period. 41/
For whatever reasons,.tort
damage awards have suddenly soared in the United States without
any apparent justification.
Excessive Transaction Costs
Another, serious problem of the tort system is its extraordinarily
high transaction costs. A study by the Institute for Civil
Justice of the asbestos litigations shows that out of every dollar
paid out by the asbestos manufacturers and their insurers as a
result of the asbestos litigation, 62 cents on the verage is lost
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses (see Chart I). 42/
This does not include the transaction costs borne by the courts in
adjudicating these claims.
It also is worthwhile viewing the transaction costs from the

•22/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
Findings .13 (1985). These averages were adjusted for
inflation and are stated in terms of the 1984 dollar. The
study's analysis of punitive damage awards in San Francisco also
showed an increase in such awards, though of lesser magnitude
than in Cook County.
40/ Id., at 25 (also adjusted for inflation). 'Peterson
notes that personal injury punitive damage awards in Cook County
between 1980-84 amounted to over half of all punitive damages
awarded in all case categories by Cook County juries from 196084.
41/ For purposes of comparison, one dollar in 1985 had
approximately half the buying power of one dollar in 1975.
42/ J. Kakalik, P. Ebener, W. Felstiner, G. Haggstrom &
M. Shanley, Variations in Asbestos Litigation Compensation and
Expenses xviii (1984). These costs, of course, include both
plaintiffs' and defendants' litigation expenses. In comparing
the costs attributable to defendants' litigation expenses to the
costs attributable to plaintiffs' litigation expenses it is
useful to remember that defendants incur such costs whether or
not they prevail, and, indeed, may incur substantial costs
defeating even clearly frivolous claims. Measurements of
plaintiffs' litigation expenses (such as in Chart I), reflect
only those cases in which plaintiffs prevail, while defendants'
litigation expenses include all cases, whether or not plaintiffs
prevail.
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perspective of the prevailing plaintiff- The study also shows
that for every dollar awarded to plaintiff, 34 cents on the
average is lost to legal fees and an additional 5 cents is lost
to legal expenses. 43/ In some cases, legal fees alone
amounted to as much as 45% of plaintiff's award. 44/
It is difficult to justify such extraordinary transaction
costs. But it is particularly difficult to justify such costs
when the costs often are borne largely by the seriously injured
and by consumers who ultimately must pay for these costs through
higher prices for goods and services. The only clear beneficiaries of this system appear to be lawyers.
II. BURGEONING TORT LIABILITY AS A MAJOR CAUSE
OF THE INSURANCE AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS
The above discussion describes a tort system that in recent
years has dramatically increased in scope. One way of measuring
that increase is in terms of the increase in the number of tort
lawsuits and in the level of damages awarded in such lawsuits.
While the available data is limited, and by no means perfect, it
clearly confirms that there has been a substantial increase in
recent years in both the number of tort lawsuits and awarded
damages..
•. The,growth in the number-of, product liability suits has beenv _s
':•>. astounding. For example, the number of product liability cases
filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in
1974 to 13,554 in 1985, a 758% increase (see Chart J). 45/
There is no reason to believe that the states courts have not
witnessed a similar dramatic increase in the number of product
liability claims.
A similar trend can be found in medical malpractice, where
claims 46/ filed against physician-owned companies increased
from 10,568 in 1979 to 23,545 in 1983, a 123% increase in four

43/ Id., at 84. For tried claims, these costs increase
to 39 cents and 6 cents respectively. Id.
44/ Id^ With legal expenses of 5%, prevailing plaintiffs
in such cases receive only half of the awarded verdict.
45/ Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
46/ Claims do not, of course, translate directly into
lawsuits, since most claims are resolved prior to the filing of
litigation. But a substantial increase in claims almost
certainly means a corresponding substantial increase in
litigation.
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years. 47/ The number of medical malpractice lawsuits per 100
physicians more than doubled from 1976 to 1981, and for
obstetricians/gynecologists actually tripled during this
period. 48/ In federal courts, which contain only a fraction
of all medical malpractice claims, such claims have
increased almost three-fold in the last decade (see Chart K). 49/
A similar increase can be found in claims filed against
municipal and county officials. A survey of over twelve hundred
local governments found that such claims had increased by 141%
between 1979 and 1983. 50/ Tort claims against municipalities
also have increased dramatically in recent years. For example,
New York City witnessed a 375% increase from 1977 to 1985 in
personal injury claims, with a corresponding 345% increase in
average settlement cost. 51/ The City's long-term liability
for tort claims already filed is projected to be $1.5 billion. 52/
The explosive growth in damages over the past decade has already
been related in detail. Suffice it to say that the increase in
the average tort award appears to have outpaced even the
extraordinary increase in the number of such lawsuits. The
extent of some of these increases are difficult to comprehend.
For example, one verdict reporting service found that the
average jury verdict in personal injury lawsuits had increased
by approximately .25% or, more in three separate years (24.5% in
^1980/'30*.49% in 1981*and :2X.54%> in 1983). .53/ The average
annual' increase in such awards -since 1975 has been over 15%. 54/
A subcategory of damages that dramatically illustrates this
development is the average jury verdict for the wrongful death

47/ American Medical Association Special Task Force on
Professional Liability and Insurance, Professional Liability
in the f80s 6 (November 1984).
48/ H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 18 (1985).
49/ Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
50/ Wyatt Co., Public Officials Liability Insurance:
Understanding the Market (1986), page 22 (the provided 1984 data
is incomplete, see pages 9-10, and therefore is not used for
comparison).
51/ Statement by Mayor Edward I. Koch before the Governor's
Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance, Feburary 21, 1986.
52/ IdL
53/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra.
54/ Id. This is more than double the average annual CPI
increase during the same period. W Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of an adult male. The average award increased from $223,259 in
1975 to $946,140 in 1985, a more than four-fold (324%) increase
in ten years (see Chart L). 55/
The increase in the number of tort lawsuits and the level of
awarded damages 56/ (or settlements) in and of itself has an
obvious inflating effect on insurance premiums. To illustrate,
assuming all other factors are held constant, 57/ if ths*
- number of lawsuits against a company or person doubles in ten
years, and if the average damage award (or settlement) doubles
over this same period, that company or person will experience at
least a four-fold increase in insurance premiums over those ten
years. As noted above, however, for both medical malpractice
and product liability the last ten years have witnessed much
more than a doubling in lawsuits and average awards.
The above observation leads to an important but troubling
insight into the current insurance availability/affordability
crisis. Some have speculated that the crisis is the result of
the attempt by the insurance industry to recoup losses resulting
from its underpricing in the late 1970's and early 1980fs. If
this theory is correct, then it would seem likely that as such
losses are recouped, premiums would decline. The above
' analysis, however, suggests that while the insurance industry
» may have underpriced,its product for a period of time, the
1
current"explosion*in premiums'results in,large part from the
-\ ; fact that now that the insurance' industry is facing substantial
underwriting losses, it must price coverage to reflect the
actual risks presented by tort law. In other words, for a
variety of reasons, the insurance industry appears to have kept
prices constant or engaged in price reductions in a period
during which the risks generated by tort liability increased

55/ Id.
56/ Jury verdicts, of course, represent only the tip of the
claims resolution process. Most claims are resolved before
trial. However, settlements by their very nature reflect the
range of verdicts available to the plaintiff. Thus, as jury
verdicts skyrocket, so do settlements. Settlements also reflect
the plaintiff's likelihood of success. As tort law becomes more
and more favorable to plaintiffs — particularly in reducing or
even eliminating plaintiff's burden of showing fault or
causation — settlements further increase. Accordingly, in
addition to the obvious effect on settlements of increasing jury
verdicts, liberalized standards of fault and causation increase
the percentage of claims resolved favorably to plaintiff and
increase the size of settlements.
57/ Of course, all factors are not held constant. For
example, if there is an increase in the percentage of claims
resolved favorably to plaintiffs, premiums would have to be
increased correspondingly.
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dramatically. Now that the industry is attempting to match
premiums to riik, there appears tp be a dramatic, pent-up
increase in premiums to bring premiums back into line with
rapidly growing liability risks.
The above analysis, if correct, is troubling in that it suggests
that even after the insurance industry's underwriting
profitability is restored, premiums are likely to remain
relatively high. That is, while the more extreme availability
problems may be resolved once the industry controls its
underwriting losses, affordability problems may remain as a longterm fixture absent significant reforms of tort law.
There is, however, another important contribution of recent
developments in tort law to the availability/affordability
crisis which 'goes beyond the number of lawsuits and size of
damage awards. The changing standards of liability and
causation have generated tremendous uncertainty. The "rules of
the game" of tort liability have changed so dramatically and
rapidly in recent years that few are willing to speculate on
v\/
what those rules will be even a few years hence. Invariably,
sf£
however, those rules seem to have been changed to the prejudice
< of parties with pockets sufficiently deep to bear increasingly
generous awards of compensation.
I This uncertainty as-to.what the ,rules of tort liability ,
, ;*, applicable tp any particular company, person or activity will be
~in'future years makes it extremely difficult for the insurance ••• • <
I industry to assess risk (and establish appropriate premiums)
>
with any degree of confidence. This undoubtedly exacerbates the S
affordability problem, and may be a major factor underlying the
availability problem. Simply put, insurance, like other
business activities, operates most efficiently within a stable
''.. - legal regime. Tort law, unfortunately, over recent years has
been anything but stable.
The recent explosion in tort liability and the lack of legal
certainty is a particularly noxious combination that seems to
react almost synergistically in promoting the insurance
availability/affordability crisis. The rapidly accelerating
growth in both the number of tort lawsuits and the size of
damage awards in and of itself significantly increases future
liability risks. But that risk is magnified by the perception —
based in large part on the lack of a stable legal regime -- that
this accelerating growth will continue unabated. The insurance
industry thus appears to be extrapolating the massive liability
surge of recent years into the future, and seems to be setting \
its rates in part on the assumption that the on-going
deterioration of tort law will continue>for some time. Simply '
put, assessments of future liability risks reflect not only the
recent rapid growth in such risks, but the perceived likelihood
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that past

e x c e s s e s wiillJ be outpaced by liie e x c e s s e s yet

to come

In conclusion, the current problems of tort law can be
summarized as follows:
0

Too many defendants are found liable (or forced into
settlements) where there should be no liability, either
because they engaged in no wrongful activity, or
because they did not cause the underlying injury.

0

Damages have become excessive, particularly in the area
of non-economic damages such as pain and suffering,
mental anguish and punitive damages. And,

-°

Transaction costs az e far too high.

The ways in which these aspects of" the tort system are
contributing to the current insurance availability/affordability
crisis can be summarized as follows:
The private sector is being asked to carry a
compensation burden which in some instances it simply
cannot afford to carry without substantial economic
dislocations. Thus, even where insurance is available,
in order to carry this compensation burden, it often is
priced at unacceptable levels.
: ...
I
I

The affordability/availability problem is greatly
exacerbated by the lack of a stable legal regime which
would allow the insurance industry to assess liability
risks with some degree of confidence.

58/ A recent Administration study of the childhood vaccine
industry, for example, found that uncertainty as to tort
liability was a major factor underlying the severe insurance
availability problems facing the industry and jeopardizing the
childhood vaccination program. See the Report of the Working
Group on Vaccine Supply and Liability (April, 1985).
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CHAPTER 3
RECENT INSURANCE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS
The insurance availability/affordability crisis has led both the
insurance industry and its customers to consider various changes
to the ways in which liability risks are insured. The following
is a description of the most significant of these developments
and their immediate implications.
I.

COVERAGE CHANGES

One of the most important of these changes has been the
development of new commercial policy forms by the Insurance
Services Office ("ISO"), the statistical and rate-making
organization for the property-casualty industry. While these
new forms have been filed with each state insurance department,
most states have not yet acted on the new submissions.
These new policy forms are more limited in scope than the old
forms in that they are written on a claims-made basis and permit
certain coverages to be excluded entirely.
Claims-Made Policies
General liability insurance, • including product liability,
coverage, traditionally has been written on an occurrence basis;
that is, the policy applies to all injuries and damages that
occur during the policy period irrespective of when claims are
presented. Under claims-made coverage, the policy covers
injuries and damages which occur during the policy period and
for which claims are filed during the policy period.
The ISO submission provides that a policyholder can purchase
unlimited tail coverage (the period during which claims are
covered after termination of the policy) for a cost of up to
200% of the original premium. In addition, a five year extended
claims reporting period for known claims is provided for
situations where no other insurance is applicable. There is
still disagreement over the reinstatement of aggregate policy
limits for tail coverage and the effect of defense cost
inclusions.
A claims-made policy covers claims occurring after the
"retroactive date," ordinarily, the inception date of the
policy. Under some circumstances, insurers will be permitted to
advance.the retroactive date, necessitating the purchase of tail
coverage for incidents occurring during the prior period. The
retroactive date may be advanced when: (1) there is a change of
insurer, (2) there is a change in the insured's operation, (3)
if the insured fails to inform the insurer of risks he knew or
should have known about, or (4) with the consent -f the
insured.
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The ISO has indicated that it does not intend to limit the use
of claims-made policies to specific problem areas such as longtail or latent injury exposures.
The claims-made forms have not yet been approved by the states,
and twelve states have expressly disapproved them as filed. The
ISO is working with the Insurance Commissioners to resolve
^differences.
The insurance industry has indicated that it wishes to use
claims-made policies. In general, 1986 is viewed as a
transition year during which insurers will train their personnel
in the use of the new policy forms and adapt their computers to
accommodate the changes. Insurers have indicated that in states
where the new forms are not insured, they may use non-admitted
subsidiaries or surplus lines carriers to provide the coverage
to their clients on claims-made basis for large complex risks
and risks in "volatile" classes, or else simply not provide
coverage to those risks.
Claims-made policies and other limited coverages also are being
adopted by reinsurers. Lloyd's of London has introduced a new
claims-made form, as have Weavers and Trenwick American
.Reinsurance, Each policy is somewhat different. Trenwick, a
, United;:States reinsurance company, has stated that it will not
twrite^any.vgeneralrliability^reinsurance on an occurrence basis,.
5
. tafter; January*lo£ this. year. Trenwick also has written a
-v* - ~ .^claims-made form for ^use by its ceding companies for "difficult"
.,
^risks. .Other reinsurers have indicated they would reinsure both
•occurrence and claims-made policies, but would strongly
encourage the use of-claims-made for heavy casualty risks. As
indicated in Chapter 1, some businesses already have been asked
to take claims-made coverage for their excess limits coverage.
Because of the many different claims-made forms currently being
used, this is likely to cause gaps in coverage.
Laser Endorsements
The ISO policy form also includes "laser endorsements" which can
be used to limit coverage. These provisions permit an insurer
to exclude claims from a specific incident, product or period of
'time. Several Insurance Commissioners have objected to this
provision and stated that, at a minimum, it should be revised to
require the signature of the insured indicating an awareness of
the exclusion. The inclusion of a laser endorsement would
necessitate either the insured's purchase of tail coverage for
that product or incident, or the insured's "going bare" for that
liability.
Pollution Exclusion
Both the new ISO and Lloyd's of London claims-made commercial
general liability policies specifically exclude pollution
w-*3*r

-•• .. . •
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I

v coverage. Traditionally, the general liability policy has
included the business community's liability for damage caused
the "sudden and accidental" discharge of toxic substances.
Environmental Impairment Liability ("EIL") policies are used to
cover damages from gradual pollution incidents. In a number of
highly controversial cases, courts have expanded the meaning of
"sudden and accidental," causing insurers to be liable for EILtype (gradual pollution) coverage when it was not intended under
the policy.

I
I
I
I
J

As a result, insurers currently are reluctant „ provide any
pollution coverage, though Lloyd's of London has indicated a
willingness to cover some liability at additional cost on a
"named peril" basis only.
Defense Cost Inclusion

I

Ordinarily, the costs of defending against liability claims are
not included within the aggregate limits of the commercial
general liability policy. Insurers traditionally have
controlled the defense of claims against their insureds by
engaging defense counsel and by governing the vigor with which a
claim is challenged. The insurers paid all costs, and the full
amount of the policy limits were available to pay any settlement
or judgment against the insured.

I
I
J

1
During the-product .liability crisis of the mid-1970's there were :.**•
I
a number of allegations that insurers were, in fact, fueling the A--f-:-* - *' claims*situation by settling too'quickly in many cases that the
' ;" '" insureds believed should have been more vigorously contested.
As a result, many companies insisted that their insurance
contracts include a right to at least partial, if not £
control of defense strategy.

J
I
I
I

In the mid-1980fs, defense costs have escalated rapidly, mostly
because of the cost of attorneys' fees, and possibly, in part'
because of the insureds' desires to contest claims to the
fullest degree possible.
In order to control costs, the ISO had proposed to change the
commercial general liability form to include defense costs
within the aggregate limits of the policy. This practice
already is incorporated in at least some other policy forms. 1/

1/ Business Insurance, December 9, 1985, page 1.
«... *

o
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I
The proposal brought a sharp response from insureds, the bar,
and the Risk and^Insurance Management Society, a trade
association of risk managers and insurance buyers. They believe
that there will be cases of defense costs exceeding the limits,
leaving no money to pay a settlement or judgment. Some are
concerned that defense counsel may urge settlement of unworthy
claims in order to prevent defense costs from exhausting all
available coverage. Others believe that there will be a spate
of bad faith claims against insurers when the policy limit is
used for legal costs and the insured is left liable for
damages.
In response to the concerns of insurance customers, regulators
and brokers, the ISO has revised its proposal so that up to 50%
of the aggregate limits may be spent on defense costs before the
policy limits will begin to be reduced by those expenses. An
endorsement will be available so that up to 300% of the limit
may be spent on defense costs before the policy limit is
affected. A discount will be applied if the policyholder buys
less than the 300% endorsement. Insurers apparently will have
the option to apply an endorsement which will charge all defense
costs to the policy limits. 2/
At its annual meeting in December, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners passed a resolution urging states not to
" ^approver the JSO/proposal Aintrl>the^proposal .can be studied by >• ..v
-Ahe* Commissioners•:*. .The ISO/, whictf had hoped to initiate the '* defense'cost change in July of 1986, will postpone filing its
* request with the states until at least February 15, 1986. 3/
II.

ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE MECHANISMS

As liability insurance becomes unavailable or unaffordable,
means of liability protection outside the conventional insurance
markets increasingly are being sought and used.

1

2/ Business Insurance, December 16, 1985, page 1.
3/ Business Insurance, December 23, 1985, page 1.
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Insurance Company Creation (Captive or Other)
One response available to large companies unable to buy the
insurance coverage they need is to set up their own insurance
company. Thirty-three major United States companies recently
have established an offshore insurer, A.C.E. Insurance Company,
which began operation in November, 1985, and provides up to $150
million in liability coverage. Founding companies include IBM,
GE, U.S. Steel and Chase Manhattan, as well as other
companies. While A.C.E. offers coverages not available
elsewhere, its policies are available only to large companies
since it only pays claims exceeding $100 million.
j n addition, it recently was announced that a group of fifteen
chemical and petrochemical companies are creating a company
called CASEX, which would provide excess limits coverage for
products, directors and officers, and sudden and accidental
pollution liability.
Another group of fifty United States banks are creating a mutual
insurer, Bankers' Insurance Co., Ltd., to provide directors and
officers liability coverage and bankers blanket bonds.
During the medical malpractice crisis
the early to mid1970*8, groups of medical professionals unable to obtain
malpractice coverage formed their own companies, commonly known
las bedpan.mutuals^:.to handle:.their claims. Such insurance
I groups currently provide about half of the coverage in the
-•; malpractice*liability market. *
Self-Insurance
Some industry groups and trade associations, as well a is
municipalities in several states, have joined together to selfinsure as groups, and others have been able to set up a formal
self-insurance program just to handle their own claims. 4
Self-insurance, either individual or group, also has been a
useful vehicle for municipalities for which insurance has become
either unavailable or unaffordable.
One major problem encountered by firms seeking to set up selfinsurance programs is that reserves for self insurance are not

4/ A formal self-insurance program is different from "going
bare" in that the former sets up reserves to cover claims and
treats it similar to an insurance system whereas the latter
simply hopes claims do not occur, which may cause financial
difficulties if and when they do occur.
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accorded the same tax treatment as insurance company reserves,
in that self-insurance reserves are fully taxable. While this
presents no problem for municipalities and other tax-exempt
entities, it is a major hurdle for private entities.
Small firms are generally unable to establish a meaningful selfinsurance program individually, but may benefit from group selfinsurance if no other insurance is available.
Product Liability Risk Retention Act Groups
The Risk Retention Act (."RRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 3901 et seg., was
intended,as a mechanism to (1) create an alternative product
liability insurance market, and (2) provide a means for smaller
insurance buyers to purchase general liability insurance -including product liability coverage -- as groups.
The RRA
evolved from an intensive interagency study of the product
liability "crisis" in the mid-19701s. President Reagan signed
the Act in September 1981, noting that it was a "marketplace
solution" to provide product manufacturers, distributors and
sellers with affordable product liability insurance.
A Risk Retention Group ("RRG") is formed by any number of
product sellers as an insurance company licensed to operate
under.the laws of any state. The RRG may provide only product
liability:and.completed:operations coverage to its members..
/
(Completed^operations.is work performedby a contractor or .product manufacturer installing its product.) .The RRG may sell
insurance .in any state without meeting the licensing or other
regulatory requirements of any state other than its domicile.
No state may discriminate against an RRG, but states may impose
normal premium taxes and enforce compliance with unfair claims
settlement practices statutes.
The Act is restrictive in that it limits a RRG to products and
completed operations coverage, but permits the establishment of
a domestic group captive that is able to do business countrywide.
A Purchasing Group ("PG") may be formed to negotiate for a group
policy from any insurer to cover product liability completed
operations, and commercial general liability when either of the
first two coverages are included. The PG and any entity
providing services to the PG are exempt from any state law which
would.-prohibit the PG from purchasing this coverage on a group
basis.
A group
premium
a tight
sharply

of companies purchasing together presents an attractive
base with lower administrative costs to the insurer. In
market small companies are subject to cancellation or
higher prices because an insurer may prefer to use its
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resources on a few large risks. The provisions for purchasing
groups was necessary to overcome statutes and regulations in
about forty-four states which prohibited so called "fictitious
groups" set up for the purpose of buying property or casualty
insurance on a group basis.
Very few companies have used the RRA to date, but the rapid
change in market conditions likely will lead "to a much greater
interest in its provision.
One reason that the RRA has been little used is the fact that ;i t
is limited to products and completed operations coverages,
although groups may include other coverages as long as products
is the primary purpose. It is a useful means of expanding
insurance capacity, and would provide additional capacity in the
alternative market if the products limitation were removed.
III.

STATE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

State legislators and insurance regulators have recognized the
severity of the liability insurance crisis, and have responded
in a variety of ways. One state has barred cancellation or nonrenewal of policies and prohibited any increases in the cost of
policies in effect. Several other states are considering
^similar actions. ~ The National Association of Insurance
^Commissioners adopted a resolution opposing mid-term
•^cancellations and short notices of non-renewal. Other states
%
t are~"implementing or considering the use of Market Assistance
* Programs, which are voluntary assigned risk pools designed to
I take risks such as day care centers on a rotating or shared
basis. Yet other states are considering joint underwriting
associations in which the state regulator mandates the sharing
of certain risks
Half the states have "file and use" rate regulation in which the
insurance department is notified of a rate increase which
becomes effective without action by the regulator. Many of
these states reportedly are rethinking their systems because of
the sharp increases in the rates of some of the problem lines of
coverage.
Regulators normally have viewed commercial insurance as
transactions between knowledgeable buyers and sellers, and,
accordingly, have refrained from interfering with the market's
operation. The recent concerns expressed by the Insurance
Commissioners is a measure of the depth of the availability/
affordability crisis, and may foreshadow a heightening in the
regulatory "oversight" of commercial insurance.
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CHAPTER 4
TORT LAW REFORM
As discussed in Chapter 2, two primary areas have been the focus
of the Working Group's examination into the crisis in liability
insurance availability and affordability: the current economic
difficulties of the insurance industry; and, the extraordinary
growth in tort liability in recent years. For the reasons
discussed in Chapter 2, while it seems likely that the insurance
industry will be able to work its way out of its present
economic straits, it is very unclear -- if not doubtful ~ that
this, will significantly alleviate the crisis in insurance
availability and affordability. Early indications are that
insurers will continue to avoid areas that present a high risk
of tort liability, or, where they do provide insurance, will
demand high premiums. That is, while the more extreme aspects
of the availability crisis may be resolved once the industry
regains its desired level of profitability, it appears unlikely
at this time that the high premiums that have led to serious
affordability concerns will be reduced significantly.
For these reasons, as well as for the other reasons discussed in
Chapter 2, there appears to be little that can or should be done
by the federal or any other government to "remedy" the economic
factors that underlie the current availability/affordability
crisis.. The excesses of the tort system, however, present a
very real opportunity to address a major cause of the insurance
crisis with sensible and appropriate reforms. And while some of
the changes in the insurance market currently under contemplation (see Chapter 3) probably will relieve some availability/
affordability problems, it seems unlikely that these changes
will provide long-term, systemic relief without fundamental
reforms of tort law.
The following is a list of eight tort reforms that would bring a
greater degree of rationality and predictability to tort law,
and thereby significantly assist in resolving the
availability/affordability crisis. This is by no means an
exhaustive list of possible tort reforms. Nor does the
accompanying discussion of these reforms indicate how they
necessarily should be implemented; that is, on the federal or
state level, or through legislative or judicial modification of
the law. Rather, this list identifies eight recommended tort
reforms which if implemented should return tort law to a
credible fault-based compensation system that provides a fair
and reasonable level of compensation to deserving plaintiffs
through a more predictable and affordable liability allocating
mechanism. While these reforms undoubtedly will be resisted by
some, they in fact are quite modest and should not dramatically
alter the basic principles of tort law as those have existed for
centuries.
60
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Recommendation No. It
liability.

Retain fault as the basis for

For the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, fault should be retained
as a basis for tort liability. As noted there, fault is the only
mechanism in tort law for distinguishing desirable from
undesirable conduct, and is an indispensable predicate to many
other aspects of the tort liability system without which the
system would generate arbitrary and unfair results.
For non-product liability cases, negligence should remain the
applicable standard of liability. Strict product liability
should .under no circumstances be extended outside the
traditional area of product injuries. Thus, theories which
would apply strict product liability to landlords or to
professionals providing services (e.g., pharmacists,
architects, etc.) should be strongly resisted and expressly
rejected. The trend in some states 1/ to extend strict
liability doctrines outside the area of product injuries is a
highly pernicious development which will significantly undermine
the ability of those sectors of our economy to function
proper ly..
Strict product liability in its traditional sense represents a
sensible application of fault-based liability to the realities
* of. modenvxindustrial/, life.. - The Working Group, accordingly, does .
m.~
: not. recommend^the'^-abolition:pfk strict product-liability, ,-..
*, /, provided; the. doctrine is/kept within, its traditional bounds. ;.
•" "\ Unfortunately, .strict product liability has been subject to
extensive abuse that often.has had the effect of transforming
the doctrine in practice into absolute liability.
The following are the elements of a strict product liability
standard which does not present an impossible or unfair burden
to plaintiffs in demonstrating fault on the part of defendantmanufacturers, while at the same time not establishing a scheme
of absolute liability which simply uses the manufacturer as an
insurer for all risks of injury.
0

Liability should be predicated on the existence of a
defect which is found to make the product unreasonably
dangerous.

'•'.•• Defendants should only be held liable for uses of a
product that are both reasonable and foreseeable.
Liability should not be predicated upon unreasonable or
unforeseeable alterations of a product that cause the
, injury, particularly where such alterations are
' prohibited or warned against. (Alterations, in this
regard, can include the failure to provide required and
reasonable safeguards, maintenance or inspections.)
1/ See in this regard the recent opinion of the California
Supreme Court in Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal.3d 454, 698 P.2d
116 (1985), extending strict product liability to landlords.
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0

Manufacturers should not be liable for defects which
have been the subject of an adequate warning or which
are readily apparent to the reasonable consumer.
Manufacturers should only be required to warn with
regard to uses of a product that are both reasonable
and foreseeable.

0

Manufacturers should only be held to the state of the
art in existence at the time of manufacture of the
product. Manufacturers should not be held liable fox
unknown or unknowable hazards.

The above elements, if applied in a principled manner, should
ensure that strict product liability will serve to compensate
persons injured as a result of a manufacturer's fault, while
preventing that liability doctrine from simply being used as a
risk spreading'mechanism designed to operate as a product-based
insurance scheme.
Recommendation No. 2: Base causation findings on credible
scientific and medical evidence and opinions.
One of the most pernicious developments in tort law has been the
extent to which causation findings are based on fringe
scientific or medical opinions well outside the mainstream of
accepted scientific.,or jnedical beliefs. Increasingly,:juries
'- *are< asked to make difficult decisions about highly.complicated .
*•_• issues* of < science and medicine. ^Unfortunately, the personality
and demeanor of expert witnesses often may be more critical in
making such determinations than decades of evolving scientific
and medical investigation and thought.
This problem has resulted in the growing perception that the
tort system often is wholly arbitrary in allocating liability in
cases involving difficult issues of science and medicine. This
is a particularly problematic situation in toxic tort and drug
liability cases. 2/
There are a variety of reasons for this problem:
0

Many judges do not have the training or inclination to
understand complicated scientific and medical concepts,
and are unwilling or unable to devote the time and
energy needed to educate themselves in a complex body
of knowledge.

°

In order not to deprive plaintiffs of their opportunity
for compensation, many courts allow plaintiffs to take

2/ For example, see the discussion of Johnson- v. American
Cyanamid Co., infra.
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whatever scientific or medical views they may have -however incredible — to the jury.
0

Many in the legal system do not appreciate how credible
scientific and medical views develop, and the degree to
which legal decisionmaking is a poor vehicle for
developing such views.

0

There often is an understandable frustration with the
fact that science and medicine frequently cannot offer
the kind of certainty that the legal decisionmaking
mechanisms strive to obtain.

The inability of the tort system to deal credibly with
complicated scientific and medical issues strikes at the very
heart of the ability of tort law to deal with the growing number
of cases involving highly complicated scientific and medical
issues. While there are no easy answers, there are several
remedial actions that the Working Group recommends:
°

d.

Greater deference must be paid to government agencies
and certain private institutions that have devoted
decades of attention and millions of dollars to
researching and trying to assess the value of medical
and scientific developments. Where such agencies and
,:w:?. institutions iiave determined ^that particular products,
- ? V4 .services or. techniques ^rar^e safe tor* socially beneficial,
r\ -\ CQurts should tread very ^carefully.in overruling those
~ * judgments through the vehicle of tort.law. Lay juries
are a very poor mechanism for second-guessing the
judgment of established mainstream scientific and
medical views. Other legal mechanisms for determining
those views, such as rulemaking and licensing
proceedings, generally are far superior in making
credible determinations involving complicated issues of
science and medicine.
Courts must be more aggressive in determining the
credibility of scientific and medical evidence and
opinions before trial, and not simply allow parties to
present any theory to the jury. Appellate courts, in
turn, should give trial courts greater latitude in
making such decisions in early stages of litigation.
Judges, where feasible, should receive training on
basic methods of scientific, medical and statistical
analysis so that they can make such determinations. If
necessary, impartial masters with appropriate training
should be used for this purpose.
Studies and opinions that have not been subjected to
the peer review process should be presumed invalid.
Where peer review has taken place, judges (or masters,
where appropriate) should acquaint themselves with the
results of such review.
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Courts must learn to accept the reality of
uncertainty. They must understand that the fact that
some degree of uncertainty always exists does not mean
that every scientific or medical belief is as credible
as the next. Judges and legislators must not try to
"force" scientific certainty where such certainty
simply is not possible. Attempts to do so through
burden-shifting, presumptions or by requiring agencies
to issue scientific "findings," simply create a
misleading and deceptive gloss of scientific certainty
that in fact does not exist. 3/ Ultimately, the
legal system must accept the fact that some things are
unknown, and, given existing methods and data, perhaps
unknowable for the foreseeable future.
Recommendation No. 3:

Eliminate joint and several liability.

One of the most troubling problems in tort law arises from
injuries caused by multiple tortfeasors. Historically, such
cases were handled by bringing separate actions against each
defendant; joint and several liability only existed where
concert-of-action was shown (see discussion in Chapter 2 ) .
Further, under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a
negligent plaintiff could not recover damages from any
defendant: Such an approach seemed harsh where plaintiffs were
*only minimally at fault for their own injuries. Eventually, and .v
\in part to remedy the harshness of the old rule, the doctrines *
"of* comparative fault and joint and several liability were
developed to make it easier for plaintiffs to obtain
compensation. .
Comparative fault operates to assure that each party, including
the plaintiff, is liable for its own fault. Joint and several
liability, although originally applied to situations where
concert-of-action was shown, is now in many cases applied to a11
defendants, regardless of their connection to the injury.
Comparative fault, when coupled with the doctrine of joint and
several liability, allows plaintiffs to recover the entire
judgment from "deep pocket" defendants -- even if such
defendants are only found to be minimally at fault. Joint and
several liability thus frequently operates in a highly
inequitable manner -- sometimes making defendants with only a
small or even de minimis percentage of fault liable for 100% of
plaintiff's damage. Accordingly, joint and several liability in
the absence of concerted action has led to the inclusion of many
"deep pocket" defendants such as governments, larger
corporations, and insured entities whose involvement is only
tangential and who probably would not be joined except for the
existence of joint and several liability.

3/ As noted, the Working Group does not believe that
scientific uncertainty can be handled simply by requiring
government agencies to issue pronouncements of risk or causation
for which there in fact is no credible basis.
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Another problem area is the relationship of joint and several
liability to "enterprise" or "market share" liability. See
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In theory, "market share"
liability such as that established in the California Supreme
Court's seminal opinion in Sindell attempts to allocate
liability for a generic product (e.g., DES) among various
producers on the basis of their share of the relevant market.
Even assuming such an allocation is reasonable, 4/ some
jurisdictions have devised variations of or alternative
approaches to Sindell which apply joint and several liability
among-the producers of a generic product. 5/ See, e.g.,
Abel- v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164,
cert, denied, 105 S.Ct. 123 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). 6/ The
difficulties plaintiffs face in attempting to show which
manufacturer of a generic product was responsible for plaintiff s injury in fact can be (but are not always) substantial.
While the Working Group does not advocate one approach over
another, it firmly believes that any allocation of liability on
the basis of market share should limit a manufacturer's
liability to its specific share, and that such liability should
not, in the absence of actual concerted action, be joint and
several in nature.
The <• Working. Group/.thus Recommends elimination of joint and - -.*
several^liability,-* exceptvin the limited circumstancescwhere the
.plaintiff rcan'-demonstrate that the ^defendants have actually
acted ,in. concert.to cause plaintiff's injury. 7/ •
*
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4/ Because of a number of problems and inequities associated
with Sindell, only a few states have embraced the position of
the California Supreme Court. See Schwartz & Mahshigian,
"Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a
Legislative Solution," 73 Calif. L. Rev. 941 (1985).
5/ It is .unclear whether even Sindell is a true, "market
share" allocation decision, since under Sindell plaintiff must
only sue manufacturers representing a substantial share of the
market, and may allocate all liability among those defendants in
proportion to their respective market shares.
6/ Particularly disturbing are decisions such as Abel which
appear to distort the principles of concerted action to impute
concerted action to manufacturers of a generic product.
7/ Joint and several liability as discussed in this report
should not be confused with the legislatively enacted schemes
for allocating financial responsibility for the cost of cleanup
of hazardous waste sites and spills under the Nation's
environmental laws, and, in particular, under the Superfund Act
(CONTINUED)
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Recommendation No. 4; Limit non-economic damages to a fair
and reasonable amount.
Non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish
and punitive damages are inherently open-ended. 8/ They are
entirely subjective, and often defy quantification. For
example, in many instances it simply is not possible, no matter
how much money is awarded, to compensate someone fully for the
pain and anguish of the loss of a loved one or from a serious
injury. Moreover, because such damages are essentially
subjective, awards for similar injuries can vary immensely from
case to case, leading to highly inequitable, lottery-like
results. Accordingly, such damages are particularly suitable
for a specific limitation.
The open-ended nature of such damages makes them a particular
problem from the standpoint1 of achieving predictability. Unlike
economic damages (medical expenses, lost earnings, etc,), which
can be reviewed objectively'and thus can be predicted within a
given range, non-economic damages are entirely subjective and
unpredictable.
Non-economic damages also can serve as a significant obstacle in
the settlement process. Plaintiffs and defendants often can

^ 7 /

(FOOTNOTE-CONTINUED)>

(the Comprehensive, Environmental Response,Compensation id
Liability Act of 1980) and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). Unlike the tort system, which is intended
to compensate injured persons and to deter wrongful conduct (see
Chapter 2), Superfund and RCRA represent a legislative choice to
allocate the cost of these programs among those who contributed
to the problems the programs are designed to remedy. Thus,
Superfund and RCRA liability, like the liability established
under other environmental laws, are founded upon congressional
objectives which provide that those who contributed to the
problem or profited from the manufacture which created the
waste, ought to bear the cost of cleaning it up. Those whose
specific contribution to the site can be identified and severed
from the whole are not jointly liable under this scheme
Without some degree of joint and several liability under
Superfund and RCRA, the effective enforcement of these programs
could be seriously impeded as a result of protracted and costly
litigation among responsible parties over the precise allocation
of cleanup costs.
8/ There are two types of non-economic damages: compensatory
(pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc.) and punitive
(sometimes called exemplary damages). The latter are designed
purely to punish the defendant.
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agree quickly on the amount of economic damages, but disagree
sharply on non-economic damages. Plaintiffs frequently have
unrealistic expectations of non-economic damages in the hundreds
of thousands or millions of dollars to which defendants simply
are unwilling to agree. Plaintiffs thus often reject settlement
offers that from the standpoint of compensation for economic
damages are quite reasonable. Plaintiffs1 attorneys also often
see high non-economic damage awards as necessary to justify high
contingency fees, which may lead them to press for a high noneconomic damage award when it may be in their clients' interest
to obtain a quick and fair settlement.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs should be entitled to reasonable
compensation for their pain and suffering and mental anguish.
The key in this regard is to provide such compensation, but to
ensure that it will be kept within reasonable bounds.
The Working Group believes that $100,000 would be such a
reasonable limitation. In this regard, it should be noted that
only a handful of claims involve non-economic damages in excess
of $100,000. For example, it is estimated that only 2.7% of all
medical malpractice claims (5.6% of all paid medical malpractice
claims) receive non-economic compensation in excess of
$100,000. 9/ However, in those medical malpractice cases going
to verdict.where non-economic damages above $100,000 are
awarded; the.jionreconomic ,damages ,-award. averages between ..
$428AOO0band< $,738,000 *(the -latter figure being the ."best ,
estimate,") *« 10/ -For such awards including non-economic..damages
in excess.of $100,000, on the average 80% of the total award is .
for <the non-economic damages component of the award. 11/ Since .
the non-economic damages in excess of. $100,000 awarded in these
cases (including verdicts and settlements) account for between
28% and 50% of all paid out medical malpractice damages, the non-

9/ H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 132-48
(1985). In comparison, approximately half of all claims that
end in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff include a noneconomic damages award in excess of $1*00,000. Id. This
suggests that non-economic damages are a major factor in forcing
claims.to trial.
p
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Guidebook wa$ >prepared for the
Florida Medical Association. Henry Manne Served as the general
editor,.and the analysis on the effect of a $100,000 cap was
prepared by Patricia Danzon -- "perhaps the most widely known
and published economist in the country on the subject of medical
malpractice." Id., at 10.
10/

Id.

11/ -Id.
In this regard, it is worth noting that noneconomic damages as a percentage of overall damages increases
substantially as the overall damages increase. Id.. at 13839. See discussion in Chapter 2.
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economic damages payments in excess of $100,000 alone account
for up to half of all medical malpractice damages. 12/ Thus, a
$100,000 limitation on non-economic damage awards would affect
only a relatively small percentage of all claims, but would
introduce substantial predictability into the tort system. 13/
It also is necessary to deal with punitive damages. While some
thought was given to an absolute ban on punitive damages, or
perhaps a separate limitation, the Working Group concluded that
the best approach would be to include punitive damages within
the $100,000 limitation on all non-economic damages.
Nevertheless, punitive damages should only be awarded for
willful.conduct bordering on a criminal violation.
Specifically, the Working Group recommends that an award of
punitive damages be predicated on a demonstration of actual
malice.
Even if these recommendations are adopted, punitive damages at
best have a tenuous basis in tort law. Increasingly, there has
been growing skepticism among legal scholars about the role of
punitive damages, 14 /and numerous instances of extraordinary

*- 12/ Id.. The best*estimate of.the Guidebook is that pain
- and suffering awards above-$100,000 account for nearly 39%
**=••-• all medical malpractice damages. *
, 13/ Some states have struck down such limitations on
* constitutional grounds, primarily on the basis of equal
protection, on the theory that it is unfair to limit the
recoveries of certain plaintiffs (e.g., medical malpractice
claimants) while allowing other plaintiffs to receive unlimited
recoveries. Recently, however, both the California Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld such
a limitation for medical malpractice verdicts awarded under
California law. .See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38
Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (1985); Hoffman v. United States, 767
F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court refused to hear
either case, finding with regard to the former that no
substantial federal question was presented. Constitutional
concerns such as this, however, can only be sensibly considered
in-the context of specific legal proposals.
14/ See, e.g., Owen, "Problems in Assessing Punitive
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products,H 49 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1982); Seltzer, "Punitive Damages in Mass Tort
Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and
Control," 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37 (1983); Sugarman, "Doing Away
With Tort Law," 73 Calif. L. Rev. 555 (1985); Schwartz,
"Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive
Damages: A Comment," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Ellis,
"Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages," 56 S,
Cal. L, Rev. 1.(1982).
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abuses. 15/ Punitive damages add considerable uncertainty, and
frequently have very little real deterrent effect because they
are awarded years after the offending conduct. In any event,
the punishment of misconduct is primarily a function of the
public law enforcement system, and should not be a common
purpose of private litigation.
Nevertheless, the Working Group does not recommend prohibiting
punitive damages in tort cases provided they are included within
the limitation on non-economic damages. If this is infeasible,
the Working Group recommends that punitive damages be
abolished. 16/
Recommendation No. 5:
economic damages.

Provide for periodic payments of future

Traditionally, a losing defendant is required to pay all of
plaintiff's future damages in one lump-sum payment. When
damages were within reasonable limits, this generally was not a
major problem. But as average damages have skyrocketed into the
hundreds of thousands of dollars this has become an increasing
burden on the defendant (or defendants' insurers). The Working
Group, therefore, recommends that future economic damages be
paid,periodically.. 17/., ^
•* Allowing * defendants :;to pay; for>plaiutiff.! s- damages, periodically
s.^.r'"* has several- advantages-.-. First, it gives defendants the ability,
in- some cases to digest major adverse judgments by spacing

15/ One of the most flagrant examples is the $8 million
dollar punitive .damage award against the defendant in Johnson
v. American Cyanamid Co., (District Court No. 81 C 2470), for
its decision to produce the Sabin rather than the Salk polio
vaccine. Despite the fact that the defendant had complied in
this decision with the well established medical judgment of the
United States government and virtually the entire medical
community, the jury apparently decided to use punitive damages
to overrule this judgment and to force the Sabin vaccine off the
market.-. .Ironically, the Sabin vaccine has proven far more
effective than the Salk vaccine in combating polio. The case
presently is on appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, and the
federal government has filed an amicus brief urging reversal.
16/ It frequently is noted that the deterrent effect of
punitive damages could be achieved through a system of civil
fines.
17/ Where there is legitimate concern that a particular
defendant may not be able to make the periodic payments in
future years the court should be empowered to require the
defendant to ensure the periodic payment through the purchase of
an annuity.
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payments out over time, much in the same way that many consumers
can afford major purchases by buying on installment. Second,
society is benefited by the fact that plaintiffs have a
guaranteed stream of income, and cannot deplete their awards
within a few years. This sharply reduces the possibility that
severely injured plaintiffs eventually will become wards of the
state.
An important additional advantage f requiring courts to award
damages in terms of periodic payments rather than lump-sum
awards is that it uses the market's rather than a court's
assessment of the applicable interest rate. Under the existing
practice in most states, the trial court determines plaintiff's
economic loss over plaintiff's lifetime, and then awards
plaintiff the present value of those losses in a lump sum. The
interest rate used to make that present value calculation is
critical, and can significantly reduce or inflate the lump-sum
payment. Frequently, courts in making that calculation use
interest rates that bear no reasonable relationship to what in
fact is available in the market.
A periodic payment requirement effectively avoids this problem
by having the court determine the stream of future economic
losses and require defendant to purchase an annuity providing a
corresponding stream of compensation (where defendant is
sufficiently large, an actual annuity probably would be
unnecessary).. Under such-a<procedure, the market determines the
^appropriate interest rate-for calculating the present^^alue of
-Hh<:-.«.*.,; jrthose?payments -(the present value would equal the cost of the
annuity). Since the payments are guaranteed through the
annuity, subsequent changes in the interest rate would have no
effect on plaintiff's compensation. Defendant, on the other
hand, would have the market rather than a judge or jury
determine the correct interest rate for assessing the p- * •.
value of future damages.
Periodic payments, as noted, are not unfair to plaintiffs
because the payments would be scheduled to be made as the
damages are in fact incurred (that is, as earnings are actually
lost, or as certain expenses actually occur).
Because the benefits of such a provision would be relatively
limited for smaller awards, the Working Group recommends that
periodic payments only be required where the total economic
,. damage § award exceeds $100,000.
4

I

Recommendation No. 6: Reduce awards by collateral sources of
compensation for the same injury.
1
I
I
J

The collateral source rule prohibits the finder of fact from
taking collateral sources of income related to the same injury
into account in making an award of damages to the plaintiff.
This effectively permits the plaintiff to obtain double recovery
of certain components of his damages award.
- ,v

70

-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In an era when collateral sources of income were financed
largely by plaintiff himself, the collateral source rule may
have been sensible. Today, however,'when many collateral
sources are provided or subsidized by the government or by third
parties (such as employers, who often are required by law to
provide certain collateral benefits), the traditional
justification is called into question. Increasingly, the
collateral source rule simply permits a windfall recovery by the
plaintiff.
As to publicly provided collateral sources of compensation,
there is no justification for not taking such sources into
account in determining plaintiff's ultimate damages. The
collateral source rule in such circumstances has the effect of
requiring citizens to pay compensation twice ~ once as
taxpayer, and once as the consumer of the product causing the
injury. 18/
The situation is somewhat more complicated in dealing with
private sources of collateral compensation, particularly where
subrogation is involved. 19/ Where a third party (such as an
insurer) is subrogated to plaintiff's claim, the collateral
source rule may not in fact result in any double recovery. As a
practical matter, however, subrogation often is not a
significant consideration:in many tort actions. In some areas,
such; as ^automobile ..accidents,^subrogation, is..quite.common. . In
Other, areas,, however,*; such *as> medipal malpractice/, subrogation , •
4>*
* ?%.. v-,- i»s.fari«less common, v^ ;• .• :••-•-;
*
*
As to private sources,- the best approach appears to be to
require collateral-sources of compensation related to the same
injury to be taken into account as long as a third party is not
subrogated to that portion of plaintiff's claim. Further
analysis may suggest that elimination of subrogation (that is,
simply offsetting all collateral sources against the award, and
prohibiting subrogation arrangements) may have a limited effect
and be justified on the basis of significant reductions in
transaction costs.
While the correct approach to workers1 compensation benefits
must be considered Very carefully, workers should be required to
seek their workers' compensation benefits where appropriate.
The Working Group takes no position on whether subrogation and
indemnification actions between employers and manufacturers

18/ Another reason to be concerned about such a windfall is
that much of the windfall is in fact a windfall for attorneys in
the form of attorneys' fees.
19/ In the context of insurance, subrogation allows the
insurer to obtain from the tortfeasor-defendant all or part^o.f
its payments to the insured-plaintiff arising from the injury
caused by the tortfeasor.
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found liable as third party defendants should be eliminated, as
has been proposed in some legislation. The Working Group will
continue to review the merits of proposals dealing with such
subrogation and indemnification actions.
Recommendation No. 7:

Schedule contingency fees.

Currently, plaintiffs1 attorneys receive a flat percentage ox
their clients1 awards, usually between 30% and 40%, but
sometimes as high as 50%. Where plaintiff's award is moderate,
such a contingency fee may, in fact, be quite reasonable, since
the attorney has significant costs and may face substantial
risks that must be reimbursed. But as the average plaintiff's
verdict has increased in recent years, such a high percentage
becomes difficult to justify. Increasingly, there are
indications of - extraordinary abuses where attorneys receive fees
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for limited work.
Particularly in mass liability cases where the groundwork for
liability has been laid in previous cases by other attorneys,
the fees often bear no relationship whatsoever to the work of or
the risk to plaintiff's attorney, 20 /
• •
Nevertheless, the Working Group does not recommend, as some have
suggested, the abolition of contingency fees. Often, such fees
are the only means available to the poor to afford an attorney
±and obtain-access<to-the-legal'system. The.problem with
"contingency fees*emerges when awards become very high, and a
•flat contingency rate becomes excessive. The Working Group, *
therefore, believes that contingency fees should be scheduled to
^decrease as awards increase.
Specifically, the Working Group recommends the following
schedule: 25% for the first $100,000, 20% for the next
$100,000, 15% for the next $100,000, and 10% for the
remainder. Thus, for an award of $500,000, plaintiff's attorney
would receive $80,000 rather than $166,666 (assuming a one-third
contingency fee), and for an award of $1,000,000, would receive
$130,000 rather than $333,333,
There are a number of justifications for scheduling contingency
fees:
°

Verdicts often are inflated by judges and juries to
compensate plaintiff for what is well understood to be
high attorneys' fees. Defendants thus pay for such
fees through higher insurance premiums or awards,

20/ As discussed in Chapter 2, the prevailing plaintiff is
not only liable to his attorney for the agreed to contingency
fee, but also for litigation expenses. Such expenses often can
amount to an additional five to eight percent of the underlying
award
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which, in turn, are passed on to consumers through
higher prices. It is difficult to justify placing such
a burden on American consumers for the purpose of
paying what often amounts to exorbitant attorneys' fees.
0

,
°

C"
\

Similarly, in order to compensate plaintiffs for very
high contingency fees, settlements often are higher
than otherwise would be the case. As with high awards,
these payments ultimately are passed through to the
consumer. More problematic; however, is that
attorneys' fees often can become a major impediment to
settlements since defendants may balk at paying a
higher than justified award in order to compensate
plaintiffs for exorbitant attorneys' fees. In such
situations, attorneys' fees create an additional burden
by causing cases not to be settled that otherwise would
be settled.
Contingency fees also distort the incentives of
attorneys. Such fees may lead plaintiffs' attorneys to
hold out for high non-economic damages (and,
potentially, windfall profits for the attorney
requiring only minimal additional work on the
attorney's part), while the clients may be best served
with obtaining economic damages and more limited noneconomic^damages-as/promgtlyoas possible. •
'."

'

•'

'*

" • • • ' "

'

'••'.•

t

•

* ° - r ' Scheduling, contingency fees also should substantially .*
reduce the excessive transaction costs presently
* ,•
plaguing the tort system. This is particularly
important in such areas as the asbestos litigations
:*
where there are only limited resources available to
*•'•
compensate a large pool of plaintiffs.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the Federal Tort Claims
Act contains a 25% cap on attorneys' fees for lawsuits filed
under the Act, and a 20% cap on attorneys' fees for settlements
obtained under the Act's administrative claims process.
28 U.S.C. § 2678. Violations of these limitations are
punishable b y fine or imprisonment, or both. A similar 25%
attorneys' fee cap (with similar sanctions) is found in the
Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 406. None of these caps
appears to have had any significant effect on the ability of
persons suing the government to obtain adequate legal
representation. In fact, the number of lawsuits filed under
both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Social Security Act has
increased substantially in recent years.

i

The Working Group has considered and recommends against the
adoption of the English Rule on attorneys' fees, which would
transfer attorneys' fees to the losing party. While such a rule
might deter some frivolous litigation, it also would inhibit
many lawsuits that may be merited but where some preliminary
discovery may be necessary to determine the strength of
plaintiff's cflaims. Moreover, because many plaintiffs
essentially are judgment proof, the widely held belief that such
73
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a rule would significantly deter frivolous lingatjon may N-«
largely illusory.
A preferable (but still problematic) alternative approach to the
English Rule would be to use a transfer of attorneys1 fees as a
means of motivating parties to settle their claims at an earlier
point in litigation. Thus, a rule modeled on Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21/ but including
attorneys' fees, might be useful. Perhaps the most promising
approach would be to combine alternative dispute resolution with
a transfer of attorneys1 fees.

,
i

!>r

Recommendation No. 8; Develop alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.
The Working Group believes that alternative dispute resolution
holds much promise. Experimentation and experience, however, is
the only reliable vehicle for determining which systems will
work. Alternative dispute resolution proposals range from
binding arbitration to mediation, and include such procedural
innovations as mini-trials and expedited discovery techniques.
Many of these proposals are worthy of serious consideration, and
states represent excellent laboratories in which to develop and
explore these various alternative dispute resolution proposals.
The Working Group strongly'supports alternative dispute
resolution, and believes that the organized bars, legislatures,
;> - >'and*jurists should be more receptive to alternative dispute
resolution proposals. Where necessary, particularly in areas
such as medical malpractice, states should be encouraged to
consider seriously the necessary constitutional changes to
permit the use of alternative dispute resolution.
The Working Group believes that the most promising use of
alternative dispute resolution will.be to encourage the early
settlement of lawsuits. For example, requiring non-binding
arbitration where part or all of attorneys' fees shift to the
party which rejects an arbitration award and obtains a less
favorable result in litigation, much as costs of litigation are
shifted for rejected offers of settlement under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 (see supra), might be an effective means

21/ Rule 68 ("Offer of Judgment") provides that costs of
litigation will shift to a plaintiff who has rejected an Offer
of Settlement made under the rule and not obtained a judgment
more favorable than the rejected offer. There currently is a
proposal under consideration to include attorneys' fees in Rule
68, as well as to make other changes to the Rule. Inclusion of
attorneys' fees in Rule 68, however, has a number of serious
problems that must be considered very carefully. These and
other problems have led the Department of Justice to caution
against the proposed changes to Rule 68.
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for using alternative dispute resolution to facilitate and
expedite early settlements.
The Working Croup does not believe r however, that alternative
dispute resolution needs to or should involve major changes to
the standards of liability or causation in tort law. The merits
of alternative dispute resolution are largely unrelated to which
standard of liability is used in resolving disputes. The value
of alternative dispute resolution lies in procedural rather than
substantive changes in the law.
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CHAPTER 5
GOVERNMENT INSURANCE:

A NON-SOLUTION

The growing liability insurance availability/affordabllilj
crisis has spawned calls for government insurance or
indemnification for persons or companies unable to obtain
adequate insurance coverage through the private sector. For the
reasons discussed below, such government insurance or
indemnification would be highly undesirable and would do nothing
to remedy the problems underlying the availability/affordability
crisis.
The most serious deficiency with the various schemes for
government insurance or indemnification is, as noted, the fact
that such proposals do not address the problems that have led to
the availability/affordability crisis. Instead, these schemes
simply would pass the costs of the crisis directly to the
taxpayer. While it is difficult to estimate the potential cost
of such a program to the American taxpayer, it should be noted
that the insurance industry suffered an estimated $25 billion
underwriting loss in 1985 (see Chapter 2). This loss does not
include self-insurance or captive insurer losses, which in all
likelihood represent additional billions of dollars.
A government insurance or indemnification program would by
definition certainly-involve the riskiest activities; that is,
those activities that even the insurance industry is unwilling
to underwrite. To the extent that the government attempts to
address affordability problems by offering coverage more cheaply
than the industry, the government, of course, simply would be
subsidizing certain purchasers of insurance. Again, the cost of
such subsidization is difficult to estimate, but considering
that the insurance industry paid out over $126 billion in 1985,
with related expenses of $37 billion (see Chapter 2), such a
subsidy easily could involve tens of billions of dollars
annually. 1/
(Again, these figures do not include selfinsurance or captive insurers).
Government insurance or indemnification would not only pass
these costs to the taxpayer, but could exacerbate the current
problems of the tort system. One of the few constraints left in
tort law as the recognition that "deep pockets" are not after

1/ For example, over recent years the National Flood
Insurance Fund has been subsidizing flood insurance by roughly
$150 million annually. The cumulative loss for the program to
date is approximately $1.4 billion. The President, in his
latest budget submission, reiterated his intention to continue
to phase out this costly subsidy. The riot, insurance program,
which existed from 1968 to 1984, was able to sustain itself
through collected premiums. The relative success of the
program, however, was largely due to the'decline in urban riots
after the program was instituted.
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all bottomless*-- that there is a finite amount of resources
that can be reallocated through tort liability. Government
indemnification or insurance would remove that last restraint,
since the resources of the Federal Government are all too often
viewed as without limit. Thus, courts and juries might be even
more willing to skew liability and causation standards to ensure
compensation, and to award the most generous compensation
conceivable.
There are, however, a number of compelling reasons for rejecting
the concept of government insurance or indemnification other
than-because of its potential cost and the failure to address
the real problems underlying the crisis. Perhaps foremost among
. those reasons is that such a program would most likely
jeopardize among the most effective and important mechanisms
currently existing in the private sector to protect public
health and safety. The insurance industry plays a vital role in
promoting public health and safety by policing insureds to
ensure that risks of injury are minimized. Insureds who fail to
minimize such risks, or who experience higher than normal claim
rates, may find the desired level of insurance coverage more
difficult to obtain and more expensive. The insurance industry
thus plays an important role in creating incentives that protect
public health and safety, both in policing insureds, and in
passing uthe-benefits, of safety back to the insureds through
• <- lower ^premiums ,*- t v ;..,••. ---... f .
v
*-••-*' v While'the^rdle of insurance in promoting public health and .
safety is,by no means .perfect,-and the above description
admittedly is somewhat idealized, insurance creates important
health and safety incentives which cannot be dismissed
lightly. This critical function of insurance is undermined to
the extent that the government supplants the private sector in
providing insurance or indemnification, particularly for high
risk activities. The government, even if and when it
demonstrates the best of intentions, simply does not have the
resources, experience, flexibility or incentives to replicate
the activities of the private sector in policing insureds1
practices and setting premiums to reflect claims experience. In
addition, were the government to undertake such activities, the
existing health and safety bureaucracies almost certainly would
prove inadequate. Substantial additional funds, personnel and
resources would need to be devoted to these activities, and in
many areas new bureaucratic structures would need to be
established. 2/ If, as seems likely, such additional
investments of government resources are not made, government
insurance or indemnification would operate as a clear
disincentive to greater safety since insureds would receive
\

2/ The necessary collection and analysis of relevant
information would of itself be a major undertaking requiring
substantial investment of additional government resources.
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the benefit of a risk transfer to the government (and,
accordingly, would have less incentive to protect public health
and safety) without any corresponding checks upon their conduct
or activities. Both the consumer and the taxpayer would be the
ultimate losers.
To the extent that the government institutes an insurance or
indemnification program, such a program also would increase
significantly in two ways the involvement of the government in
the private sector. First, while the government, as noted,
cannot replicate the efforts of the insurance industry, it would
have to become involved in the activities it has insured or
indemnified to ensure that such insurance or indemnification
does not lead to completely open-ended liability on the part of
the government. This necessarily would involve new additional
forms of government supervision and regulation of private sector
activities.
A second undesirable but inevitable effect of such a program
would be that the government frequently would be forced to
manage, or at least actively oversee, the litigation of cases
involving the liability of its insureds, since the insureds
often would have only a limited incentive to contest
aggressively claims, however meritless, against which they are
fully insured or indemnified. Even putting aside the
consideration of the massive investment of litigation resources
that would be needed by both the insuring agencies and the
Department of Justice, this could involve the government
- directly*-and actively in some of the most controversial and
visible tort litigation in our society, much of which would
involve ^litigation in state court under substantive, procedural
and evidentiary rules of state law.
An additional consideration is that such a program necessarily
would involve the federal government in state regulation of the
insurance industry since such regulation could have a
significant impact on the kind of insurance or indemnification
the federal government would have to provide. For example,
state regulators who might wish to avoid approving politically
unpopular rate increases or policy provisions might be far more
inclined to withhold such approvals if they perceived the
federal government as ready and willing to provide an
alternative source of insurance. The federal government, in
turn,-in order to avoid such wholesale transfers of the
insurance burden, could very easily find itself compelled to
regulate the insurance industry directly, or to regulate the
state regulators. Either way, it would represent a substantial
intrusion by the federal government into the regulation of the
insurance industry.
Finally, a federal program of insurance or indemnification would
interfere with and perhaps severely inhibit the ability of the
market to devise new policies, insurance mechanisms, and
specific contractual provisions to meet changing economic and
78
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social conditions. Where the current services of the insurance
industry prove inadequate or unacceptable, insurers and insureds
have strong incentives to restructure those services so that the
needs of the marketplace can be met (witness, for example, the
current discussions over the introduction of claims-made
policies and the inclusion of defense costs). Where government
insurance or indemnification is available, however, insureds may
be far more inclined to seek such insurance (particularly where
it is subsidized, either intentionally or unintentionally) than
to negotiate with insurers or invest considerable effort and
resources shopping for better conditions. Insurers, in turn,
who may feel themselves compelled to offer otherwise
unattractive services to customers they wish to retain, may find
a government insurance or indemnification program a convenient
dumping grounds for the risks they would rather spin-off. 3/
The end result could very well be that the ability of the
marketplace to respond to new conditions with innovative
solutions could be severely chilled if the "safe harbor" of
government insurance or indemnification were available to both
the insureds and the insurers. 4/
In sum, government insurance or indemnification would be a
highly undesirable and counterproductive response to the current
availability/affordability crisis. It effectively would amount
to the. nationalization, of.a potentially large portion of one of
the Nation1s leading, financial industries. And,, given the
history of:past government involvement in the private sector, it
is all too apparent that removing the federal government from
the insurance industry once the purported justification for its
presence had passed would be an arduous if not ultimately futile
endeavor.

3/ Such risks most likely would include the type of longlatency, catastrophic risks endemic to toxic torts. As is
apparent from the asbestos litigations, such insurance would
expose the taxpayer to potentially massive liability. The
problem of insurers spinning off certain types of business very
likely would generate pressure for some form of federal
regulation of such practices.
4/ It should be noted in this regard that the contractor
indemnification provision which the Administration supports in
the context of Superfund reauthorization is purely discretionary
in nature, is limited to cleanups under the control of the *
Environmental Protection Agency, is linked to a critical
limitation on liability (liability would be predicated only on
negligence), and would be provided only because it will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep this vital
program in operation without such limited and closely regulated
contractor indemnification (which presumably will include both
limits and deductible?y.
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CONCLUSION

This report contains within it a number of c servations,
conclusions and recommendations. The most : portant of these,
however, for the purposes of the Tort Policy Working Group, are
what this report implies as to the appropria e response of the
federal government to the current crisis in insurance availability
and affordability. In this regard, the pertinent conclusions are
straightforward and relatively apparent.
First; tort law appears to be a major cause of the insurance
availability/affordability crisis.
Second; there^are a number of beneficial reforms of tort law
that the federal government can support and promote in sensible
and appropriate ways.
Third, to the extent that other factors — such as the recent
large underwriting losses of the insurance industry — underlie
this crisis, there is little the federal, government can or
should do to remedy these problems. While the contribution of
these economic factors seems clear, it is likely that these
problems will work themselves out in the short-term as the
insurance.industry restores its desired level of profitability,
and as other'insurance* industry developments (see Chapter 3) are
implemented.v It seems highly^unlikely, however, that these
changes will substantially alleviate the crisis, particularly
the affordability aspect of the crisis, without substantial
reforms*of tort law.
Fourth, the Working Croup found nothing to support the
suggestion that this crisis could be remedied through federal
regulation of the insurance industry or of state insurance
regulators.
Fifth, while a federal insurance or indemnification program
obviously could provide subsidized insurance where insurance is
unavailable or unaffordable, for many reasons (see Chapter 5)
such a program would be highly undesirable and ultimately
counterproductive.
In sum, tort law appears to be a major cause of the insurance
availability/affordability crisis which the federal government can
and should address in a variety of sensible and appropriate ways.
But significant, long-term reform cannot and should not come solely
from the federal government. Ultimately, state governments and
courts must address the current excesses of tort law. Their active
participation is essential to finding workable solutions to the
increasingly debilitating problems of tort law.
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Resolution 6 (A-87), which was adopted by the AMA House of
Delegates, calls for a study of the impact of product liability on
the availability of drugs and other medical therapies. This report
provides an overview of the impact of product liability lawsuits on
research and development of vaccines, contraceptives, and other
medical therapies, finding that product liability lawsuits are
having a profound negative impact on the development and utilization
of potentially life-saving medical technologies. The AHA supports
continuing the efforts of tort reform.
INTRODUCTION
Product liability is having a profound negative impact on the
development of new medical technologies. Innovative new products
are not being developed or are being withheld from the market
because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate
insurance. Certain older technologies have been removed from the
market, not because of sound scientific evidence indicating lack of
safety or efficacy, but because product liability suits have exposed
manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks.
The number of cases commenced in federal courts involving
product liability generally has increased at a compounded annual
rate exceeding 17% over the last 14 yearsl (see Figure 1 ) . From.
1974 to 1985 the average jury award in product liability suits
climbed from $494,580 to $1,850,452. It is estimated that only
one-third of the award goes to the plaintiff; the remainder covers
attorney's fees and court costs. .%
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pharmaceutical manufacturers have been hard hit by product
liability suits, especially manufacturers of vaccines and
contraceptive agents. The number of lawsuits filed against the
manufacturers of DTP (diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis
vaccine), for example, has climbed from fewer than 100 during the
three-year period 1982-1984 to 110 in 1986 alone. Current legal
interpretation of product liability law, especially the doctrine of
strict liability, diminishes the incentives of a manufacturer to
research, develop, and produce vaccines.
It has been claimed that the main culprit in skyrocketing
liability insurance rates is the insurance industry, which
purportedly made imprudent investments in the early 1980s when
interest rates were high and now charges exorbitant premiums because
the interest rates have dropped.2 Evidence clearly shows that the
profits of the insurance industry vary significantly from year to
year, and interest rates are an important determinant of insurance
industry profits. A recent study, however, demonstrated that the
rise in liability insurance premiums is not due to collusion among
insurers, cyclical behavior, or systematic errors in forecasting
losses, but to growth in the discounted value of expected liability
losses.3 In the pharmaceutical industry meaningful product
liability insurance has all but disappeared. According to one
financial analyst in London, "Lloyds and other companies have become
very cautious about this type of business in the US because of
unpredictability . . . . It has been difficult for them to assess
the level of likely claims and hence to price business.M*
This report will describe the different legal doctrines used in
product liability suits and discuss the impact of product liability
on the manufacturers of vaccines, contraceptives, and other drugs
and devices.
THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Product liability suits typically employ one of three legal
doctrines: negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability.
Negligence is a violation of the duty to use ordinary and
reasonable care with respect to persons to whom a duty of care is
owed. To sue for negligence in product liability, a plaintiff must
show that defendant breached his or her responsibility to exercise
reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, testing, or
inspection of the product or in providing adequate warning
concerning the use of the product. A drug manufacturer would likely
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be found negligent if a drug was not manufactured in accordance with
"current good manufacturing practices," and the specific failure was
causally linked to the injury. Currently, most drug and medical
device manufacturers follow good manufacturing practices, and few
cases of negligence result from defective manufacture, assembly, or
testing and inspection of finished products. Most suits invoking
the negligence doctrine base their claim on the duty to warn,
although, increasingly, plaintiffs allege failure to conduct
adequate general safety testing and sometimes improper design.
The duty to warn can be applied in suits invoking either the
negligence or strict liability doctrines. Generally, the legal duty
is to warn medical professionals, as "learned intermediaries," about
the inherent dangers in the use of the product. Learned
intermediaries are presumed able to understand the risks and weigh
them against the expected benefits to be derived from use of the
product and are expected to uphold their fiduciary responsibility to
do what is in the best interests of their patients. The concept of
learned intermediary has generally relieved manufacturers of
responsibility to warn patients directly of the dangers inherent in
the use of a drug or medical device. Manufacturers have been held
liable, however, if their package inserts, "Dear Doctor" letters,
advertising, promotional materials, or the activities of their sales
staff provide misleading, insufficient, or ambiguous information on
risks associated with the use of the drug and thereby prevent
physicians from making informed decisions.
A manufacturer is legally held to the standards of an expert and
is responsible for keeping abreast and informing the medical
community of newly discovered adverse effects. The adequacy of the
warning is generally based on the level of knowledge at the time of
the injury. A manufacturer has not been expected to warn of dangers
discovered subsequent to the injury, about which they could not have
known at the time of the injury.
The scope of liability based on negligence may have been
expanded by the case of Toner v. Lederle Laboratories.5 In this
case a young boy was paralyzed from the neck down after receiving
the whole cell DTP vaccine. The plaintiff's lawyer alleged that the
manufacturer knew how to make a pertussis vaccine that was safer and
equally effective but did not pursue development. The attorney for
the defense argued that the effectiveness of .the split cell vaccine
was unproven. The jury held that Lederle was negligent for "failing
to design or manufacture a safer vaccine," and returned a $1.13
million judgment for the plaintiff on that basis.
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There are two types of warranties, express and implied. The
doctrine of express breach of warranty allows recovery from a
manufacturer whose product did not conform to an assertion by the
manufacturer, when, as a result of that lack of conformance, the
plaintiff was injured. Express warranties are based on oral or
written statements and can be absolute. For example, if a drug
company specifically stated there were no contraindications to a
drug but an individual was later shown to have a contraindication to
that drug (even if the contraindication was discovered subsequent to
the statement), the manufacturer could be liable for breach of
warranty. As stated by the courts, "The obligation of a warranty is
absolute, and is imposed as a matter of law irrespective of whether
the seller knew or should have known of the falsity of his
representations."6 Implied warranties are created by statute and
attach to all sales. They attach if the product has been
distributed in a truly "defective" state (ie, is not fit for the
intended purpose or deviates from similar goods) and if the
"defective" product resulted in personal injury. Breach of express
warranty is relatively easy to avoid and defend against in
comparison to negligence and strict liability, and although breach
of implied warranty is still alleged in most cases, it has been
displaced in most cases by negligence and strict liability in
medical product liability suits.
Strict liability holds a defendant iiable for a "defective"
product regardless of fault. The plaintiff must simply show that
the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous and that it
caused physical harm. The public policy rationale behind the
doctrine of strict liability is:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict
liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing
.- his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public
has the right to and does expect, in the case of products
which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the
seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods; that public policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for
consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such
products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the
hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are
those who market the products.7
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Almost all states recognize that there are some products, such
as prescription drugs and vaccines, that cannot be made completely
safe. Manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products are specifically
protected from strict liability by those states that have adopted
comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:

-

Unavoidably Unsafe Products: There are some products
which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to
very serious and damaging consequences when it is
injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the
unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very
reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians or tinder
the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or
perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience
as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed and proper warning is
given, ... is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.

At least one court, however, has held that, under certain
circumstances, a drug may not be afforded protection by comment k of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories8 the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
We see no reason to hold as a matter of law that all
prescription drugs that are unsafe are unavoidably so.
Drugs, like other products may contain defects that could
have been avoided.by better manufacturing or design.
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Thus, although a drug has been through the rigorous FDA approval
process and found by that expert regulatory agency to be safe and
efficacious, some courts have decided that it is a jury question as
to whether drugs contain "defects'* that could have been avoided.
IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL THERAPIES
Effect of Product Liability on Vaccine Manufacturers:
Vaccines are one of the great success stories of medicine.
Their impact on the prevalence of communicable diseases has been
very impressive, and the amount of suffering and pain prevented by
vaccines is incalculable. For example, the prevalence af measles
dropped from 315.2 per 100,000 population in 1950 to 0.6 per 100,000
in 1983.9 "The number of cases of poliomyelitis dropped from
57,000 in 1952 to 4 in 1984. Smallpox has been eradicated from the
world, while diseases such as tetanus, diphtheria, and polio have
been extensively controlled. Vaccines are still an extremely
important means of preventing the spread of disease and are needed
for #,herd immunity." In England, when the DTP vaccination rate
dropped from 79% in 1973 to 31% in 1978, there was an epidemic
outbreak of pertussis.'
Vaccines do have some risks. The most serious vaccine-related
injuries and their estimated prevalence are shown in Table 1. I
in society's interest to adequately compensate vaccinees who are
injured by vaccination. The issue is not whether to compensate the
injured parties but to determine a method to compensate for injuries
directly resulting from vaccination that is fair to the injured, the
manufacturer, and society at large.
.-Until 1986 (see below), the tort system was the only formal
setting in which to determine compensation~for parties directly
injured from vaccination. Successful vaccine liability suits
usually were based on a failure to warn. Vaccine manufacturers are
considered to have a greater responsibility to warn recipients than
do the makers of most pharmaceuticals or medical devices and are
generally obliged to ensure that any warnings accompanying their
vaccines are actually communicated to the vaccinee rather than
simply to the physician. This duty to warn the vaccinee rather than
the physician is an exception to the concept of the "learned
intermediary". In Davis v. Wveth Laboratories10 the courts ruled
that, when vaccines are administered at mass immunization clinics,
there is no learned intermediary, and ix? is the "responsibility of
the manufacturer to see that warnings reach each consumer, either by
giving the warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give
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In Reves v. Wveth Laboratories** the federal courts held that,
even though the polio vaccine was properly produced and
administered, shipped with printed warnings, and there was strong
evidence that the disease was caused by an unrelated wild virus
rather than by the vaccine, the manufacturer was liable because it
should have warned the plaintiff's parents that there was a remote
possibility that the vaccine might cause polio. The reasoning was,
Statistically predictable as are these rare cases of
vaccine-induced polio, a strong argument can be advanced
that the loss ought not to lie where it falls, but should
be borne by the manufacturer as a foreseeable cost of doing
business, and passed on to the public in the form of price
increases to his customers.
Over the last 10 years the number of liability suits filed
against vaccine manufacturers has increased significantly,
resulting in vaccine prices that greatly exceed the inflation rate
(see Figure 2 ) .
The reluctance of manufacturers to produce vaccines without
adequate protection from product liability suits was also
exemplified by the swine flu vaccine difficulties during the Ford
Administration. In 1976, the CDC forecast a probable outbreak of
the swine flu and recommended a national immunization program.
Vaccine manufacturers and their insurers refused to produce vaccines
for the national program without special protection from liability.
According to one insurance executive, "new liability doctrines made
the manufacturers uninsurable at any price."* 2 Legislation had to
be enacted making the United States the sole possible defendant in
any action for damages arising out of the swine flu vaccination
program. Thousands of claims were filed producing conflicting court
decisions that exacerbated the uncertainty prompted by Reves v
Wveth. The government paid almost $80 million, much of it to people
immunized for swine flu who contracted Guillain-Barre syndrome.
Because of product liability concerns and an inability to obtain
reasonably priced insurance, several companies, including Wyeth and
Parke-Davis, ceased producing childhood vaccines. 13
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More recently, the manufacturer of a vaccine for Japanese
encephalitis discontinued its distribution in this country because
the firm was unable to obtain liability insurance. Individuals
traveling to the rural areas of India, China, Korea, Nepal, Burma,
and Thailand may be at increased risk of developing encephalitis
because of the withdrawal of this vaccine from the US market.14
Considerable concern has been expressed regarding the impact of
product liability on the development of valuable vaccines in the
future.
For example, a headline in Science pointedly questioned
H
Will an AIDS vaccine bankrupt the company that makes it?"15
Brian Cunninghan (Vice President and General Counsel for Genentech)
stated, "As the law stands today, manufacturers are held liable for
injuries caused by a vaccine even though they were not negligent in
designing it. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the legal
system has simply run amuck. And for a small company like
Genentech, we simply cannot take the financial risk."15 Recently
the National Academy of Sciences found:
Given the extremely high cost of vaccine development
programs and the present concerns over liability for
vaccine-related injuries, many manufacturers may be
unwilling to initiate or pursue the derivation or
distribution of a vaccine to prevent AIDS.16
The doctrine of a duty to warn is predicated on the assumption
that the informed individual has the freedom to weigh the risks
against the benefits and to decide whether or not to purchase or use
the product.1^ Most vaccinees, however, especially those
receiving vaccines required for school entry, often do not have the
freedom to reject immunization. Therefore, other forums for
compensation of the injured are generally considered necessary. In
1986, Congress passed a bill to provide an alternative environment
to settle compensation questions regarding vaccines required for
school entry. This grew out of the recognition that the courts are
an inappropriate setting in which to settle such questions. The
bill did not make its compensation mechanism an exclusive remedy and
continues to permit these cases to be brought as lawsuits in the
traditional court system. On November 14, 1986, President Reagan
signed this legislation into law. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987 established an excise tax to fund future claims and to
authorize appropriations from general revenues to fund preexisting
claims. The excise tax, taking effect January 1, 1988, is $4.56 per
dose for DTP, $4.44 per dose for MMR, $0.29 per dose for
poliomyelitis vaccine (both oral and injectable), and $0.06 per dose
for diphtheria and tetanus vaccines.18
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All vaccines have some inherent risk. However, society has
gained tremendously by mass vaccination programs. It would be a
travesty to have product liability concerns adversely affect the
continued development and utilization of this life saving
technology. The no-fault compensation program of 1986, while far
from perfect, is a step in the right direction.
Analysis of Contraception Liability:
Contraceptive research and product development has been greatly
impeded by product liability concerns. In the early 1970s, there
were 13 pharmaceutical companies actively pursuing research in
contraception and fertility. Now, only one US company conducts
contraceptive and fertility research.*9 Unless the liability laws
are drastically altered, it is very unlikely that pharmaceutical
companies will aggressively pursue research in this area.
The Director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development has expressed concern about this issue:^0

j

Research [is constrained by] a system that becomes driven
primarily by concerns over lawsuits. This is already
affecting our institute's research program in two ways.
First, our ability to test new drugs and devices related to
pregnancy has been curtailed because of the inability of
some of the investigators we support to obtain liability
insurance for the testing at any price. If we cannot do
the clinical testing, we cannot bring new products to the
public. Second, our ability to conduct research on
alternative obstetric practices to what is standard,
accepted and safe from a medicolegal standpoint faces
constraints based on fear of a malpractice suit if an
adverse outcome occurs in the experimental group....When we
are forced into a situation where we-must follow
established dogma rather than be allowed to try something
new and possibly better for fear of a malpractice suit,
medical research and progress will come to a halt and the
health care of our people will suffer. This must not be
allowed to happen.

But it may already be happening. In 1986, a landmark case
allowed recovery of $4.7 million from Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corporation by a woman claiming that her child's birth defects
resulted from use of Ortho-Gynol Jelly. 21 This ruling was upheld
on appeal in spite of overwhelming scientific evidence that
contraceptive gels are not teratogenic. The FDA had previously
reviewed the data and concluded that no warning about possible
teratogenicity was necessary. The courts allowed the judgment of
persons with no medical training to overrule the federal agency
which has the responsibility and the medical expertise to ensure
that drugs are safe and effective. The appellate court ruled:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiffs' burden of proving that Katie Wells' defects
were caused by the product did not necessarily require them
to produce scientific studies showing a statistically
significant association between spermicides and congenital
malformations in a large population . . .. [I]t does not
matter in terms of deciding the case that the medical
community might require more research and evidence before
conclusively resolving the question.22
This indicates that the courts will now allow as the sole basis
for liability anecdotal evidence that is considered unacceptable by
the scientific standards of the day23* The appellate court stated:
We recognize, as did the Ferebee court, that a cause-effect
relationship need not be clearly established by animal or
epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that,
in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the
basic methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is
sound, such as use of tissue samples, standard tests and
patient examination, products liability law does not
preclude recovery until a "statistically significant"
number of people have been injured or until science has had
the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory
studies of the chemical.24
Intrauterine devices have also been under attack from plaintiff
lawyers alleging negligence. The manufacturers of all but one IUD
have stopped their distribution and sale within the US because of
product liability concerns (a second manufacturer of IUDs has
recently entered the US market). The Oalkon Shield, manufactured by
A.H. Robins, exposed some users to higher than normal risks of
pelvic inflammatory disease and infertility. Trial evidence
suggests that Robins may have known of the risks uniquely associated
with its IUD yet did not inform physicians or the public of the
problems. A relatively small number of plaintiff lawyers
specialized in handling suits against the makers of the Dalkon
Shield and were able to obtain adequate cash flows from out-of-court
settlements. However, in 1985 Robins declared bankruptcy, which
caused all of the outstanding cases to be consolidated in the
bankruptcy courts, halting all settlements and eliminating the
source of cash flows for the lawyers. At that point, these same
lawyers began focusing their attention on other IUD manufacturers,
especially G.D. Searle Company. The number of suits filed against
Searle shot up to 800 by 1986, and Searle spent $1.5 million
defending the last four trials alone.25* In January 1986, Searle
removed the Cu-7 IUD from the market, citing "unwarranted product
litigation" as the main reason for its action. At that time, the
.total sales for Cu-7 were only $11 million annually. One
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study reported that the withdrawal of the Cu-7 and TCu-200 IUDs from
the market by Searle and the earlier withdrawal of Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corporation's Lippes Loop IUD in September 1985 left
an estimated 1.4 million women in need of an alternative method of
birth control. This situation may result in an increase of up to
123,000 pregnancies per year.26
Analysis of Other Drug and Medical Device Product Liability:
Small drug and device manufacturers, including much of the
medical biotechnology industry, are very susceptible to product
liability suits and rising liability insurance premiums. It is not
surprising, therefore, that a survey discovered that over two-thirds
of biotechnology companies consider product liability an important
factor to consider when deciding whether to proceed with commercial
introduction.27 Nearly 60% felt that tort reform was needed to
limit liability, and over one-third of small and mid-size companies
may refuse to bring a product to market unless liability insurance
is available. The threat of product liability suits has even halted
the distribution of investigational drugs under study. For example,
the distribution of Botulinum A toxin, an investigational drug used
to treat strabismus and blepharospasm, conditions for which no- good
alternative therapy exists, had to be halted for many months due to
lack of product liability insurance.
One of the most disconcerting movements by the courts is their
willingness to ignore overwhelming scientific evidence when
determining whether a product was the "proximate cause'9 of the
injury. For example, in addition to the Wells case discussed above,
the prescription drug Bendectin was withdrawn from the market not
because of scientific evidence of its hazards but because of the
large number of lawsuits against the manufacturer. The American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology felt that Bendectin was safe
and effective in treating nausea and vomiting of pregnancy. The
College stated, "The decision by Merrell Dow [to discontinue the
distribution of Bendectin] creates a significant therapeutic gap.
Nausea and vomiting during pregnancy cannot always be treated by
symptomatic means, and in the past year, severe cases have led to
serious maternal nutritional as well as other deficiencies."2S
In 1987, the FDA developed a new set of regulations in an
attempt to get potentially life-saving drugs to desperately ill
patients more rapidly. The new regulations, known as the Treatment
IND regulations, allow physicians to prescribe selected drugs to
patients while the drugs are still in%Phase III; occasionally drugs
can be distributed late in Phase II trials if the manufacturer is
willing to make them available. This new system may remove a
regulatory block to improved patient care. The potential of product
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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liability suits, however, threatens use of the Treatment IND
process. A Chief Executive Officer of a major pharmaceutical
company has stated, "the product liability specialist could take
someone to court and convince a sympathetic jury that the venal drug
company in its desire to charge for drugs as soon as possible took
advantage of a sick and dying person and deprived him or her of his
last few precious weeks on earth." 29
RECENT CHANGES IN STATE LAWS REGARDING PRODUCT LIABILITY
Nineteen states have enacted new legislation addressing product
liability (see Table 2 ) . Some have incorporated provisions
specifically protecting drug and device manufacturers. For example,
Ohio, Oregon, New Jersey, and Texas provide a defense to punitive
damages against a manufacturer if the drug was approved by the FDA
and a manufacturer acted with due diligence when any additional
risks were reported. New Jersey also established a rebuttable
presumption that a warning which has been approved by the FDA is
adequate.
CONCLUSION
The AMA recognizes that product liability issues are having a
profound negative impact on the development and utilization of
potentially life-saving medical technologies. Laws developed to
protect the public at large can sometimes hurt the very individuals
they were meant to protect. Basic biomedical research is
deteriorating in certain fields because product liability inhibits
utilizing that research to develop new medical products. Small
companies involved in innovative research, such as many of the
biotechnology firms, are delaying or foregoing certain product
releases because of inability to obtain adequate insurance
coverage. Finally, useful products are being taken off the market
because the discoimted costs of defending litigation and purchasing
insurance premiums can sometimes exceed the projected profits for
the product.
Patients deserve to receive the best medicine that can be
provided. There is a social responsibility to protect individuals
from unnecessary harm and to compensate a person when wronged, but
there is also a responsibility to protect manufacturers from
unjustified liability when, using the best available knowledge, they
develop products that, although unavoidably unsafe, offer such
benefits that their manufacture and distribution greatly benefits
society as a whole. It is particularly*important to eliminate tort
liability that is predicated not on the manufacturer's unacceptable
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conduct but rather on the injured person's "need" for compensation
or the manufacturer's presumed ability to provide that
compensation. To do less will jeopardize all citizens, which would
be the greatest miscarriage of justice.

10

The AMA urge the continuation of efforts at the state^level
to reform product liability form; and

11
12
13
14
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The Board of Trustees recommends that:

2.

The AMA support creative solutions to prevent product
liability suits from slowing the development and utilization
of medical technologies in this country,

*
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inningp Laboratoty andAnirridStudies

he scene is a typical one. A patient, perhaps you or I goes
to a doctor and gets a prescription. Then a pharmacist fills
T
the prescription, with instructions to take the drug in the pret

> • 1'

. J»

T

scribed amount and manner over the following days, weeks or
; morjth*. This scene is repealed millions of times across this
country every day—some 1.6 billion prescriptions are filled
every yea/ in the United States, an average of seven for; every
man, woman and child. In fact, the process is so commonplace
that the pills* tablets, capsule* and other medications that virtually every one of us relies on to restore or maintain good i
health sd tome point in our lives come to be taken for granted.*
Yet theie drugs—arid the improved quality of health they j
bring to the American people—ere truly "miracle* of modern
science/*Jin fact/the process for discovering, developing and'
testing new drugs encompasses some of the most exciting areas
of scientific discovery today* The endeavor runs the gamut !,
from bask biomedical investigation of living cells and mole- ;
culei to applied research that yields new consumer products to
Improve health care,, j
. \ L
.
L
\ I

THE CUTTING EDQE

"Wt art on the cutting edge of the biological sciences,;' says
RhodaOruen,a Wodirnlst'at Hoffmann-La Roche* Imi,,a
leading pharmaceutical research and manufacturing flrrh, head-

quartered in Nutley, N.J. "We suck up new information like a
sponge. Everything we do is subject to change as new scientific information becomes known.**
iI
i
The research process is a complicated, time-consuming, and
costly one whose end result is never known at the outset. Discovering a new drug has been likened to searching for the
proverbial needle in a haystack. Literally hundreds and sometimes thousands of chemical compounds must be made and
tested to find one that can
achieve the desirable result without
too-serious side effects.1 ^
j|
j
The complexity of the process can be gauged, in part, by the
diversity of scientific disciplines engaged in finding new drugs.
Traditional organic chemists, physiologists and statisticians
have been joined in recent years by new kinds of specialists.
Biochemists study the chemistry of life processes. Molecular
biologists study the molecules that make up living matter. Toxicologies investigate chemicals' potential for harm. Pharmacologists look at how drugs work. And computer scientists
I apply the power of their sophisticated machines to analyze and
»'assess new chemicals. Each provides a different way of looking for that needle. ; :•• ,' .
j
j|
Such a complicated prooess costs vast amounts of time and
! money. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
I (PM A), a trade group of rcscardh-bascd drugmakers, says 10
! years or more are needed to study and test a new drug before
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the Food and Drug Administration can approve it for the gencan clog the arteries that deliver blood to the heart muscle,
eral public. That includes early laboratory and animal testing, , blocking the flow of oxygen and nutrients, causing a heart atthe subject of,this article, as well as later clinical trials using
I tack.
human subjects! (See page 10.)
i
There have been few drugs that effectively cut cholesterol
Drug companies spend about $65 million, on average, to delevels without either toxic or unpleasant side effects. This has
velop a new drug, says economist Steven Wiggins of Texas
;limited their use. Others that were tested acted too late in the
A&M University. Actually, Wiggins, who conducted a study
process by which the body makes cholesterol to lower its levon the costs of drug development on behalf of PMA, says the
els. What was needed, says Eve Slater, a cardiologist and "K
real cost of bringing a drug to market is more like $125 milMerck's director for biomedical research, was a drug that
lion. That includes what the economists call the opportunity
would act earlier in the cholesterol-making process.
cost of investing money in research whose payoff may be years
To find one, scientists at Merck and elsewhere spent decades
away, instead of in a more immediate moneymaking venture.
studying how the body makes and uses cholesterol. Along the
A company such as Hoffmann-La Roche, whose annual sales
Way they identified more than 20 biochemical reactions necesin the United States alone exceeds $1 billion, spends about $2
sary for the body to make cholesterol, along with the enzymes
million each business day on research worldwide.
j required at each step to turn one chemical into the next one in
the chain.
The research problem. Slater says, was to find the step
BUILDING ON GOOD SCIENtE
, """""
where interference by a drug would effectively lower cholesterol production. By the 1970s, scientists had found a pos- *
There is no standard route by which the 2,400 drugs now sold
sibility. They had isolated a chemical, mevalonic acid, that,
in the United States were developed. "Each drug has its own
was an early link in the cholesterol chain and an enzyme called
way of being born,** says Clement Stone, senior vice president
HMG-CoA reductase that produced mevalonic acid. :
for Merck, Sharp & Dohmc research laboratories, West Point,
What was needed, then, was a drug that could either inhibit
Pa. •'Often we consciously search for.a drug for a specific use,
HMG-CoA reductase or prevent cells from correctly using the
. but more often it is serendipity. What is required, though, is
good science building on good scienci." (
enzyme. '
Sometimes, scientists arc lucky and find the right compound
In some cases, a pharmaceutical company decides to develop
quickly. More often, Gruen says, hundreds QT even thousands
a new drug aimed at a specific disease or medical condition. In
must be tested. In a series of test tube experiments called as*
• others, company scientists.may be free to pursue an interesting
says, compounds are added one at a time to enzymes, cell cul. or promising line of research. And, in yet others, new findings
tures, or cellular substances grown in a laboratory. The goal is
from university, government or other laboratories may point
• to find which show some chemical effect. Some may not work
. the way for drug companies to follow in their own research.
well, but may hint at ways of changing the compound's chemiIndeed, the process typically combines elements of all three
avenues. "We let our scientists do and make use of the best re- cal structure to improve its performance. The latter process
alone may require testing dozens or hundreds of compounds.
search they can in their fields/* says Ronald Kuntzman, vice
• president for research and development at Hoffmann-La
Roche. "The only question we ask as a company is whether
• this research it leading toward development of a new drug."
COMPUTER CtrUES
N^w drug research starts by studying how the body func- *
A
more
high-tech
approach
is to use computers to simulate
tiomj, both normally and abnormally, at its most basic levels.
an enzyme or other drug target and to design chemical strucThe pertinent question, Kuntzman says, is: "If I change it (the
tures that might work against it. Enzymes work when they atbody's functioning!, will I have a useful drug?",That, in turn,
leads to a concept of how a drug might be used to prevent, cure tach to the correct site on a cell's membrane. A computer can
show scientists what the receptor site looks like and how one
or treat a disease or medical condition. Once the concept has
might tailora'compound to block an enzyme from attaching
been developed, the researcher has • target to aim for, Kuntzthere.
'
;
.
man adds.
I •*'.••-''*,'.';' '•;
Nevertheless,
"computers
give
chemists
clues
to
which
'
Omen elaborates: "Disease processes ire complex and incompounds to make, bit they don't give any final answers,"
volve a sequence of events, (f you want io intervene in the disease process, you try to break it down into hs component parts. says Kuntzman. "You still have to put any compoundyou u
made based on a computer (simulation] into a biological sysYou then analyze those parts to find out what abnormal events,
tem
to see if it works."
ut occurringg at
and molecular levels, You would
• * the
UPC cellular
Wir
Yet a third approach involves testing compounds made natuthen select ai particular
step
as
a
target
for
drug
development
particular i
rally by microscopic organisms. Candidates include fungi, vi- ,
with the aimi of correcting
correctii the cellular or molecular dysfuncruses and molds, such as those that led to penicillin and other
tion,"
. antibiotics. Scientists grow the microorganisms in what they
call a fermentation broth, One type of organism per broth.
A NEW CHOLESTEROL DRUG
Sometimes 100,000 or more broths are tested to see whether
any compound made by a microorganism has a desirable
Tike cholesterol, a Wax-like substance found naturally in the
eff<*>
\
I
body. Too much cholesterol,j either naturally or in the diet, gin
In the icferch for a tew cholesterol drug, scientists found a
cause h to build upon the inikfe walls of blood vessels. This
funguf that inhibited the HMG-CoA reductase enzyme'In a test
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tube. Chemists then had to identify which of the fungus'
dozens of chemical byproducts was actually inhibiting the enzyme. Once that was done, the chemical*s structure was analyzed and improved on to enhance its effects.
To this point, the search for a new drug has been confined to
a laboratory test tube. Next, scientists have to test those compounds that have shown at least some desired effects in living
animals. "We have to find what the drug is doing on the down
side," Kuntzman explains.
ANIMAL TESTING
Pharmaceutical firms conduct laboratory and
animal research with new drugs before they can
begin experiments with humans. Scientists at
Hoffmann-La Roche conduct basic research Into
normal life processes (above) as well as studies
targeted to developing specific new drugs. The '.
. Investigator, In the above right photo Is studying
obesity In laboratory rats, with the ultimate
goat of developing medicines to control obesity
In humans:
| '; ' ' . ' • •'
(Photos courtesy of Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.,
Nutley.NJ.)
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In animal testing, Kuntzman says, drug companies make every
effort to use as few animals as possible and to ensure their humane and proper care. Two or more species are typically
tested, since a drug may affect one differently from another.
Such tests show whether a potential drug has toxic side effects
and what its safety is at different doses. The results "point the
'way for human testing and, much later, product labeling/*
1 Kuntzman says..
| So far, research has ainted at discovering what a drug does
t to the body. Now, it must also find out what the body does to
J thetfrug.So, in animal testing, scientists measure how much j
! of a drug is absorbed into the blood, how it is broken down j
j chemically in the body, the toxicity of its breakdown products1.
| (metabolites), and how quickly the drug and its metabolites are
i Excreted from the body. Sometimes such tests find a metabolite
i that is more effective than the drug originally picked for de- j
J vplopment.
j
j*
' 'j
\i
I
\ j Of particular Concern i* h6w much of the drug is absorbed i
| Into the blood. "If a drug s active ingredients don't get into the
j blood/* Kuntzman says, "it won't work/* Scientists may add
I other chemicals to the drug to help the body absorb it or. Ion j

1
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the other side, to prevent it from being broken down and exsafe and effective. It does not give the agency responsibility to
creted too soon. Such changes in the drug's structure mean
develop new drugs itself. So, FDA physicians, scientists and
other staff review test results submitted by drug developers.
even more testing.
Absorption rates can c a W a host of problems. For example, I The purpose: to determine whether the drug is safe enough to
test in humans and, if so—after all human testing is comfor a certain drug to be effective, 75 percent of it may need to
reach the bloodstream. But absorption rates can vary among in- pleted—to decide whether the drug can be sold to the public
and what its label should say about directions for use, side
dividuals from, say, 10 percent to 80 percent. So, the drug
j
must be able to produce the desired effects in those who absorb effects, warnings, and the like.
FDA first becomes involved when a drug company nas comonly 10 percent, but not cause intolerable side effects in people
pleted its testing in animals and is ready to test a drug on huwho absorb 80 percent.
44
mans. (Actually, some animal testing continues after human
If we can improve the absorption rate *we can reduce the
tests begin to learn whether long-term use of the drug may
variation in what real dosages people would be subject to,"
cause cancer or birth defects. Also, more animal data may
Kuntzman says. A more standard absorption rate for all indibe needed if human tests turn up unexpected effects. And new
viduals, say around 75 percent to 80 percent, would mean that
• therapeutic uses may be found by continued animal studies.)
the dose could be reduced and still have the desired effects.
Although FDA usually does not tell drug companies what
specific laboratory or animal tests to run, the agency does have
THE WRONG ROAD
regulations and guidelines on the kinds of results FDA expects
to see in any request to conduct human testing. *'We certainly
By this time in the testing process, many drugs that had
send signals to the drug companies on what they need to do," .
seemed promising have fallen by the wayside. More often than
says Elaine gsber, director of FDA's Office of Biologies Remany scientists care to admit, researchers have to just give up
search and Review.
I
when a drug is poorly absorbed, is unsafe, or simply doesn't
And the drug companies listen to those signals. Botn
work. "In research you have to know when to cut your losses
Hoffmann-La Roche's Kuntzman and Merck's Stone say their
if you are going down a wrong road," says Merck's Clement
companies follow and sometimes exceed FDA's guidelines.
Stone. And,he adds, there are many more wrong roads than
44
We want to optimize our chances of taking a compound from
right ones.
animal to human testing," Stone says.
\
Nevertheless, progress may yet be made. Occasionally,
So drug research is a long, difficult and costly road, cerStorte says, a stubborn scientist keeps looking and finds a ustainly. But sometimes the hard work, the scientific sleuthing,
able compound after others had given up. In other cases, comand the time and dollars spent pay off. Such was the case in
pounds may be put aside because they failed to work on one
August 1987, when FDA approved—in nine*and-a-half
disease, only to be taken off the shelf years later and found to
.mdnths—the much studied and much anticipated cholesterolwork on another.
i
lowering drug mentioned earlier—lovastatin. That approval
. Such was the case was zidovudine (formerly known as
azidothymidine, or AZT), the first drug approved for treatment holds the promise of longer and better lives for millions of
Americans with heart disease and substantial sales for Merck,
of AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome). The drug
the drug's developer. FDA's evaluation of lovastatin was aided
was first studied in 1964 as an anti-cancer drug, but it showed
by the care with which Burroughs Wellcome conducted its
little promise. It was not until the 1980s, when desperate
studies, presented the results, and responded to requests from
searches began for a way to treat victims of the deadly AIDS
agency scientists conducting the review, according to Commis* virus*, that scientists at Burroughs Wellcome Co., of Research
sioner Frank E. Young, M.D., Ph.D.
J
! Triangle Park, N.C., took another look afzidovudine. After it
But to scientists like Hoffmann-La Roche's Kuntzman, drug
showed very positive results in human testing, it was quickly
research goes even beyond preventing or curing disease or
approved by FDA in March 11987.
making money. It is also a tool for finding out more about the
Even so, "a minuscule number of drugs we test ever reach
i
.testing in man/* says Richard Salvador, a Hoffmann-La Roche human body and its basic life processes.
vice president and director of preclinical development. The Upjohn Company of Kalamazoo, Mich.,.estimates that of every
PROGRESS, NOT PERFECTION
2,000 chemicals studied, only 200 show any potential in early
tests. Only 20 of those may be tested in people, and only one
"Research is an evolutionary process," Kuntzman says. "You
may be safe and effective enough to reach pharmacy shelves.
change studies and use experiments to lea<) to other experiOther estimates are gloomier—PMA puts it at one in 10.000.
ments. As you go along you may not even see the connection
One of the most important new products to gain FDA apbetween studies. In a sense, research has no end. The only end*
• proval for testing in people is a vaccine to protect against
would be when we understand everything there is to know
\ AIDS. In August 1987, FDAiapproved human studies of such
about the human body. I expect that we will never know
a vaccine developed by MicroGcneSys, Inc., of West Haven, 1 enough about the body."
|
i Conn.
j l Merck's Eve Slater agrees. "We can make progress," she
says, "but we are unlikely to achieve perfection." In the end,
that is what researching and developing new drugs is all'
(
THE ROLE OF FDA
about—understanding and progress. •
\ The role of FDAHp the early %\&%t% of drug research is- small.
! The Food, Drug, ahd Cosmetic Act requires FDA to ensure
Jeffrey F. Cohn is a free-lance writer in Washington
; that the new drugs developed by pharmaceutical companies arc
who often writes on health issues.
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What Is Deterred?

The Innovator Departs
Who fled most quickly for shelter from the baying new tort pack? Those
quickest on their feet, of course—the person of action, the company of
initiative, the mover, the shaker, and the doer. When it comes to liability
problems, the bold innovators are the most fleet-footed of potential defendants. More often than not, they adjusted to the threat of liability by
doing less. Not innovating is a remarkably easy thing to do.
The Founders had promised quite the opposite—a steady march of innovation and progress impelled by the pursuing avengers of liability. The
pursuit was there all right. But the innovation did not follow. To the
contrary, in the very markets where the legal pursuit was the most intense—on the trail of exotic drugs, contraceptives, pesticides, small planes
and cars, hazardous waste disposal, and medical procedures—the mood
among suppliers became most sullen, hostile, defensive, and then coldly
stagnant. Soon tired of running, the fox retreated to its burrow and refused
to come out.
Research expenditures by U.S. companies working on contraceptives
peaked in 1973 and plummeted 90 percent in the next decade. Steroidal
oral contraceptives in this country underwent no significant changes after
1976, and no truly new contraceptive chemical entities have been introduced since 1968. Clinical tests of a contraceptive implant system called
Capronor, developed by the National Institutes of Health, were stalled for
more than a year for lack of liability insurance. The implanted contraceptive Norplant, which releases a hormone for five years, was developed by
the New York Population Council and as of 1986 was on the market in five
other countries. But no American firm dared to market it at home. A new
and effective IUD, the Copper-T 380A, won FDA approval, but no major
firm was willing to market it for several years. In late 1987, one tiny
company finally announced that it would sell the product, at a price vastly
above the cost of manufacture, and without any liability insurance (which
was, in any event, unavailable), presumably on the assumption that if a
wave of lawsuits struck, bankruptcy would provide a quick and clean exit
from the market. So the United States, a leader in contraceptive research
and marketing well into the early 1960s, has today lost its edge and its
hunger for progress. Research on other aspects of reproduction has suffered as well. "Who in his right mind," the president of a major pharmaceutical company asked in 1986, "would work on a product today that
would be used by pregnant women?"
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Liability
The story has been much the same in other high-tech markets favored
with attention from the liability system in recent years. Between 1965 and
1985, the number of U.S. vaccine manufacturers shrank by more than half;
by 1986 the nation depended on a single supplier for vaccines against polio,
rubella, measles, mumps, and rabies. In the 1960s there were eight U.S.
manufacturers of whooping cough vaccine; by 1986 there were only two.
And only two major companies, Merck and Lederle Labs, were still investing heavily in vaccine research. America, once the world leader in this
technology so vital to the public health, was quickly losing ground here
too.
Consulting engineers report that they systematically favor old products
over new ones in their design specifications, fearing (quite correctly) that
newer design options carry a greater risk of liability, whatever real decrease
in risk they might actually represent. Liability-conscious universities decline to license patents to small companies, despite the fertile environment
they offer for innovation, fearing that anyone suing over a patent-related
product would be sure to go for the university's deep pocket as well.
Liability concerns forced a Virginia engineer to abandon his business of
designing better hand controls for cars used by the handicapped, a business
he had set up after his own son had been crippled in a motorcycle accident.
America, land of the Wright brothers, has lost even its appetite for
innovation in small planes. Burt Rutan, the pioneering designer of the
Voyager, didn't have the resources to compete with larger manufacturers,
but he had a cheaper way of getting his products out into the marketplace.
He sold construction plans for novel airplanes to do-it-yourselfers, who
built the planes in their garages. But in 1985, fearful of the lawsuits that
would follow if a home-built plane based on his designs crashed, he
stopped selling the plans.
As the new tort soldiers marched forward, in whatever field, technologists fell back; it was that simple. The phenomenon ran so contrary to the
accepted articles of the new tort faith that many in the law-and-economics
priesthood doggedly refused to acknowledge the facts at all. Their theories
had declared, quite emphatically, that sharper liability would spur more
innovation. How could the facts dare to be otherwise? The answer was that
the accepted theories were wrong.
The theories depended, first of all, on a fine-tuned and highly predictable legal process which consistently disfavored more dangerous products
and favored safer ones. The success of the new liability engine thus depended on great precision in the courts. But the legal assembly line relied
on unskilled workers, heavily pressed for time and with many extraneous
156
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— factors—sympathy for the victim most especially—on their minds. This
introduced a great uncertainty into the system. And there are limits to the
total uncertainty—scientific plus regulatory—that any endeavor can tolerate. With innovative science and technology, that limit is reached much
sooner than with the old and familiar.
Worse still, the new tort theoreticians penned a book of new legal rules
that discouraged innovation at every turn. From the innovator's perspective, much of the damage was done at the very beginning, when the courts
replaced negligence with strict liability. The negligence standard had inquired whether the technologist—the human actor on the scene—was
careful, prudently trained, and properly supervised. Who is most likely to
pass a negligence test? The best and the brightest—the technologists working at the leading edge of their professions. It is at the frontiers of science,
after all, that the best engineers, pharmacologists, doctors, and chemists
typically congregate. Under the new legal standards, however, the people
themselves, and their good care, good training, and good faith, were quite
irrelevant. The new inquest concerned the product itself and its alleged
defects. Where once human conduct had been its focus, the tort system
now placed technology itself in the dock.
This seemingly modest change sharply tilted the system against innovation. The reason lies in quite understandable human psychology. Jurors
can make reasonably sensible intuitive judgments about people—even
about professionals—because we are all in the people-judging business
every day of our lives. But jurors are not experts about technology itself,
and intuition here is a terrible guide. When a juror is asked to categorize
technologies—as distinct from their inventors or managers—as good, bad,
or ugly, the answers follow a quite predictable pattern. Age, familiarity,
and ubiquity are the most powerful legitimizing forces known to the
layperson. The inexpert juror is predisposed at every turn to identify
technologies that are novel, exotic, unfamiliar, or adventuresome as unwelcome and fraught with danger—in short, defective.
It is a matter of human nature, an instinct as ancient as the species itself.
Mothers who stay at home underestimate the familiar risks of their own
environment—electric sockets, bottles of cleaning fluid, pediatric services,
and cars, while overestimating the less familiar hazards of chemical pollution and nuclear power. Blue-collar workers see too little threat in their
familiar cigarettes, alcohol, and construction-site environments, and too
much threat in the less familiar hazards of air travel or high-tech medicine.
People everywhere underestimate the risks they know well and face every
day and overestimate
those that are new and foreign. The familiar is safe,
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Biopsychobehavioral Correlates of Insomnia, V:
Clinical Characteristics and Behavioral Correlates
Joyce D. Kales, M.D., Anthony Kales, M.D., Edward O. Bixler, Ph.D.,
Constantin R. Soldatos, M.D., Roger J. Cadieux, M.D., Glenn J. Kashurba, M.D.,
and Antonio Vela-Bueno, M.D.

The authors compared two large samples of
insomniac patients with a group of control subjects.
Sleep difficulty usually began before the age of 40
and generally persisted for many years (average
duration, 14 years). Several characteristic behaviors
were correlated with the symptom of insomnia.
During the day and at bedtime, patients reported
difficulty relaxing and frequently described
themselves as tense, anxious, overly preoccupied,
worrted. and depressed. Reports of poor mental and
physical health were far more prevalent in the
insomniac patients than in control subjects. These
results indicate that psychiatric factors need to be a
primary focus in the multidimensional treatment of
chronic insomnia.
(Am J Psychiatry 141:1371-1376, 1984)

I

nsomnia is a prevalent symptom (1-4) of a wide
spectrum of psychiatric and medical disorders and
situational disturbances (5-11 and DSM-UI). When
longstanding and severe, this symptom profoundly
affects patients' lives and often becomes the central
focus of distress, obscuring the factors involved in the
development of the insomnia.
As a result, when seeking treatment insomniac patients frequently perceive their sleep problem as their
primary disorder. To accurately assess the problem and
to formulate effective treatment plans, psychiatrists
need to elicit specific details concerning the condition's
onset, clinical course, and characteristics. To date,
however, these factors have received little attention in
termsof clinical research.
Our primary goals in this study, therefore, were to
assess the onset, clinical characteristics, and behavioral
and psychosocial correlates of chronic insomnia. Accordingly, we evaluated two large samples of adult
patients with a primary complaint of chronic insomRecetved Dec. 29, 1983; revised March 8 and March 22, 1984;
accepted March 29, 1984. From the Department or Psychiatry and
Sleep Research and Treatment Center, Pennsylvania State University
College of'Medicine, Hershey, Pa. Address reprint requests to Dr.
Jovce Kales, Department oi Psvchiatrv, Hershev Medical Center,
Hershev, PA 1703J.
Copyright v 1984 A men can Psvchtatnc Association.

Am J Psychiatry

141:11, November

nia. In one group, data on the onset and clinical
characteristics of insomnia were gathered through
comprehensive sleep histories. In another group, responses to specific items on the MMPI related to sleep,
behavioral, health, and psychosocial factors were compared with those of control subjects.
METHOD
In our Sleep Disorders Clinic we evaluated 100
consecutive patients with a primary complaint of
chronic insomnia of at least 1 year's duration. These
same patients made up the sample of a previous study
in which multiaxial diagnoses were made according to
DSM-UI (11;. The insomniac patients were 47 men
and 5} women berween the ages of 18 and 84 years
(meanrSE age, 4 7 . 9 r l . 6 years). Seventeen percent
were less than 30 years old, 34% were between 30 and
49 years old, and 49% were 50 years old or older.
Each patient completed at home a comprehensive
questionnaire consisting of more than 350 coded items
that provided detailed demographic information, a
sleep history, physical and mental health profiles, and
a description of current and past use of medication,
alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine.
The same questionnaire was completed by a sample
of 100 control subjects, consisting of 41 men and 59
women (meanrSE age, 48.2-1.5 years; range, 24-80
years) who were screened to ensure that they were
without a sleep complaint or severe medical illness, not
using any medication, and able to comply with the
study requirements. These subjects were recruited
from volunteers in the community, medical and technical staff and students of the medical center, and their
friends and acquaintances, all of whom responded to
advertisements for good sleepers. As previously reported (11, 12), none of the patients or control subiects
was found to have sleep apnea or nocturnal myoclonus
as a clinical condition. There were no significant
differences berween insomniac patients and control
subjects in terms of socioeconomic status, educational
level, marital status, or general living arrangements.
We have reported previously on the MMPI patterns
of patients with chronic insomnia (13, 14). This study
focuses on responses to individual MMPI items relat-
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Treatment of Sleep Disorders
Joyce D. Kales, M.D. Associate Director of Sleep Research and Treatment
Center; Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Pennsylvania State University
College of Medicine, Hershey, Pennsylvania
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Sleep disorders are quite common in the general population and frequently
encountered in medical practice. In a survey of the adult population of a large
metropolitan area (Los Angeles), more than half (52.1%) reported a current or
previous sleep disorder.1 Specifically, the prevalence for various sleep disorders,
either currently or in the past, was: insomnia, 42.5%; nightmares, 11.2%; some
type of excessive daytime sleepiness, 7.1%; and sleepwalking, 2.5%.
Physicians in a nationwide survey2 reported that an average of 17% of their
patients had insomnia; psychiatrists reported the highest prevalence of insomnia,
32%. For other sleep disorders the estimated prevalence was as follows: nightmares, 4.3%; hypersomnia, 2.9%; enuresis, 2.2%; night terrors, 1.2%; somnambulism, 0.6%; and narcolepsy, 0.6%. Psychiatrists and child psychiatrists
most frequently reported patients with insomnia, nightmares, and hypersomnia,
whereas child psychiatrists and pediatricians more often encountered enuresis,
somnambulism, and night terrors.2 Thus, in psychiatric practice the evaluation
and treatment of sleep disorders constitutes an important area. 3 - 6 Most often
both evaluation and treatment of the patient with a sleep disorder can be accomplished in the office setting.7
Emotional factors are predominant in the etiology of insomnia,3.3.8-io
some types of hypersomnia6"-12 and secondary enuresis, 5J3 and in adult sleepwalking,5 , 4 night terrors,5J5 and nightmares.5J6 However, childhood sleepwalking, 5 U J 7 night terrors,5J5 nightmares.5-18 and primary enuresis5 , 9 2 ° are
most often related to maturational factors. Sleep disorders such as narAddress reprint requests to: Joyce Kales. M.O., Associate Director, Sleep Research and Treatment Center, Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine, Hershey, PA 17033.
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colepsy 6 -'-- 5 and sleep apnea 6 - 26 " 29 are caused by organic factors (either
obvious or presumed) but often have extensive psychosocial consequences,
which frequently cause secondary psychopathology.6-24 2 5 2 9
Using the sleep history, psychiatric assessment, general medical assessment
and drug history, the psychiatrist is in the best position to comprehensively
evaluate and treat sleep disorders with either primary or secondary psychopathology. 5-7 With the exception of sleep apnea patients who must be evaluated
in the sleep laboratory, evaluation and treatment are completed in the office
setting. 3 " 7
There have been problems with the diagnostic classification of sleep disorders. An unofficial classification, which appeared as an appendix in DSM-IH,
presented with many serious shortcomings including: excessive number of diagnoses (about 70); many unsubstantiated and confusing diagnostic terms with
little validity; over-reliance on expensive sleep laboratory tests; neglect of psychobehavioral dimensions of sleep disorders; and incompatibility with a multiaxial format. A number of these problems have been recognized and resolved in the
DSM-III-R. In this classification only a dozen specific sleep disorders are
grouped into: dyssomnias (insomnias, hypersomnias and sleep-wake schedule
disorders) with the predominant disturbance in the amount, quality or timing of
sleep: and parasomnias (sleepwalking, night terrors and nightmares) where
abnormal episodic events occur during sleep. Because this classification relies on
physicians' clinical skill rather than an unnecessary focus on sleep laboratory
procedures, it facilitates management of sleep disorders by the physician in the
office setting.
In this chapter we summarize data from recent studies regarding the nature
of psychopathology in insomnia,5 8 - ' ° sleepwalking,5 , 4 night terrors, 5 , 5 and
nightmares,5 , 6 as well as the psychological correlates and psychosocial consequences of narcolepsy6 24 and sleep apnea. 6 2 9 We also present recommendations
for the management of these disorders. 3 " 6

INSOMNIA
Clinical Characteristics
Insomnia is a symptom of various medical, psychiatric, pharmacologic, and
situational conditions. At times, however, particularly when insomnia is chronic
and severe, it may affect the patient's life so much that the patient considers it as
a distinct disorder in itself.3 5 Difficulty falling asleep is the most frequent
problem, either as a single complaint or in combination with difficulty staying
asleep or early final awakening.5 -30 (See following table.)

Clinical Features of Insomnia, Narcolepsy, and Sleep Apnea
Insomnia
Complaint of difficulty in falling asleep, staying asleep, or awakening too early
More common in women and the elderly
Relatively high levels of psychopathology often present
Patterns of depression, anxiety, and obsessive/compulsiveness are common
Irregular schedules and activity levels or napping may be factors, especially in elderly
patients
Medical illness or drug use should be excluded as causes
Narcolepsy
Excessive daytime sleepiness characteristic at onset
Onset often in childhood or adolescence, but diagnosis delayed
Sleep attacks of short duration
Auxiliary symptoms of cataplexy, hypnagogic hallucinations, or sleep paralysis most
often present
If cataplexy is present, diagnosis is confirmed
Often a family history of disorders of excessive sleep
Psychopathology is secondary to psychosocial consequences of the condition
Sleep Apnea
Gasping and choking and/or periodic loud snorting sounds with intervals of breath
cessation of more than 10 seconds
Often associated with excessive daytime sleepiness
Excessive thrashing movements during sleep
Morning headaches often reported
•

•

•

•

••

*

Modified from Kales et aP

Insomnia is more prevalent with increasing age, in women, in association
with psychological disturbances, and among individuals of lower educational
and socioeconomic status. , - 531 ~ 35 Insomniac patients generally tend to overestimate the various measures of their sleep difficulty.36-*38 Nevertheless, sleep
laboratory studies have shown that they do have significantly more sleep difficulty than normal sleepers, and discriminant function analysis based on sleep
measures, personality variables, or both has successfully differentiated insomniacs from normal controls. 39 * 42 Thus, the complaint of insomnia should generally be considered as valid by the clinician.
Insomnia may be transient (occurring in response to various stressful
events, medical conditions, or pharmacologic agents), or chronic (more or less
ingrained into the patient's life style.)3""5 Patients with chronic insomnia manifest typical behaviors during the day and prior to sleep. 30 During the day they
characteristically feel depressed, worried, tense, irritable, and preoccupied with
themselves.30 Not surprisingly, at bedtime they report that they have difficulty
relaxing: they describe themselves as feeling tense, anxious, worried, or
depressed, and as though thefr "minds are racing."
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excessive sleep: men and women who reported sleeping ten hours or
more had about 1.8 times the mortality rate of those who reported
7.0 to 7.9 hours of sleep. In the same study, those who often used
sleeping pills had 1.5 times the mortality rate of those who never had
used sleep medication. Overall, the data supported the common notion
that the asymptomatic or healthy person sleeps about eight hours a
night. The authors point out, however, that their data need to be interpreted conservatively because thev were not able to control for all
major illnesses.40
Although this information on optimum sleep length may be useful
in understanding the role of sleep in general health status, the clinician
needs to keep in mind that the need for sleep varies widely from person to person. An additional problem in quantitatively assessing sleep
needs arises with insomniacs, who frequently overestimate their sleep
difficulty45"51 (see also Chapter 3, Sleep Laboratory Studies of Insomnia).
Psychosocial Correlates of Insomnia
Insomnia as a Chronic Psychobehavioral Disorder
More than 30 million people in the United States are disabled by
chronic conditions, and half of them are considered to have major
disabilities.52 Among these disabling conditions are psychobehavioral
disorders (such as chronic pain syndromes and obesity), which, although functional in nature, are characterized by excessive somatic
symptomatology.53 W e believe that chronic insomnia should be included in this category. Unlike chronic medical illnesses that have
distinct organic pathology, such as arthritis, diabetes, and emphysema,
chronic psychobehavioral disorders usually lack any demonstrable
pathology, or, if pathology is present, the symptoms are grossly disproportionate to it.
The treatment of chronic psychobehavioral disorders such as insomnia is a major challenge to modern medicine. These conditions are
usually refractory to conventional medical treatment and have a major
economic impact. Conservatively estimated, the cost of chronic disabling conditions in the United States, in general, is well over $100
billion annually.52 The cost of one psychobehavioral disorder alone,
chronic pain, was estimated to be between $35 and $50 billion in
1976.54 Similarly, one of the most costly consequences of chronic insomnia may be its economic impact on the public.
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difficulty falling asleep,3*7'8 as well as reporting lighter sleep with more
frequent awakenings.7'11 An increased prevalence of insomnia has also
been associated with psychologic disturbances3'5'7'12*13,14 and lower socioeconomic status.3'6*7'10*15 These two factors that increase the likelihood of insomniac complaints appear to be related, because mental
health disorders are more prevalent among persons of lower socioeconomic status18'17 and social class has been found to be inversely related
to degree of life stress, as measured by life-change events.18 Furthermore, the noise, crowding, and other conditions associated with disadvantaged social environments may also contribute to sleep disturbance.19
Two nationwide health surveys in the United States have shown
that insomnia is experienced by a considerable proportion of the general population; one revealed a prevalence of 21 percent,4 and the other,
32 percent.9 Regional surveys have produced similar percentages. In
the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the estimated prevalence of insomnia was 32 percent,3 while a survey in Alachua County, Florida,
showed a prevalence of 35 percent.6 The slight variations in prevalence among these four large surveys were probably caused by differences in the questions asked. Specifically, the three surveys in closest
agreement (32%, 32%, and 35%) asked about "difficulty sleeping at
least sometimes,"3'6'9 whereas the study reporting the lowest figure for
sleep difficulty (21%) asked specifically about insomnia.4
In one of the U.S. nationwide surveys, insomnia was reported more
frequently by older subjects and was more common among women
(26%) than men (13%). 4 In the other U.S. health survey, which included more than 6,000 adults, difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep
was a problem "at least sometimes" for 40 percent of the women and
for 30 percent of the men. Sleep difficulties were more common among
older subjects, especially women.9
In the Los Angeles metropolitan area survey, insomnia was more
common among older individuals, particularly women, and among persons of lower educational and socioeconomic status.3 It was also correlated with more frequent mental health difficulties and physical problems. The prevalence of current complaints of difficulty sleeping was
32 percent, while the prevalence of such complaints at any time during
the respondents' lives was 42 percent.
Consistent with the other surveys, the Alachua County study showed
that trouble sleeping was more prevalent among older people.6 Also,
hypnotic drugs were used more often by older subjects, particularly
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Table 2.1. Prevalence of Insomnia
Area Represented
in Survey

Sample
Size

Prevalence of
Difficulty
Sleeping

Factors
Affecting
Prevalence*

United States4
United States9
Alachua County, Florida6
Los Angeles, California3

1,064,004
6,672
1,645
1,006

21%
32%
35%
32%

A,S
A,S
A, S, SES
A, S, SES

Insomnia: S
12%. This
orders kno
mares, nigh
populated ;
with non-p
the psychis
somnia wei
bance but i

* A = Age; S = Sex; SES = Socioeconomic Status
The Need f
by women and by divorced, widowed, or separated individuals. Among
the 35 percent of respondents who had difficulty sleeping, the following
categories of frequency were reponed: 22 percent had difficulty sleeping "sometimes" and 13 percent, "often" or "all of the time."
Table 2.1 summarizes data on the prevalence of insomnia from the
two nationwide surveys and two regional surveys conducted in the
United States.
Two other surveys of note were conducted in the United Kingdom.7-8 An assessment of over 2,000 adults in the cities of Dundee and
Glasgow, Scotland, showed that sleep difficulty increased with age.7
Reports of nervousness were also related to sleep difficulty; those who
described themselves as being nervous reported more difficulty getting
to sleep and staying asleep. This study also indicated that sleep difficulty was more prevalent among the less advantaged social classes. Finally, it showed that when compared with men, women reponed that
their sleep difficulty began at an earlier age and presented with more
complaints of sleep disturbance, a higher incidence of nervousness, and
more frequent use of hypnotic drugs. In a study conducted in Merseyside, England, the frequency of both nocturnal sleep disturbance and
daytime naps increased with age.8
Because of its high prevalence in the general population, insomnia is
understandably the sleep disturbance encountered most frequently by
physicians. A nationwide survey of physicians indicated that 19 percent
of all adult medical patients (aged 18 and older) complain of insomnia.2
When medical specialties in this survey were compared, psychiatric
patients had the highest percentage (35%) of complaints of insomnia.
The frequency of complaints of insomnia for adult patients in other
specialties was as follows: surgery, 22%; internal medicine, 18%; family-general practice, 16%; neurology, 16%; and obstetrics-gvnecology,
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Food and Drug Administration's Adverse
Drug Reaction Monitoring Program
Beulah La* and Wayne M. Turner

The advene drug reaction monitoring program of the Division of Drug Experience within the PDAw described.
Historical informatioD on the development and activities of
the current drug reaction monitoring program, and goals and
objectives of the current program are discussed. Also presented
are a brief description of the Voluntary Reporting System, intensive drug monitoring studies and special epidemiologic stud*
ies, and a workable definition of alert reports and examples of
theirprevious role within the PDA.
Pharmacists should participate actively in adverse drug reaction monitoring.
Key words: Drugs, adverse reactions; Pood and Drug Administration (US.); Methodology

In 1952, reports of an association between chloramphenicol and aplastic anemia were appearing in the literature.
Among the first reports written were two by well-known
American hernatologiste, Wintrobe1 and Sturgeon.2 Further
inquiries within the medical community provided additional
confirmation of this new, rare and serious suspected drug
effect This event led to the awareness of alack in effective
monitoring for advene drug reactions once a drug has been
approved and marketed Thus, the Committee on Blood
Dyacraaias was established in 1954 under the guidance of the
AMA for the development of a Registry on Blood Dyscrasias.
In 1961, an increasing awareness of drug reactions resulted
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in the expansion of tins committee into the Committee on
Adverse Reactions, and the Registry began to monitor all
adverse drug reactions (ADRs). During that same year, the
FDA also created an adverse drug effects reporting system.
It was agreed that FDA would focus on coHecting data from
universities, government and teaching hospitals, while the
AMA Registry would concentrate on data from individual
physicians and smaller hospitals. There was to be a free exchange of information.3 As a result of under-reporting, lack
of information provided, inability to determine incidence
rates and the parallel efforts of the FDA, the AMA's Registry
of Adverse Reactions was discontinued in 1970. ^
In 1970, as a result of a reorganization of the Bureau of
Drugs, the adverse drug reaction monitoring functions were
delegated to the Division of Drug Experience (DDE). DDE
was established to:
1. Collect and evaluate information on drug usage, adverse
reactions and other drug experience data,
2. Disseminate drug information throughout the Bureau and
other organizations,
3. Evaluate the sodoeconomk implications of drug use information,
4. Participate in the World Health Organization (WHO) drug
monitoring program,
5. Promote drug epidemiologic and drug nwnitoring waearch,
a n d ' • • . . - , • •

6. Conduct studies obtaining drug-use trends.
FDA's complex objectives for monitoring ADRa were
better recognized in the ensuing years. There were vital
needs for. (1) monitoring acute adverse effects of newly
marketed drugs, (2) generating and csqrturing well-documented spontaneous reports, (3) detecting rare and longterm drug effects, (4) surveying drug morbidity and mar*
tality, (5) developing a national adverse drug reaction information center, and (6) disseminating evaluated drug use
and drug reaction data.
. Currently, DDE usesfivesources to meet the majority of
its needs for monitoring adverse drug effects. These are:
I. A VcJuntajy Reporting System, consistiDg of ipontane
reports, manufacturers* (mandatory) reports and special
registry reports*
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2. Intensive drug monitoring studies,
3. Special epidemiologic studies,
4. CommunicstioM with WHO and national drug monitoring
centers, and
5. Published literature.
To expand upon these sources, an experiment in postmarketing surveillance is underway, cosponsared by the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS), FDA and the Joint
Commission on Prescription Drug Use (JCPDU). This effort
m directed at "identifying and analyzmg the legal policy, and
technical implications and consequences of postmarketing
surveillance of new drugs, and designing and testing one or
more systems to identify or further characterize relatively
common, serious adverse effects which can be seen within
tiro years folkwiiig marketing.^
into two phases. At the end of Phase I, several proposed
designs including their implementation and methodology
for evaluating effects and costs of postmarketing surveillance
systems, would be available to FDA, NBS and JCPDU.
Phase II will test and evaluate one or more of the systems
developed under Phase I. Projected completion date of this
study is late 1980.
SurvelSance Sources

Voluntary Reporting System (also known as Spontaneous Reporting System). (J) Spontaneous Reports. FDA's
spontaneous reports are dependent upon participation by
health professionals in private practice or hospital settings.
Reports of adverse drug reactions are mailed directly to
DDE. Two drug experience report forms have already been
sent to community practitioners. The original long form
(FD-1639) is preferred because it contains approximately
25 data elements, and, if properly completed, should provide
case reports that may be evaluated thoroughly. This form
has been used successfully in hospitals. However, because
of its length, it is rarely used by private practitioners. Thus,
a short form (FD-1639a) was developed which had the
benefit of brevity (13 versus 25 data elements) and the
convenience of a ©elf-addressed, prestamped format. This
form is periodically attached to the FDA Drug Bulletin
which is sent to over one million health care professionals.
Widespread distribution of this latter form to community
practitioners has resulted in increased participation in the
program.6
(2) Manufacturer (Mandatory) Reports. In lata 1962,
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was revised under "the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments to require manufacturers
with an approved New Drug Application (NDA) to report
adverse drug reactions to FDA. These reports, collected
voluntarily from health professionals, are submitted to FDA
on a regular basis.
(3) Special Registry Reports. Special registries collect
and evaluate the occurrence and recurrence of adverse drug
reactions and their most frequent patterns or sequences.
They are responsible for consolidating prior and current data
on adverse effects.
An example of a specialty registry is the Armed Forces
Institute of Pathology's Registry of Tissue Reactions to
•30

Drugs which correlates morphologic biopsy and necropsy
data with the historical, clinical, medicinal and laboratory
data of the patient7 Clinicopathologic studies of cases which
have in common a particular organ or category of reactions
to a particular type of drug are published periodically (e.g.,
liver reactions to oral contraceptives). These studies may
lead to an investigation of the tumorigeoic and teratogenic
effects of drugs as well as the mechanisms of drug-induced
reactions in tissues and cells. Individual cases are submitted
voluntarily by the medical community.
The idea of monitoring drug experiences through registries
is relatively new to FDA. Existing and past registries have
been developed and implemented by professionals with interest in collecting specific types of data^ FDA has financially
supported some of these efforts, (e*., contrast agents, ocular
aide effects). In the interest of monitoring dnjg safety and
efficacy, a future goal of the FDA is to stimulate and support
new registries of adverse drug experiences.
The major benefits of the Voluntary Reporting System
include the infinite size of the reporting sources, the availability for active involvement by health professionals and
the relatively inexpensive cost of materials. In addition, its
ability to support known reactions and to uncover rare, serious or fatal reactions allows for the generation of hypotheses for further studies. Major criticisms of the system include gross under-reporting, difficulty in obtaining foDow-up
information and the inability to derive incidence rates (lack
of denominator data).
Intensive Drug Monitoring Studies. Intensive drug
monitoring studies (e.g., Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Program) provide systematic and detailed collection of data from well-defined groups of inpatients. The
aurveillance is done by ipeeifllly trammi h»*Hh pmte*smnqlq
(eg., nurse monitors, clinical pharmacists) who devote their
full-time efforts toward recording all drugs administered and
all events which might conceivably be drug-induced.8 Subsequently, statistical screening for drug-event associations
may lead to special studies.
The major benefits of these studies include the ability to:
(1) derive incidence rates, (2) analyze factors which may
contribute to reactions, (3) identify drug interactions and
study' them, (4) detect previously unrecognized reactions,
and (5) generate and test hypotheses. Criticisms have included: (1) the great expense of resources, (2) the relatively
small population size resulting in nontdentification of rare
reactions, (3) the relatively short period of observation resulting in nomdentificatian of delayed reaction*, and <4) the
lack of follow-up and outcome information. Ongoing studies
include the acute medical, surgical and pediatric care settings which limit the drug monitoring only to those drugs
which are characteristic of medical, surgical and pediatric
inpatient use.
Special Epidemiologic Studies. Special epidemiologic
studies (e.g., Drug Epidemiology Unit, Boston University
Medical Center9) detect associations between major disease
outcomes and drugs used in long-term therapyforoutpatients. Case-control and cohort approaches are currently
used.
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Cohort studies assess the relationship of one or more
variables (e.g., drugs) toward increasing the risk of disease
development These variables are measured initially in a
group of healthy persons and then are reviewed over a period
of time to determine if a particular disease has developed.
Some of the major advantages of this type of study are the
ability to:

1. New and unexpected reactions not listed in the labeling,
% Serious, life-threatening or fatal reactions,
3. Unusual increases in numbers or severity of reactions
(clusters),
4. Potential association with congenital anomalies, or
5. Indents c^therapeutfcaihire which suggest problem* with
drug bioavailability.

Within DDE, all incoming voluntary reports are immediately screened for alert reactions. These reports are then
1. Repeat initial measurements of variables,
presented to an Alert Committee meeting whichk composed
2. Demonstrate time relationships between ths presence of of physicians and pharmacists. The tasks of this committee
variables and the subsequent disease,
are to determine whether or not (1) a probability of a causal
3. Determine incidence,
relationship
may be surmisedfromthe suspected reaction(s)
4. Use the depth and variety of information for leyeral measures of safety (as well a* efficacy),
to the suspected drug(s), (2) the particular "alert" should
& Study the effecUtf known familial and demographic vari- be forwarded to FDA's New Drug Evaluation (NDE) Diviables,
sion which has theresponsibilityof reviewing and evaluating
6. Make follow-up information complete and comprehensive,
drug safety and efficacy, and (3) follow-up information
7. Generate hypotheses and test them, and
.should be requested and, if so, what additional information
& Test hypotheses derived elsewhere.
is needed for optimal evaluation. Therefore, before FDA
issues new proposed labeling changes or drug alerts to the
Information bias*, loss of follow-up because of attrition,
high cost and long-term commitment of funds and personnel, public, consultations have occurred between NDE, expert
and lack of randomization (versus controlled clinical trials) outside advisors and DDE.
are some criticisms of cohort studies.
Until recently, because of the difficulties in establishing
Case-control studies measure the relationship of existing direct cause and effect relationships between the drug(s)and
disease states to drugs and other variables. For every group reaction(s), the Voluntary Reporting System had contribof patients with a particular disease state, a suitable disuted only indirectly to regulatory action by FDA. It had,
ease-free control group is used for comparison. These studies however, played a role in helping FDA substantiate and
aim at determining factors (e.g., drugs) responsible for dis- document actual instances of previously unusual and rare
ease development Some of the advantages of case-control
adverse reactions that appeared in the literature. Some exstudies include the ability to:
amples of these are clindamycin and severe lower bowel effects,11 diethylstilbestrol and vaginal adenocarcinoma in the
1. Derive relativerisksattributable to various factors, inoffspring,12 sustained-release potassium chloride tablets and
cluding drugs,
severe gastrointestinal ulceration,13 and ibuprofen and oc2. Detect delayed and rare drug reactions,
ular effects.
3. Identify previously unrecognized reactions,
A significant advance did occur late in 1976 through
4. Confirm recognised reactions,
5. Focus on known sources of cases (e.*\. specialty and death spontaneous reports which involved direct initiation of
registries, hospitalized serious cases, even existing cohort regulatory action. Several reports associating gamma benstudies),
zene hexachloride with central nervous system (CNS) tox6. Generate hypotheses and test them,
icity were received.14*1* Although prior to this time it was
7. Test hypotheses produced hy other studies, and
& Succeed with minimum resources.
known that variable percutaneous absorption could occur
Criticisms of this type of study concern the difficulties in
from its topical application in humans, the resulting CNS
selecting appropriate control groups and in collecting com- toxicity was not well established. These reports provided the
parable information on cases and controls.
necessary clinical support which contributed to hew warnOther Sources, To supplement all the previously discussed ings in the official labeling.16
sources, medical and pharmacy journals are screened each
History also shows that FDA made some premature alert
month by DDE personnel to detect new, rare and serious
decisions to the pubOc from insufTictentevideixe. These may
adverse drug reactions published in letters-to-tbe-editor or
have led to injurious delays in drug testing and drug usage.
ini journal articles.10
Two examples are: (1) dimethylsuttbxide (DMSO) and tons
Another means of obtaining additional information is
clouding, which was later concluded to occur only in anithrough exchanges with other countries. DDE has been
mals,17 and (2) the original multifilament Dalkon shield and
designated by WHO as the National Drug Monitoring
septic abortions or maternal deaths, which was later conCenter for the United States. Information is usually acquired cluded by FDA to differ insignificantly from other
from WHO or other national centers through news bulletins, IUDs.1*1®
personal communications or international meetings.
As can be seen, there is a problem of identifying and
evaluating previously unknown drug reactions. At times,
FDA is suffering from drug information gaps and the diffiAlert Reports
cult choice of quantifying the benefits as well as the risks of
Alert drug reactions are defined by DDE to include:
certain drugs. However, health professionals and the public
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must understand that the success and failure of ADR alerts
is dependent upon astute suspicions that an unnecessary risk
is being taken by the patient Often, these observations or
information gaps can be provided by any member of the
health care team.

Figure I. Suggested procedure for the pharmacist to use when reporting
a drug reaction
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Summary and Conctusfon
FDA uses five surveillance sources to monitor adverse
drug reactions. The primary focus of the program is coilecting new, rare and unpublished suspected drug effects.
A major surveillance source depends upon information and
materials received voluntarily from health professionals.
p\tprm»riatm »r» in * nniqiia paritifln to use their proximity
and frequent communications with medical personnel to
obtain ADR information. Tbey have access to suspected alert
reactions from their oral exchanges with staff physicians,
nurses, students and fellow pharmacists. FDA's experience
has been that adverse drug reaction reporting is unrewarding
and time-conwiming for the physician. This provides a great
opportunity for pharmacists to participate in a professional
service which contributes toward drug safety.
A successful methodology used in private practice and in
hospital settings for participating in the Voluntary Reporting System involves the collection of data by a single
pharmacist This person should be motivated to accept the
responsibilities of collecting the information needed in the
suspected drug-reaction association, discussing the information with an appointed committee or other fellow consultants, sending the information to DDE and following
through on additional information if requested (Figure 1).
It is well recognized that greater pharmacist involvement
in health care is needed. The identification of new, rare or
unusual adverse drug reactions enables the FDA to reassess
whether or not the benefits of a drug outweigh the risks.
Cooperation by all pharmacists and other health professionals is vital for the success of a voluntary program.
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PREVENTION BY CHOLINE OF THE DEPLETION OF
MEMBRANE PHOSPHATIDYLCHOLINE BY A
CHOLINESTERASE INHIBITOR
To the Editor: Choline serves, within cholinergic neurons, as a
precursor to both acetylcholine and such membrane phospholipids
as phosphatidylcholine.1 The availability of extracellular choline,
provided by the circulation or formed intrasynaptically through
acetylcholinesterase-mediated hydrolysis of acetylcholine, can influence the synthesis1 and release2 of acetylcholine, the synthesis of
phosphatidylcholine,3 and levels of phosphatidylcholine in membranes.4 Moreover, the choline in membrane phosphatidylcholine
can be mobilized to serve as a precursor to acetylcholine,5 when
extracellular choline is inadequate.3
We previously proposed6 that patients with Alzheimer's disease
be given supplemental choline when treated with drugs, such as
acetylcholinesterase inhibitors, that diminish the availability of extracellular choline to cholinergic neurons. In such circumstances,
the supplemental choline may both enhance the release of acetylcholine2 and protect the neuron from the depletion of its membrane
phospholipids. We now show that, without such supplemental choline, acetylcholinesterase inhibitors can in fact cause the depletion
of phospholipids.
Sections of striatum from rats, superfused in Krebs-bicarbonate
medium, were stimulated electrically for one to eight periods of
20 minutes each that were separated by similar intervals; the mediums were assayed for acetylcholine, and the tissues for membrane
phosphatides. When the acetylcholinesterase inhibitor physostigmine was present in the medium, membrane levels of phosphatidylcholine declined to 76±4 percent of initial values (n « 14).
(The levels of the other principal phosphatides also declined stoichiometrically, suggesting that the choline deficiency diminished
the amount of membrane in the cell, rather than altered its composition.) Sections stimulated without physostigmine showed no
decline in membrane phospholipids (97±4 percent of initial values; n - 7). Moreover, the addition of choline (0.01 to 0.04 mM)
to the physostigmine-containing medium caused a dose-dependent
enhancement of acetylcholine release and fully protected the
sections from phospholipid depletion (103 ±2 percent of initial
values; n = 17).
A multicenter study is about to begin that attempts to confirm
earlier studies7 demonstrating a therapeutic effect of tetrahydroaminoacridine, another acetylcholinesterase inhibitor, in patients
with Alzheimer's disease. Although the patients in that earlier trial
also received supplemental choline (as lecithin7), the announced
protocol for the replication study provides only tetrahydroaminoacridine. Our data suggest that failing to give a source of choline to
patients receiving acetylcholinesterase inhibitors may decrease
phospholipid levels in their cholinergic neurons. Although our data
have been derived from in vitro studies, it should be noted that other
reports have described elevations in the levels of phospholipid
breakdown products within the brains of untreated patients with
Alzheimer's disease; such subjects may be especially vulnerable
to the depletion of phospholipids caused by acetylcholinesterase
inhibition.8*9
ISMAIL H. ULUS,
RICHARD J. WUHTMAN,

Cambridge, MA 02139

M.D.
M.D.
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LIABILITY FOR VACCINE-RELATED INJURIES
To the Editor: Japanese encephalitis is a mosquito-borne viral infection that occurs in epidemic and endemic forms in much of Asia.1
Although infection can be asymptomatic, clinical cases are usually
severe and often fatal.
Several vaccines are produced commercially for immunization
against this disease. The vaccine produced by BIKEN Corporation
in Japan is safe and effective and was approved as an investigational
new drug by the Food and Drug Administration.1 The Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) distributed this vaccine to physicians who
registered as collaborative investigators. These physicians could
then give the vaccine to travelers who would be at risk, using
an informed-consent protocol and reporting any adverse effects
to the CDC.
On June 30,1987, the CDC informed the collaborating investigators that the vaccine could no longer be obtained from BIKEN
because the company did not have appropriate liability insurance,
and there was no statutory mechanism for absolving them of liability. Because of the limited demand, it is unlikely that any American
company would undertake the manufacture or distribution of this
vaccine.
An increasing number of American companies are seeking business and development opportunities in the Far East. There is also a
steady stream of tourists going to areas in which the disease is
endemic in India, China, Korea, Nepal, Burma, and Thailand. This
number will increase dramatically in 1988, when the Summer
Olympics are held in Seoul, South Korea. It is regrettable that these
travelers will have to be at risk for a potentially fatal but preventable
disease because of a liability issue.
It is apparent that the American public, and not just physicians,
are paying a price for the medical malpractice-liability crisis. The
Japanese encephalitis vaccine issue is one small but important part
of this problem. One way to resolve this particular problem would
be to include all vaccines in the no-fault compensation program for
childhood vaccinations recently signed into law (and discussed by
Iglchart in the May 14 issue2). It would also be helpful if such
programs were funded; that they were not was a distinct deficiency
of the pedi a trie-oriented legislation at the time of its passage. Good
intentions are not enough.
LEONARD C. MARCUS, V . M . D ,

Newton, MA 02160

M.D.

Travelers* Health and
Immunization Services

1. Japanese encephalitis: report of a World Health Organizatioo Working
Group. MMWR 1987; 33:119-20, 125.
2. Igtehart JK. Compensating children with vaccine-related injuries. N Engl J
Med 1987; 316:1283-8.

The above letter was referred to Mr. Iglchair, who offers the
following reply:
To the Editor: Dr. Marcus* letter raises several points about the
Vaccine Injury Compensation Act that deserve reaction. It also
contains a bit of misinformation that may needlessly alarm some
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readers. Dealing with the latter point first, I am informed by the
CDC that people who travel to Seoul for the Summer Olympics are
considered by the agency to be at negligible risk of contracting
Japanese encephalitis. Only if they intend to travel to rural areas of
Korea (or of other countries in which the disease is endemic as well)
should they possibly be considered candidates for Japanese encephalitis vaccine, according to the CDC.
There appear to be two major reasons why Japanese encephalitis
vaccine is not covered by the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The first is that it is not a licensed product. The second is that
the program was intended to provide compensation for those injured by vaccines required for school entry. One can only speculate
about whether the inclusion of Japanese encephalitis vaccine under
the program would provide sufficient relief from liability to persuade the manufacturer to seek licensure. One major vaccine manufacturer (Lederle Laboratories) has testified that the program as
established under the new law will not reduce its liability.
To date, no funding mechanism has been established for the compensation program, so it has not yet become operational. The
House-passed Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 contains
provisions that would establish an excise tax to fund future claims
and authorize appropriations from general revenues to fund preexisting claims. The excise tax would be $4.56 per dose for diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine; $4.44 per dose for measles,
mumps, and rubella vaccine; $0.29 per dose for poliomyelitis vaccine (both oral and injectable); and $0.06 per dose for diphtheria
and tetanus vaccines. Appropriations to cover preexisting claims
would be authorized at a level of $80 million per year for four years.
The excise tax would take effect January 1, 1988, but claims could
not be filed until October 1, 1988. Other proposed amendments
would extend protection to the person who administered a vaccine
(a step strongly advocated by physicians' groups), clarify the definition of a compensable condition to include only conditions having a
serious impact six months after immunization, and modify benefits
for preexisting conditions. The system would have a five-year life,
but would be automatically terminated if more than 150 new claims
were awarded in any 12-month period. The program strikes balances all along the way, but without such compromises it would
never have been created in the first place.
JOHN K. IOLEHART

Potomac, MD 20854

Jan. 21, 1988

THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE

12008 River Rd.

ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FOR DISABLED CHILDREN
To the Editor: As chairman of the Committee on Children with
Disabilities of the American Academy of Pediatrics, I am writing
concerning the Sounding Board article by Butler et al. in the July 16
issue.1 The analysis deserves considerable praise for effectively describing the difficulties of ensuring access to health care for children
with disabilities. However, three issues need further discussion.
First, the authors indicate that there may be discontinuity of
coverage as a result of a change in a parent's employment. Our
recent Health Care Financing Study of Chronic Illness at Albert
Einstein College of Medicine3 has demonstrated that about 15 percent of families with children who have severe chronic disabilities
were denied insurance for either their families or the disabled children. This was often done because of the presence of a "preexisting
condition.** In addition, some self-insured employers have reportedly denied employment to parents of disabled children because of
apparent concern about raising the employer's insurance costs.
Health maintenance organizations have also allegedly denied membership to families with disabled children.
Second, as the authors mention, state variations in coverage make
it difficult to use Medicaid as a national program to ensure comprehensive health care services for disabled children. Unfortunately,
the income-eligibility standards for Medicaid vary from state to
state, as does each state's willingness to provide optional services,
including many therapies that physically handicapped children require. It would be unwise to force families to become medically
indigent in order to qualify for Medicaid, only to receive limited

services beyond basic health care. Given states' sensitivity about
their rights and prerogatives, Medicaid as it is currently structured
would appear to be an unlikely source of comprehensive health care
for chronically ill and disabled children.
Third, problems of access to health care for people with disabilities do not end in childhood. A frequently heard criticism is that
families can obtain pediatric care for their children with disabilities,
but that it is enormously difficult to find physicians with the requisite skills or interest who are willing to care for adults with developv
mental disabilities.
The view of our American Academy of Pediatrics committee is
that comprehensive health care, home care, and catastrophic-illness
care for the population with disabilities are inexorably linked, and
that Medicaid and private insurance will need to be supplemented
by catastrophic-illness insurance if we are to ensure the provision of
community-based care for the disabled. In addition, efforts to increase access to care must be coupled with the training of professionals to increase their skills in dealing with the disabled and to
correct or mitigate the pejorative attitudes that unfortunately remain pervasive among health care professionals.
HERBERT J. COHEN, M.D.

Bronx, NY 10461

Albert Einstein College of Medicine

1. Butler JA, Rosenbaura S, Palfrey JS. Ensuring access to health care for
children with disabilities. N Engl J Med 1987; 317:162-5.

2. American Academy of Pediatrics. Health carefinancingfor the child with
catastrophic costs, June 1987.

The above letter was referred to the authors of the article in
question, who offer the following reply:
To the Editor: My coauthors and I are grateful for Dr. Cohen's
amplification of our remarks. We certainly concur that preexistingcondition clauses, state variations in Medicaid benefits, problems
associated with health care access for older adolescents, and problems of physician training and attitude all can constitute serious
obstacles to adequate health care access for disabled children and
youth.
Our only concern with the letter is that some may read it as a
generalized condemnation of Medicaid, which, although far from
perfect, remains the largest single source of insurance for lowincome children with disabilities. Optional benefits under the program do vary, but now are often fairly generous. In 1985, for example, 36 states covered services by persons other than physicians, 18
covered private-duty nursing, 36 covered physical therapy, 29 covered occupational therapy, 34 covered therapy for speech, hearing,
and language disorders, 48 covered prescription drugs, 45 covered
prosthetic devices, 35 covered rehabilitative services, 50 covered
intermediate care facilities, 33 covered psychiatric services, and 26
covered personal care services.1 In addition, all states can now pay
for case management. In our own research on children with disabilities in five states, we discovered that publicly insured children had
much broader coverage than privately insured children, reflected in
the fact that Medicaid-eligible parents paid out of pocket for only
5 percent of all health care visits, whereas privately insured parents
paid out of pocket for 23 percent of all visits.2
Also, Medicaid is improving its standards of care. Twenty-six
states have adopted the federal reforms contained in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, allowing states to cover pregnant women and infants whose family income exceeds the payment
level established by Aid to Families with Dependent Children but is
below the federal poverty level. Congress is currently debating two
pieces of legislation: one, proposed by Senator Durenberger, would
extend Medicaid benefits to any disabled child whose family income
is less than 185 percent of the poverty level; the other, proposed by
Senator Bradley and Congressman Waxman, would extend Medicaid eligibility to all pregnant women and infants in that income
bracket These efforts, even if imperfect, are likely to advance far
sooner and provide far more benefit to low-income children with
disabilities than any contemplated reform of the private insurance
industry. To the extent that Congress succeeds in restructuring
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incidental factors are gaining importance as FDA's information quality
concerns increase.
§13.11 New Drug Applications: The Process
The drug approval process is the archetype of necessary regulation. Drugs cannot be judged safe or unsafe by the average person who
picks up a tablet or bottle; and each drug compound is intended to act
in the body with some physiological effect. So there is little dispute
about the need to have a governmental drug clearance and regulation
process. However, once past that point of consensus the regulatory
process by which drugs are cleared becomes controversial for its cost,
time, expense, and laxity or rigidity, depending on one's political
outlook.1
Federal drug approval processes seek a body of safety evidence
sufficient to predict whether or not the drug will be harmful. Founded
on the tragic experience with untested elixir sulfanilamide,2 the process helps to identify hazards and to screen out risks which are not
justified by therapeutic benefits.3 Because all drugs have some risks,
efficacy studies must show that the drug's contribution to patient care
will be sufficient to overcome its hazards.4
study methods which should be used by drug sponsors. 47 Fed Reg 46627 (Oct 19,
1982). Speech by Acting Commissioner Novitch to Conference on Generic Drugs (July
15, 1980). See also FDA Appropriations: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Agriculture and Related
Agencies, Senate Appropriations Comm, 97th Cong 1st Sess (1981) (testimony of Commissioner Hayes)
1 See e.g., R Merrill 8c P Hutt, Food and Drug Law Cases and Materials 409-33 (1979);
P Termin, Taking Your Medicine (1979); Comment, The Focd and Drug Administration:
Law, Science and Politics in the Evaluation and Control of New Drug Technology 67 Nw U L Rev
858 (1973). "[T]here can be iitde doubt that it is more difficult and cosdy to obtain
approval of a new drug in this country than in the other . . . . " Merrill, Can FAD Do
Anything Right! 2 Va Law School Report 19, 20 (1978)
2

This drug's fatal ingredient, a diethylene glycol solvent, spurred Congress to adopt the
1938 Act's "new drug" testing for safety. See §3.04, Ch 13

3 Many of the safety-related issues come up in animal testing or during Phase I human
testing under an IND, at which point the further development of the drug is dropped.
The 1962 amendments were spurred by a teratogenic drug, thalidomide, which was
distributed in a poorly controlled investigation. See §3.07, Ch 13
4

21 USC §505 is a balance of risks and benefits, not an absolute barrier to hazardous
drugs. For example, an anticancer agent with liver damage as a side effect may be an
acceptable risk for cancer patients. The approved process identifies dosages at which
adverse effects occur and quantifies the benefit and hazard probabilities so that a factual
judgment can be made on approvability
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There have been at least three historical phases to FDA's approval since the 1962 Drug Amendments created FDA's modern drug
control powers.5 In each, communication channels between developer
and reviewer have been the index of success for drug approvals. Between 1963 and 1976, the process of approval was a scientific debate,
the terms of which were developed through extensive paper submissions. This process did not attract much controversy or attention outside of the pharmaceutical community, compared to its later period.
FDA paperwork gradually became longer and more detailed until
truckloads of papers constituted a formal new drug application filing.6
The predominant issue in debate was whether the existence of a premarket proof of efficacy had created a delay in relative availability of
necessary therapeutic drugs in the United States as compared to other
countries without that requirement. The "drug lag" debate attracted
more economists and congressmen than virtually any other subject in
the field of FDA regulation.7
A lawyer-designed procedural reform effort, which was highly
skeptical of FDA drug reviewer dialogue with industry scientists, arrived in the late 1970's.8 This theory held that "pressure" to approve
could be avoided by isolating the reviewers. This proceduralist scheme
of drug approval interactions emphasized controls, inspections, and
oversight. Contact with reviewers by outside researchers who developed drugs was forbidden except under formalized methods of discourse.9 While it facially served to cut off improper contacts, it
produced an adversary atmosphere in which drug developers and reviewers could barely talk beyond "name, rank and serial number," in
5 See $13.02 for the development of 21 USC §505 in the 1962 amendments
6 Actual case reports on each patient constitute the bulk of the NDA. As soon as the
approval letter is issued the actual NDA file is retired to a Federal Records Center, so
as to leave more room for storage at FDA. "The average application today contains
100,000 pages,fillinghundreds of volumes. Applications arrive at FDA, literally, in truck
loads." Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June
23, 1982)
iSee e.g., R Merrill & P Hutt, supra note 1, at 430-33; S Peltzman, Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation (1974); P Temin, Taking Your Medicine (1979); W Wardell 8c L
Lasagna, Regulation and Drug Development (1975). And see also GAO Report, "FDA
Drug Approval-A Lengthy Process That Delays the Availability of Important New
Drugs/' HRD-80-64 (May 28, 1980)
8 HEW Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Final Report (May 1977)
9 "Public" participation would occur by additional committee reviews and public disclosures but the questions which inevitably arise in reviews would not be answerable in a
dialogue
December, 1983

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13-58

CHAPTER 13 DRUG REGULATION: APPROVAL

the words of a top FDA official.10 In hindsight, it is ironic that the two
principal incidents of alleged improper, or illegal, reviewer conduct
occurred during this phase of tighter controls on all drug developer
contacts with the FDA.11 Such incidents were rare, but did not mark
the earlier or later periods of freer contacts. Legislation to codify the
proceduralist reforms was offered and passed the Senate, but failed to
draw a consensus for support during its time in the Congress.12
The 1981-84 period of reform in the drug approval process emphasizes communications at all levels as the centerpiece of an effort to
expedite the drug approval process. Casting aside some of the
proceduralist reforms which had failed to win congressional endorsement, this latest phase brings a confident FDA into more open dialogue with its constituency of drug consumers and manufactures.13
The procedures for drug approval today fall into essentially four
stages. The drug manufacturer discovers a compound or conducts
experiments with a known compound, which is tested in appropriate
laboratory screening tests and then is examined in animals as a possible pharmacological entity. Private research funding predominates;
public funding aids less marketable products and some drugs for exotic therapies,14 but for the most part FDA drug reviewers deal with
private firms sponsoring the new drug.
FDA's approval process beings with an investigational new drug
(IND) application, filed 30 days before first human experimentation
with the drug, so as to permit FDA an opportunity to examine the
proposed testing.15 The IND process is undergoing modifications

10 H Meyer, Director, National Center for Drugs & Biologies, Address to Washington
Forum (June 10, 1982)
H The indictment of a drug reviewer for receiving gratuities from a drug developer of
DMSO and the firing by FDA of a physician and a statistician for accepting gratuities
from a marketer of contact lens sterilizing solution occurred as a result of activities in
1977-80. As one result, the individual former reviewers are being sued and the government refused to pay counsel fees, see "FDA Reviewer Liability in IND/NDA Decision,"
44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) TG-6 (July 19, 1982)
12 See S Rep No 96-321, regarding S 1705, 96th Cong, 1st Sess (1979)
13 The confidence was seen in testimony by FDA's new leadership, see e.g., FDA Oversight
Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 3, 1982) (testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes)
l* Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 23,
1982)
is See 513.12
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which may reduce delays and assure more prompt development of
FDA-drug firm communications.16
IND regulations resulting from the 1983 proposed rules will be
made final and will become part of the operating system of the National Center for Drugs and Biologies, perhaps in 1984 or 1985. FDA is
considering several new ideas, not yet even proposed as rules, under
which more of the burden will rest with outside review boards at the
first level of clinical approval; overall effect of the proposed new IND
rules would be more rapid clearances for the earliest, least intrusive
human investigations.17
Because safety is a paramount consideration at the more intensive, later stages of drug investigations, the clinical "hold," staying the
conclusion of the routine 30-day pretesting period, is more readily
applied against larger or more risk-related human experiments performed under INDs after the short initial testing phase. 18 Commercial
distribution of the IND product is not allowed, but in some cases FDA
will grant written permission for the sale of the investigational
product.19
The second stage of FDA approval of the process begins with
meetings preparatory to the filing of the new drug application
(NDA).20 The FDA should meet with the drug firm and examine the
IND evidence to identify special problems and additional testing which
is needed. When FDA has a research program in mind, it will usually
negotiate with the firm at this stage for additional testing. By the time
of the pre-NDA meeting, the firm should have completed Phase I basic
human studies and Phase II studies in patients for whom the drug will
be expected to produce a therapeutic result.21
The goals of those phases are distinct. Phase I seeks pharmacologic effects information and early evidence on effectiveness in
16 Hayes testimony, supra n 13
17 The Investigational New Drug proposed rules are found at 48 Fed Reg 26720 (June
9, 1983). Discussion of the FDA's desire for future use of the outside review boards is
detailed in proposed Investigational New Drug (IND) Regulations preamble id at 26722.
18 Proposed rules on clinical hold procedures, 21 CFR §312.42 (proposed), formalize
the methods now in use for suspending or delaying the use of the drug in humans.
19 Commercial sale is prohibited without written FDA approval. An example likely to
be approved is an expensive orphan drug, for which no sustaining market is yet available.
Proposed 21 CFR §312.6, 48 Fed Reg 26737 (June 9, 1983)
20 Id

tiSee e.g., House Comm on Science and Technology, 96th Cong, 2d Sess, The Food and
Drug Administration's Process for Approving New Drugs (Serial HHH Comm Print
1980)
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20-60 patients. Phase II measures several hundred closely monitored
patients for the clinical effectiveness of the drug. Both prepare the
product for its real test, the multiple Phase III effectiveness and safety
tests which form the basis for risk assessments and label warnings,
during which thousands of patients may be exposed.22
FDA and the firm have the greatest interest in results from the
Phase III clinical studies, which have been designed to elucidate neutral, "blind" research results. This is the point at which drug products
do or do not prove effective in double-blind controlled clinical studies.
Evidence generated at this point is crucial to approval. Meetings with
FDA continue during this phase as preliminary results are reviewed.23
These meetings may be frustrating, for the agency employees
may be skeptical. But in tactical terms the persuasion must be done at
this level, for it is quite risky to file over protest and then sue the
agency after rejection.24 FDA has procedures for internal appeals, and
one should always try the internal appeal option if the issue is a pivotal
study or otherwise is of crucial importance.25
The final phase of the review process leads to formal acceptance
of the proposed NDA. Concurrent reviews of the application by several
groups within the National Center for Drugs 8c Biologies each produce
a reviewer's recommendation.26 Internal meetings within FDA generate questions, and meetings with the drug developer pose those questions. An advisory committee to the FDA may review the new product
and advise what additional work needs to be done.27 Advisory commit22 Proposed 21 CFR §312.21, 48 Fed Reg 26737 (June 9, 1983)
23 Id. There will be more of these meetings to inform sponsors more quickly of the
correctable deficiencies. Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 23, 1982)
24 Filing under protest means the claiming of an opportunity for a hearing. At this point,
the application will be denied, the hearing will probably be denied, and the courts will
probably defer to FDA's wisdom in reviewing the application. So the procedure will be
seldom utilized. 21 CFR §314.110(c) (proposed), 47 Fed Reg 46655 (Oct 19, 1982)
25 Internal appeals within the Office of New Drug Evaluation are a commonly available
internal remedy to appeal disagreements. Preamble to NDA Proposed Rules, 47 Fed
Reg 46633-34 (Oct 19, 1982)
26 Concurrent review allows each reviewer to have a detailed technical section on that
person's area of responsibility and a 50- to 200-page summary of the total NDA technical
data
27 Advisory committees review the progress of studies and suggest additional studies.
"Sterling's Trilostane . . . Recommended," 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) TG-9 (June
28,1982). Advisory committees were involved in the decision to clear for marketing the
anti-inflammatory drug Oraflex in 1982. FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt
Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 3, 1982) (testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes)
© McGraw-Hill, Inc.
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tee clearance is a helpful step for FDA, but as a legal matter does not
represent a required step of approval and does not speed up the
process.28
After the FDA is satisfied with the product's adequate and wellcontrolled studies showing its safety and effectiveness, the agency
collects other necessary information, as by validation of testing methods. 29 FDA's field force inspects the manufacturing facility for compliance with good manufacturing practices.30 The verification of inactive
ingredient safety may involve review of a master file, submitted directly
to FDA as a proprietary protection by the inactive ingredient supplier.31 Labeling claims receive a preliminary review.32
After these reviews, the hierarchy within the FDA drug operation
endorses the recommendation to approve the NDA.33 Time delays at
this stage may be significant, for the demise of an approved drug
product through adverse patient reactions quite often leads to adverse
congressional questioning of the drug approval managers. Managers,
because of this disincentive to speed through reviews, may ask questions which delay the process, or may sit on an application until stimulated. In the parallel example of "paper NDAs," discussed as a
separate process in a later section,34 the FDA has delegated approval
authority for all paper NDAs after the first one in a product class (i.e.,
28 For example, a sponsor whose NDA was delayed in the FDA for years could not
persuade a court to order FDA action on the NDA even though the advisory committee
had already cleared the product. Newport Pharmaceuticals Intl Inc v Schweiker, Food Drug
Cos L Rep (CCH) 138148 (DC DC 1981)
29 Methods validation permits an FDA laboratory which analyzes the purity of the drug
to duplicate the sponsor's testing method. This assures that the quality of the sample
used will be duplicative when future FDA inspectional samples are checked. GAO
Report, "Speeding Up the Drug Review Process," HRD-82-16, 17 (Nov 23, 1981)
W21 CFR §314.100(b)
Mid at §314.11. FDA does not review the safety of the inactive ingredient in the master
file until the file is referenced by an NDA applicant for use in connection with an active
ingredient. But FDA considers the safety of inactives to be a very critical part of its total
drug safety decision. Brief for United States in United States v Generix Drug-Corp, No
81-1222 (US pending Oct 1982 Term)
32 21 CFR §314.100(d). Comparative claims of efficacy probably will not be permitted
in the labeling, as a result of a 1982 fight between drug manufacturers concerning a
disputed label claim. Crout Signals an End to Comparative Efficacy Labeling, 13 Wash Drug
Letter 4 (Dec 14, 1981), " Rx Drug Comparative Promotional Claims", 44 F-D-CReports (Pink Sheet) 11 (July 26, 1982)
33 Authority to approve is delegated at 47 Fed Reg 26822 (June 22, 1982)
34 See 513.19
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after the controversy has passed) to the division director level and the
subdelegation has speeded approvals of the me-too product copies.35
An "approvable" letter states that the application can be approved but
that label and labeling copies must be submitted.36 At this point, the
firm prepares and FDA approves or modifies a "summary of safety and
effectiveness" which is the publicly disseminated, summary basis of
approval for the drug product.37 Then the "approval" letter is sent and
the drug may be marketed. A monthly list of approved drugs carries
news of the approval.38
FDA has three controls after approval. The first advertisements
for a prescription drug must be submitted to FDA and, thereafter, FDA
can request that ads be submitted.39 Pre-approval promotional efforts
are strongly discouraged and can delay an approval.40 Reports of adverse reactions must be submitted very rapidly to FDA during the first
year after approval.41 Problems of late reporting have led some firms
into conflict with the FDA, while FDA has attempted in proposed rules
to expedite all adverse reaction reports, first during the IND process42
and later by requiring updating of adverse information after the filing
of the NDA but prior to approval.43 In some cases FDA imposes additional post-approval testing by agreement with the manufacturer—
35 Address by National Center for Drugs &: Biologies Director H Meyer to National
Association Pharmaceutical Manufactures, Dorado Beach, PR (Jan 16 1983)
36 21 CFR §314.100(d)
37/rf at §314.14(e). Note that the total file is withheld. But factual internal memoranda
of FDA reviewers would be available under the Freedom Of Information Act, see Sterling
Drug Inc v Harris 488 F Supp 1019 (SD NY 1980)
38 This listing is available by mail subscription from National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia
^ See Ch 15
40 FDA has been adamant in opposing promotional information prior to marketing
41 As the NDA-IND changes come into regulations format, rapid transmission of adverse
reactions already provided for in 21 CFR §310.300 will be expanded. Address by HHS
Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 23, 1982)
42 Adverse reaction data on investigational new drugs is extremely important. In its
proposed rules, FDA would require IND holders to report within no later than 20 days
an incident of adverse experience "that may suggest significant hazards, contraindications, side efTects or precautions." 21 CFR §312.12(b)(l)(i) (proposed), 48 Fed Reg
26741 (June 9, 1983)
43 The NDA reports are divided into immediate repons, 15-day reports, and 30-day
reports, with those of least gravity taken into the annual report as well. 21 CFR
§314.80(c) (proposed), 47 Fed Reg 46652 (Oct 19, 1982)
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forcing agreement as the negotiated precondition for product approval where a doubt about safety or efficacy remains.44
The most common debates on new drug approval relate to efficacy. Safety screening steps in animal and basic human studies usually
alleviate safety concerns or place the safety risks into perspective, from
which therapeutic benefits can be said to outweigh risks, though as
with all small-scale inquiries, safety information in test phases may
differ from actual market experiences.45 FDA is careful to get this
safety information in as complete detail as possible, during the preapproval phases, to assist in the final risk assessment. Failure to provide the date risks an enforcement action.46 FDA has used many clinical guidelines for study methods, 47 and has recommended that these
be used in the drug industry, particularly by generic firms which customarily are weak in the research field.48 Efficacy controversies are
usually scientific disputes about whether a study was adequately controlled, to avoid prejudice to the "blinding" of the research, and
whether statistical tables of patient progress demonstrate that the drug
had a significant advantage over the control placebo product. 49 FDA
has devoted a great deal of attention to the adequacy of controls in a
study to assure that the agency's scientists agree that the proof of
44 Special reporting obligations may be imposed, 21 CFR §310.304, and FDA actively
sought approval of a Phase IV authority which would permit agency control of postapproval studies on the product, while drug reform legislation was pending in 1977-80.
That additional reporting may be part of the 1983 regulations
45 Because of the intentionally small number of persons exposed to a drug before it is
marketed, each patient's experience will be carefully studied and there may be debates
about reactions or effectiveness in a handful of patients, who represent one millionth
of the numbers of patients who would be exposed after approval. FDA is very aware of
the difficulty of predicting adverse reaction experiences and so is ready to control the
new product after it enters the marketplace. Oraflex was a product marketed between
May and August 1982, which was suspended from sale by its manufacturer as a result
of adverse reaction reports received after FDA approval.
46 Proposed 21 CFR §314.80, 47 Fed Reg 46652 (Oct 19, 1982)
47 Preamble to Proposed NDA Revision Rules, 47 Fed Reg 46627 (Oct 19, 1982).
48 Address by National Center for Drugs & Biologies Director H Meyer to National
Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, Dorado Beach, PR (Jan 16, 1983); Speech
by Acting Commissioner Novitch to Conference on Generic Drugs (July 15, 1980);
Testimony of Commissioner Hayes to Congress, FDA Appropriations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm on Agriculture, Senate Appropriations Comm, 97th Cong 1st Sess (1983)
49 FDA guidelines and the Good Clinical Practices rules control the experimentation
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efficacy is well established. Courts uphold FDA in this complex area.50
A product with no significant advantage over a placebo would not be
effective enough to justify the product's risks to patients, and could
deter the user from use of a product which would be effective.
FDA audits the data which are submitted in the NDA process as
part of its bioresearch monitoring programs, such as those for clinical
investigators51 The use of foreign data as a basis for approval is permissible as long as some United States research supports the approvability conclusion and as long as the foreign data were compiled under
standards acceptable to the FDA (which conclusions could be audited
by FDA visits to that foreign testing site.52 If the audits or the manufacturing site inspections are not satisfactory, there may be a delay in the
approval of the product.53
Drug approval is a human process and humans tend to disagree
at times. The NDA process includes a level of appeal which proceeds
from the reviewer to the supervisory officials, to a committee which is
headed by the Director of the National Center for Drugs and Biologies.54 It is important that firms use their appeal rights, so that they

50 Courts have tended to be quite deferential to FDA in the "new drug" area, see e.g.,
Weinberger v Hynson Westcott & Dunning 412 US 609 (1973); Rutherford v United
States 442 US 544 (1979), and this has been especially true in the efficacy evidence area.
see e.g., Smithkline Co v FDA 587 F2d 1107 (DC Cir 1978); Edison Pharmaceutical Co
v FDA 513 F2d 1063 (DC Cir) rehearing denied 517 F2d 164 (DC Cir 1975): but if the rules
of efficacy are changed in midstream and approval is refused, the firm may be able to
find a sympathetic court, Amer Cyanamid Co v FDA 606 F2d 1307 (DC Cir 1979). See also
cases cited at Ch 15
"See 21 CFR pts 52 et seq and Ch 23
52 Although FDA has permitted foreign data to satisfy Phases I and II, before the
controlled double-blind efficacy studies, FDA has required at least one of the Phase III
studies to be a United States study. 21 CFR §314.1(c)(2), item (12)(c). An exception
exists for drugs intended to treat diseases which are rare in the United States. In
1974-80, 51?& of new drug approvals for truly new drugs or indications contained
foreign clinical studies, and of these 17% were studies deemed pivotal or significant for
approval. Under a new policy revision, foreign clinical data may be the sole support for
an NDA if the data are applicable to United States medical practice, if the investigators
are of a "recognized competence/' and if FDA deems those data valid without an on-site
FDA inspection. FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong,
2d Scss (Aug 3, 1982) testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes)
M A firm which refuses inspection or fails to show that the facility is adequate to make
the product will have a difficult time winning FDA clearance for its NDA
M FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug
3, 1982) (testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes)
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are not foreclosed from litigation for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.55
Public access to the drug approval process occurs when approval
is announced and the summary of the data which served as a basis of
safety and efficacy is made available.56 The detailed information remains confidential; that which is released cannot be used as a basis for
approval of another firm's subsequent products.57
The process for drug products which are "orphans," i.e., which
have so little a market as to be unattractive for manufacturers' investments in research, is different. More FDA involvement with testing,
potential involvement of other federal agencies like the National Institutes of Health, and possibly a relaxed efficacy requirement because
of smaller test populations, will be some features of an orphan drug
approval process.58 It has been suggested that orphan products are so
difficult to run through larger double-blind studies that FDA should
accept expert opinions concerning efficacy, but the suggestion would
be so different from normal FDA insistence on having two doubleblind clinical studies that its future is questionable.59
The time for the NDA approval process is 180 days, by statute,
from filing to final action.60 Reforms within FDA have been made to
reduce the perennial inability to abide by this time period.61 But a
court would uphold a reasonable delay and would side with the FDA
55 The comparable food additive clearance process produced the litigation in Stauffer
Chem Co v FDA 670 F2d 106 (9th Cir 1982). Stauffer failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies after an adverse opinion letter from FDA. In the NDA process, reconsideration
opportunities already exist. 21 CFR §10.75. And see Dormer, Contesting Advene FDA
Decisions: Is it Worth The Risk? 4 Med Device 8c Diag Industry 26 (1982)
56 21 CFR §314.14
57 "FDA Discussions of Unpublished Data/* 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) TG-7 (June
7, 1982)
58 These are "orphans" because they lack sufficient commercial markets to justify the
costs of development. FDA has set up an Office of Orphan Product Development to
work with the Dept of HHS Orphan Products Board and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Commission on Drugs for Rare Diseases. FDA Oversight Hearings Before
House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 3, 1982) (testimony of FDA
Commr A Hayes)
59 "FDA Drug Efficacy Determinations," 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) 3 (May 10,
1982)
60 21 USC§355(c)
61 FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug
3, 1982) (testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes), and see also Address by HHS Secretary
Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 23, 1982)
December, 1983
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where injunctive relief to force approval is sought.62 Measures to
speed up the process have been under consideration for some time.63
§13.12 New Drug Applications: Investigational New
Drug Exemptions
The investigational new drug exemption provisions of §505 of
the Act are extremely important for drug firms to comprehend.1 No
new drug can be approved without first satisfying FDA about its safety
and effectiveness in humans. To gather the needed evidence requires
an investigational new drug exemption application (IND) which puts the FDA
on notice of the proposed clinical trials. An IND is deemed approved
if FDA does not object; usually, FDA has reviewed animal test results
and the proposed program for the new drug's human tests within two
months of the IND filing.2
Prior to the 1962 amendments, there was no IND system comparable to the present elaborate system; four lines in the Act, rather than
the present page of text, discussed investigational new drugs.3 But
eleven birth defects cases in the United States which followed the
widespread "investigational" use of an unapproved drug in the early
1960s, thalidomide, led Congress to write strict control authority into
the Act.4 The investigations issue entered the bill late, as a result of
the publicity given thalidomide while the bill was in final stages of
62 Newport Pharmaceuticals Intl Inc v Schweiker Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) 138148
(DDC 1981)
to Compare Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council
(June 23, 1982) with HEW Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Final Report (1977)
and Commission on the Federal Drug Approval Process, "Substantial Evidence Requirement Should be Reduced," 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) 2 (Mar 2, 1982)
i 21 USC §355(i). This section has had a "profound effect" on United States and world
drug development by its very existence in United States law. Crout, The Nature of Regulatory Choices 33 Food Drug Cosm LJ 143, 420 (1978)
* 21 CFR pt 312; and HEW Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Final Report 19-23
(1977).
3 Before 1962,21 USC §355(i) read simply: "The Secretary shall promulgate regulations
for exempting from the operation of this section drugs intended solely for investigational use by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety
of drugs." Food Drug & Cosmetic Act ch 675, 52 Stat 1040, 75th Cong 3d Sess (1938)
* Ley, Federal Law and Patient Consent 24 Food Drug Cosm LJ 520, 521 (1969)
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it GRASE. The issues are quite distinct. There may be opposing experts;
the fact that FDA does not agree with the experts "does not eliminate
the fact of their disagreement," and the plaintiff has the burden to
establish such generality of recognition. Chattem, Inc v Heckler Food Drug
Cos L Rep (CCH) 138293 (D DC May 10, 1985).
Add to text at end oj section:

When is a drug the "same" drug? I he answer depends on the
context. In the case of orphan drug status, a court decided that the FDA
properly treated two drugs as being different, and properly granted
orphan drug status to one. Under 21 USC §360cc(a), orphan status will
be exclusive once the NDA is granted, and this w ill exclude other
products from the market. Thus, FDA approval is a reviewable decision
when challenged by a third party whose drug would be excluded. On
the substance of the issue, the court agreed with FDA that a
biotechnological drug and a human extracted material which were used
for the same purpose were not the same. The FDA's decision was
upheld. GenentecK Inc v Bowen 676 F Supp 301 (D DC 1987).
The advocate should consider that exemptions may apply from
new drug status, and case precedents on animal drugs might be applied
to human drugs as well. FDA took what a court believed was an
unreasonably narrow view of exemptions and an unreasonably strong
demand for new animal drug restrictions. This would conflict with the
statutory policy that FDA would not interfere with medical practice.
FDA's view was rejected by the court. United States v Algon Chemical, Inc
Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) f 38079 (D NJ 1988).
§13.11 New Drug Applications: The Process
Add to footnote 1:

See economic analyses of the FDA approval delay problem, S Pekzman,
The Benefits and Costs of New Drug Regulation (R Landau ed 1973);
Schifrin, Lessons From The Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962
Drug Regulations 5 Harv J Law & Public Policy 91 (1982).
Add to eighth line oj text in carryover paragraph on page 13-62 at end of
sentence:

Since enactment of 5355(c) i n jgg2 t FDA has considered the date of
"approval" to be the date on which FDA issues a written notification
November, 1988
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of a new drug's approval. Mead / • )hn $« m
(D DC Jan 27, 1987).
Add to text at end of second full paragraph, page 1 ? 58:
Xhe new drug approval requirement applies to both users and
distributors of the new drug; there is no implicit exemption from §505
because one is an end user of a drug rather than a commercial firm.
Duncan v United States Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) 1138269 (WD Okla
1984).
Change Rutherford citation
806 F2d M55 llOih < •

-

Add Hi Irxi after ntiu* r") *

.
.

There was a great debate over this data's status in the early
1980's, with one court holding that it was not a trade secret but that
it was confidential commercial information. Public Citizen v FDA 704 F2d
1280, 1291 (DCCir 1983)
Congress ultimately settled the argument and determined that
the data would be withheld, upholding the FDA administrative position
that such data was properly confidential. Congress adopted at FDA's
request a legislative determination that safety and efficacy data may be
withheld by FDA upon a showing that commercial confidentiality helps
the developing of secret research data maintain a stronger competitive
position. Loss of exclusive use would cause a loss of competitive
position, and under those extraordinary circumstances, FDA need not
disclose the data when requests for disclosure are made under the
Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub L 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 §104 (1984),
and see O'Reilly, Knowledge is Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry
Trade Secrets 54 U Cin L Rev 1 (1985).
Add to footnote 58:
and as to orphan drug developments, see Grossman, The Orphan Drug
Act: Adoption or Foster Care? 39 Food Drug Cos LJ 128 (1984).
Add to text at end of section:
FDA has the power, through a generic rule applicable to a number of
drug applicants, to limit the applicants' access to certain regulatory
entitlements which had been readily available in the past. Upjohn Co v
FDA 811 F2d 1583 (DC Cir 1987)
iic! IPi 1 , <
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ed the clause once it had been added to the legislation, and unanimous
votes led to enactment on September 6, 1958.!*
Problems with color additive products under the 1938 Act surfaced during the 1950$, when a reexamination of approved colors
found that they could create human safety risks,14 Legislation set safe
limits on levels of colorants infinishedfoods, drugs, and cosmetics and
established certification procedures for approval of batches of colors.^ After the food additives debate, color additives legislation was
adopted with relative ease, but it also included the Delaney anti-cancer
clause.*5
§3.07

ew Drug Amendments of 1962

The two principal conditions which historically have led to major
food and drug legislation have been the existence of a persuasive
leader with legislative skills, and the occurrence of a crises in which the
weaknesses of existing protective legislation are exposed to the public
by the news media, Harvey Wiley and the meat adulteration muckraking and Senator Royal Copeland and the elixir sulfanilamide incident
were joined in 1962 by Senator Estes Kefauver and the thalidomide
birth defects case. The result of that combination of efforts and events
was a major revision of drug approval authority for the Food and Drug
Administration.
The 1938 Act gave the FDA a negative option authority; it could
act against drugs, but if it failed to act in a timely manner and did not
use specific procedures, the drug would come onto the market despite
any uncertainties as to its safety.1 The statute failed to require proof
l j 460,462 (1973), For oihcr participant! in the controversy, see Sunshine. Reguluory
Aspects ofFood Additives—Yesterday. Today and Tomorrow SI Food Drug Cosro LJ
264 (1976) and Kleinfeld supra note 2 at 559
\% Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub L No 85-929
Si i 1784 (codified at 2i
USC IMS)
IS Jans*en, FDA Since 193S: Major Trends and Developments IS J Fob I 2U
n)
(1964)
H 21 USC 1576
15 Id at 576(b)(5)(B)
»To refuie to allow a drug application to take effect. FDA would have to hold a hearing
and male findings in the form of an order, if no order were made, the application would
become effective in 60 day*, former 21 USC »55(c); but the secretary could delay action
for up to 180 days from the date of Wing. See Cavers, 77>c Food Drug & Cosmetic Act
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that drugs were effective, so the FDA was forced to approve implicitly
a drug which had not been shown to be unsafe even though it may not
have been effective for the use intended.*
Senator KeEauver's public hearings were a dramatic attack on
prices and profits of the pharmaceutical industry,3 Much of the original
economic thrust of his efforts was effectively blunted by prudent defensive lobbying on the part of the pharmaceutical industry. Kefauver
had spent a great deal of time on patent reform and the promotion of
generic drug products and vigorously criticized advertising practices
which failed to communicate adverse information about drugs and
their side effects to physicians,*
The sponsors of legislation increasing the power of FDA over
new drugs made much of the thalidomide incident. In that case a new
drug marketed in Europe, but only available on a test basis in the
United States, proved to be teratogenic with infants born with seal-like
flippers instead of limbs.5 Under the proposed legislation more time
was to be made available to FDA's drug review staff, through extension
of statutory time limits, to make decisions about new drug applications
filed by drugfirms.*More extensive safety and effectiveness testing
would be required with efficacy tested through ^adequate and wellcontrolled" studies. "Adequate tests by all methods reasonably appii-

of 1938: it* legislative History and its Substantive Provisions 6 1 fc Contemp Prob 2,
40 (1938)
2 S Rep No 1744, 87th Cong 2d Sess (1962):
In the first place, once the Food and Drug Administration determines thai its
value a* a drug outweighs its toxicity, the Department claims that ii must permit
the drug to be marketed even though its claim to effectiveneis is exaggerated. In
the lecond place, where a drug is essentially innocuous, it must dear the drug
despite thefeetthat its daim of effectiveness is not borne out by the evidence.
. , . The Department believes that the manufacturer should satisfy the Food and
Drug Administration that his product is effective for the purposes claimed before
it is marketed
Quoted in [1962] US Code Cong k Ad Newt 2892
* 11962] US Code Cong k Ad News at 2898, Ketou> ei [TJhe record is dear that by
any test and under any standard the prices of most drugs are excessive and unreason*
able1'
* Views of Senator Ktfauver, S Rep No 1744. 87th Cong 2d Sen (1962)
* In the United Sutes, over 2.5 million doses were distributed in investigations by 1,270
phvsicians. Comment, The food and Drug Administration: Uw, Science and Politics in
the Equation and Control of /Ven Drug Technology 67 NwU I Kev 858, 868 n 41
6 21 USCJS55W
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cable1' would be required to determine the safety of drugs during the
clearance process,7 The burden of providing substantial evidence of
effectiveness was placed squarely on the drug manufacturer, and a
continuing post-approval reporting requirement was also imposed to
maintain theflowof safety information.* Explicit records inspection
authority was added for investigation of new drugs.9
A major compromise issue in the legislative development of the
1962 amendments was advertising, an issue which had been hotly
contested in 1938 as well The conference reconciled conflicting
House and Senate views by rejecting mandatory FDA pre-approval of
drug advertising for prescription drugs,10 However, the conference
report strongly encouraged prior review of such advertisements (without much future adoption of the encouragement) and limited the
FDA's post-clearance power to act against advertising which it had
already reviewed,11
Along with the drug approval authority and efficacy amendments, FDA received a number of incidental powers including power
to register establishments and controls over antibiotic drugs.12 As a
concession to iht Kefauver view on drug marketing economics, generic names for products were to be established by FDA and then disseminated on labeling in order to make the public aware of the identity
of trademark-named drug products•**
A review of the amended statute's impact on technology drew
7

Mat §855(d)(i); subsection (d) defines "substantial evidence
»Id ai (&){\)\ this had Us origins in President Kennedy'* letter of April 10,1962. to the
chairman of the Senate committee studying drug amendments; "Drug manufacturers
should be required to keep records on and repon to the Department of Health EducationfcWelfare any indications of adverse effects from the use of a new drug or antibiotic" Set 1*962} US Code CongticAd News 2896
* 21 u s e ISW0K2)
10 (1962) US Code Cong & Ad News 29M-M
It is the intention of the managers on the pan of the House . . . lhat no action
shall be brought by the Secretary under this section because of the use of an
advertisement submitted to him prior to publication and found not to be in
violation of this paragraph unless he subsequently finds the adveniscment in
violation, advises the advertiser, and allows reasonable tune to eCTect the necessary correction.
Id
»2 2tUSCHS57(M,S60
IS 21USC 1*58; s#e Conference Ref oi adc pting Senate version, 119621 US Code Cong
U Ad News 2932
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this conclusionfromthe 1962 amendments: "Among federal agencies
undertaking technology assessment, the FDA is unique in that its sole
responsibility is to determine whether the benefits to be gained by
releasing a new technology outweigh therisksinherent in that innovation/'H
Unlike other comparable agencies the FDA was given no responsibility, formal or informal, for promoting the particular aspect of
technology which it must regulate,
A& neither an advocate of technology nor absolute arbiter of legal
status—to the extent that courts retain that role—the FDA was placed
in a unique position by the 1962 drug amendments. Readers may draw
their own conclusions about the consequences of the use and abuse of
FDA's powers since those important amendments. Congress set up
procedures with which the agency subsequently disagreed; FDA felt
that individual hearings could not be practicably implemented, and the
Supreme Court agreed.15 Historical fact suggests that the procedural
amendments of 1962 were soon obsolete as the agency became con*
scious of the mass of implementation work. Historians of the 1990s will
record the ultimate value of those amendments for the FDA and for
society,
Between the new drug amendments and the medical device
amendments of 1976, FDA underwent a consolidation of existing
statutory authorities which expanded the bounds of the statute. Animal drug authority, the Drug Listing Act, and an amendment resolving
a longstanding dispute over labeling and sale of vitamin and mineral
foods were adopted during the period from 1962 to 1976.16

§3.08 Medical Devices Amendments
Of the statutory categories created by r n 938 Act the one left
H Comment supr* note 5 at 870
i* The Supreme Coun dismissed the procedural fine points or ihe amended act's
hearing provisions with the comment;
The deluge of litigation that would follow if "me-too drug* and OTC drug* had
to receive de novo hearings in the coum would inure to the interests of manufacturers and merchant! \t\ drugs, but not to the interests of the public that Congress
was anxious to protect by the 1962 amendments. . .
Weinberger v Bentex Pharmaceuticals, lnc 412 US 645 (197.5)
l« Act of Apr 22. 1976, Pub L No 94-278. 90 Stat 401
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all cases, except in the situation in which an OTC drug may be unsafe
unless it is placed on prescription as a manner of controlling distribution.1*
§14.04 Definitions; SaSafety is not an absolute determination; its boundaries are the
current knowledge of science and its assumptions are the normal
behavior of man. Water is safe except when ingested in large quantities
by swimmers; salt can have toxic effects at very high levels. The judgment of marketability made by both the manufacturer and the Food
and Drug Administration for a drug product takes into account the
benefiu of the product and the relativeriskpresented in light of other
available remedies and the particular therapeutic situation to which the
drug is addressed,1 Even dying patients, if the status can be defined,
are entitled to be protected from drugs which are not "safe", and are
denied access to those drugs which may be unsafe, as the Supreme
Court decided in the lactrile anticancer case in 1979.* And the proof
of safety is not an easy assignment by any means.*
When FDA set out to define safety as it applies to drugs studied
in the over-the-counter (OTC) drug review, it declared;
Safety means a low incident c

adverse reactions or significant side

W The need for prescription drug distribution in lieu of stronget label warnings hat
been debated in a 1978 administrative bearing, Matter of Supplemental New Drug
Application, Bcnylin Expectorant, Docket 76N-0485 (FDA 1978), and lee Parke Davis
fc Co v Califano, Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) ttBISi (6th Cir 1977)
1

Pf]he typical issue for the FDA is not the absolute safety of a drug. Most drugs
are unsafe in tome degree. Rather, the issue for iht FDA is whether to allow sale x
of the drug, usually under specific restriction*. Resolution of this issue inevitably
means calculating whether the benefits which the drug produce* outweigh the
costs of its restricted use,
Hess k Dark Division of Rhodia, lnc v FDA 495 F2d 975,993 (DC Cir 1974)
* United States v Rutherford 47 USLW 4724 (June 18, 1979)
S "Proof of a drug's safety i s . . . problematic . . . because of the uncertainty as to what
constitutes an adequate demonstration of safety. Drugs that are toxic for a small number
of patients may b« perfectly harmless for the great majority or users
Because all
drugs induce some chemical reaction •.»no drug can be termed absolutely safe," Note,
Picking Your Poison: The Drug Bttlacy Requirement and the Right of Privacy 25 UCLA
L Rev 577, 585-86 (1978). But see United Slates v Rutherford 47 USLW 4724 (June 18,
1979)
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effects under adequate directions of use and warnings against unsafe use
ai well as low potentialforharm which may result from abuse under
conditions of widespread availability.4
FDA then defined the term as subject to proof by "adequate tests
by methods reasonably applicable to show the drug is safe under the
prescribed, recommended or suggested conditions of use/*
Congress intended that safe have the ordinary meaning of an
absence of harmful consequences.* A perplexing regulatory problem
has been to define safe in the abstract,6 FDA's legislative approach in
1978*79 drug reform proposals was to find a product safe whose
health benefits "dearly outweigh** its risks,7 But "how much risk is
acceptable in light of the beneficial effects likely to be achieved"8
remains a difficult calculation. Former FDA Chief Counsel Richard
Merrill stated the quandary:
FDA is asked to apply the label 'safe' to compounds whose hazards are
imperfectly understood and, in some cases, recognized to be serious,
even ifinfrequent... (FDA) has been given this responsibility by a public
that assumes a product it has determined to be 'safe* has no prospect of
producing harm.*
It is important to underscore the term which acts as a qualification on the statute's misbranding prohibition against unsafe drugs:
M
.. • when used in the dosage, or manner or with the frequency or
duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
« 21 CFR i$S0.10(a)(4)(iy, and set 57 Fed Reg 85 flan 11972)
s See Merrill, C*n FDA Do Anything Right? 2 Va Law School Report 20 (1978); Repon
by the Commissioner of Food and Dr\x%% on Finding* and Recommendations of the
Review Panel on New Drug Regulation 95 (1978)
« Rutherford v United States 588 F2d 1234 (10th Ck 19 78) c i d47 USLW 4724 (June
18,1979)
7 Sec S1045.96th Cong 1st Sets U979), and S 2755,95th Cong 2d Sett 1109(e) (1978):
"tT]he term 'safe' means that the health benefits of the drug entity clearly outweigh the
risks presented by the drug entity, taking into account the standards and requirements
applicable to drug products eligible to be licensed under the monograph . , /*. The
definition includes several (acton to be considered as well, which may change m the
legislation U debated
» Merrill supra note 5
a M i l SO
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thereof.'^0 Intended use controls how we can and do measure the
safety of a drug, as that intention is manifested in directions in the
labeling,11 A drug is shown to be safe in the context of its recommended uses, not in the abstract J 2
A prescription drug which bears full warnings is more likely to
obtain prompt NDA approval for distribution than one which may be
dangerous to the public if mistakenly misused.15 But, as FDA's administrative law judge has opined, "questions of the safety of a drug
when it is used in a manner contrary to the label warnings can be
considered only in limited circumstances."1* FDA bears the burden,
according to that 1978 ruling in the Benylin proceeding, to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of misuse in violation of label instructions, if the agency wishes the safety-related issues which are not
labeled to be considered in a safety decision.** Generally, misuse is not
a major part of clearance considerations other than for a "controlled
substance" drug. The 1978-79 drug law revision proposals would
grant FDA more authority to include these misuse considerations in
drug approvals and in decisions on continued approval.** It would
"make dear that safety is always a relative matter — that using any
drug always presents somerisksthat have to be weighed in the light
10 A drug is misbranded if "it is dangerous to health when used in the dosage, or manner
or wiih the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling therof," 21 USC «352<j)
n United Stales v 62 Packages . , , Marmola Prescription Tablets 48 F Supp 878
Wis 1943) ttfif 142 F2d 107 (7ih Cir 1944) cert denied 823 US 731 (1944)
W Sec Initial Decision, Matter or Supplemental New Drug Application Benylin Exports
rant. Docket 76N-G48S (FDA 1978) and cfPhanaaceuiical Mfrs Assn v Richardson 318
F Supp SOL 315 (D Del 1970)
15 21CFR $330.10(a) (4)(vi) presumes that a drug will be for over-the-counter sale unlets
risks are found to be associated with it, See Initial Decision, Benylin Expectorant Docket
76N-0483 (FDA 1978). and Parke Davis fc Co v Califcno 564 F2d 1200 (6th Cir 1977)
ten denied 435 US 942 (1978)
w Initial Decision, Benylin Expectorant, Docket 76N-0483, slip opinion at 7 (FDA 1978)
15

Id at 8; "Consideration of safety evidence relating 10 uses of a drug outside of the
label requirements necessitates a showing that there is a reasonable probability that such
non-label indicated uses can be expected to occur."
rt S 1045.96th Cong 1st Sess (1979), and S 2755, 95th Cong 2d Sess (109(e)(2)(C)
(1978); and "therisksof a drug include the risks from improper use and the societal
risks that ate presented by the drug." Department of HEW, Section-by-Section Analysis,
Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 (1978)
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CHAPTER 1* DRUG REGULATION: SAFETY
of the benefits." *7 These proposed bills, howe 1 • • > t 1 e still in serious
doubt in the 1979 session.
§14,05 Risk—Benefit Decisions in Drug Approvals
No drug is absolutely safe.1 There will be some condition or
circumstance in which any drug can cause harm to some susceptible
individual. The societal role of the Food and Drug Administration is
to make tough choices about which risks are acceptable in order to
obtain a drug's benefits.* In making these risk—benefit judgments, a
great deal of guesswork is inevitable. Animal tests and controlled
clinical experiments do not always detect the problems which mass
distribution of a drug would disclose. For the Bureau of Drugs, predicting and then balancing risks and benefits in a fair and equitable
manner is the prime objective of the drug approval exercise.*
Safety decisions since the 1962 Drug Amendments have included
exacting review of the benefits promised for a drug. Because Congress
believed FDA's safety control of new drugs was satisfactory, the only
change made was the addition of an effectiveness consideration,4 Prior
to 1962, benefits were considered only in those cases in which the drug
was a serious pan of life-saving therapy, the failure of which would
n Remark* of Secretary Califano. HEW Press Conference on Drug Regulation Reform
Act of 197S at 5 (Mar 16,1978)
1 Hess fc Clark Division .of Rhodia, Inc v FDA 495 tt* 975, 995 (DC Cir 1974).
Rutherford v United Stales 47 USLW 4724 (1979); and see generally Merrill, Compeijsation for Prescription Drug Injuria 59 Va L Rev 1 (1973)
2 FDA's rationale for the 1978 proposed drug amendments stated; M[T)he decision on
whether a drug can be used for medical care in the United States is a risk-benefit
determination. The definition of 'safety' [in S 27551 reflects longstanding practice in
evaluating drugs for approval.... Every drug — even aspirin — presents some risks.
If 'safety1 were defined to mean the absence of any risk, then no drug could be ap.
proved." Department of HEW, Section-By-Section Analysis* Drug Regulation Reform
Act of 1978 (1978). CfHuvi. Public Policy Issues in Regulating Carcinogens in Food S3
Food Drug Cosm LJ 541 (1978)
s Crout, the Nature of Regulatory Chokes 38 Food Drug Cosm LJ 413 (1978); Huu,
Philosophy of Regulation 28 Food Drug Cosm I j 177 (1973); and see Note, The Food
and Drug Administration: Law Science and Politic* in the Evaluation and Control of New
Drug Technology 67 NwU I Rev 858 (1973)
4 See Senate comments. S Rtp No 87 1744.87th Cong 2d Sess (1962), 119621 US Code
Cong k Ad News 2890
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HAPTER 14 DRUG REGULATION: SAFETY
application,11 internal disagreements among FDA toxteologms, chemists, pharmacologists, and other scientists^ over details of the approval process, and often conflicting scientific judgments1* lengthen the
process of approval* A recent additional complication is the openness
for decisionmaking within the Bureau of Drugs* which strives for a sort
of consensus14 among employees. The HEW study of the new drug
approval process extensively examined the complaints about that process which were raised by the bureau's "conscientious objectors/'15
whose complaints precipitated several years of external and mtemal
evaluations of the process of drug approval,*6 Recently, still another
player in the approval "game" has been added, with the emergence of
therapy groups such as epilepsy organizations and the American Heart
Association to spur the FDA toward approval of new therapeutic
products for their respective areas of interest. This was the case with
informal lobbying for approval of valproic acid in treatment of epilepsy
in 1978.1?
The most difficult of all regulatory decisions, and drug approval
decisions, are those in which potential carcinogenic or other chronic
effects may be present but cannot be confirmed by present human
evidence, w Though this text is not of sufficient length to cover these
complex issues, a reader interested in risk—benefit and relative risk
theories would do well to begin with the literature on cancer causation,
n For a good brief statement o b e currtni NO A process, sec Review Panel, supra note
6 at 23-25
** Id at 3142; the Review panel found that industry had noi dominated ihe reviewing
staff, as had been alleged, to resolve iheie disagreements in industry's favor
i* Conflicting views are frequent and ltd to FDA action to formulate a dissenter policy,
$ce Rtpon by the Commisiioner supn note 9 at ix
i4/d»tviiMX
W Jd*ix-xi
l* Merrill supra note 8
»? HEW Press Release P7M2 (Feb 28, 1978). Commissioner Kennedy obliquely acknowledged the legislative oversight pressure of the epilepsy patient organizations when
he remarked that "new drugs are not approved by referendum*'
18 For an example of an extremely difficult approval decision by the FDA in this field,
examine the animal drug Sensitivity of Method (SOM) debate reflected in a 1979 pronouncement, 44 Fed Reg 17070 (Mar 20,1979): MlT]he Commissioner now believes that
the time is ripe for formulating a comprehensive approach for regulating all chemical
carcinogens." And see aspartame notice of Board of Inquiry, 44 Fed Reg 31716 (June
I, 1979)

© Shepard* inc.
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including both the legal19 and political*0 aspects as well as the scientific
causation theories. It is so particularized an examination that no useful
brief statement can be made to distill the thousands of pages written
about cancer causation in recent years.
§

i Warning Labels

A drug must bear adequate warning labels to communicate its
dangers.1 The sole exception to this rule applies to prescription drugs
in retail containers for which a physician has given directions for use.2
Warning labels enable \hc consumer to avoid overdoses of habit-forming or toxic drugs,3 and permit the consumer to know of drug interaction problems which may be present with certain drugs. As the
interactions of smoking and alcoholic beverages with drugs become
better known, foT example, drug warning labels can be expected more
frequently to caution against smoking or drinking while under medication.4
If label warnings can be simply and directly stated, and protect
the consumer effectively, then their use on the drug should obviate the
need for prescription-only distribution. Only in limited circumstances
can FDA base a decision on the safety of a drug when it is misused in
defiance of proper labelings Considerations of improper use as a
M Hutu The Basis and Purpose of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Food 33 Food Drug Cosm IJ 505 (1978)
» Carter, How to Asses* Cancer Risks 204 Science 811 (May 25 1979)
121 VSC 1352(0(2)
* Id at |S55(bK2), and otcepuon from iS52(f)
s Secretary of Agriculture recommendations following the Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster,
(1302. tuied: "Much injury results from insufficient direction* and from insufficient
directions and from lack of warning agains; overdosage, or administration io children,
or uie in disease conditions where the drug is dangerous, or possibility of drug addiction*1 Senator Copeland, the 1938 Act*! principal sponsor and a homeopathic physician,
noted thai pain relievers sometimes ltd to overdosages in "pathetic instances" because
"there is always a temptation on the pan of a human being to think. *lf a little medicine
will help me a good deal, more will help me still more/ " Senate Debate (Mar 9,1937).
Both are quoted in C. Dunn. Federal Food Drug k Cosmetic Act 1326 and 744, rcspeclively
« See e.g.. Oral Contraceptive Patient labeling, 43 Fed Reg 4214 (Jan SL 1978)
»Initial Decision, Matter of Supplemental New Drug Application. Benylin Expectorant,
Docket 76N-0483 (FDA 1978), and see United States v Article
Decholtn 264 F Supp
473 (£D Mich 1967)
November 1979
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Medical and Surgical Risks
The title of this chapter could sen e for a 1500-page textbook of
medicine and surgery, but our aim here is more modest. It is to
illustrate some of the important ways in which treatment-associated
risk is identified and measured in contemporary medicine. Coronary
heart disease and hypertension are two major diseases considered in
some detail. Coronary bypass surgery is prominent in the treatment
of CHD, and the problems of its evaluation compared to drug treatment illustrate a whole class of treatment-related risk-assessment
problems. The treatment of hypertension, on the other hand, is an
area where the insurance perspective is uniquely strong, allowing a
striking comparison between the risks of treating and not treating.
Then we examine the process by which prescription drugs are tested.
Drugs are the mainstay of modern medicine, and so the limits on risk
detection in drug testing have wide impact on treatment-related
risks. Here the comparative risks of treating versus not treating
reveal some curious quirks in how small risks can become the basis
of big controversies, while bigrisksgo unnoticed. To begin, however,
it is useful to understand the limits on the individual physician's
ability to detect treatment-related risk.
Risk as Perceived by the Individual Physician
There are natural limits on the individual physician's ability to perceive treatment-related risk. These limits have to do with the size of
any one physician's practice.
To understand the origin of those limits, consider how a busy
practice operates. If the physician works six 10-hour days a week and
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Risks Related to Drugs and Drug Regulation
Twentieth century technology has transformed two old institutions,
the doctor and the drug, from relatively harmless comforters and
anodynes into powerful forces capable of strong actions, good and
bad. Drug regulation in the United States appeared in three successive steps: (1) in the first years of this century, following a number
of deaths due to a contaminated vaccine; (2) during the 1930's,
following a number of deaths due to a sulfa drug product that was
formulated with a toxic solvent; (3) in 1962, following the recognition that thalidomide was responsible for children being born with
deformed limbs. All three steps focussed on tightening standards of
manufacturing, testing, and labeling to minimize the risk of adverse
reactions; the most recent big changes added for the first time the
requirement that drugs be proven effective for uses claimed for them
by their manufacturer.5
Each country has its own special approach to drug regulation, but
the economic and technological power of the United States is such
that the activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are
closely watched internationally, and frequently imitated by other
countries, though each country brings a special character to their
drug regulatory system: the Japanese are extremely rigid; the Americans demand complete documentation of every aspect of the drug's
testing program, irrespective of the mountain of paper—and cost—
entailed; the British are sensible and flexible; the French have a
system which is a unique amalgam of the bureaucratic and the
personal; the Germans and the Canadians lean heavily on the FDA's
policies.
The bias in all drug regulatory systems is toward preventing unexpectedly hazardous drugs from reaching the market. That bias is
understandable from the history of how drug regulation came into
being, through public reactions to a series of disastrous incidents
involving relatively small numbers of victims compared to other
hazards in our lives. This bias poses a curious paradox, as illustrated
by the following rather simple-minded parallel. We disrupt traffic
and incur rather special risks to-rush injured or seriously ill people
to the hospital by ambulance so that they can come as quickly as
humanly possible to the best available treatment, and sometimes we
bend heaven and earth to rush a special medicine to a few people who
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need it. Yet somehow none of this sense of urgency carries cner to
the regulatory review of new drugs.
An example of the cost in human lives of the slow pace of the drug
regulatory system is the seven years it took for FDA approval from
the time of thefirstpublications showing that administration of beta
blocker drugs reduced mortality in the first few years after heart
attack. The results of the first clinical trials were reported in 1974,
and in 1976 the Swedish regulatory authorities approved this use for
one of the beta blocker drugs—alprenolol—then already available in
the Swedish market. The first FDA approval of this usage for a beta
blocker came in November'1981 In 1975, Professor William Wardell of the University of Rochester had called this beneficial action:
of the beta blocker drugs to the attention of the then-commissioneof the FDA, Alexander Schmidt, together with calculations indicai
ing that each year's delay in approving this use would cost abou
20,000 lives.6 Six years after WardeH's letter, when thefirstapprova
finally came, FDA Commissioner Arthur Hayes announced thai
indeed, the newly approved product would save 17,000 lives per year
Nobody thought to haul him up to the Capitol, sit him down in fron
of the TV cameras and a Congressional investigating committee, anc
ask him what about the 100,000 people who died in the time between
thefirstpublications and the approval, without which few physicians
will use a drug. In effect, Americans had to use ONURONE for .:
half dozen years even though something demonstrably effective ua
already available.
Yet, when it recently developed that there had been five deaths
from allergic reactions associated with the widely used analgesic
drug ZOMAX, there was a strong reaction in Congress and the
launch of an investigation to learn how this terrible thing had been
allowed to happen to the American people.
Critics of drug regulation point out that the only time that Congress, the President, and the American people were of one mind in
praising the FDA was when Dr. Frances Kelsey delayed the approval of thalidomide in the United States. President John F. Kennedy
transformed her into a heroine by presenting her with a special medal
in the White House Rose Garden. The message was not lost on her
colleagues at the FDA or in other regulatory agencies around the
world: there is no credit to be gained for lives saved due to speedy
regulatory action, but a very small number of fatalities or other
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severe adverse reactions to a drug will lead to public humiliation and
scorn for any regulatory official who may have acted other than very
cautiously and conservatively in reviewing the drug.
If one were to judge the overall value of drug regulation strictly
on a body-count basis of lives lost due to regulatory delays as against
lives saved due to keeping unduly dangerous drugs from the market,
one would have to question seriously whether drug regulation is a
very good bargain. With little or no regulatory involvement, many
other industries design, test, manufacture, and market complex
products on which many lives depend, and it would appear that both
competitive forces and the pressure of product liability lawsuits are
effective checks on the sale of unduly risky products. At the very
least, we ought to be a sophisticated enough society to be able to see
and understand the risks that are prolonged, as well as the risks that
are minimized, by regulatory review. A simple-minded stranger
looking in might wonder: if we have ambulance crews on duty
around the clock and allow them to run red lights when called,
should we not have our drug regulatory agencies working a threeshift, seven-day week to minimize the fatal consequences of delaying
the introduction of improved drugs?
The FDA and other drug regulatory agencies around the world
get most of the criticism whenever the subject of long delays in
bringing new drugs to market arises. However, there are two other
often overlooked factors that contribute to these delays. One of these
is that only large pharmaceutical firms can mobilize the resources to
develop and test a new drug, but one of the inevitable consequences
of large size in any organization is that it necessarily becomes slow
and bureaucratic in its operation. The second delaying factor is a
technological one. As pharmacologists and physicians have become
increasingly cognizant of the power of modern drugs, the processes
for testing new drugs have become increasingly elaborate and searching. There has been a steady expansion in the kind and number of
animal toxicologic tests run on new drug candidates, and the whole
field of designing clinical trials has been fundamentally transformed
during the last two decades. Thus, the whole process of new drug
development is vastly more complex and time-consuming since the
days when insulin was rushed from the laboratory to the bedside. It
is probably amenable to some considerable pruning, but there is little
incentive in the current regulatory environment for that to happen.
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In clinical trials of various treatments, one seeks to standardize
diagnostic criteria and methods, to standardize the severity of disease
in the patients admitted to the trial, and to standardize the various
treatment regimens which the trial is designed to compare. Standardizing the cooperation of the patients with the prescribed regimens,
however, is easier said than done—even when everyone acts in the
best of faith and solemnly swears to do just what the doctor asks.
Clinical trials have come to play an increasingly important role in
modern medicine, putting different treatment methods to the test of
quantitative comparison in as controlled a fashion as ethical medical
practice allows. When a new treatment modality appears for a previously untreatable disease, the controlled clinical trial will naturally
include a no-treatment group, though often disguised from patients,
nurses, and doctors by use of a placebo, i.e. an ONURONE treatment. Contemporary standards of ethics mandate that participants
in the trial know they are in a trial and be informed about the various
treatments that they may (or may not) actually receive. The designs
of such studies are a not-always judicious blend of scientific experiment and everyday medical practice.
There are many vexing problems in the design and execution of
clinical trials, but they are one of the very important advances which
have come into clinical medicine in the last quarter-century. Their
routine use in the evaluation of virtually all new methods of treatment—plus their use in the retrospective assessment of many time
honored methods of treatment—is gradually transforming medicine
from an almost wholly empirical art to an amalgam of quantitatively
validated technology and art. Clinical trials are gradually providing
the main outlines of how the best practice should be carried out, but
clinical judgement and the art of medicine continue to guide most
diagnosis and treatment. Thus, the physician's judgment will continue to be an important element in the risk of disease, however much
it may seem that technology may have displaced the art of medicine
and the essential human contact between patient and physician or
nurse. In medicine, the patient is an object of a discipline which, in
using technological-scientific procedures, puts.on a scientific face but
is both more and less than a science in the extent to which it draws
on the art of human judgment tempered by experience.
The growth of medical knowledge based on well-designed clinical
trials is a slow process. Clinical trials take a great deal of time to plan,
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•Medical and Surgical Risks 121
to be reviewed by the necessary disinterested individuals for ethical
concerns, to find the appropriate patients to enter into the trial, to
carry out the sequence of treatments called for, to analyze the data,
and finally to communicate the data to other physicians and health
care personnel. There are pitfalls in the process, many of which come
down to bending the need for scientific rigor to the exigencies of
caring for patients. The trial has to have enough rigor to give a
definite answer to the question of which treatment modality is best,
or the better of two; at the same time it has to be a close enough
approximation of routine clinical practice so that treatment efficacy
shown in the trial will also be found in practice. Some big clinical
trials take three to five years to complete, especially if they involve
questions about diseases that progress slowly.
Yet there is a huge numerical gap between even the largest of
clinical trials and the potential patient population that would use a
new drug. Some of the biggest trials are those in which contraceptives were evaluated: these have had between 10,000 and 25,000
participants. Most new drugs, however, are tested in 1000-2000
people. In the case of the oral contraceptives, there are about 12
million women in the United States using these products and probably upwards of 50 million worldwide. In the case of drugs for
hypertension, there are about 40 million hypertensives in the United
States. Certainly not all will ever take any one drug, but, if a drug
appears to be especially efficacious and well tolerated, and poses little
risk, it may be used in half or more of the patient population. Consequently, the clinical trial population and the population who may use
the product in the market will differ in size by hundreds of thousands
to millions. That number gap has the important consequence of
making the first few years' use of the drug after market introduction
into a big but poorly controlled experiment.
The initial years of market experience are necessary to close the
number gap between the population size in the clinical trial and the
population size needed to define safety-degree to the 4-5 SDU range
(i.e. risks of 1 adverse reaction in 10,000 to 100,000 patients). This
point has already been mentioned in the discussion on oral contraceptives in Chapter 5, but it is a very important fact of life about
which our society manages to delude itself. To illustrate why the
number gap exists, suppose the clinical trials have involved 5000
patients, which is an unusually large number; if 50 patients have
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similar adverse reactions, it is reasonably certain that the risk of that
adverse reaction can be defined as 1 in 100 during the time period
involved. Suppose, however, that only one patient develops a particular kind of adverse reaction. It is difficult to know what to conclude
about a single event—it may or may not be related to the drug, and
so the matter has to be held in abeyance until more experience is
gained with the drug. Thus, having 5000 people in the clinical trial
does not allow definition of a risk level of 1 in 5000, but something
rather more like 1 in 1000.
Suppose five patients developed similar adverse reactions in a
group of 5000 patients: one has an approximate idea that the risk is
1 in 1000. This figure is only an approximation, however, for it may
be that there was a chance clustering of a few "extra" adverse reactions within the study group and that the true risk is less. On the
other hand, the events in the study group may somehow have minimized the occurrence of the adverse reaction, such that in subsequent
market experience with the drug, the adverse reaction turns out to
occur at a 2-5 times greater incidence than in the trial. As a practical
matter, the biggest unicohort size one can define with reasonable
accuracy in a clinical trial is about one-fifth the size of the trial's
population. If, however, the patients in the trial have to be considered as being divided into subgroups—by age, sex, other disease
conditions, etc.—then the biggest unicohort definable will be about
one-fifth of the biggest subgroup.
The initial use of the drug in the first year or two after its market
introduction builds up large numbers of users—assuming the product is widely prescribed—and will necessarily begin to reveal adverse reactions which occur at the 1 in 10,000 to the 1 in 100,000
level of incidence. As in the clinical trial phase of experience with the
drug, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from a single adverse
reaction. Therefore, it usually takes 4-6 occurrences before an association with the drug is suggested. However, one of the things lacking
in the United States is a means of insuring that adverse reactions to
drugs are reported; as a result, more than nine-tenths go unreported.
Thus, it may take over 2 million people's use of a drug before the full
extent of its risk is reasonably well defined to the 1 in 50,000 level—
per use if it is an acute-use drug, per year if it is a chronic-use drug.
If we had a mechanism in place that insured efficient and timely
reporting of adverse drug reactions in the first years after a new
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product entered the market, we could reduce both the number gap
and the time required to identify drug-related risk. Even with an
efficient system of reporting adverse drug reactions, however, there
will still be a large number gap between the biggest clinical trials and
the smallest numbers needed to reveal all the risk information we
crave to know about any widely used drug.
Therein lies one of the reasons for saying that life is an experiment:
there is no earthly means to finance or manage a clinical trial that
could define the degree of drug safety to more than 3 SDU (1 adverse
reaction per treatment period in 1000 patients). Yet our social and
political behavior indicates that we reserve the right to react with
shock, horror, and witch-hunting when drug-related risk shows up
at the 3^.5 SDU level (1 in 1000 to 1 in 30,000).
The number gap is a fact of life, but it is not generally understood.
When a newly introduced drug is associated with adverse reactions,
there is usually a big uproar and witch-hunt—talk of prosecuting
people in the company which developed the drug, suspicious congressional cross-examination of FDA people who reviewed and approved the product, and a usually brief but intense coverage of the
subject by the news media. By the time media attention shifts to a
fresh subject, the drug in question usually has acquired such a widespread reputation as a poison that it is practically useless thereafter.
Many months or years later, when the nature of the association has
been worked out and reported within professional circles, the news
media give little attention to the resolution of the story, which sometimes exonerates the drug.
The automobile manufacturers seem to be able to recall their
products without' such catastrophic losses in credibility, but drugs
are much more politicized, despite the fact that automobiles kill
many more people than drugs do.
For example, McNeil Pharmaceutical recently recalled, on its own
initiative, its pain-relieving non-narcotic drug, ZOMAX, for reevaluation in light of a small but growing number of reports of
serious and very rarely fatal allergic reactions to the drug. There
were five known fatalities possibly attributable to use of the drug,
which had been widely prescribed and so had a very large cohort of
past and present users. Prior to McNeil's voluntary recall of
ZOMAX, the recall of a drug because of possible adverse reactions
had meant the drug's end as a product. McNeil's stated intention,
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however, was to clarify the risk situation and then decide whether
to reintroduce the product, and if so to make changes in instructions
to physicians and patients which would act to minimize risk. This
"recall for re-evaluation" was a bold and innovative step, signifying
a new degree of realism in evaluating the risks of adverse reaction
to a widely used drug.
However, a congressman promptly demanded an investigation of
what the FDA had done wrong, what the company had done wrong,
and so forth, effectively taking the matter out of McNeil's hands and
turning it into a media happening. The concept of a "recall for
re-evaluation" is ethical, scientifically sound, and beneficial to the
public health, but no pharmaceutical company is likely to repeat
McNeil's experiment for a long time to come. Instead, recalls will
continue to be postponed until adverse reactions are clearly occurring at a risk level which is high enough to force everyone involved
to jettison the product permanently. This policy means that: (1) we
shall continue to lose opportunities to preserve useful drugs by making risk-reducing changes in their instructions for use; (2) more
people will have to suffer adverse reactions to trigger a permanent
recall than a recall for re-evaluation.
An intriguing and not yet fully understood footnote to the
ZOMAX episode was revealed about eight months after McNeil's
voluntary withdrawal. A prescription-event monitoring study of
ZOMAX in England showed that patients taking the drug appeared
to have about half as many heart attacks and strokes during their
time on the drug as would have been expected for their age group.
After the drug was withdrawn and the patients all had to turn to
other drugs for pain relief, the rate of heart attacks and strokes
resumed at the usual rate.7 If this unexpected finding is in fact related
to the use of ZOMAX, it would certainly suggest that many more
premature deaths were prevented by the use of the drug than it may
have caused, if even the worst assumptions about its risk were true.
The basic fact is that drug use, both in clinical trials and in everyday
medicine, is a risk discovery process. Clinical trials can only screen
for relatively high-risk problems at the 1-3 SDU level; the discovery
of the more dilute risks—at the 3-5 SDU level—has to occur in the
course of the drug's use in everyday medicine.
Useful new drugs do not grow on trees, but now cost an average
of $70 million and take seven to ten years each to develop. Every new
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stricture in the heavily politicized arena of drug regulation adds new
layers of cost and time. Each new layer of cost effectively raises the
minimum patient population size for which drug development is
economically justifiable. The term "orphan drugs" has recently appeared. These are drugs for diseases that affect too few people to
allow a return on the expense to develop, test, and register the drug
product. The orphan drug phenomenon has been created by successively more complex and costly regulations governing new drug
development.
Pharmaceutical innovation is a goose that has laid many golden
eggs in the past half century. One cannot but wonder how hard the
process can be squeezed before investment simply moves into other
areas,8 leaving it to governments to develop the new drugs. Reviewing the meagre pharmaceutical innovations which have come out of
the state-run industries of Eastern Europe does not inspire one to
believe that this would be a very effective way to meet present and
future disease challenges.
Not all the news is bad, however, as a drug gains use-experience
in the market, for sometimes unsuspected new therapeutic uses are
identified for older drugs—the above-mentioned apparently favorable action of ZOMAX, for example. Once the initial several million
patients have used the drug and its overall risk picture is reasonably
well-defined, these new uses are indeed bonuses. They do cost money
to document in clinical trials and to gain approval from regulatory
authorities for inclusion in the indicated uses for the product. These
costs pose a major problem when the discovery of a new use comes
at or after the end of the drug's patent life, for thereafter the drug
is public property, and a new claim registered by any manufacturer
is more or less automatically available to all. That quirk in the
regulatory and patent laws deprives all manufacturers of the economic incentive to innovate with older drugs, which is one reason
why most manufacturers will opt to bring forward a new, "me-too"
drug of the same class as the older one, around which to develop new
uses. That has two disadvantages: (1) it keeps the regulatory system
clogged reviewing "me-too" drugs; (2) each new drug raises a whole
new set of risk questions, which can only find minimal answers in
clinical trials. Because of the number gap, about 2 million patients
have to undergo the involuntary experiment of testing for adverse
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reactions that occur at the 3-4.5 SDU level (1 adverse reaction per
treatment cycle in 1000 to 50,000 patients).
One area of recent pharmaceutical innovation which partly sidesteps this problem is the development of new drug delivery systems,
or therapeutic systems. These are special dosage forms which meter
the drug, into the body at low, usually steady rates for extended
periods of time. They have their own patent protection and thus can
be used in conjunction with some older drugs to develop better
tolerated, less frequently dosed forms while still relying on the existing risk definition of the drug that came from its initial years in the
market. Controlling the rate of entry of drug into the bloodstream
can have an important influence on balance between therapeutic
actions and side-effects of many drugs. These new drug delivery
systems make it both scientifically and economically possible to
extend or improve the uses of some older drugs. Examples of such
products are the "skin patches" which administer nitroglycerin for
angina, scopolamine for motion sickness or vertigo, clonidine for
hypertension, and estrogen for the menopausal syndrome and to
prevent postmenopausal mineral loss from bones. These technological advances are gradually turning the major pharmaceutical companies away from their long-standing, single-minded focus on new
chemicals as the sole means of pharmaceutical innovation.
Everyone should understand that there is no such thing as a
risk-free drug, just as there is quite obviously no such thing as
risk-free surgery. It is unfortunate that the term "drug safety" is used
so widely in so many contexts, both lay and professional, for it is
fundamentally misleading and contributes to the confused politicization of pharmaceuticals. U.S. drug regulations require that the "safety and efficacy" of each new pharmaceutical product be proved,
thereby implying promise of the unattainable goal of absolute safety.
German regulations avoid the confused semantics of the term "safety," and ask instead that the product should be "free of concern,"
which is also unrealistic, for how can any intelligent person be "free
of concern" in the face of a defined risk of death or serious injury?
The choice of words in these two sets of drug regulations symbolize
the lack of realism and confusion with which we, as technologically
advanced societies, confront risk. Often while we dither, patients are
left with ONURONE.
Part of clinical judgment is to balance risk and benefit in the use
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of a drug. With great insight, Plato used the term pharmacon to mean
both "medicament" and "poison," leaving it to the context to indicate which meaning was appropriate. It is not always easy to make
such judgments in clinical practice, nor can these judgments be made
"free of concern." The use of an effective anticancer agent may
necessitate—and warrant—the acceptance of a 1 in 10 risk of fatal
bone marrow suppression, but when the antibiotic chloramphenicol
turned out to have a 1 in 30,000 risk of fatal bone marrow suppression, its previously general anti-infective use was promptly restricted
just to the treatment of typhoid fever, for which it was uniquely
effective and still offered an overwhelming advantage compared to
other treatments.9 A diuretic drug called tienilic acid had to be
withdrawn several years ago when it turned out, after its first halfyear in the U.S. market, that its use carried a 1 in 500 risk that the
patient would develop a sometimes fatal liver disorder; 10 curiously,
the same drug had already been in the market in France for several
years without this problem having become evident, nor was there any
evidence that it was occurring in France when very careful studies
were done there after the problems became known in the United
States. That discrepancy remains a mystery. Aspirin is probably the
most widely used drug of any—a recent British survey showed that
4.5 million out of the 57 million total population took it at least once
a week, and half a million people took five or more a day.11 Aspirin
has its recognized risks—among them are gastrointestinal bleeding
and ulceration, plus precipitation of asthma attacks in people with
a certain kind of allergy problem—but the risks of these occurrences
are very dilute. However, the exceptional person who has encountered an adverse reaction to aspirin is well-advised to use another
agent in the future.
The most troublesome kind of adverse effect of a drug is the one
which takes many years to appear. Two examples will illustrate. The
first is an antidiarrheal drug, clioquinol, which had been widely used
in many countries for many years throughout the world before its use
in Japan was associated with several hundred cases of serious neurological damage, blindness, and a number of deaths.11 Protracted
investigation has failed to give a satisfactory explanation for how this
catastrophe occurred when and where it did, but an extensive litigation process put the blame on the drug and held the pharmaceutical
companies involved liable. The second example is a true "time
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bomb"—diethylstilbestrol (DES). This artificial estrogen compound
had been developed in the 1930's; among its clinical uses during the
1940's and 1950's was the treatment of impending miscarriage. In
the late 1960's a small number of young women in Boston were found
to have a previously extremely rare form of vaginal tumor; casecontrol analysis showed that during the fetal lives of these young
women their mothers had received DES treatment for impending
miscarriage. In earlier years, this choice of treatment had been especially strongly advocated within Boston medical circles, which probably accounts for why the problem was first recognized in Boston,
instead of elsewhere. Other—seemingly minor—abnormalities in the
genital tract are also observed in about 1 in 3 of either males or
females exposed to DES in fetal life; fortunately, the lifetimeriskof
developing the vaginal tumor in the exposed females appears to have
been about 1 in 7000 (3.8 SDU)J2 The whole story will not be
known, however, until the people exposed during fetal life have lived
their entire lives.
There is no conceivable clinical trial or drug regulatory mechanism which could have prevented either catastrophe. Both could,
of course, have been prevented if, back about 1900, all countries had
legislated against administering synthetic chemical substances to humans, just as we can readily prevent jet plane crashes by banning jet
planes. The cost in human suffering and in premature death of
restricting our pharmacopoiea to the ONURONEs of the 19th century would create such a preposterous imbalance of risk and benefit
that there can be no alternative to accepting occasional disasters as
part of the price of improved lives and health for the vast majority.
Nor should we delude ourselves that drugs extracted from natural
sources—plants or animals—offer any inherently greater insulation
from risk, for every natural substance has its undesirable, frankly
toxic, and sometimes lethal actions.
The only hope for minimizing the risk of such events in the future
is the added understanding that we gain with each passing year from
the big investment being made in biomedical research. It may eventually enable us better to foresee certain kinds of problems and avoid
having always to deal with them in retrospect.
We have been lucky to have gained so much and lost so little as
modern technology has moved so rapidly into medicine. Infrequent
disasters involving small numbers of people have brought govern-
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ments into the process in the name of protecting the public health.
We should pay much more attention than we now do to the health
consequences of the slow pace of pharmaceutical innovation and
regulation, for the resulting forced dosing with ONURONE can be
responsible for many thousands of premature deaths. The whole area
of medicine and drugs is so thoroughly politicized that the foreseeable changes will probably bring both a slower pace and more
governmental involvement, not less. An important area for improvement is the monitoring of unexpected drug actions—both adverse
and beneficial—during the drug's use in thefirstfew million patients.
Improved monitoring would reduce the number gap standing betweenrisksdefinable in clinical trials andrisksacceptable to society.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 63

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Therapeutic implication* of the drug lag

The Ameru^mlagwahrespect to BrHamm the
the past decade was analysed to determine whether, in therapeutic terms; Britain has grimed
or last from adopting the more permissme pokey. The therapeutic impact of m new drug en
the whole community is difficult to assets, mainly became there ere few methods or data
amuabte for measurssg benefit. On the evidence currently available, Britain probably did
not lose appreciably from me introduction of Ineffective drugs, nor from the fact that a greater
number of net* drugs were made avertable. The main deleterious effect was mat Britain suffered
mm ioxkHtyduetonewdrngsthandid the United State*, as could have hem anticipated from
; the fact that mora new drugs were marketed mere. However, considering the size of the total
harden of drug toxicity, the portion due to new dru{^ was extremely smatl^ and would in any
case be at least parHsUy offset by the adverse effects of older alternative dntgt had the latter \
been used instead. Conversely, Britain experienced dearly discernible gains by introducing
useful new drugs, either soener than the United States or exdustoehj. On balance, Britain
appears to hoot gained m comparison from its more permissive poUcy toward the marketing
of new drugs coupled with a more rigornm pmgrmn of postmarketing surveiiance. Wide*
hastes raised by this etudy tnchude the destrahfoty of further intensifying postmarketing
'survedlance, psrtkuhtrly in the case of new dntgs; the conflict between the presently
concerned pubUc health rok of a regulatory agency end the desire of a physician to choose
optimal therapy for particular patientt; the therapeutic and sodd implications of the control
of drug utilization as distinct from marketing; and ike significance of the latter controls for
the future of medicine*
*

William M. Warden, B.M„ B.CH^ D.PMMOxe*)* Rochester, N. Y.
Department of Fharrnacology and Toxicology, University of Rochester School of Medicine Usui
Dentistry
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by differences in therapeutic approaches
in Britain and die United States. American
physicians were found to be poorly informed about drugs used widely aad for
some years abroad but not yet available
in the United Sutes. :
The present paper examines the therapeutic implications of that international
difference. Compared with the United
73
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Conclusions
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American approaches.
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probable, therefore, that British patients
currently available.
j
have gained economically in comparison
As Lasagna** has pointed out, the pro1with Americans.
tection conferred by delaying the introduc|
In addition to economic factors, one
tion of new drugs needs to be weighed
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relative attention given to ascertaining a
drug's safety in the earlier phases rather
than in later phases of its development
Toxicity testing in animals can never guarantee a drug's safety in man77; neither can
the Small numbers of closely monitored patients required for premarketing trials of
efficacy guarantee its safety in thepopulation at large. Given these facts, the actions
of a regulatory agency should hinge to a
ing surveillance. If postaarketing surveillance is poor ornonexiktent, then the decision to approve a new drug is a grave and
irreversible one; it sbc*Jd be delayed as;
long a* possible (forever?) in the hope that,
exhaustive preclinical and clinical testing,
together with the experience of other countries, will reveal all -unsuspected toxicity in
the drug before it is approved for market* .
ing. If, on the other hand, postmarketing
surveillance is rigorous enough to detect;
even rare .drug toxicity, promjrtly, tiben
drugs could be introduced more rapidly,
with confidence that (provided information
from the surveillance system 5$ acted upon
at once ) no widespread hartn to the community will ensue even if the drug does
turn out to induce unsuspected reactions.
. It should be recognized that, contrary
to general belief, the early stages of newdrug investigation are , extremely safe.11
When widespread, cataj±mphic drug toxicity lias occurred, it has only been after
a drug ha* been marketed, and never in tibe'
early phases of development. Tliere is a
tendency for episodes erf this nature to be
taken as evidence of laxity in thedrug-approval procew^ however, lift the present
regulatory era when preclinical tests are
being used to the limit of their usefulness
(and possibly beyond), it would be .more•
«>raect to regard widespread toxicity as a
failure of ppstniarketing surveillance, rather than a failure. of premarketing screen*
i n g . .-V-•••:".•: ..•••...•..•..•;.•; \ . : ; / ; : ^ : ; - : c i . > , V

. Therefore, if the resources available to
develop and regulate new drugs are not unlimited, the way these resources ane currently deployed should be re-eaciuniiied*

Rath^ t h w centum
land human premarketing hurdles, society
inight benefit more from ascertaining and:
improving the predioUve power for man of
:'animal safety tests, and from intensifying
postmarketing surveillance. The latter approach appears to be a major difference in
; practice between the current drug regulatorysystemsin the United States andjPrit>
ain. In the United States, animal and premarketing procedures are generally more
demanding; implementation of the regulation requires a large number of people;
and assessment takes a relatively long time,
Nationwide postmarketing surveillance is,
however* poorly develppri by internal
'.
11
nB !
standards. In the:-^?itt«^l,"ipSiEig^ ^' *^*-""P' t'
marketing requiremeot* are' less onerous,
and new drug apphcatiom are proofs
more quickly• with a considerably mailer .
staff.14'41 Cc^vewely,, 'Sxj^'>-:<mq^ed.
- to place more reliance on its more sophistk
cated surveillance system^ and this approach appears (with the reservations
made earlier) to have forestalled w
spread toxicity due to the introduction of
new drugs. As already discussed, Britain
appears on the evidence currently avaflable
to have benefitedfromthis approach.
The third conclusion is that fundamental
differences can be discerned in the roles of
the regulatory agencies in Britain and in
the United S t a t e s ^ - \ ^ ^ t ' : ^ ^ \ - 0 ^ , t
enoes oai^ profo
practio* of medicine. >
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•'. In the t y ^
cacy of a proposed new drug has been a
formal requirement of the approval process
since 1062, when/efficac^ was foarmaUy
added to safety" -'"by; > Aie:';.jCi^iivBrrJHtaate
amendments to th^ Food, -Drug and O s metics Act Befort 1962, 'evidence of efficacy, altiiough jdktt ^
in fact given some w d g h t u It is, indeed,"
entirely reasonable in prindple to m ^
the question of efficacy with that of safety,
since no toxicity is tolerable if a drug lades
efficacy.
In Britain the m*in formal focus of the
drug approN^ prooessfrom^
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ADVANCEMENT O F SCIENCE

Benefits, Risks, Vaccines, and the Courts

The hero of the 1500's was an explorer who blazed trails through hostile
terrain to discover new worlds and wealth. The "hero" of the 1900's is a
victim who blazes trails through hostile lower courts to establish a new
precedent for lawsuits and wealth.
The high cost of such thinking is that few manufacturers want to make
vaccines any more (see Science, 1 March, p. 1012). The profits are small;
the risk of lawsuits very great. The country may soon be in the ludicrous
position of developing a vaccine for AIDS and of not being able to find a
manufacturer to produce it.
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continued from page 15S7
vaccines and accompanying host factors. Wyeth
HDCV is a subunit vaccine, disrupted with tri(n)butyl phosphate and further inactivated with ppropiolactone, while Merieux HDCV is a whole virus
vaccine inactivated with 0-propiolactone. Other factors, including older age, receipt of mildly immunosuppressive medications and administration of the
vaccine into the buttocks, may also have contributed
to the lower responses. Injections in the gluteal region
will almost always be delivered into fat 6 It is not
known whether there is a difference in absorption of
the two types of HDCV when administered by this
route. It has recently been recognized that administration of hepatitis B vaccine in the gluteal area
probably results in a poorer response than vaccination in the deltoid.7 It is recommended that all adult
immunizations be administered in the deltoid
region8,9; the deltoid area is the preferred site for
HDCV vaccination. The gluteal area remains an
acceptable site for large volumes of RIG. HDCV and
RIG should never be administered in the same
anatomic sites.
One 1.0-mL intramuscular booster with Merieux
HDCV in the deltoid area is recommended, based on
review of available information, for all persons who
have been potentially exposed to rabies since Oct 15,
1984, and who have received postexposure prophylaxis
with Wyeth HDCV (unless serum samples obtained
after postexposure prophylaxis demonstrated an
acceptable antibody titer). Merieux HDCV can be
obtained by telephoning (800) 327-2842. Anyone currently receiving Wyeth vaccine should complete the
course with Merieux vaccine and does not require an
additional booster. Serologic testing is recommended
if a systemic allergic reaction (serum sickness or
urticaria) occurred during previous administration of
postexposure prophylaxis. In that case, an acceptable
serologic response obviates the need for a booster
vaccine dose. Serum testing continues to be indicated
if a patient who received postexposure prophylaxis
with HDCV is immunosuppressed (by diseases or
medications).1 State health departments can be contacted for the addresses of laboratories where serologic testing is available.
The Wyeth vaccine administered preexposure and
in the recommended 1.0-mL intramuscular doses
(three injections) has been effective in inducing
antibodies. Based on currently available information,
persons so-vaccinated need neither serologic testing
nor booster doses of HDCV, except for those select
groups previously identified.1 In the event of future
exposure to rabies, persons who have received preexposure prophylaxis with either type of HDCV should
receive two 1.0-mL intramuscular booster doses of
HDCV (one each on days 0 and 3), as is currently
recommended.1
•At present, the CDC considers a neutralizing antibody titer
that produces complete inhibition in the rapid fluorescent
focus inhibition test at 1:5 dilution or greater (1:11 or greater
by the Reed-Muench method) an acceptable response to
immunization.' The
World Health Organization considers 0.5
IU/mL or greater2 an acceptable response (approximately
equivalent to 1:56 by the Reed-Muench method or complete
inhibition at the 1:25 dilution).
1540
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Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis
Vaccine Shortage
On Feb 12,1985, the American Academy of Pediatrics hosted a meeting to discuss ways of dealing with
the current shortage of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis
(DTP) vaccine. The meeting was attended by representatives of the American Medical Association;
American Academy of Family Practice; the vaccine
manufacturer; state, county, and city health officials;
the US Department of Defense; and the US Department of Health and Human Services.
Available information indicates that, overall, state
health departments have approximately 2.3 months'
supply of DTP vaccine on hand, but this vaccine is not
uniformly distributed, with 18 states having supplies
on hand of one month or less. Because of close
inventory monitoring and prudent use of DTP
reserves held by the manufacturer, vaccine has
remained available in the public sector to date.
A survey conducted by eight different state health
departments of 583 physicians indicated approximately one third had had difficulties in obtaining DTP
vaccine, and approximately one half were following
the current recommendations to defer the DTP doses
for 18-month-old and 4- to 6-year-old children. In four
states, where inventory estimates were made, physicians' current inventories ranged from 1.9 to 2.9
months' supply.
Lederle Laboratories reported the release for distribution of one DTP vaccine lot on Feb 12. This lot,
about 35,000 vials (525,000 doses), has been divided
among the company's five regional distribution centers located in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Dallas. This vaccine is being distributed
to health-care providers now.
Because currently available supplies of DTP vaccine
are limited, the manufacturer is carefully coordinating the distribution of vaccine to both public and
private health-care providers. Following extensive
discussions, the group reached the following conclusions and recommendations:
1. Current information indicates that adequate
supplies of DTP vaccine should become available in
mid- or late 1985.
2. Until adequate supplies become available, it is
important to continue the currently recommended
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practice of deferring the DTP vaccine doses for
18-month-old and 4- to 6-year-old children to assure
that the initial three-dose immunization schedule for
infants is met.
3. Practitioners should not administer partial doses
of DTP vaccine in an effort to make the vaccine go
further, since the degree of protection afforded by
such partial doses is not certain.
4. Diphtheria-tetanus vaccine should not be substituted in the routine DTP vaccine schedule for 18month-old and 4- to 6-year-old children.
5. It is important for practitioners to establish
recall systems to ensure that children whose doses are
deferred are recalled for the DTP vaccine they need
once supplies become available.
6. Because some children will have their 18-month
or "preschool dose" of DTP vaccine deferred this
spring and summer, it may be necessary for day-care
centers or school systems to allow provisional enrollment of such children until they can receive the
needed doses.
7. As soon as adequate supplies become available,
the Academy of Pediatrics and the US Public Health
Service will notify physicians so they can again

Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome Associated
With Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Enteric
Infections—United States, 1984
During the first 11 months of 1984, seven cases of
hemolytic-uremic syndrome (HUS) associated with
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 gastroenteritis were identified in the United States. All patients had microangiopathic hemolytic anemia, thrombocytopenia, and
evidence of renal disease; none had new onset of
neurologic abnormalities to suggest thrombotic
thrombocytopenic purpura. A diarrheal illness preceded onset of HUS in all seven patients. The cases
occurred in Washington, Nebraska, and North Carolina.
Washington.—Three cases occurred between
March and October. The first two patients (women
ages 25 and 36) had a prodrome of hemorrhagic
colitis; the third patient (a 3-year-old boy) had a
prodrome of watery, nonbloody diarrhea. E coli
0157:H7 was isolated from the stool of each patient
No exposures common to all patients were identified.
Nebraska.—During an outbreak in September of
diarrheal illness caused by E coli 0157:H7 among
residents of a nursing home, one of the patients with
hemorrhagic colitis, a 63-year-old woman, subsequently developed HUS.
North Carolina.—During an outbreak of gastroenteritis (both bloody and nonbloody diarrhea) in a
day-care center in September and October, three
children who had bloody diarrhea subsequently developed HUS; they were 11 months, 31 months, and 35
months of age. E coli 0157:H7 was isolated from the
stools of four ill children, including one with HUS.
Reported by Washington Dept of Social and Health Svca; Div of

Ansamycin LM427
Since October 1983, the CDC's Division of Tuberculosis Control, Center for Prevention Services,
has supplied the experimental drug, ansamycin
LM427, under a "compassionate" investigational
new drug permit to physicians treating patients
with serious mycobacterial disease unresponsive to
conventional therapy. Beginning Monday, Feb 18,
1985, physicians requesting the drug for new
patients should contact the CDC Drug Service at
(404) 329-3670 during normal working hours. Ansamycin LM427 is not released at night or during
weekends. The Division of Tuberculosis Control
([404] 329-2530) will continue to provide medical
consultation on the treatment of mycobacterial
diseases.
resume the full DTP immunization schedule and
recall those who need additional doses.
Reported by US Public Health Service Interagency Group to Monitor
Vaccine Development, Production, and Usage.

Health, Nebraska State Dept of Human Resources; Div of Health
Svcs, North Carolina Dept Human Resources; Enteric Diseases Br,
Div of Bacterial Diseases, Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC.

Editorial Note* E coli 0157:H7 was first recognized as
an enteric pathogen during the investigation of two
outbreaks of hemorrhagic colitis that occurred in
Oregon and Michigan in 1982.J Since then, E coli
0157.H7 has also been associated with sporadic cases
of hemorrhagic colitis and HUS in the United States,
Canada, and Great Britain.2"1 Isolation of this very
rare E coli serotype from stools of patients with HUS
suggests that this pathogen may be one important
cause of HUS; however, further epidemiologic and
laboratory studies are needed.
Since E coli isolates from stool cultures are not
routinely serotyped, the diagnosis of E coli 0157:H7
infection cannot be made unless physicians consider it
and arrange for serotyping. Stools from HUS patients
who present with a diarrheal prodrome should be
collected as soon after onset of illness as possible and
held frozen at -70 °C (-94 °F). Arrangements for
examination of the stools and/or E coli isolates from
such stools at state laboratories or the CDC can be
made through state laboratory directors.
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Bankrupt the Company
That Makes It?
In the present climate of richly rewarding
lawsuits by individuals against manufacturers for product liability, U.S. pharmaceutical
companies may be less than eager to invest
large amounts of money and effort into
producing a vaccine for AIDS. But an experimental AIDS vaccine should be available
Robert Windom announces a framework for initial clinical testing within the next
for industry and government collaboration on
decade, and individual scientists as well as
an AIDS vaccine.
drug companies recognize the needforlegislation that will encourage rather than discourage vaccine production.
collaborative program. These include: pepT h e important legal issue is pretty dear,"
tides isolated from or based on AIDS virus says Brian Cunningham, vice president and
proteins that might be used in a potential general counselforGenentech in South San
vaccine, organisms such as vaccinia virus Francisco. "As the law stands today, manuthat can be genetically engineered to pro- facturers are held liable for injuries caused
duce proteins normally made by the AIDS by a vaccine even though they were not
virus, methods for producing and dectecting negligent in designing it. In these circumthe AIDS virus, isolation methods for pro- stances, in my opinion, the legal system has
teins made by the AIDS virus, and molecu- simply run amuck. And for a small company
lar dories of the AIDS virus. The United like Genentech, we simply cannot take the
States government owns the rights to these financial risk." Genentech is now in the
patents.
research phase of developing a potential
The PHS notice calls for collaborative AIDS vaccine, but the company has not
plans from the private sector to be submit- decided whether it would move into fullted by October 21, sixty days from the date scale vaccine development.
of the notice. Each plan will be considered
Current])', drug companies are subject to
on a case-by-case basis, and final selection stria product liability, a legal term meaning
will be made by the agencies of the PHS that the manufacturer is liable for any injuincluding the National Institutes of Health ries caused by the product, even though die
and the Centers for Disease Control.
product was made properly.
California is leading the legislative effort
Harmison says that the concept for establishing a collaborativeframeworkfor AIDS to lessen a manufacturer's liability for an
vaccine development is not new. In 1984, AIDS vaccine with a bill, which is expected
the PHS issued an invitation for private to pass before 1 September. Governor
industry to become involved in making test George Deukmejian hasformallyendorsed
kits to detect AIDS virus antibodies in the the vaccine legislation (as of this writing).
blood (which were on the market by 1985), His office projects that Californians will pay
and the idea for vaccine development col- about $3.5 billion in medical costs alone for
AIDS patients in 1990, making the need for
laboration began then.
An AIDS vaccine is not likely to be a vaccine afinancialas well as a health care
available for general use until well into the issue.
Due in part to persistent lobbying efforts
1990's. The primary reason for the expected
delay in its development is the scientific by Genentech and other pharmaceutical
complexity of the research problem, which firms, the new bill would relieve drug comnecessitates large and equally complex re- panies from strict product liability. Introsearch collaborations. Why did the PHS duced by assemblyman John VasconccDos, it
release its new notice now? Because the is designed specifically to apply to an AIDS
stage of scientific research warrants such vaccine once it has been approved by the
collaborations at this point, says Harmison, Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The
and perhaps because the time is ripe for bill offers not only protection from two
exercising some control over who has access classes of Lability claims, but also provides
incentives for drug companies to make a
to patent licenses. •
DEBORAH M. BARNES vaccineforAIDS.
The California bill has four essential fea(A discussion of the different research stratetures. First, it leaves intact a person'srightto
sue because of injury due to manufacturing
gies now being used to develop an AIDS vaccine
defects in an AIDS vaccine. At the same
will appear in the 12 September issue.)

i

,.. __.M...»w »uiwi piiAiuii iiapiury in a
suit based on warning or design defects if
the vaccine has been found to be "unavoidably dangerous" (defined on the basis of a
California appellate court decision as a product with great public benefit that is unavailable in a less dangerous form). Second, it
states that it is the intention of the state of
California to purchase 750,000 doses of the
vaccine for a maximum of $20 a dose, if this
number is not sold in the 3-ycar period
foUowing FDA approval of a vaccine. Third,
it provides for $6 million in grant money to
be given to drug companies that do clinical
testing of potential vaccines. And fourth, the
bill guarantees compensation to individuals
injured by an AIDS vaccine by paying their
medical expenses, lost income, and a capped
amount for pain and suffering. The money
for this compensation fund will come primarily from a surcharge that the vaccine
manufacturers will pay, with any future state
appropriations to be decided later.
The California bill may prove to be model
legislationforother states or perhapsforthe
federal government. The House of Representatives subcommittee on health and the
environment has introduced bills that pertain to childhood vaccines. One of them,
sponsored by subcommittee chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA), would protect pharmaceutical companies that make childhood
vaccines which are already FDA-approved
against stria product liability. It would also
offer compensation to children who are injured by a properly made vaccine.
But anyforthcomingvaccine for AIDS is
admittedly experimental and will not have
FDA approval until it is shown to be both
safe and effective. Whether protective legislation will be introduced at the federal level
for such an experimental vaccine is uncertain. Public Health Service scientists and
representatives from private industry have
been discussing these issues with congressional staff, m DEBOKAH M. BAJLNES

NASA Council Sees
Continued Erosion off
Space Program
The advisory council of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has expressed "great concern"
about the agency's ability to fulfill its mandate for national preeminence in space.
In a blunt letter to agency administrator
James C Fletcher, dated 14 August, council
chairman Daniel ). Fink also says "that
actions being taken by the U.S. to restore its
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Foocf and Drug Administration because they are not considered drugsThere is no solid information about the correct dosage that wight
alleviate arthritic tenderness or to keep cholesterol and triglycerides
at their correct levels.
So what should the American public do when these wonderful fish
oil omega-3 capsules are offered to them at a high price? It's still
best to get fish oil from eating fish.
The FDA should take a good hard look at all nutritional
. ^
supplements, including fish oils, and exert some authority over the* - ^
based on the claims being made.
Q. jta one of your columns you described a pill that women could
take to3|*rninate an early pregnancy. Can you tell me when this drug
will be marketed in this country and what is holding it up?
A. The name of the drug is Mifepristone and will stimulate a
spontaneous abortion (miscarriage) in 90 percent of women when taken
before the fifth week of pregnancy, studies say.
I believe this drug will never be marketed in the United States.
Although it will be opposed by the anti-abortion lobby, the nain reason
probably will be the inability of any manufacturer to obtain product
liability insurance.
^.
0. Do you think because Nancy Reagan has had breast cancer that
there will be a faster development of a drug to cure it?
A. Research into the causes of breast cancer is at an all-time
high. There is no immediate expectation of a drug that will cure it,
but advances in drugs that improve the immune system may hasten a cure
for breast and other cancers. Mrs. Reagan's contribution, however, has
been to alert women that they can prevent possible death from breast
cancer by having a mammogram. What her husband can do is to see that
all women, regardless of income, have access to a mammography.
Q. I am a healthy person of 38. I have a little trouble sleeping
now and then, but I take c^re of this with camomile tea. Lately, I seem
to have spells of sneezing and watery eyes. I live in the city so I
know it is not hay fewer, I was thinking of taking one of those
products advertised to help colds, but I thought I would ask you if any
other products would help.
A. The only thing I can suggest is that you stop the camomile tea
for a few weeks and see if your sneezing and watery eyes go away.
Camomile comes from the same plant family as ragweed.
Q. I have had a bout of running to the bathroom every 15 minutes
and the doctor prescribed Gantanol DS. What kind of drug is it?
A. Gantanol DS is a brand name for the sulfa drug,
sulfamethoxazole, double strength. It is usually very effective in
eliminating urinary infections such as cystitis. If you do not receive
relief from your problem in a few days, be sure to call your doctor.
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NEW YORK Fear, distrust and misinformation have created a crisis in
contraception in the United States, slowing research and stopping
introduction of new and safer birth-control methods, an internationally
known women's health expert warns.
i
^
"We're basically going to hell as far as contraceptives and ^ " ^
women's health is concerned," Dr. Elizabeth B. Connell, professor of Tu*
gynecology and obstetrics at the Emory University School of Medicine iiT^Atlantar^said in a telephone interview.
"American women are being forced to leave the country to obtain
contraceptives," she said. "This is already happening with the IUD
(intrauterine device). The Copper T Cu 360 A is now available in
Canada, the United Kingdom and continental Europe. American women are
traveling to these countries to obtain the device."
Connell said population-control experts in those countries are
increasingly perplexed at what is happening to birth-control efforts
here: "They're just beginning to realize how crazy we are."
Dr. Gerald Zatuchni, director of the Chicago-based national
Program for Applied Research on Fertility Regulation and a professor in
the department of obstetrics and gyneocology at Northwestern Memorial
Hospital, says prospects are bleak.
"I've been involved in all aspects of concept planning and
development for 25 years, and I've never been as pessimistic as I have
been the last year or so. I don't see any opportunities for any
resurgence in interest in developing new methods of birth control over
a minimum of 10, probably closer to £0 years. And it won't change just
because there may be a new administration in Washington in 1989."
Zatuchni cited a string of factors involved in the loss of
interest in research. The magic of the term population explosion has
vanished,, partly because of successful family planning programs in some
developing countries, he said. Lessening population pressure in the
United States and preferences for reduced families also are involved.
"Also, we're in a legal situation with new and existing methods of
birth control in terms of all the suits that have been filed and won in
some instances. The IUD story particularly has been quite detrimental
to companies willing to invest any sort of monies in developing new
methods."
The length of time and money at risk to develop an FDA-approved
drug or device, he said, affect research and development. "From the
cost accounting point of view, it just takes too long and too much
money at risk for fairly small financial returns.
^Fear of sexually transmitted disease is important. Today condom
manufacturers are working three shifts to keep up with the demand,
mostly because of the AIDS scare. It has, in general, indicated to
those who are interested in contraceptive research and development that
methods would have to be developed that would also be as effective as
the condom and spermicides in thwarting infection as well as providing
birth control. When you ask yourself what method should we develop,
it's pretty obvious you come back to the method called condoms.
•'*_.. >%
"The religious/political factor, of course, is another point. I """
don't mean to lump them together, but they sometimes go hand in hand*/^
Just the other day the pope came down hard again against any method «f
contraception other than the so-called natural one.
"The present administration in Washington is not only
anti-abortion but anti-family planning. This has affected the whole
field in terms of interest to come up with improved methods of birth
control."
Other experts long involved with birth control echo concern about
the field. l>r. Enayat Elahi, medical director of Planned Parenthood in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
New York City, said: "There is no
liability insurance available for new
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
methods

Of

COntraren-Mnn

i^hirtk

*~~

«i~_.-t..

* - »- * -

-• -

•*

Sweden, is not available here."
Dr. Richard Lincoln, senior vice president of the Alan Guttmacher
Institute in Hew York City, warned during a recent birth-control
association's meeting in Washington, D.C.:
%
If the 1960s ushered in a contraceptive revolution, then during
the 1980s we're experiencing a contraceptive counter-revolution. The
IUD has effectively disappeared from the American market. Spermicides meaning foams, jellies, creams and sponges - may be next. /
"Methods that have already been developed and are available •'•'-*:*?%
elsewhere are not available to Americans. Clinical research using human^
subjects "'to develop new methods has virtually been brought to a
iK r ^
standstill in this country."
"**•
Another population-control researcher, Laurie Liskin at Johns
Hopkins University, said American women are being denied access to some
of the safest, most effective and" convenient birth-control methods.
In contrast to an American woman, Liskin said: "A woman in
Indonesia can get one of several types of copper IUDs, which are not
available - and never have been available - in this country. She can
also get two different types of injectable contraceptives, one that
lasts two months, another that lasts three months. Or she can get a
contraceptive implant that lasts five years."
In addition, women overseas have ready access to various versions
of the contraceptive Pill, spermicidal tablets and ordinary condoms.
In the United States, however, Liskin said, "There is a general
lack of availability of reversible, easily accessible methods of birth
control."
The situation is particularly ironic, Connell said, because it was
the United States that led the world in contraceptive research and
development.
"Americans have provided most of the basic scientific data,
expertise and manufacturing capability for contraceptive technologies
now in use around the world," she said.
But now, she added, "The United States is losing its leadership
role in this area - with potentially disastrous consequences for women
and men in this country and elsewhere."
Reasons for the dramatic decline in contraceptive research and
development - and the unavailability of newer contraceptive methods include:
Widespread public misunderstanding of the risks and benefits of
various birth-control methods, such as newer, highly effective birth
control pills and IUDs.
"The public's fears far exceed the real dangers," Connell said.
"This is particularly true of the Pill, whose risks have been grossly
exaggerated in proportion to its benefits."
The Reagan administration has decimated family-planning efforts
because of the link to the ideologically explosive issue of abortion.
"The current administration has refused to fund any international
family-planning organizations that offer abortion counseling or
referrals *long with other forms of birth control," Connell said.
In 1984, for example, "the Reagan administration abruptly
terminated 17 years of support for the International Planned Parenthood
Federation because it would not renounce its members' rights to carry
on abortion-related activities with their own funds.
"The following year, the U.S. Agency for International Development
cut $10 million from support for the United Nations fund for population
activities because of its program with China."
In mid-August, the agency again withheld funding from the UN
program, despite strong objections from congressmen and senators,-and
from within itself.
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been a member of the Planned Parenthood executive committee and has
been an adviser to the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Reliable birth control, other than condoms, became a reality in
1960 when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the first oral
contraceptives. The Pill is almost 100 percent effective in blocking
pregnancy, but initially the oral contraceptives made some women more
susceptible to blood-clotting problems.
After the chemical composition of the Pill was changedjto decrease
the amount of estrogen, problems declined dramatically. For most women
it is far safer to take the Pill than to continue a pregnancy to term.
"Despite this track record," Connell said, "The use of oral
contraceptives has declined. This is largely because the Pill's early
risks received a disproportionate share of public attention."
As for IUDs, she said, serious problems caused by the Dalkon
Shield have caused their use to decline dramatically. And because of
liability problems, the newest and best of the IUDs - the copper T Cu
360 A - "may never be brought to the U.S. market" even though it
already has been approved by the FDA.
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Pit-bull attacks mustn't be tolerate/
Neal Peirce
ANIMALS;
dogs; pit bull

the sight of another dog,
A pit bull named Gadhafi goes berserk
strains at its leash, bites its own tongue,/ >prays saliva and blood.
Another pit bull is so keen to attack it tries to chew its way through
a chain-link fe^ce* And a street dude named Eric tells about the litter
of eight young pit bulls he's raising Only 8 weeks old, they're
throats.
already -Jiterally - at each other
When my photographer colleagu Shepard Sherbell came back from
Baltimore's Liberty Hill neighbor bod with those reports recently, I
decided this was one urban stor I was happy to learn of secondhand.
But what of the pit bulls'? Can this summer's wave of horror
stories be passed off as medda hype? Hardly. Pit bulls have inflicted
21 of the nation's 29 fata^r canine attacks since 1983. Fourteen of the
victims Jiave been children under 6 years of age. Each story of a
mutilated youngster's bpdy, torn by the vice-like jaws that close with
1,800 pounds of pressure, ripping off flesh with sure intent to killf
is more appalling thim the last. And for each fatality, there are * '^
dozens of other pitbull attacks that leave victims with lifetime
scars, physical id psychological.
>?
This wave
terror stalking American streets can only worsen.
There's an explosion of pit-bull breeding in ghettoes and barrios where
idle, embittered youth have chosen the animals as "macho" status
symbols, t/o fight and wager on. In Philadelphia, the pit-bull count has
soared f^x>m 25 to 4,000 in five years. Time magazine reports the
animals/are often fed gunpowder or hot sauces to make them mean, live
Digitizedtaste
by the Howard
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hiding us to concentrate on expanding our beauty, health care and direct
mall businesses."
At one time, Avon planned as many
as 15 Tiffany stores around the country. But Deepak Raj, an analyst af

1977, Tiffany had operating mar gins
of a healthy 14 percent, last year they
dropped to closer to 3 percent. .
In trading on the New York Stock
exchange yesterday, Avon stock rose
62}£ cents, to $20,875.

cuntM's and Lxrhanpe Commission
that tt is talking with the Amrep Corporation about the repurchase of
Amrep slock. The Unicorp group
holds 823,337 Amrep shares, or 21.9
percent of the total outstanding.
Unicorp owns and manages real estate investments. Amrep is engaged
in land devlopment and residential
construction, both are based in New
York On the New York Slock Exchanpe today, Amrep was the biggest
percentuge loser, plunging $3.75, to
$19.25.

Kodak Microfilm

ROCHESTER, June 19 (AP)-The
Eastman Kodak Company introduced
a high-speed microfilmer and a retrieval terminal capable ot finding
one microfilm image from among
10,000 or more in hwoods Kodak also
introduced two packaged information
systems— the high-volume KAR-4400
and the low-volume KAR-2200 —
which include the microfilm equipment as well as printers, a computer
and software. The company said the
products are a step toward its goal of
creating a system that would allow
users to electronically scan images
June 19 (Reuters)
on microfilm and transmit them in —WASHINGTON,
The Student Loan Marketing Asthe form of computer data. The new sociation,
also known as Sallie Mae,
products include the R. hunt 2000 miit had submitted an application
crofilmer, which Kodak said would said
to
charier
a
bank in North Carolina. It
cost about $19,000.
said that First Capital Bank, to be
based in Raleigh, would specialize-in
investment and liability products related to education credit, but would
also offer limited banking services to
the community. Sallie Mae, a fedchartered, stockholder-owned
JEFFERSON CITY, Mo., June 19 erally
corporation,
Is a financial intermedi(AP) — The Republic Bank of Kansas ary serving the
credit marCity has been closed because of poor ket. By buying education
insured student loans
lending practices and other problems and providing other
financial servthat rei/dered it insolvent, Missouri's ices to financial and educational
instiCommissioner of Finance, Kenneth tutions
and
state
student
loan agenLittlefield, said. An examination last cies, it replenishes local supplies
of
month by the Federal Deposit Insur- student credit.
ance Corporation indicated that the
bank had suffered heavy loan losses
and had violated banking laws, he
said. The bank, which had two offices
in Kansas City, reported abuut $38
million in deposits and $41 minion in
assets at the end of March
The American Home Products Corporation said its Wyeth Laboratories
Division had ceased production of
pertussis vaccine, used to immunize
children against whooping cough, because of possible liability problems
associated with th/shots. A company'
PARIS, June 19 (Reuters) ~- Mas- spokesman said the vaccine had been
sey-Ferguson Ltd. said it planned to withdrawn because of higher injur- d'
close its harvester plant in Marquette ance costs and the risk of liability in
in northern France and lay off all of
lawsuits from users of the vaccine, as
the plant's 1,430 employees for a least well as the cost of defending any lawthree months because of abnormally suits. Wyeth is estimated to have achigh stocks. Production at the plant is counted for 25 percent of the product
forecast to fall to 415 harvesters this in the domestic market. Lederle
year, from 620 in 1983. A spokesman __
Laboratories is the other major pro*aid -an-annual-level-of ^ ^ ^ a s - ^ u ^ ^ j ^ ^ ^ Y t a t ,
needed to maintain the current work,
force.

Sallie Mae Charter

Small Bank Closed

Wyeth Vaccine

Massey Layoffs

Changesat I.B.M
The International Business Ma-1
chines Corporation said a variety of
graphics capabilities previously
available on its larger computers
would be offered for its System/38.
I.B.M. also said that terminals used
with its intermediate and Jarge s y s tems could now he attached to
System/38 by remote communications lines.

Military Contracts
WASHINGTON, June 19 (Reuters)
—The Oshkosh Truck Corporation re- ceived a $133.4 million Army contract
for. trucks, the Defense Department
said. In addition, the Puerto Rico SunOil Company was given a $61.4 million contract by the Defense Logistics
. Agency tor fuel, and Sanders Associates Inc. received a $37.4 million Air
Force contract for spare parts for
countermeasures test equipment.
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into the river In that aroa, Including raw sewage.
Tbey also begin to acclimate themselves to the aalty ocean
water in which they will live as adulu, and tome venture into the
upper bay near the tip of Manhattan.
They go back up river in the spring, and the pattern repeats
v
Continued on Page C4

Vaccine
Liability
Threatens
Supplies

How a Soviet S
Was Finally Pi
By WILLIAM J. BROAD
• • B BOUT three years ago a kind of obsesf f l M
sion began to take hold of Dr. Mark
M*jlL
Kuchment, a 48-year-old science
• I B B histonan who emigrated to this country in 1975 from the Soviet Union.
While interviewing Soviet emigres for a Harvard University research project, Dr Kuchment kept hearing stones of an American engineer who had aclueved dazzling success in the
secret world of Soviet military research An
American? How could that be?
Dr. Kuchment, who was born in the Ukrainian port city ot Odessa and educated in Russia,

By PHILIP M.BOFFEY
WASHINGTON

IIIE nation's major drug compa•nies, some stung by large liabil"
ity costs, have been dropping out
of vaccine production for years
and the trend is continuing, raising fears
that future supplies may be jeopardized,
important research wilt be neglected
and the costs of vaccines may skyrocket.
The latest dropout was Wyeth Laboratories, which announced June 13 that it
rty ceased production of a vaccine used
to immunize children against whooping
cough after more than 30 years of
producing it. Hie company cited "dramatic increases in the cost of participating in this market," chiefly due to liability insurance and the costs of litigation.
The whooping cough vaccine has the
most serious side effects of any of the
vaccines now adminstered to virtually
all children in the country under state or
Federal laws.
The Wyeth defection continued a tr
that has been under way for the past decade or two, according to Paul D. Parkman, deputy director of the center for
drugs and biologies at the Food and
Drug Administration. During the 1960's,.
Dr. Parkman said, there were eight
manufacturers of the combined vaccine
that is used to immunize children
against diphtheria, whooping cough, and
. tetanus; now, after Wyeth's withdrawal,
Continued on R«geCJ3

•

TteNe* York Time*/Rick Fnetota

Dr. Mark M. Kuchment, above,
found that top Soviet researcher
was Alfred Sarant, right.

Sleuth lear
scientist ai
American
set out to find the ai
ultimately solve a
ternational mtrigu
and Federal agents
The tale pieced u
nally revealed that
a high official in tl
military research
American engineei
after the arrest of
senberg in 1950, we
Dr. Kuchment, i
versay and is a fell
Centet at Harvan
' work in a recent ini
shed little light on
innocence of Julius
were executed in II
passing atomic be
Union.
But he believes
about Soviet techno
Soviet officials in a
eigner and about tfi
a defector who took
"It's a strange a
Dr. David Hollow*
University on the
Contii
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Long before men ran out West in
search of gold and glory, they ran off
there are two, Lederle Laboratories
to
sea in search of whales and wealth.
of Wayne, N.>., and Connaught LaboThat era, 1£0 to 1*40, when whalers
imtoriee Inc. of Swiftwater, Pa.
sailed from the Eastern Seaboard,
Four other vaccine* that are adbrought with it, most incidentally, its
ministered to virtually ail children
works of art.
are now produced by a eingle domesThe flavor of this period is on (he
tic manufacturer, according to Dr.
walls and floor of the Museum of
Parkman. The live-virus measles
American Polk Art, ensconced now in
vaccine, made by all companies In
a new home, a building once occupied
the 19Ws, and the German measles
by John D. Rockefeller, at 125 west
vaccine, made by three companies
85th Street (Ml-2474). The show of 89
' then, are now manufactured only by
objects is called "Cross Currents;
Merck Sharpe * Dohme of West
Faces, Figureheads and Scrimshaw
Detail from Iftb-ecBtnry ail paintPoint, Pa. So is the mumps vaccine,
Fancies."
which Merck Sharpe has produced
ing by Orlando Hand Bears, InIn it are the works of three artists.
alone for two decades.
cluded In display en the sea at the
not household names, who painted
The live-virus polio vaccine, which
Museum of American Folk Art,
families prominent in shipping from
had three makers in the 1960s, is now
Massachusetts to Long Island. laaac
made only by Lederle Laboratories.
Sheffield worked in New York and
Tomov Yugoslav Folk Ensemble.
And the influenza vaccines, adminisConnecticut, painting portraits and
Admission Is free. Information:
tered on a voluntary basis to millions
miniatures of captains, their wives
3*4357.
of adults and children, are produced
and children. Orlando Hand Bears of
by only three companies, down from
Sag Harbor did the same in the same
aevealntheltfO't.
area. The third is Frederick MayHigh Casts of UabUlty
hewm, whose "natve" portraits have JAZZ
been popping up for years in Martha's
The reasons for the shrinkage are
Joe Barone and Ulyann Carol and
Vineyard and New Bedford.
complex and vary from company to
their trio have been going, if not
The ahow includes those essential
company, according to industry
eieady,
at least occaaTonally, with
art pieces of old-time shipping under
sources and Government officials.
Jimmy Weston's, the restaurant-club
sail, figureheads. There are also
Some companies concluded that the
at 131 East Nth Street (838-8184). Mr.
many examples of the carving art
vaccine market was too small and
Barone plays saxophone and his wife,
called acrimshaw, among them a
profit margins too low. Others
Miss Carol, is vocalist. Miss Carol
whalebone piece engraved with a
dropped out because competitors dewas
a featured vocalist in the early
acene of New Bedford, canes inlaid
veloped superior product*. Still
with ivory, jagging wheels of whale 1840's with the Louis Prima Orchesothers were squeezed out because the
tra before Keely Smith entered the
very success of vaccinations in reduc- ivory.
acene. Mr. Barone performed with
ing disease also reduced the demand
Open Tuesdays from 10:30 A.M. to 8 Cab
Calloway, Jerry Vale and Steve
for some vaccines.
P.M., other nights (except Mondays),
to 5:30 P.M. Admission: 82; students Lawrence.
But increasingly manufacturers
John S. Wilson visited them at an
andover-85's, $1; uoder-13's, free.
are blaming the high coat of protectearlier Weston's engagement and
ing themselves against liabiity
wrote
in The New York Times: "The
claims by the small number of people
kind of Intense, rhythmic and
who are inevitably harmed by severe ALF1ESCO
adverse reactions to the vaccines.
Even if a vaccine is produced with the
During summer, Al Fresco la New
utmost care in accord with the most
great impresario of music, as
stringent specifications, It is virtually York's
big as sll outdoors. Al fresco concerts
certain to cause harm to a tiny fracfuT streets, parks and plazas. Soma
tion of those who use it, or sometimes concerts are formally programmed:
to those who come into dose contact
others are not only al fresco, but ad
with those who receive it.
Music
hoc.
Some victims who suffer debilitatOne
of
the
more
popular
outdoor
B * * U I H NATIONAL 0 * * B A , Vtrtfl % MftifOft«ing physical damage, or even death, concert locations is Bell Plaza, the
to," M*truek>4lt4n Ot-K «liovtt, I
IN TUB PABKI, VOTreceive little compensation for it.
block-through court of the New York MUnaO^OtlTANOMlU
a t "antoni." GrMt L*wn, Central *orfc, S;*ty
They are the unfortunate victims of
Telephone building, on the Avenue of
r»lr»d*U,Thur*kv.
programs designed to protect the the Americas, between 41st and 43d
CBIMftON.
wtth Adrian
ftrtftn
Bftow,
TIMS CO*CBBTS
on TMB
CSi
public health. But other victims are Streets. Often, lata in the day, a first- etiLika
frit*. Tuny Uvtrt tnd Stil BrvfertfTMfl
_
fttrorf tnd fit* A v w * , 7;»
successful in winning large liability rate big band lets loose its jazz here in NBW
VOBK CttOAAL SOCIBTY SUMMSB
awards that can eat into the profit* of an unofficial gig. And during the sum- BINOvAmv JCtlior,conductor, C«M Holt/Ml
WMfl7n\ltrMt.7:io.
the manufacturers, either through mer, the telephone people sponsor STSPMBM
HAA4MBA. Bore**
St. fowl's Church.mVH*Olit|tfit,ft.
12) WMITTif |tr««t, I
the awards themselves or through outdoor event*, as they will do, start- A M
*ftI GAM M B * MilllC COMftOftTIUM,
legal fees and higher insurance costa. fog today, every Tuesday from noon
W.Y.U. Loot ttudont Conhr, Too of tnt •>**,
ft* U Ou*dU Pi#«:Iloctr©*Acou»tlc Mt«fc
A report submitted to a Congres- tolP.M.
From fht HvthorUndt.ft;Bdwor* UwU, * . .
sional committee this year died 11
oot»r. i f * jtc* Krtltoimon. dor ln#tttt,7.
This is the fifth annual Summer
recent court awards or settlements in Arts Festival, and each week two dif- B i l l Y JOBU rock nncorl, Motiaon t««r»Oorwhich victims won between 8150,000 ferent musical acts will hold the aUBSABBT LB*B TAN. plonttt, VftVtntv Mu•oum of AmorkAA An tt Philip MorrU B v &
and $5.5 million. Sometimes the pavement. Today's stars are Neighfeo, tft A vonut ond 4M Itrwt. •.
manufactureTi end up paying sub- borhood Juke Box, a rockabilly band AN BVSNIM* WITH TUB ITABL AJUoftOt Sf
Utto Ariunoftecltty,lr»tttv* oflr*frn«ti«**t
stantial awards even though they evoking the lttO's sound, and the
iductttorw S3* onrtpd Mtflam H A M , J.
made their vaccines perfectly.
. Federaltotarvwitkwlough*
The steady withdrawal of vaccine
inamif|cturers has caused alarm
High Wihdg in Vermont Get
among professional organizations
Pltyert Away Prom Tible
and in Congress. The American Medical Association at its annual meeting
last week approved a report calling
lyALANTlUSCOTT
for the Federal Government to asaume responsibility for compensating
the victims of mandatory childhood
High wtndi are a nuisance to ath* bJe when the diagramed deal ocimmunization programs,
relieving
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. leas they are negligent.

raunchy lounge act that Louis Prima
created In Las Vegas is being carried
on with some degree of legitimacy by
Uiyam Carol and Joe Barone. while
their versatile three-man band keeps
a shuffle rfayihm going behind them,
one song flowa into another with a
amoothness that belles the seeming
anarchy of their performance."
Through June 30. they appear daily,
except Sundays, from 8 P.M. to 3
A.M. There is an 88 cover and no
minimum. Drinks, 84 up.
s: 81110318.
IEVTVAL
In January 1808, Samuel Beckett's
second play, "Endgame," had Its
American premiere at the Cherry
Lane Theater, directed by the late
Alan Schneider, and It has been a
theater perennial ever since then, receiving prestigious and other revivals
by companieslarge and small. Now It
Is getting a special revival at Theater
Row's Samuel Beckett Theater, 410
West 43d Street, where the director It
Alvln Epstein, who was in that first
performance and appears also la this
one, although in e different role.
Brooks Atkinson, In a 1858 review in
The New York Times, called it impressive and wrote: "Mr. Beckett if
wise in choosing the form of the myth
in which io sound his tocsin on the
condition Of human society. Since his
theme is unearthly, the unearthly
form becomes it."
In this production, Mr. Epstein la
joined onstage by Peter Evans, Alice
Drummond and James Greene Tuesdays through Saturdays at 8 P.M.,
Also Saturdayi at 2:30 and Sundays at
3 and 7. Admission today and tomorrow, before opening on Thursday:
$15; after that, 830 and 821 Reserve,
lions: 8944836.
•
•
•
Tuesday Sports Is on page A22.

Richard F. Shepard

Entertainment Events

Bridge:

••ROC. PABKBB TBKTBT. ita, oroe* H C M .
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Fewarsi Intervention Seuairt
The ataady withdrawal of vaccine
manuficturen haa cauaad alarm
among* professional organization*
and in Congress. Tha American Medical Association at IU annuel meeting
last week approved a report calling
for tha Federal Government to assume responsibility for compensating
the victims of mandatory childhood"
immunization programs, relieving
tha rnanufacturers of liabilityriskunless they are negligent.
"Of all of the armaments of medicine, vaccines offer the greatest
C n t i a J benefit to tha greatest nunv
of persona/' tha A.MA, report
aaid.
As examples, tha report estimated
that one in every 312,500 doses of
whooping cough vaccine, and one hi
every one million doses of measles
vaccine would cause brain damage,
and that one In every 3.2 million doses
of polio vaccine would cause paralysis, mostly in tmvacdnated adults
who came into contact with vaccinated children.
The Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences Is conducting a study of the fsctors that are
driving companies out of vaccine production and interfering with the
development of new vaccines. Roy
Widdus, the itaff officer for the study,
aaid it was motivated in large pari by
indications that "the industry which
was responsible for producing
vaccines wis not healthy'1 and that "people were dropping out" at the very
time that advances in biotechnology
ahowed "an enormous potential for
developing new vaccines."
Thus far the shrinking vaccine
capability has caused no major supply problems. "We don't yet have a
• crisis, but it may be that a crisis is
waiting to happen," aaid Kenneth
Bart, a vaccine authority at the Cents** for Disease Control in Atlanta, a
Federal agency that purchases vaccines for many of the state childhood
immunization programs.
The chief worry is that in cases
where there is only a single manuf acturer of a vaccine, the supply could be
disrupted by an unexpected manufacturing problem, a bad batch of vaccine, a strike by employees or a decision by the Last manufacturer to
abandon the market.
Another concern is that prices will
rise as the number of competing com- panies dwindles and liability costs
continue upward. The price of the
combined diphtheria, whooping
cough and tetanus vaccine has soared
from an average of 11 cents a dose 18
months ago to an average of 98 cents
a dose •
The final worry Is that reaearcn
aimed at designing new vaccines will
. diminish as the number of companies
producing vaccines grows smaller.
The Federal Government is trying
to head off supply problems by building a stockpile, paid for by the Government and stored at the manuiacTuring sites.
Meanwhile, Senator Paula Hawkins, Republican of Florida, and Representative Henry A. Waxman,
Democrat of California, have introduced legislation that would establish
a Federal mechanism for compensating victiins mjured by vaccines. '

^*^;

High Winds in Vermont Get
Players Away From Table

NORTH
4J764
94
0782
+ A7083
RyALANTRUSCOTT
WES I
EAST
SKQ
4 A 10 8 8 8 2
High winds are a nuisance to str- ble when the disgramed deal oc- V A K Q 8 2
9 J 10 8 8 8
iates, golfers and tennis players, but curred at one table. North's negative 0 10*84
0 they rarely affect bridge games. double, suggesting some values out- • K10
488
They did so Sunday, however, at a re- side hearts, was aggressive.
SOUTH (D)
gionaltournamentin Jaffarsonville,
It encouraged South to persevere In
48
diamonds at the five-level, and EastA tree was blown down and severed West went astray. West needed soma
978
a power line. The tennis bubble where diamond strength, rather than a
vAKQJOO
tha Swiss Teams was being played wealth of high cards, for a penalty
4QJB4
was deprived of its primary electrical double, and East ahould have retreatEast and Wast wan vulnerable.
source and began to away. Rather ed.
The bidding:
than rely on tha backup system, tha
Wasttoda top heart and shifted to Sooth
Wast
North
East
management arranged to evacuate apades. South ruffed tha second spade
19
DM.
49
the area in tha middle of a match. . lead, ruffed his remaining heart In I v
DM.
Pass
Pass
Tha evacuation was wall executed dummy, and drew trumps, The 8 0
and entirely orderly, but there was highly favorable club position al- Pass
considerable confusion about the lowed him to take all tha remaining
Wast lad tha heart king.
tournament, and some players went tricks for a score of 650.
East and West were naturally unhappy, and South tactfully refrained
A Problem far Officials
from adding to their gloom by pointWhan play resumed three hours ing out that six hearts was unbeatable bubbl* burst although tha large one
later In crowded substitute playing with North on lead. Indeed, ail IS remained Intact.
apace, 88 teams had been reduced to tricks can be made If North fails to
The evacuation was announced, au68, and some teams were composed of lead tha club ace.
tomatically voiding play In tha curfragments of originalfleams.This set
South was happily calculating that rant match. The opponents hurried
a rare problem for officials who have his team could win 18 International away, eager to escape from two Imto determine the standings and allo- match points on the deal, and prob- pending misfortunes, while South
cate master points.
ably win a bundit of victory points In stood for a moment, looking mournTne Swiss play was atill In the bub- the match. But at that point his small fully at the table.

Bridge:

Chess:

Karpov Captures First Place
In Oslo Centenary Tburney

By ROBERT BYRNE
aver, In the even material position
that arose after 18 RxP, Black's doubled KBP'e would prove to be a positional liability.
After 20 R-Q7, Miles could have
played 20 . . . RxP; 21 OxR, OxR; 22
QiP, but It Would not nave bean a
panacea since White would still have
been able to operate with the threat of
P-Q5, which, would have a powerful
disruptive effect on tha black position.
Just as Miles set his sights on a
pawn with 22 . . . Q-NO (maybe tha
defensive 22 . . . R-R2 was better),
Karpov sacrificed another one with 23
P-QM? Now, 23...BPXP; 24
RjtKPI, QzP ( 3 4 . . . P * R ? ; 23
QsPmate); 25QaQ, RiQ; 26 R/6-K7,
R-Q6; 27 N-R4 would give White winning chances for the sacrificed pawn.
Miles's alternative, 23 . . . KPiP;
24 Q-B3, QxP also did not shake off the
ressure after 25 R/1-K7, threatening
I N-K5I.
Miles had indeed Insured his king
by getting the queens off at move27,
but In the mutual time-scramble that
ensued, he tost one pawn after another.
Karpov'i 34 N-N3 gave the Englishman no time for 34 . . . R-QB?? in
view of 35 R-Qech, B-Bl; 88 N-K6,
winning a piece.
»
Since Karpov'i 38 N-B3 forced tha

The Oslo Centenary Tournament in
Norway, celebrating the founding of
the city's chess federation in February 1884, was won by Anatoly Karpov
of the $oviet Union. The world chainplod scored 6-3 to surpass by a halfpoint his nearest rivals, the grandleiw Tony Miles of Britain and
Ichev of the Soviet

Injthe sixth round, Karpov and
Miles reargued the aame Caro-Kann
Defense variation they had struggled
with In the BBC Tournament in Bath
last year. Then Miles won. lids time
Karpov got his revenge.
In Bath, Karpov had played 8
P-ON4?!, which loosened his position
and thus gave Miles tha impetus for a
sharp counterattack with 8 . . . PK4! Now he offered a positional gambit with 8 B-Q31?
Miles accepted the challenge with
10 . . . QxNP but soon changed his
mind and arranged to give back tha
pawn to catch up in development with
12 . . . N-NS and 13 . . . B-R3. How.

KARPOV/WHfTt

win of Black's last pawn (38 . . . RK5?; 38 R-Q&eh, K-R2; 40 N-NOch
picks up a rook), Miles gave up,
CAR04LANN DEFENSE .
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S/M/S4

Poeitloo after 22 . . . Q-N«

12 KR-K1
1) 8-87
14 BIN
II aaP
II R/1.N1
17 RiNP
II P-Kl
It K-N2
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•MAKER OF VACCINE
QUITS THE MARKET
Immunity Shots for Whooping
Couch Will Now Be Sold by

Only One U.S. Company
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

I

WASHINGTON, Dec. 11 — Connaught Laboratories Inc. has stopped
selling whooping cough vaccine, a company official said today. Health experts
•aicf the move would worsen shortages
of the vaccine, which is used to protect
* nearly every infant in the country
against the potentially fatal disease.
The company, one of two remaining
- American manufacturers of the vac-1
dne, said it was withdrawing rather
than pay sharply higher rates for liability insurance. Earlier this year, Wyeth
Laboratories halted production of
whooping cough vaccine, citing high
litigation costs.
Lawsuits against manufacturers of
all vaccines have risen sharply in recent years. Severe reactions are rare,
- but whooping cough vaccine has been
more vulnerable because it causes a
relatively higher rate of side effects,
including brain damage and death.
Douglas B. Reynolds, a vice president for marketing and sales with
Squibb/Connaught Inc., the toint venture company that distributed the vaccine for the Canadian-based Connaught, said the concern's insurers demanded higher premiums and deductibles, 'it just wasn't economically feasible to continue production," he said.
Stopped Taking Orders Inly 1
Mr. Reynolds said the company
•topped taking new orders for the vaccine July 1 but was still producing
small quantities of the vaccine to fill a
handful of contracts expiring early
next year. Connaught notified doctors
and health officials in a letter last
month that its efforts to solve its insurance problems had failed.
Doctors with the American Academy
of Pediatrics said that spot ahortages
had already developed in supplies of
the vaccine. The academy has recom. mended that doctors ration their supplies to assure that the youngest children, who face the worst risk, receive
immunization.
Connaught's withdrawal means that
each vaccine for childhood diseases,
those used to prevent polio, measles,
. mumps, rubella, diphtheria, tetanus
and whooping cough, is now produced
by a single manufacturer. The development is likely to stimulate a drive by
parents' groups and the drug coxnpatiles to set up a Federally sponsored
system of compensation for children
harmed by vaccines.
Such a program, financed by a Mrcharge on each dose of vaccine, could
reduce the number of lswsuits, proponents aay. A similar bill was intro.-.', duced in the last session on Congress.
Connaught had held about 25 percent
of the market in April 1963 when it
raised its price tenfold, to 142 a 15-shot
vial. It lost much of its business as a result.
The other remaining producer of
pooping cough vaccine, Lederie
Laboratories of Wayne, N. J., raised its
price in July to $42. It Is now expanding
r:: + : . to produce the nation's entire supply,
said Martha Homma, • company
:~
spokesman.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Lederie is also the sole manufacturer
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of the oral polio immunixation.
Dr. Martin
Smith, a vie*said
president
of
tLat - v >. v Academy
of Pediatrics,
that'do-

mumps, rubella, diphtheria, tetanus
and whooping cough, It now produced
by a tingle manufacturer. The development U likely to atimulate a drive by
parenu' groups and the drug companies to set up a Federally sponsored
system of compensation for children
harmed by vaccines.
Such a program, financed by a surcharge on each dose of vaccine, could
reduce the number of lawsuits, proponent* say. A similar bill was introduced in the last session on Congress.
Connaught had held about 25 percent
of the market in April 1983 when it
raised its price tenfold, to $42 a lfrehot
vial. It lost much of its business as a result.
The other remaining producer of
wHpoping cough vaccine, Lederle
Laboratories of Wayne, N.J., raised its
price in July to $42. It is now expanding
to produce the nation's entire supply,
said Martha Homma, a company
spokesman.
Lederle is also the sole manufacturer
of the oral polio immunization.
Dr. Martin Smith, a vice president of
Academy of Pediatrics, said that dependence on single companies would
likely mean a continued rise In the
price of all vaccines.
Dr. Smith said reliance on a single
manufacturer risked even greater
abortages because "it gives us no cushion of safety whatever" in case the
plant has to shut for any reason or
batches of vaccine are rejected by Federal regulators.
Many of the lawsuits involving vaccine injuries have focused on whooping
cough vaccine, which is made from the
bacteria that causes the disease, also
known as pertussis. It is estimated that
SO to 100 children a year suffer severe
reactions, although parent groups contend this figure is understated.
Medical expert* say that it is possible for a vaccine to cause a reaction in
an otherwise healthy child, even if it is
made according to Federal standards
and properly administered by the doctor.

New Rules Accelerate
Review ofNew Drugs
WASHINGTON, Dec 11 (UPI) —
Margtret M. Heckler, Secretary of
Health end Human Services, announced new regulations today designed to accelerate the review of new
drugs and bolster safety monitoring of
existing medications.
Mrs. Heckler said the new regulations would cut as much as six months
from the time needed to get a new drug
on the market, a process which now
takes an average of two vears or more.
The new rules will allow drugs to be
approved based on foreign clinical
studies as long as those findings can be
substantiated; reduce paperwork up to
70 percent; and allow simultaneous reviews by various offices of the Food
and Drug Administration, she said.
Mrs. Heckler said the regulations
would also strengthen requirements^)
for reporting by manufscturers and
distributors of adverse reactions to
medications. Mrs. Heckler's agency
oversees the Food and Drug Administration.Dr. Sidney Wolfe, head of the Health
Research Group, a group founded by
Ralph Nader, said regulations to accelerate reviews of new drugs could backfire, by reducing the "guallty of some
reviews" and slowing the drug review
process in certain circumstances.
The regulstions will be published in
~the Federal Register this week. Most
provisions become effective in three
months, with a transition period of OjrT
to a year for certain requirements,

vr
Originally

200.6g-~ti

Treasures fo love and
Cultured pearl brae
Polished

' ^ \

'

*'

Smooth, shiny b<
C

Culturedj>por\neckk
j
Exquisitely textured bt
Strand of cultured pearls,
Chain 4'mk necklace of 14 kt. gold
to.ma
' v•
^* ' » Spirof earrii
Exquisitely textured earrings of 14 kt gol
»
Ridged b<
"" Tine Jewelry, Street Floor, lord 8**1
J

Christmas

Shopping

Hours:

All to

•]

*<&&<
fc&£*W\

Digitized
^ by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0<fc<

*«i/V*.»j*-^r Jr^*r

fcS*.

>"j

•-.„

^ l ^ - _ .«=!*. .

Tab

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

V&*VU'-^^-«^^
THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY DECEMBER 20, im

r

r

r

•y STEPHEN ENGEISERG •_
. Social to TW Nr» Yaift TUMi

WASHINGTON. Dec 19 — A major'
drug company offered today to provide
•_ enough whooping cough vaccine to
avert a shortage projected for early
* next year, but only if the Government
assumed liability for lawsuits.
.'*" "'. Until this year, the company, Con"" naught Laboratories of Swifrwater,
Pa., supplied about 25.percent of the
nation's whooping cough vaccine. The
company said earlier this month that
since July 1 it had been filling fJhry existing contracts because of difficulties
to obtaining liability insurance at area~
sonable price.—.
:—

But David J„ Williams, vice presi- swine flu vaccine and then faced more
dent and genera] manager of Coo- than $1 billion in claims.
Mr. Williams said Consaught was
naught, told a bearing of the Bouse
Subcommittee on Health and the Envi- still negotiating for its own insurance,
ronment today that his company had but be added that it was unlikely to secontinued production and could deliver cure new coverage soon.
three million doses within 60 days If
More Stockpiling Asked '- Congress was willing to indemnify it
The Connaught offer underscored
against suits brought by parents of chilJ what
Federal officials said at the beardren who suffer adverse reactions.
ing was the ma)or reason for the shortThe chairman of the subcommittee. age of whooping cough vaccine: the inRepresentative Henry A. Waxman, creasing number of lawsuits against
Democrat of California, said It was un- manufacturers.
likely that Congress would approve
At the same time, the head of the
such protection. In the Carter Adminis- Federal Centers for Disease Control,
tration, he said, the Government as- James O. Mason, called for increased
sumed liability for the production of stockpiling of vaccine, particulariy for

T-*The American Medical Association Jdoaea aryeaT wer
whooping cough*
Dr. Mason testified that there were and the manufacturers have called on from December to
no stocks of whooping cough vaccine o& Congress to set up a federally spon- was likely to ouUt
hand and only a three-month supply of sored compensation system that would 'JOOJOOO d o s e s .
Mr. Wauuso cil
the other ma)ortaoculationsww avall- provide payments but keep the cases
out of the courts. This proposal has centers for not beiii
been
opposed
by
parents'
groups.
situation
at Wvet
- Dr. Alan Hinman of the disease cenRa&or, Pa., whicf
ters toid the committee it would cost
that it was halting
about S25 million to buy a six-month
As a result of the shortage, the dissupply of whooping cough vaccine at to- ease centers recommended last week of liability probtetx
said
it wasaeilmg
day's prices. He added that the 19© ap- that physicians postpone booster shots
propriation to stockpile vaccine for all for infants. Federal officials said tins Laboratories of W
major childhood diseases was 14 mil- would cause no immediate health prob- was assuming iiaix
Dr. Maaoo sa»d :
lion.
lems, buf other experts said increased ceived
incomplete
Specialists in pediatric medicine ac- incidence of whooping cough could re- the companies' mte
knowledge that no vaccine is com- sult if the shots were puupuocd for a ficial. Dr. Dtnief 2
pletely safe or completely effective. In full year.
he had kept the cen
Dr. Hirrman said that if production company's product
the case of whooping cough, an estimated 40 to 50 of the 3.6 million chil- schedules were met, the cxjuntry would
dren annually who receive inoculations nave adequate suppbes of the vaccine
KtMfMttftl
by March or AprlL He said IS million
suffer brain damage.
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Another
T prison spokesman, Charlie Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Mr.
Brown, sal
aid, "1 don't know if It was the Morin never had a stay of execution
i Executed in Texas longest,
but it was the toughest." In and bis case was never reviewed by a
lodelsnetrouoffidal
•aid*
*e.
sted of
too that
aum for

t having
the dose

Mr. Morin was the second Texas inmate executed this year, the sixth since
the stale resumed capital punishment
in 1M2 and the «xh in the United States
since the Supreme Court allowed earn resume in 1976.

five previous executions by injection, Federal court.
wad; navulon, a muscle relaxant, and the longest It took to insert a needle was
Ct» erase Bart
p^flifitfTi chloride, used for the pur* 10 minutes. - .
pose of halting the heartbeat.
Mr. brown said the difficulty In in- Gov. Mark White, in a brief stateTut problem in the execution, how- serting the needles would probably ment iuat aher 9 P.M. Tuesday, said he
ever, w u DOC In the choice of drugs, but prompt the Texas Department of Cor- would nut interfere in the case. District Beodectin Production Ends
the mechanic*! problem of finding a rections to review its procedures for Judge David Berctieimann of San Anto- CINCINNATI. March IS (UPI) —
btoodvessd free of scars or other dam- administering the drugs when the con- nio refused earlier Tuesday to block the Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.,
age into which to pass the deadly solu- demned person has a history of drug execution.
which won a major liability suit involvMr. Morin also faced death sentences ing the antinausea drug beodectin,
tion. Mr. Marin's long-term use of
drugs had caused extensive damage to Twenty capital punishment oppo- for killing Janna Bruce. 21, ofjCorpus said today that It bad abandoned problood vessels.
hetd a vigil outside the death Christl, and Sheila Whalen, 23, whose duction or the product, which It halted
As the lethal injection flowed into bis chamber and 30 others held a candle- body was found in the Denver area. temporarily In 1863. A Federal fury
veins, Mr. Morin took a deep breath light vigil on the steps of the State Cap*. Those two slayings and Miss Scott's oc- ruled Tuesday that Beodectin, taken by
and then uttered his final words, "Lord
curred within a five-week period In mors than 23 million pregnant women,
Jesus, 1 commit my soul to you."
Mr. Morin admitted shooting Carrie 1861. He also was accused of killing two was not responsible for birth detects.
The State Attorney General, Jim Marie Scott, 21, outside a San Antonio women whose bodies were found in a
Utah desert after Jfteir abductions ewesjiees wwy ne^ps yew sswy sx*esjs
Mattox, taid Mr. Morin "died very restaurant on Dec. 11, 1961.
calmly."
The conviction was upheld by the from Las Vegas, Nev.
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Under square Mils on the fore and main masts and
tier triangular sails on the mtuen and counter mluen
ts, the crew and passengers ate biscuits, fatback and
is seasoned heavily with garlic. They cooked in large copkettles over fires kindled with vine shoots and fed with
• wood Stowed below deck were tons of wheat, casks of
• and olive oil, cheese, vinegar, salt pork and sardines.
While other recent findings are reviving debate over
re Columbus — Admiral Don ChristOval de Colon — first
ed in the New World on Oct. 12, 1492, the discovery and
ysis of shipping documents in the Archive of the Indies In
tie are expected to contribute more to the understanding
ase early voyages of exploration. How the ships were reed and outfitted, how they were rigged, what cargoes they
ed and how various contractual arrangements shaped
y commerce with the New World are among the many fasting details the documents contain.
Of more immediate importance, the knowledge of Nina's
ensions and rigging is expected to Influence the many rep> of Columbus's ships thai are being planned for the qulnennial celebration of the 1492 voyage to the New World,
il now, as the historian Samuel Eliot Morison once wrote no
realty knew what the Nina, Pint a and Santa Maria really
ed like and every picture of them "Is about 50 percent
yM
Ihe most striking Insights, says Dr. Lyon, who is an ad4 professor of history at the University of Florida, relate to
Continued on Poge C3

mncks arc mircu in conirovcr*y.
The main object of study so far has been

Continued on Pogi* CS

Source: Corners tor Otf ease Control
Peaks represent dioxlns (D) and furans, a elass of related chemicals (F). Numbers Identify each chemical according to position of chlorine atoms on molecules. _
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Loss of Drug Relegates Many to Blindness Again
By PHILIP M. BOFFEY
ASHINGTON, Oct. 13 Thousands of patients
with rare neuromuscular
disorders are suffering
renewed contortions of the eyes, face,
neck and other parts of the body because their supply of experimental
medicine was cut off when its only
manufacturer was unable to obtain liability insurance.
Many who had been faring well are
now reverting to functional blindness,
unable to read, work, drive or venture
outdoors. Others can no longer
speak; some suffer debilitating muscle spasms that contort their faces or
necks.
r
Desperate patients are traveling to
* Canada or England to obtain the ex- perimcnt'al drug, made of botulinum ^-4oxtnT-l4~4s-the-only-med»cthe-thatgfves'them satisfactory leliefrArfew
are already resorting to risky, disfiguring surgery as the only alternative

to the missing medicine.
At the urging of doctors and patient
advocacy groups, roughly 2,000 of the
patients have written heart-rending
appeals to the Food and Drug Administration and, to Congress.
Their problem stems from the fact

that there is only one small manufacturer and distributor of the medicine
in the United States: Dr. Alan B.
Scott, an ophthalmologist who is associate director of the Smith-Kettlewell Eye Research Foundation in San
Francisco. In January, Dr. Scott in-

,,r*r«tti> AiUinf aaiinray

Injection of botulism toxin Impairs transmission of impulses from
facial nerves to eye muscles.
'

formed some 250 doctors who were
administering the toxin in clinical
trials involving more than 7,000 patients that he could no longer ship the
drug "because of inability to obtain
product liability insurance."
The drug continues to be available
In several foreign countries and in a^
specialized research project at Dr.
Scott's laboratory, which can accept
only a restricted number of patients.
The researchers testing the drug
said they were unaware of other
cases in which patients were suffering because a drug had been withdrawn from use as a result of insurance problems.
Over the last six to nine months, as
supplies of the drug were gradually
used up in this country and as the effects of the last doses wore off in individual patients, the level of desperation has been rising
.>_—~-—
—"We're in~~a"majdP^lnff'in the
United States right now," said Dr..
Continued on Poge C10
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Loss of Drug Relegates Many to Blindness Again
elded to keep sending the toxin to for- tome people because of its associaeign doctors on the assumption that tion with botulism.
Carole Kimball, an account executhere was less risk of a large damage
suit abroad. Hut he laid he was dis- tive with Alexander and Alexander, a couraging foreign doctors from treat- large Insurance brokerage In San'
ing large numtwrs of Americans, Francisco that has tried to rind coverpartly because that might increase- age for Dr. Scott, said his plight was
the liability risk and parti* because_ J'Bh example of the liability crisis" in
the foreign doctors' would have diffi- which both insurance companies and
culty following the progress of Amer- those needing Insurance are "looking
ican pat tents for research purposes.
very very curefully" at ways to reDr. Scott said there had been no duce their exposure to potent la tly
suits or damage claims Involving the high claims.
7~~
drug.
Dr. Scott aald he was continuing to
aeek insurance coverage and had also
•We Stumbled Along*
. Many patients and doctors say they asked the F.D.A. to allow him to
arc unsure whether the insurance In- charge tor the drug so that he could
dusjry is at fault or whether Dr. Scott pay for insurance premiums. Ordihas somehow failed to solve business narily, the F.D.A. does not allow pa*
tients to be charged for experimental^
drugs whose value has not been
firmly proved, but some exceptions
have been made.
Dr. Scott's prime goal Is to get the
drug licensed for regular therapeutic
use, a step he said he felt would improve his chances of obtaining insurance. The drug has been in an Investigational status for roughly a decade,
but Dr. Scott applied for full licensure
in April 1985; the F D A is reviewing
his data and Is expected to Issue a license when the review is complete.
"This has been the most frustrating
thing I ever wonted on," said Abbey
Meyers, executive director of the Na-ttonal Organization tor~Rare-Dtsoiyproblems efficiently or whether the ders, a Connecticut-based group. "We
F.D.A. has somehow failed to act ex- want the drug to get to patients," the
peditiously on Dr. Scott's request for said. "We don't want to see patients
a drug license. All know is that they suffering like this."
are unable to get the medication, and •A Difficult Subject*,
no solution appears yet in sight.
Dr. Scott said in a telephone interMs. Meyers, said she believed that
view that his insurance problems the F.D.A. was "proceeding wisely
began when his research project, and as quickly as possible." The
which is supported by a grant from agency "finds it a difficult subject
the National Institutes of Health, and just wtli not be pressured politimoved from the jurisdiction of one cally," she said. "Their safety consmall research institution, the Medi- cerns are very Valid. It is, after all, a
cal Research Institute of San Fran- toxin that people die from."
cisco, to another, the Smith-Kettle*
F.D.A. officials declined to comwell Eye Research Foundation, as ment on the case because of secrecy
part of a larger reorganization. In the laws surrounding the handling of
process, he said, the insurance that drugs under investigation. In a form
previously covered the project was letter to patients, the agency said:
no longer applicable, ana he was un- "Although we sympathize with those,
able to find another insurance carri- individuals whose therapy has been
er.
interrupted by this occurrence, the
"We stumbled along for a month or Food and Drug Administration does
two," Dr. Scott said, but then Smith- not have the authority to regulate the
Kettlewell ordered him to stop send- availability of insurance lo cover the
ing out thousands of vials of toxin be- use of investigational drugs. We recause the foundation was unwilling to main willing to work with Dr. Scott
lake the liability risk and feared that regarding the problem of interrupted
continuation of the project would distribution." Ihe agency also said no
cause its other insurance coverage to license could be issued until Dr. Scott
be canceled as well. Shipments-to provided proof, as all manufacturers
other countries were allowed because must, that he would be able to make,
large damage claims were deemed repeatedly and reliably, a safe and effective product.
less likely abroad.
Meanwhile, the Medical Research
•Bad Name' From Bftuiism Usk
Institute, where Dr. Scott's project
was
originally based, lost Its own li'Dr. Scott>£fforts to find insurance
have thtntfar been fruitless. He has ability coverage. Mary Woolley, the
set up a small company, Ocuiinum, executive director, said the institute ,
Inc., to make and distribute the drug had been covered for 11 years by the
in what he describes as a "small- same company and had never subtime" operation. "We've tried a large mitted a claim or failed to pay a pre-.
number of insurance brokers and lots mium, only to be abruptly dropped on
of different avenues to Insurance Aug. I. Tne institute has talked to
companies directly, but nobody is some 30 insurance underwriters and
^PMeUTJfi.S!^O0.fl7^1235|^^ipEpiJ0O-J?3*7ra
willing to write a policy on it," he . appealed for help to the California Insurance administrator, she said, but
•*id.
only company that responded set
One company offered to provide a the
the premium so high that "it was a
maximum of $300,000 in coverage, far we-don't-want-your-business quote."
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"and while surgery works, It's mutilating The surgeons remove muscles
from your fucc or cut nerves. ComItai^i^Burodlc', a" ncurc^ophthmalo-" pare that to an injection that takes 30
gist at the Harvard Medical School, ' seconds and lasts three or four
who was using the drug to treat months."
' The chief aide effects of treatment
•cores of patients suffering from involuntary muscle spasms in the eye- with the toxin are a drooping of the
eyelids,
an overflowing of tears and
lids and face. "All my patients are
double vision, hut all the side dfrctw
getting worse and worse."
transient and minor, Dr. Scott
"Tlte patients are Just desperate," art
aald. In some blepharospasm pasaid Mottle Lou Kocter, president of tients, the drug also interferes a bit
an organization that helps victims of with normal blinking of the eves, forcblepharospasm, a disorder in which ing the patient to use eye drops.
the eyelids clamp shut involuntarily
The disruption of supplies of the
for periods lasting from a few sec- toxin has been devastating.
onds to several minutes.
—The drug, distributed under the •Back to the Same Condition'
name Ocuiinum, is mode from botull- _ " A l l m y patients have gotten
hum A toxin, the same deadly sub=~ worse, ana some huve major probstance that poisons improperly lems," said Dr. Joseph Jankovlc, ascanned food. Dr. Scott was a pioneer sociate professor of medicine at the
in developing a therapeutic form of Baylor College of Medicine in Housthe toxin and supervising its testing ton, who is chairman of the medical
advisory board of the organization
in human clinical trials.
The drug is produced in twovtages. • for blepharospasm patients, the BeFirst, Dr. Edward Scharitt, of the Uni- nign Essential Blepharospasm Reversity of Wisconsin, cultivates bac- search Foundation. He has treated 28
teria In the laboratory and extracts patients for muscle spasms of the
the toxin produced by the bacteria. eyelids, neck and vocal cords.
"All were very disabled before
He sends the purified toxin on to Dr.
Scott, who uses it to make the drug,, treatment and now all are back in the
which contains only a very tiny same condition," he said. '-Many are
unable to chew or swallow and two
amount of the toxin,
blinder Dr. Scott's supervision, the cannot talk."
—
Mary Sousa, a blepharospasm p a -drug has been used to treatmore than2,300 victims of blepharospasm and tient from Somervllle, Mass., is bewilmore than 3,300 victims of strabis- dered by the problem. "There's fightmus, or crossed eyes, it has also been ing about the Insurance and other
used to treat hundreds of other pa- things 1 don't understand," said Mrs.
tients suffering from muscle spasms Sousa,' who is 76 years old. She said
in the neck, which cause the head to she used to get five injections of the
twist and pull sideways; in the vocal toxin around each eye every few
.cords, which hinders or prevents months, which would allow her to
speech, or in the face, Jaw, fingers or "open my eyes" .and "do anything."
The only side effect, she said, was
limbs.
that her eyes were black and blue
•Safe* and 41elpfur
after the injections.
- The greatest success has come in
But now, because her last injectreating blepharospasm. The drug is
typically injected into the lid and tions In February have long since
worn
off, "I cannot read anything,"
brow, where it paralyzes muscles
that cause the eyelids to close. The ef- she said. "I cannot concentrate on
fect generally lasts a few months, anything. I can't see because my eyes
after which a new injection is re- close every second." On bad days,
quired. In a paper published last Mrs. Sousa said, she can no longer
year, Dr. Scott described the treat- sew, cook or do housework. "I get
ment as "safe, simple, repeatable, mad cooking because it's so hard,"
and symptomatically. helpful." Nei- she said. "My eyelids are closing
ther the toxin nor any other current down every second. 1 shake my head
treatment Is directed at the cause of to try to get them open."
blepharospasm, which Is unknown.
Some desperate patients are flying
London or Canada to get the drug.
Although some eye surgeons say to
Dr.
Wise said he and a colleague had
surgery is the most effective treat- treated
about 20 Americans In Canament for blepharospasm, doctors da. But Dr.
Wise said he did not have
using the toxin believe the drug is far enough toxin
hundreds or
superior for most patients. Dr. even thousandsto'treat
of Americans who
Borodic said 90 to 95 percent of the need the medicine,
and
he
added that
130 patients he and colleagues had Dr. Scott had asked the Canadian
doctreated were helped by the drug.
tors not to treat vast numbers of
Dr. Jack Wise, assistant professor Americans,
largely because of the II-.
of ophthalmology at McGill Univer- ability problems.
sity in Montreal, said he and his col"If
it's
just
a few desperate people,
leagues had treated more than 100 that's O.K.," he
said. "But not by the
blepharospasm patients and roughly busloads. We have
getting
150 strabismus patients with the toxin . the toxin from Scottnoastrouble
long as we do
over the last two years. ''Conven- it within reason."
tional drugs don't work," he said,
Dr. Scott said his foundation deContinued From Page CI
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As supplies of the
drug in this country
were used up in
recent months, the
level of desperation
rose.
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Medical Costs and the Drug Industry
By HASST lorwAsn

even though their respiratory systems had
been pnralyxed. Todav thc\r^*t majority
of AfnericanHratned tiStfto under 40 hare
nerer aeen a polio case and Iron lungs
hare been relegated to museums of medl*,
cal tecJtnology. We enjoy the fruits of the
fantastic effectiveness of the Satk and Sabin polio racemes, but simply take them
tor granted.
So atmilarty do we now take for granted
the human and monetary sanngs of effective antibiotics which hare routed most Infectious diseases, of the phenothlaxlnea
which hare revolutionised the treatment of
awychotics and permitted many of them to

may be and are assessed against drug
firms when, as to Inevitable even under the
best of drcumsuncet, some people are In•jhred by* drug aide effects. Moreover, not
all of these side effects can be predicted
even after the intensive and substantia!
testing thai takes place before a drug can
be marketed. Additional»y, some American
courts are showing a tendency to award
damages eren when there to considerable
doubt that a particular drug or a particular
drug company to responsible for the damage at Issue.
Thus a Florida jury last March SI
awarded S30.000 to a couple who claimed
that their sons birth defects were caused
by the morning-sickness drug Bendectln
kahohes. H't t word that's handled
the Msatarhosetts Oeneral
was thus convicted even though
To introduce a new drug Dendectin
re*ii*Jly-!t was first sawd In IfTl Hospftai has decided tfUnat fotnf Into the
It has been taken by SO million pregnant
t Inn* ?*{• ttnn in this very new* hexn trtnaptant bustneat. The reaaon: a
in the United States and women, Including fire million In this coun
i«J In » book by a profeaaoi and heart transplant requires about etfht Qmea
try. without any previous serious evidence
or But exactly who ait wortahoi- the financial and other resources needed
meet all the Food and Drug that tt to harmhil.
what makes thern Bet?
for coii • entJonaJ sjpea heart avrpjery, owt
The SmithJUtne Corporation recently reAdministration requirements ported
wing aom* fight to Marttys htach- the probabtttty of pafienta benefitinsj fror.i
that there have been 34 deaths and
a raff peyejrtoglst for Nfw Ywt coronary bypasa operatjona and other such
now takes on the average SS3 cases of liver damage among thf
furu^e Co , who has Just written now routine open heart procedures to far
hundreds of thousands of Americans whe
5uW be the Ant formaJ tttidy of th# greater than the probabtllry of a patient
about ten years and costs have taken Seiacryn. an antl high Moot
t: "WofUnoflea: Uvtng with Them, benefittflf from a heart transplant.
prisaurt drug that has been taken off the
anywhere from $50 million marttt.
t with Thern." Uddaton-Watffy, tt*
nHnvmonetary conssoerttkina atsn aeem
There to apparently no conftrmet
cloth Sit Jl* paper MJSJ
to ptay a suft role hi medartne, of eaajrta.
proof
f9i that Sefhcryn caused either the
to
$60
million.
.
deaths or the liver damage, but SmlthKltne
Tuidn't have come at a mora spoor* When Aflnrd brwenatetn's sndlet-fiddled
has already felt It prudent to announce that
me. Paradoxically, schntarx suspect body reached a MsTthsttan hoapttaJ emer*
# number of wortahoties to on the fency room after hto ahootlnf some weeks' return to the world of wort or of L-dopa lawsuits may be filed against It, and that
C. As society changes and people be» afo^Vtejfe ouffacai learn automatically * which has created a new era In the treat- the punitive damages asked tor to thost
kta tort of the* roiexjnjt^uere/ be fan a he rote hutftnafryasiaraillif efJort m e * and Uvea of many rictams of Partia- suits may ant be covered by the corpora
tloit's Insurance Yet Seiacryn has beet
>re turn to their wort for FPfuge, ejK \JQ sare has 1st.to AppaienOy there was no oon's utosaai.
^_T
caicuUie whether ttt
Yet one need not do much research to used widely In other countries without any
Jay Rohrtlch. a New Yort-btW
atrtit who treats wortahollcs. Addle- ptrtfefy benefits of keeptnf htm afire Indefl* anscorer how adversarial government reta* evideree of (he organic damage now said
work "to the new narcanBem," at altery^beneftu ftfured perhaps In terms Oons these days are with the pharmaceuti- to be urxurring hers*
'You're creating products that aw of the future Income taxes he might pay- cal aadustry. and how tittle connection ex- DCS
ists between the enormous cost effect! vs*
were worth the hours of determined sursjr
Her*toa lot of T to wort."
noes of many drugs and the treatment the . The case of dlethylsttlbeeterol fDSS)
. caJ effort la this
i the most fear among pharmaceu
Ph
-Jenders In siiarTnarretrral rertnrrh
IflalHlfSCUlfefl Tt how Spptlrl OS!
awveiopment receive from Washington,
from the beginning.
it# n{ the I^vtrrvwi tnstnute, a Belone In a thousand daughters of moth
The adversary relationships have many about
Mass., consulting firm that worts Me*Ikroe*oo«nic
who took DBS SB to » years ago ma>
facets. Perhaps the moat Important to the ers
have developed vaginal cancer. Not sur
can Cancer Society policy shaft that groat tact that to Introduce anew drug to the nrlstngty damage suHs art being filed, sue
pi lasure ejojstj ID anu eooauensc trtssrla as United States and meet ait the Pood and Is some cases awards are being handet
By U s !
determining medical actions. p*ur years t>uf Administration requirements now down, tn one case, s pharmaceutical com
"he author i$ a member « / the
now Americans hare been exhorted to real- takes on the seerage about u»n years and perry was ordered to pay a plaintiff ever
toe there to no Infinite store of as sources lo •costs anywhere from ISO mUUon to 100 mil* though there was ao evidence that com
m a l l Beaton tmrtau.
free erer^ody all the medacal care he or Don. Conditions for developing and letting puny had produced the DBS taxes by tt*
she might want We shall hart to decide new drugs here are ao unpropftious that aa pUiatifTs mother. It was enough for thr
sacreaatng amount of pharmaceutic ai iu* court that the company had produced DBS
>iT*nixettone. adds that aa parents
aaarrh to being trassferred abroad. .
we hare
But af drug manufacturers can be suet
[ more of efeUdren. "each gins ration
Much of the aeubtom arises from the
Bfiytort
> the results following safts
do- morv. be more, become more** is told, and eren some Confresarnen
changes
In
the
food
and
drug
isws
adopted
been heard crtticistof the federal program
tfon of their drugs M or M years ago
to fWI satisfied.
the
wake
of
the
than>
that pays tor attney dufysto and trana- too mthed tearly ItossT tn
shouldn't all drugs be lasted tor M to!*
I all peopte who wort hard art pUjrtj because tt heneflta all
* * ^ * * T 5 l h * t d^aaster focused
"Jrlt'
yean or loader torruu^aure they are sah
amtion property on peobteme oT
iwotfru »^Prom bar hrterviewn with fardlees of age.
,*™t IstlMilongrunuweUaflnthe short run?
iss people. Ktoa MachJowtta IdeuCr
safety, hut the legal changes that reauhsd
By such reasoning tt would be assy It
ilrw characteristics of wortahoties.
. tooassd ontightawiafthe requlrenaeats lor
nake up perhaps no more than i% of
—-mahe a bureaucratic case for aamsryftfuj
.aVug efficacy.
ipuJatioo. She says, tor example, that anight expect thai the snout dost ffJocfieo
At another Irrel the adreraary retatton* tag to tot any sew. drugs be marketed tr
Lhoitcs tend to mix wort and leisure, harm of medacai Qarrawy now araUaoie Slaps arise from the ajtxiety of government thto country until well tote the Slat Can
far lev
woujo rocerew apeLm nrrDrrasrn. TSUH "^aawciwnae the coat of drugs while eacfud* turr. Yet there to no doubt that drugs are
nothtnf.
tog conssderatton of thetonnescaused else- tire therapy we hare available,
torrn, of course*tot
where by thai "cheap to better" poficy. and srlD continue to he. the moat cost ettec
definition, they coiistanfJy wort long
many sick people seed better
Just the other day. for example, a our* There can be ao doubt of govemmenfi sad bettor drags tor their ailments,
. far pii.it normal business noun,
work weekends. And they brtnf wort feon reported aubtldy about the recent burning seal to promote generic drugs st
is It beyond the wit of the Americai
on •vacationa,* X they bother la uharp decline hi stomach and related gae- the coot of brand name drugs, and to Intro- ;- people is aroducej better aet ef arrange
since
price
cetfings
for
generic
drugs
sjssd
afgery.
iwt
ressviUj,
K
turns
them at all. A former Nader's Ratter
Batnts lor ascouraging the sevetopvnast!
Is thai i sew drug. Tagamet tdrnett- Si foferntrjent medxal programs.
worts 13 houro a day. seven days a
But apparently lew. If any, people to* ssd saafteting of needed druaw-parties
to so ttfecore agatoet uJeeri that
. A pregnant publicist feettng labor
; rushes back to work from her obste- many patients who would hare been apee* eofeed la this seaious effort ever bother to torry.agtinet the most serious Utomm
is'a offlct. altar beta* told that de0> ated on to rarnore those uicen Is the past ask tbemrfrat what the toog run Implicav ' such as cai*cer*whito reaching an asjrsee
aw now abequatety taken can»af by;Tifr ttons aft fur pharmaceutical tenoration. haiance between risk ssto benefit? ABE!
• hours away. Aa attorney
anet areurrtpOona. The sartng. of count, Why should drug eornnejues Isfreat huge ntaauhta • a sovernmenf as oanjosrSjad awotji
9rt tn a burning office
can he reckoned In lent* of pass and as* sutna to drug tuuearch af government pol- the hagh costs of medical ease take another
C*tert fordWy e)ect MHL
prsfunssoa aroaded aa wtfi as ofdofiars. icy to so determined to fRutimtse the prof* ^ook at sto srrjeAces and erocosttepttooj
I i*orc w^noihoTTrs ifjiiyly cant wuv saved ft hoepttal and aurgicaJ btfla. ^ _
aa from thf au«eatfaf ventum" wtjCe is>^ About the pnaraaceuticaJ toduatry srhase
3nf. Vita Machiowtti txpiiin* that
A generation ago frequent polio epldem* noring the ananas from the many uiaucy make
are addicted to wort per at. rather tes allied thoussoads and paralyatdedan ceasful ventures which -art tnerruble to
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course, there Is the whole'J*
la- mm 0* Drpmlmni tf Butfrrw & c*metian to aa aaact a cjArartertoOc at ecTjwenicsny aadipiudaat
»>^nt devHopmemi m this country
auff*-it thai medicine and money are be*
corninaj moretoterTwineQthan eeer berore.
The moat spectacular example to the rao>
eaJ ehanft of eoursa by the American CanhnhoHci
cer Society with regard tn thefrequencyof
cancer detection examinations and the
fh» p*»ff f*v»rtl y*ari, Students Of
*v» r»~n bemoaning the declining af*i at which they should be talen. The
[Mty of th* American worker and ACS to now recofTtmenoinf fewer anch
r~*x\r\f *mphasto on fsmiry and W- teats to be taJten at wider mterrato hecanse
1t jodra that the benefits Its termer policy
TUIU.
w»Jt a minute. Even today. there achlered to terms of tires tared, especially
opt* out there-worxaholics-who the nres of yoonrer adults, did not justify
line to do ffitie Hat In their lives but the costs of afl those muttons of freqnent
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WHEN PRODUCTS TURN INTO LIABILITIES

:'.•:•'

MICHAEL BRODY

¥!-:'• X.*:*"

- ?:

*% •.?. Mr.Brodyisan
§ / f or the more than two million American women who use intrauterine contraceptive device*,
v ~ * associate editorof M ^ c d^Jon h ^ l 0 h a v c been a shocker. Taking a tack manufacturers in other industries inuy
Fortune* From
• "When Products increasingly be forced to follow, C D . Scarlc & Co. announced on January 31 that it would stop sell. . . .T*frnIP!° ing its Copper 7 and Tatum T intrauterine devices in the U.S., a decision that severely limits a mode
'•
Liabilities,
by
' -r *>' Michael Brody, of birth control preferred by many women. The reason for Searle's move: product liability lawsuits.
• v Fortune, March 3,
Not that Searle's products were generally considered unsafe. Approved by the U.S. Food and
;
:
\r
A * P°*cs
. jfryg Administration in 1974, the Copper 7 was more frequently prescribed by doctors than the
1
/
\]Y .
Tatum T, A plastic device shaped like the numeral and partly wrapped with copi>cr wire, the Cop
;
.»-* -'
per 7 had gained a reputation as "the safest of the IUDS on the market," according to Dr. Louise
.">..-.
Tyrer of Planned Parenthood, the nonprofit organization that counsels people on birth control.
.' :-*"' v
Searle had successfully defended the devices in eight lawsuits, three brought against the company
?y^ ,/m
>*'*
by the same attorney. But the lawsuits kept coming, inspired partly by stories of women allegedly
£ i ; V - *i". • -j ;;
rendered sterile by the badly designed DaJkon Shield, an IUD produced by A.H. Robins Co. In two
:
¥**&*!'#.r---v i '* v cases in which Searle had argued that its products were not at fault, juries decided against the com?4'j*ty&i''^h%<*\$ •• V pany. Some 300 suits remain outstanding. At the end of 1985, Searle, recently acquired by Monsanto,
^^\»^;^ ^.^:V/f \'] l ' discovered it could no longer get insurance to cover its potential liability on the products.
W$$&isj>^-:
C v ; W t h ' u U ^ * ***** o f ^ c CoPP^ 7 a n d Tatum T amounting to only SI 1 million in 1985, and its
g^^vV^^
^- i f ^ k p l c o s t $ to tuccessfully defend four lawsuits reaching $1.5 million, Searle decided to get out of
ItfV 5 •';?'^.%y'^^S:{lfr^business. That leaves only Alza Corp., a small company that sells about 50,000 IUDs in the
r^^
A frustrated O. B. Parrish, president of the Searle pharmaceutical division, sums
»^*^- : vV'-"~-V* '»•:,'..up tfie result: "We have removed one important option from birth control in the U.S."
$% ^^^H':';^~\'*yk
-;•' While good statistics are hard to come by, virtually all the experts say the number of product lia.^^^"^S^
^ been climbing sharply, along with the total dollars paid out in damage awards and
1 $ ! ^ ^ £ : \ & £ ^x^f^^t<ouTi
settlements. Figures compiled by Jury Verdict Research Inc. of Solon, Ohio, show
&2*:*&[$-;^ '"*:3v#?£ :%-v that the number of million-dollar jury awards have almost quadrupled over the last five years. The
K&^ f:^^U^:'^''^'-.v."titmeiidous values some juries have put on victims' lives have helped inflate the awards. Faced
h^l^^•!'£•
'^^^'Jitth
t**c possibility of costly suits and the certainty of soaring insurance premiums, what arc a com/pany's managers to do? ; A • :- .

the choice Searle did—abandoning cerCXher companies, finding that their smaller
insurance, have tried to raise prices to cover 1
they still find themselves up against tough price v •>• ' \
advantages include lower insurance bOb/On-**,, 4 •' -V
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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^warning against tvery conceivable misuse.
tors left the field. The Lederle laboratories
They are aUo exploring new wayi to settle
division of American Cyanamid mid Conproduct liability claim* without litigation and
naught Laboratories are the only companies
pushing for state laws to HmlOa wards, and for that sell diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis
federal legislation to revamp product liability
(DTP) vaccine; and Ixdcilc is the only maker
law entirely. The chances for success on Capiof oral polio vaccine. Lcdcrlc's DTP vaccine
tol Hill are better than ever.
has gone from S2.K0 a dose to S4.2V in the last
Decisions to file for bankruptcy In recent
year, partly to cover increased legal and inyears by A H . Robins and Manvllle Corp.,
surance costs. Wyeth I .aboratoiles ceased sellWhich was hit by billions of dollars In asbestos
ing DTP vaccine In l')K4, citing litigation and
claims, represent the most drastic managerial
insurance costs. At least two companies have
V
responses to product liability claims. However
stopped making polio vaccine.
^v
effective bankruptcy ultimately proves as a
:
Vaccine manufacturing is a marginal busi V'AiXINl
" 3U
defense, the extent of the companies* trouble*
ncss, even without the threat of lawsuits: the MANUI ACIUHlNd
;v,
has punched home a sobering lesson. David
market is small and profits are low. With the
* Hoi brook, an executive vice president of
baby boom well l>eyond vaccination age, only
MarshftMcLennan, the world's largest insurthree million to four million doses 11! the MMK
ance brokerage* observes: "Managers throughvaccine, for example, are sold a year, not
out the U.S. industry now know that legal Nuenough to support many competitors. Ilie
• -^. v .
bilities for potentially hazardous products may
prospect of puying out huge judgments is all
X
exceed not only a corporation's insurance but
companies need to lip the balance against stayUs total assets/'
ing in the business. If those that remain were to
'; While getting out of a risky line of business
raise prices enough to cover potential liabilitnay be the right move for a company, how
ties, the vaccines they make could become proabout everybody else? Decisions to ball out
hibitively expensive. In assessing his company's
\
have begun to endanger the continued supply
situation, William H. Ireilich, Merck's counOf important vaccines, drugs, and medical
sel, makes an astonishing statement for a corequipment in the U.S. Consider the example of
porate executive. "A good businessman would
Bendectin, the only prescription drug available
not be in this business/' he says. "The potento help pregnant women suffering from severe
tial liability risk is too high. But Merck is comnausea. In courtroom after courtroom, Benmitted to manufactui ing vaccines from a social
dectin has been found not guilty of causing
responsibility standpoint."
birthWects; its maker, Merrell Dow PharmaN
SKYROCKETING PREMIUMS
ceuticals, never lost a suit. But publicity given
to allegations that the drug was dangerous,
Other companies are not willing to shoulder
together with the specter of the thalidomide
the risk, or can't afford to. Puritan-Bennett of
' disaster of the sixties, kept suits coming by the
Overland Park, Kansas, a leading U.S. manuscore. In 1983/ confronted with legal bills and
facturer of hospital equipment, stopped makinsurance premiums that threatened to exceed
ing anesthesia gas machines in 1984, leaving to
the product's $13 million a year in revenues—
two foreign-owned manufacturers a market
and with devastating potential liabilities if the
once shared by half a dozen companies. Even
company lost—Merrell Dow stopped making after abandoning the product, C.E.O. Burton
A. Dole Jr. says, "Our product liability insurV^ut'^^xthc'drug* •;•
:
:,-**;
ance went up 750 percent this year. We got fpu*
^^t^
^^:^r
^ ^ Bendectin was pulled off the market
less coverage and higher deductibles, so it ac^ ^ ^ V i ' ^ - ^ - ^ w W w l ^ . - S e a r t e wilt continue to sell the Coptually went up 1,500 percent."
^£&& '-Vs.£/!; P * 7 overseas. Ooverned by different legal sysIn Virginia, William Perry, an engineer, set
ty^i^&^^&y*™,
**& regu!adons,*otJ^er countries permit
l0 awumc
up a company to design and build hand and
;!j&£^^
rob**risk in the U.S< and
foot controls for cars and vans. Perry's son
j^£i^\^^
*9 M»uint leas* Yet even
\
1&'^
to jack consistency^' While %
;' had been crippled in a motorcycle accident,
^ • *• m^m^^J £ ; ^ o j m « ^ y no longfer opt for 'ah iyb; npllis.^ I and the father was appalled when he saw the '
^ ^ ^ i ^ | % ^ - £ * W $ £ ***& * cigarette manufacturerHitbte : devices available to handicapped drivers. His . ••* ' .
3|?jj^^
by smokers, thd}igh;iHc; 'iqpmpany has never been sued * but he recently •
:
;stopped
selling
his
products
nonetheless:
his
'•'•'**
*
<
'
;«•. M-;
ti.>%1:^T$V^ tissue;!* still being hotly contested/ V &•?'U7
Uabtliiy insurance premiums went up t over*
'•Yin*
[£j^
in «••ye«f/ > Sa^.-Pw/c- 11 !*-•'•
would have continued, this business even~at>a \
%*'
>tbs* If l could tiavtgot a decent premium/1 '-*,
. Big companies can pay big insurance premi- it.
ums to staytoa business. More than half -a' •
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,•dozen
J. Reuben
Clark Law have
School,given
BYU. up making'footcompanies
».
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.*/-. ball helmets in the last ten yean. Two names

Analysis Associates of Palo Alto, California, a
bow dominate: Bike Athletic Co., owned by
large engineering firm with a huge database on
Coigat^PalmoIive. and Ridddl, part of Macthe frequency, severity, and cost of accidents.
Grtfor Sporting Ooods. Thdr cost of insurAfter identifying the features of a product that
ance
may exceed manufacturing costs. Sayi an
have occasioned the most lawsuits, manufac.V
attorney who defends heimet makers: "The turers can try to improve the product or edubigger the parent, the better the chances of obcate consumers in its proper use. Several years
taining insurance. Bike on its own would be
ago manufacturers were hit by a wave of law*7
•virtually uninsurable.0
suits over multipiece truck wheel rims, which
' Their staying powermight seem to give large
can explode when huge high-pressure tires are
companies an opportunity to raise prices once
mounted on them. Failure Analysis did statisticompetitors have quit. Not necessarily. In incal and engineering studies that showed the
dustries as diverse as light aircraft, truck wheel
multipiece rims had accident rates no higher
than singlepiece rims, and that the real culprit
rims, machine tools, and industrial machinery
was the procedure that mechanics were using
•—businesses with long-lived products—U.S.
to inflate and mount the tires. The findings led
product liability law has given foreign manuto industry-wide training standards that cut infacturers the advantage. American manufacjury rates by 80 percent.
turers remain liable for thdr products as long
But preventive law can do only so much. No
as they are in use. Having recently entered the
^•N
matter how carefully decisions on product deUS. market, foreigners typically do not carry
sign have been documented and justified, it
this burden. Piper Aircraft Corp.'s insurance
is
virtually impossible to prove to a court
• *v
bills, which reflect the risk of lawsuits over any
equipped
with 20/20 hindsight that a design
Piper aircraft still flying, amount to $75,000
could not have been improved upon. Riddell,
for every new plane built—more than the cost
whose football helmets protect the pros, was
of manufacturing Piper's smaller planes.
recently slapped with a $12-million judgment
Nor do foreigners carry heavy insurance
in the case of a high school football player who
burdens at home. A recent study by the Ameribroke his neck in a scrimmage. The jury de,. .
can Textile Machinery Association found that
cided the helmet should have carried a sticker
•v * /
foreign manufacturers of machine tools and
warning players of the danger of butting op"*;
other hardware used in the workplace pay only ponents with it. Riddell has appealed the case.
1 percent to 5 percent as much for liability in.surance in their home markets. In Europe and
NEW PROCEDURES
;\
,*•;**'_;
Japan, employees rdy on workers' compensaThe risk and expense inherent in litigation
- ; :"
tkm payments for workplace injuries rather
have led a handful of companies to experiment
-' ••'
than on suing.
with procedures to try to settle claims before
lawsuits are filed. While Union Carbide's efCRISIS IN "The crisis in liability insurance has made
•INSURANCE
forts in this respect have been overshadowed
LIABILITY risk
management
a oudn concern
top cor-•'V*
porate
decision-makers,"
says for
Robert
H.
by
the Ahopal disaster, the company's chief
Malott, chairman of FMC Corp. Malott heads
litigation
counsel, Robert A. Butler, says it has
the Business Roundtable's task force on prodexperimented with so-called mini-trials, presiduct liability. Like other sophisticated corporaed over by a company executive, in product
tions, FMC uses "preventive law" programs to
liability cases involving workmen injured by
reduce the company's exposure to suits. Such
accidental exposure to toxic chemicals. The
programs can include a so-called legal audit of
Center for Public Resources, a New York noncorporation's businesses, Identifying prodprofit voperation financed by over ISO major
cervices, or manufacturing operations
corporations, has also developed some altercould trigger lawsuii, and either cleaning
natives to litigation. The center helped set op,
them up or scrapping them. The programs also
for example, the Asbestos Claims Facility, a
3 provide tor safeguarding product-development
forum for settling disputes among insurers,
documents that could 'become .evidence in a
manufacturers, and plaintiffs over the payouts
suit. I n one jase Plpa was directed xo supply
on asbestos lawsuits. So fart more than 25,000
^Ut^iffiV lawyers wkh stacks, of product. claims have been Bled;'.
ucvciopcncsi xiecocus*? wnen IDS company "
"
t*bt jtod several key papers, the judge • In the eyes of corporate managers, the chief
introducing any other {<#ppeal of private dispute resolution b the pros-; t '
pect of keeping caustmphk'taji^ frooi
the case for
v
stoking*
a jury's sympathy-Hind ^geoowby;
- ;^:
One
dramatic
variation on the klea comes from* \'
s*v- '**&* ^>r*sw;IVq^»ciawabo*meens
bringinglawyers.
^ ^ A V # ^ ^ C W ^ i ' « f ^ stepe£ developing products'and im- *. Professor JefTrey O'Cotmefl Of the UnWenit/
K E ^ £ g & r ^
may be called % of Virginia Law School. 0*GxmeQ has drafted
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
a no-fault
insurance
program for high school •*V
,wtE,
todudfng
-specialists
tikeLaw
Taflure.

4E.

M

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

"

•

*

*

*

v - -n.

.Hr^ : .*>^^?

*~*

. - • " • • « *

' ~s'

TvV

V7-'

<N
A

CV K K EN T

JULY/AUGUST

.football players ancj other student athletes. It
has been adopted by two-thirds of the nation's
school districts, at a cost to the schools of
$1.40 per athlete per year. Under it, if a student is severely injured, the school district offers the family the option of accepting a settlement thai will pay all his medical and rehabilitation expenses, and compensate him for his
estimated lifetime earnings loss. Ii\ exchange
the family agrees not to sue. The offer has
been accepted by the families of all 24 young
athletes seriously injured since the program
took effect in 1981. The families may. still sue
, equipment manufacturers, who have not joined
• the program but are thinking about doing so.
What makes the system work, CVConnell argues, is that families of plaintiffs with truly appalling injuries face enormous expenses and
terrifying uncertainty about the future. Because claims against mass-market products—
.cars, say, or power toob—could swamp the

I 9 8 6

system, it would seem to have the best chance
of working for industries whose products are
blamed for relatively rare but severe accidents
—sports equipment, medical equipment, drugs.
By limiting claims to severe injuries and by
barring recipients of compensation from also
suing manufacturers, the system might avoid
the loopholes that have made insurance so expensive in states with no-fault auto plans.
For now, however, most companies have
contented themselves with trying to change existing product liability laws at both the state
and federal levels. Lawsuits against corporate
defendants with deep pockets, Malott argues,
"have turned the courts, in effect, into an erratic, backdoor system of nationalized health
and accident insurance, financed by corporate
insurance premiums." It's time to get a better
system, but until one comes along, companies
arc mostly stuck with hard choices.
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Statements

Yale Brozen
In considering a research agenda for evaluating public policy toward
pharmaceuticals, one fact should be kept stage center: drugs are our
most cost-effective input in supplying the demand for health. A tendollar prescription is frequently a substitute for $2,000 worth of hospital
services—a substitute that produces a positive outcome with much higher
frequency than hospital care.
There is, at present, a long list of ailments that still require costly
and frequently ineffective treatments and for which there is no low-cost
drug substitute. Our progress in the past in producing drug substitutes
for such procedures and the developments on the horizon indicate that
pharmaceutical innovations could contain the cost explosion in the
health industry. If we arc serious about minimizing costs, our best bet
is to increase the number of drug innovations. "It should be clearly
recognized that existing drugs are inadequate to deal with most of the
diseases we face."11 would suggest, then, that the foremost item on any
agenda is to learn as much as wc can about what factors affect the size

and productivity of the pharmaceutical research effort. There is much
that can and should be done to increase research productivity, particularly in view of its marked decline since 1962.*
Because drugs arc cost-effective in producing health. I tend to lose
patience when I see so much effort devoted to finding a monopoly
explanation for pricing in the drug industry. It has been demonstrated
that what some investigators blame on monopoly is usually a disequilibrium phenomenon in a competitive market3 or a consequence of ar1
William M. Wardcll. Regulation und Drug Dcwlapmem (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute* 1975), p. 144.
A
Henry Grabowski, Drug Regulation and Innovation (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), pp. 36, 54. Apparently, productivity of pharmaceutical research
is now about one-sixth of what it was before 1962.
*Y*le Brozen, "The Antitrust Task Force Deooncetitration Recommendation/' Journal
of Law and Economics, vol. 13, no. 2 (October 1970), pp. 279-92.
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WHAT RESEARCH AGENDA?
J)itrary or governmcntally required accounting conventions4 If we want
to investigate pricing, let us find out why the prices of drugs are so low
relative to their value when that value is measured relative to nondrug
alternatives. Why is it that drug pi ices have consistently fallen relative
to the consumer price index?
A high-priority item for the research agenda is a measurement of
the benefits of drugs. If they arc a great bargain, as the evidence so far
suggests, we need to make that obvious. We need to revive memories
of the day when drugs were referred to as miracle drugs. Apparently,
the drug industry has fallen to the state of the senator who, after reminding his constituents of die projects he had obtained for hi* state
ten years before, was asked, "So what have you done for us lately?'1
The importance of measuring explicitly the value of the medical
innovations produced by the drug industry should not be underestimated. My reason for believing this is that attitudes in the making of
policy are colored by notions of "mc-too" chemical entities, as if research efforts were and are being devoted to reruns that serve no useful
purpose. The me-too propaganda has been exposed,5 hut its influence
lingers. Policy-making and regulatory attitudes are also colored by notions that the industry can promote any chemicals, no matter how lacking
in efficacy, into multimillion-dollar moneymakers by bribing physicians
with samples and prizes.0 It is this sort of attitude that leads some Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) officers to demand such absurdities
as comparative efficacy studies and to demand repeated efficacy studies
to replicate what the efficacy studies have already proved.
Attitudes are also colored by the belief that the drug industry makes
so much money that we might as well "stick it to them" by demanding
costly efforts, no matter how little the value of duplicative efforts or
how much delay is suffered in drug introductions. Commissioner Kennedy, testifying in the 1979 House drug innovation hearings, argued that
drug firms are doing magnificently in financial terms and that they can
afford to pay for whatever nonsense is demanded by the FDA without
stinting on their research effort.7 It is time that the Kennedys were told
4

Kenneth W. Clarkson, Intangible Capital and Ruttn of Return (Wishingon, D.C.;
American Enterprise institute. 1977): Robert Ayanian, "The Profit Rates and Economic
Performance of Drug Firms;' and i. R. Stauffcr. "Profitability Measure* in the Pharmaceutical Industry,** in Robert B. Helms, cd.. Drug Development and Marketing (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. 197,5).
•Larry L. Dcutsch, uR«$*arch Performance in the F.thical Drug Industry." Marquette
Business Review, vol. 17 (Fan 1973), pp. 129-43.
•S.1075 contains a provision piohibitmg promotional gifts to phy&icitint whose value
exceeds ten dollars.
* U.S. Congress, House, Drug Innovation Hearings, 96th Congress* 1st session, June 21,
1079, transcript, p 46. Cited in American Enterprise Institute Legislative Analysis* Proposals to Reform Drug Regulation Laws (Washington, D C . . 1979), p. 37.
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YALE BROZEN
that real resources are being consumed in FDA-demanded boondoggles—resources that could be producing lifesaving innovations that are
not being produced.
We need to demonstrate just how competitive the drug industry is.
A showing of how low drugs arc priced relative to their value would
help in that endeavor. We also need to demonstrate just how profitable
research is—apparently it is no longer very profitable1*—to end the demand for boondoggles.
Some of the research needed is conceptual rather than empirical.
It seems to many economists that drug prices are high relative to marginal cost—which means to them that the industry is not competitive—
but their notion of the relationship of price to marginal cost is based on
a primitive conception of marginal cost. Professor Tclser has demonstrated that marginal cost is a bit more complicated than the usual
economist's notion of this concept.9 His work needs extension and elaboration in language and examples from the pharmaceutical industry that
can be comprehended by minds less subtle than his.
While we are clarifying some of the primitive notions we use when
introducing innocent students to economics in order to make these notions into operational concepts appropriate for research use, we should
also remove some of the obfuscation resulting from the use of the structure-conduct-pcrformance paradigm. Perhaps the boxes are useful, but
the arrows from structure to performance point in the wrong direction.1"
Instead of automatically accepting the notion that structure determines
conduct, which determines performance, we should recognize that it is
performance and conduct that determine structure.11 The efficient and
innovative firm that behaves competitively wins the market. A concentrated structure and a variety of products result from such good performance. Concentration and product variety are a proof of competitive
conduct and good performance,12 not a cause of bad conduct and poor
performance.

I would suggest that we apply an upended structure-conduct-per•Meir Statman, Returns on Pharmaceutical Research and the Competitive Equilibrium
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming); David Schwartzman,
The Expected Return from Pharmaceutical Research: Sources of New Drugs and the Profitability of R&D Investment (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975).
• Lester G. Tcbct, "The Market for Research and Development; Physician Demand and
Drug Company Supply/* herein.
* Yale Brozen, Industrial Concentration and Public Policy (New York: MacmilUn, fuiih*
coming).
» AJmarin Phillips, "Structure, Conduct, and Performance—and Performance. Conduct,
mnd Structure?" in i. W Mirkham and G. F. Papanck* rth.% Industrial Organization and
Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
u
George J. Stiglcr, appendix to "A Theory of Oligopoly," Juurnal of Political Economy,
vol. 72, no. t (February 1964), pp. 44-61. Reprinted in Stiglcr, The Organization of
Industry (Humewood, III.: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), pp. 60-62.
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WHAT RESEARCH AGENDA?
formance paradigm to an analysis of the history of innovation and indusirial structure in each of the various therapeutic categories. We need
to analyze the benefits of innovations as they appear and the benefits
of new product varieties. I believe we would find that we should be
praising concentration and product variety, then, as evidence of good
performance and competitive conduct. Product "differentiation" is a
virtue, not a sin.
On our research agenda, we should also be looking into what proof
of efficacy there is of the investigational new drug (IND) requirement
and of the proposed monitoring of animal studies. The IND requirement
presumably was installed to make sure that animal toxicology studies
were adequate and that no harm would be done in human trials. Has
the harm done to patients in clinical studies been reduced by the IND
requirement? Since practically zero harm was done in clinical studies
before the IND requirement was installed, I believe that the efficacy of
the requirement is nonexistent. Let us apply the same standards of
efficacy to such requirements as the FDA applies to new chemical entities. If the efficacy of the IND requirement cannot be demonstrated,
then there are grounds for discarding it—for removing it from the regulation panoply.
Let us also examine the efficacy of the efficacy requirement. There
is some evidence indicating that it is not effective.1 * Let us apply the
efficacy requirement standard to efficacy demonstration requirements.
I think a double-blind test here will demonstrate that there is not even
a placebo effect.
The whole regulatory mechanism may be a gigantic sham with
enormous costs and no benefits. If it is a charade, we should go about
the task of unmasking the charade. If it is not, let us prove it is not. If
some parts are valuable and some are not, let us sort them out. It is
time to get on with this task, above alt others.

William S. Comanor
There are really two literatures on the economics of the pharmaceutical
industry. These two literatures focus on different positions and come
to different conclusions for public policy. In this comment, I briefly
examine both these literatures and how they relate to each other, for
it appears that they frequently pass as ships in the night and do not
really confront each other on the relevant issues.
The first literature is perhaps the more conventional. It follows the
" Sam Pcltzroan, Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation: The 1962 Amendments (Washington, D C . : American Enterprise Institute* 1974).
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Commissioner Schmidt's testimony dated August 16, 1974 stated:
Kennedy, Edward. "[Keynote] Address.** Press release of speech before the
Tulane Medical Symposium on Principles and Techniques of Human
Research and Therapeutics, New Orleans, November 2, 1975. Mimeographed.
Rutstein, David P. Statement in U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, February 6, 1973. Mimeographed.
Schmidt, Alexander.. The Commissioner's Report of Investigation of
Charges. October 24, 1975. Mimeographed.
. "Communication as the Basis of Regulation.'" Food and Drug Law
Institute/FDA, December IJ, 1973. Mimeographed.
. "Dimensions of Change in the FDA.** Speech before the Pharmaceutical Advertising Seminar, Chicago, September 3,1973. Mimeographed.
. T h e FDA Today: Critics, Congress, and Consumerism.*" Speech
before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C, October 29, 1974.
. "The FDA in I985." Speech before the Tulane Medical Symposium
on Principles and Techniques of Human Research and Therapeutics,
New Orleans, November 5, 1975. Mimeographed.
. Statement in U.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers, July 21, 1975. Mimeographed.
. Statement in U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Subcommittee on Health, August 16, 1974. Mimeographed.
[Schultz, Harold.] "Risk-Benefit Considerations in Food Safety.** Attachment A to minutes of November ]4-15, 1974, joint meeting of National
Advisory Food Committee and National Advisory Veterinary Medicine
Committee, November J974. Mimeographed.
Seidman, David. "Protection and Overprotection, the Politics and Economics of Pharmaceutical Regulation." Paper given at Midwest Political
Science Association conference, April 29-May I, 1976. Mimeographed.
Simmons, Henry. Statement in U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, February 5, 1973. Also five
addenda (A-E), and exhibits 4*18; and "Status Report on a Number of

In sum, it is clear that the rate of drug introduction into the United
States has slowed since the I950*s. This slowdown is worldwide, but is
somewhat greater in this country than in other advanced countries.
There appear to be some doigs unavailable in this country that represent
modest but real therapeutic gains. We are concerned about this and
want to be very sure that useful drugs are not held back unnecessarily. It
also appears that drug research has moved abroad to some extent. We
are also concerned about this, because of its negative impact on the
development of good clinical investigation in therapeutics and because
it will further delay the availability of useful drugs.73 *
And on October 29, 1974, Commissioner Schmidt, in what might be considered a plea for a positive rather than a negative legislative mandate to the
FDA, spoke at the National Press Club as follows:
A What I see as a seriously unbalanced and deleterious pressure can be
remedied only by Congressional and public recognition that thefailure
to approve an important new drug can be as detrimental to the public
health as the approval of a potentially bad drug. Ifsoften forgotten—
and sometimes conveniently so—that our responsibility to get good new
drugs into medical*practice is at least as important as our responsibility
to keep worthless or dangerous drugs off the market.74
Meanwhile, an improvement in FD.Vs approvals of NDAs had occurred
between 1971 and 1976. In September 1974, Dr. William Wardell, their most
effective critic because his criticism was based on primary scientific data and
was reported in terms which FDA staff could more easily understand than
criticism by economists, had stated before the Senate Subcommittee on
Health:
Over the past 214 years, a marked improvement has occurred in the rate
of FDA approvals of medically useful new drugs, with resulting benefits
for the American patient. . . .Large anachronisms still remain—e.g., in
the cardiovascular area. . . .Nevertheless, in general the FDA has come
to be more in touch with up-to-date standards of medical practice, and
has done much to regain the confidence of the scientific and medical
communities. • . .T5
73. Ibid., p. 2S. Although dated August 16, 1974, w*s referred to September 25, 1974, several
limes but not actually orally presented during the hearings.
(?4-) Alexander Schmidt. *"The FDA Today: Critics, Congress, and Consumerism," speech before
trte National Press Club, mimeo. p. 12.
75. U.S. Senate, Joint Hearings, op. cit., September 27, 1974, p. 507.
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'Reform9

INSURERS APPEALING COURT DECISION
UPHOLDING MOST PROVISIONS OF NEW LAW
TALLAHASSEE, Fla. — A circuit court ruling upholding all but
one of the major provisions of Florida s Tort and Insurance Reform
Act of 1986 is being appealed by
insurers seeking to take their case to
the state Supreme Court.
Leon County Circuit Court Judge
Charles E. Miner Jr. ruled Oct. 24 in
favor of the state's Department of
Insurance, along with fellow defendants Florida Power and Light Co.,
the Florida Medical Association, and
the Florida Railroad Association. A
group of 23 insurance companies,
three industry groups, and the
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers
challenged the law in July, charging
that it violates both the state and

federal constitutions {LIB, July 28,
i).
But Miner rejected those claims,
throwing out only one aspect of the
comprehensive legislation: the refund of premiums on commercial
liability policies in force prior to
July 1, 1986, the effective date of
the law. Such rebates, he said, "substantially impair . . . contracts and
violate due process rights." The law
required rebates on all commercial
liability policies in effect between
Oct. 1, 1986, and Dec. 31, 1986, no
matter when they were written. Insurers testified the provision would
have cost them $140 million.
On Oct. 29, the First District
(Continued on p. 2)
P.

Self Insurance

AMENDMENTS ON RISK RETENTION
SIGNED INTO LAW BY PRESIDENT REAGAN
Legislation that will ease restrictions for businesses, professional
groups, and others seeking to create
self insurance pools or buy liability
coverage was signed Oct. 27 by
President Reagan.
The legislation (S 2129) amends
the Product Liability Risk Retention
Act of 1981 by expanding coverage
to include general liability insurance. It permits self-insurance
groups which meet thefinancialrequirements in their chartering states
to operate in all 50 states.
The bill also includes language
that would permit non-chartering

states to require such groups to
demonstrate financial responsibility.
It provides that a state's authority to
impose or apply financial responsibility requirements is subject to statutory prohibition that a state cannot
impose any discriminatory requirements on a risk retention group.
Sen. John Danforth (R-Mo) one of
the Senate bill's original sponsors,
said the measure is not a "complete
solution" to the unavailability of insurance, but by creating new alternatives for liability coverage, "it represents an important step toward
alleviating the problem." •
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Florida, from p. 1
Court of Appeals in Tallahassee extended to the insurance industry
most of the injunctive relief previously granted by the lower court,
including a delay of rate filings required by the law and a stay on the
payment of special credit refunds.
The new extension expires Nov 7.
Under the injunction issued by
Miner some months ago, the insurance companies were ordered to pay
the special credits into an escrow
account. Under the appeals court's
extension, however, no payments
must be made. Also under the extension, the insurers are not required to
pay $500 to establish the joint
underwriting association called for
under the new law, although the
administrative process for creating
the body will continue.
The appeals court also passed the
matter directly to the Florida Supreme Court for review. "We expect that the industry is going to ask
the Supreme Court to extend injunctions to prevent implementation of
the law," Sandra Fish, a public in-

formation specialist in the Florida
Department of Insurance, told LIB.
"We're going to vigorously oppose
any efforts to keep us from moving
along with this law."
The major provisions of the new
law were upheld under Miner's ruling, including the requirement,
cited as most onerous by insurers, to
roll back commercial liability insurance premiums and freeze rates and
increases until Jan. 1, 1987.
In other "insurance reform" provisions, the law gives the Department of Insurance greater authority
to review and approve property and
casualty rates, restricts cancellation
of policies, creates a joint underwriting association, creates an excess
profits law for property and casualty
insurance, and requires insurers to
return excess profits to policyholders
who comply with risk management
guidelines. It also provides for the
formation of professional and commercial self-insurance funds and
permits banks to own and control
reinsurance companies.
Among the "tort reforms" in the
act are provisions to replace joint

and several liability with proportional liability, limit noneconomic
damages to $450,000, and limit punitive damages to three times economic damages unless there is clear
evidence that is not sufficient. Only
40 percent of punitive damages will
go to the plaintiff, with the remainder going to the state.
Frederick B. Karl, lead attorney
for the insurers, said he is pleased
that the "tort reform" provisions
were upheld and that a portion of
the premium rebate section was
struck down. "That is one of the
sections that was most offensive to
insurers," he said.
Insurance
Commissioner
Bill
Gunter called the ruling "a tremendous victory for Florida business
and professional insurance consumers." "The Florida law was more
comprehensive than that of any other state, and yet it stood the test of
an all-out legal challenge," he said.
{American Insurance Association et
ai v. State of Florida, Dept. of
Insurance, and Bill Gunter, Insurance Commissioner,
CirCt Leon
Cty, No. 86-2262) D

D&O Coverage

SMALL COMPANIES DROP COVERAGE AS PREMIUMS RISE
Small- and mid-size companies
faced with steep increases in liability insurance premiums are dropping directors' and officers' coverage, according to results of a
nationwide survey of 41,000 companies released Oct. 28.
The cost of D&O insurance for
small- and mid-size firms rose an
average of 242 percent in 1986, according to Growth Resources Inc., a
Massachusetts consulting firm that
conducted the survey.
One third of the 41,000 firms surveyed reported that they did not
renew their coverage. The remaining two-thirds said the coverage
they purchased increased on average more than 400 percent. (The
overall average increase therefore
fell to 242 percent because no premium increase was reported for the

one-third of firms that dropped
their coverage.)
The average liability insurance
premium per director in 1986
neared $2,700, up from $1,100 in
1985, Growth Resources reported.
The average amount of liability coverage purchased was $3.5 million.
While 41 percent of the smaller
companies' boards provided D&O
coverage in 1985, only 31 percent
provided it in 1986, according to the
survey. "The removal of liability insurance coverage could put a crimp
on the progress that has been made
by so many small companies in attracting outside directors," said
Richard Bronstein, president of
Growth Resources.
"Some companies are getting
around the problem of attracting
qualified outsiders who may balk at

serving as directors without liability
insurance coverage by establishing
advisory boards," Bronstein said.
"While an advisory board cannot
substitute for a board of directors, it
can perform many valuable advisory functions and receive compensation without carrying the legal responsibilities
of
a board of
directors," he said.
Growth Resources Inc. surveyed
manufacturing, technology, and service companies with sales ranging
from $250,000 to $60 million for the
report. These firms' boards of directors had an average of five members
each.
Copies of the Seventh Edition
1986/87 Officer Compensation Report are available for $425 from
Growth Resources Inc., One Newbury St., Peabody, Mass. 01960. •
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Damage Awards

$1 MILLION VERDICTS REDUCED BY HALF, ATLA REPORTS
Plaintiffs who won jury verdicts
of $1 million or more in 1984 and
1985 actually received less than half
the total amount of the money
awarded, the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (ATLA) said in
a report released Oct. 27.
While 198 verdicts examined totalled $790.6 million, the amount
actually paid to plaintiffs was
$339.2 million, an aggregate reduction of 57 percent, the report said.
The larger the original verdict,
the larger the percentage reduction.
While $1 million verdicts were reduced by 21 percent on average,
$10 million verdicts were reduced
by nearly 57 percent, it said.
The verdicts were examined by
Dr. Ivy Broder, of the American

Product

University. Her findings were based
on 198 cases out of a sample of 472
verdicts for $1 million or more provided by Jury Verdict Research Inc.
She said the remaining 274 cases
were still on appeal or were unusable because of confidentiality or
other constraints.
The most severely injured received the highest verdicts and the
highest settlements, Broder concluded. Her survey found that:
• The 22 paralysis victims received average verdicts of $4.1 million and settlements of $2.7 million;
• The 37 brain-damaged plaintiffs
averaged $3.7 million in verdicts
and $2.3 million in settlements; and
• The nine amputation cases had
average verdicts of $3.5 million and

average settlements of $2 million.
The less severely injured received
the lowest average original verdicts
and settlements, as well as the larger
percentage reductions.
The wide variation in original
verdicts is reduced through settlements, Broder said, suggesting that
the settlement process provides a
more consistent pattern of final
awards. "Focusing on verdicts is
quite misleading. A full picture of
the way our judicial system actually
compensates victims must include
the actual settlement process as well
as the results of jury deliberations."
The report, An Analysis of Million Dollar Verdicts, is available
from ATLA, 1050 31st St. NW,
Washington, DC 20007. •

Liability

PRESIDENT REAGAN URGED TO SIGN HEALTH LEGISLATION
Backers of the Omnibus Health
Package passed in the final days of
the 99th Congress are urging President Reagan to resist Justice Department officials' recommendations to
veto the entire bill because of its
provisions to create a vaccine injury
compensation fund.
At a press conference Oct. 28 and
in ads in the New York Times and
the Washington Times Oct. 27, the
supporters disputed the officials' arguments that the need for a no-fault
compensation program for victims
of vaccine-related injuries has not
been proven.
The bill (S 1744), unanimously
approved by the Senate Oct. 18
(LIB, Oct. 27, p. 3), is a comprehensive measure designed to promote
exports of prescription drugs and
compensate children injured by vaccines. It would also strengthen
medical peer review and establish a
national network to provide information on individual physicians'
records.

"The potential for lawsuits has
caused the price of the DPT vaccine
to rise from $4.00 to $11.40 per dose
in the last year alone," said Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), a cosponsor of the bill. "Insurers are reluctant to underwrite the liability, and,
when they do the rates are high."
Hatch said the bill would make
tort changes to reduce the unpre-

dictability of damage
awards
against manufacturers and protect
them if they meet government standards and requirements. "Most importantly, it will foster the development of safer vaccines," he said.
Even if signed by Reagan, the
vaccine
compensation
program
would not take effect until Congress
approves a funding mechanism. •

Environmental Liability Coverage
EPA TO STUDY ASBESTOS HAZARD INSURANCE
Legislation requiring identification and abatement of asbestos hazards in some
31,000 public schools, signed by President Reagan Oct. 22, calls on the Environmental Protection Agency to study the availability of liability insurance for school
boards and contractors doing the abatement work.
The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 provides for the establishment of federal requirements for inspection for asbestos-containing material and
implementation of "appropriate response actions."
Sec. 210 of the law (PL 99-519) requires EPA to make a preliminary report on
the availability of liability insurance for school agencies and contractors by April 1,
1988, and a final report by Oct. 1, 1990. It also authorizes the formation of
insurance pools to cover injuries arising from the release of asbestos into the
atmosphere during the abatement process.
The asbestos legislation specifically permits states to establish or modify liability
standards for contractors or local education associations. •
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TWO INSURERS SEEK TO WITHDRAW FROM NEW JERSEY JUA
TRENTON, NJ — Firemen's
Fund and Keystone Insurance Co.
are seeking to withdraw as insurance carriers under the New Jersey
Joint Underwriters Association
(JUA) program, a state insurance
department spokesman said Oct. 29.
A decision on the request will be
announced "shortly/* said spokesman Thomas Hooper, adding, "We
have to approve it." The department has not yet received a formal
application from Keystone, he said.
Citing a prospective $500 million
deficit by 1988 in the JUA, Firemen's fund criticized the legislature
for failing to enact proposed re-

New Jersey Tort, Insurance

forms. Hooper said the insurers
"have no obligation to fund any
deficit. That's what they're afraid
of, but there is no danger of that."
The JUA, which covers nearly
half of New Jersey's 3.8 million insured autos, contracts with individual insurers to cover those who are
rejected in the voluntary market. Its
rates are set at the same level as the
voluntary market, Hooper said.
"That's one of the problems."
Under state law, the companies
must remain as part of the administrative structure of the JUA but are
not required to serve as carriers,
Hooper said. He said he does not

think the withdrawal "will have any
effect." The JUA has 15 carriers for
1.8 million cars, and loss of the two
companies would affect only about
60,000 cars, he said.
Recommendations to increase the
JUA's revenues, issued Sept. 16 by
the Senate Special Committee on
Automobile Insurance Reform, include: more efficient collection of
surcharges on fines for accidents
and violations; a second-tier rate for
drivers with excess points for accidents and violations; stiffer fines for
failure to maintain insurance, and a
relaxation of the non-renewal law to
"assist in depopulating" the JUA. •

Reform

PACKAGE OF 12 BILLS INTRODUCED IN LEGISLATURE
TRENTON, NJ — A 12-bill
package of tort and insurance " reforms" was introduced in the New
Jersey legislature Oct. 6.
The bills would give judges power
to reduce jury verdicts, cap awards,
and limit joint and several liability,
as well as imposing financial disclosure, notification, and other requirements on insurers.
The package of bills is pending in
the Senate Judiciary Committee and
the Assembly Insurance Committee,
a spokesman for Sen. Raymond Lesniak (D) told LIB Oct. 29. "We
don't know when there will be
action/'
Lesniak's "tort reform" bill (S
2644) would allow judges to reduce
or increase civil damage awards for
personal injury if they find the
awards "unreasonable" or the result
of "mistake, prejudice or passion."
A $500,000 cap would apply to all
noneconomic damage awards except
those involving "catastrophic" injury such as permanent, severe disability or disfigurement. The cap
would not apply to medical costs.
The legislative package would

amend joint and several liability
provisions, which now permit a
plaintiff to collect the total amount
of an award from any defendant
found 30 percent or more at fault if
other defendants are unable to pay.
The changes would eliminate joint
and several liability for government
agencies except in environmental
torts. It would provide that defendants found 20 percent to 60 percent liable would pay only their
share of noneconomic damages,
while a defendant found more than
60 percent liable could be held responsible for all damages.
Other provisions in the bills
would:
• Provide for structured payment
of damage awards exceeding
$200,000;
• Deduct collateral payments
from damage awards;
• Permit stockholders to limit or
eliminate liability for corporate directors and officers;
• Require arbitration of non-auto
damage claims of $20,000 or less;
• Impose penalties of up to $2,500
for filing frivolous suits; and

• Limit dram shop and social host
liability.
Among the insurance provisions
in the legislative package are measures that would require financial
disclosure by insurance companies,
require a company to submit a plan
if it intends to withdraw from a
certain line of coverage "so the market won't be disrupted," and provide capital and surplus requirements for captive insurers, said Dale
Davis, an Assembly Insurance Committee aide.
Lesniak's spokesman said the insurance provisions would also cover
rate reductions and risk retention.
Davis told LIB the legislature is
considering the "tort reform" measures first and probably will not take
up the "insurance reform" bills until
November or December.
The only insurance bill released
for consideration by the legislature
so far is S2318/A2404 on reporting
requirements. Davis said the 12
bills, originally interlocked so that
all or none would have to be enacted, have been "unhooked" for
separate consideration. •
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Reinsurance

Medical

100 FIRMS FORCED OUT OF MARKET

18 PERCENT HIKE
PASSED IN GEORGIA

NEW YORK — Some 100 competing reinsurers have pulled out of
the U.S. casualty business in the last
two years, "mostly because they are
bankrupt or will be," attorney Donald J. Greene told the Insurance Information Institute (III) Oct. 29.
Greene, senior partner of the
New York firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb,
Leiby & McRae, told the Ills 11th
annual research seminar that those
firms were "losing their shirts" because of the "crisis" in the reinsurance business. "This was not a xenophobic decision or an intellectual
exercise," he said.
"In the last two years, they used
up all the premium, all the investment income on the surplus, all investment income on premium they
were holding in reserve and all their
loss reserves, so they had to pay out
from their basic capital," he said.
Greene, who is U.S. counsel for
Lloyd's of London, said Lloyd's has
picked up some of the business left
by bankrupt firms, but, when 100

markets disappear, "there is bound
to be an economic dislocation."
Changes in the U.S. tort system
could improve the situation, he said.
"Right now [the system's] lack of
predictability is such that insurers
and reinsurers would rather devote
their capital and risk taking knowhow to other lines of insurance in
other parts of the world," he said.
Greene said the industry should
fight any attempt by the federal
government to regulate the reinsurance business, saying it is already
adequately monitored by the states.
"It's inevitable that the federal government will inquire into reinsurance," he said, but the additional
red tape created would only aggravate problems by raising costs.
Enactment of the new legislation
amending the Risk Retention Act
(See related story, this issue.) "will
have a big impact on the business,"
Greene predicted. "People who
can't afford commercial insurance
will consider this alternative." •

Malpractice

ATLANTA — Georgia Insurance
Commissioner Warren D. Evans has
accepted a consent order permitting
an 18 percent hike in physician's
malpractice insurance by the St.
Paul Companies in return for the
elimination of the insurer's 8.5 percent surcharge plan.
Evans announced his decision
Oct. 27, following a public hearing
on Oct. 15 (LIB, Oct. 20, p. 3).
"After I ordered the hearing, the
St. Paul Companies provided the Insurance Department with considerably more documentation than they
did in their original rate filing,"
Evans said. "This additional data,
plus St. Paul's offer to drop their 8.5
percent surcharge, were the deciding factors."
Evans had favored the surcharge
plan because in theory it would
mean higher premiums for doctors
who have had malpractice claims
filed against them. He said he
changed his mind following protests
from the medical community.
St. Paul instituted the surcharge
Product Liability
plan following the department's denial of an average 62.3 increase in
INSURANCE COSTS DETER AIDS VACCINE
medical malpractice rates. An
High liability insurance costs are several recent academy studies have across-the-board 38 percent increase
partly responsible for delaying the found that court awards to persons was later granted, but St. Paul said
development of a vaccine against claiming injuries from vaccines have that rate hike was not enough. The
AIDS, the cochairman of a National a chilling effect on the development company insures some 5,200 of the
Academy of Sciences panel on the of new vaccines. "This general cli- state's 9,000 doctors.
St. Paul subsequently said it
disease said Oct. 29.
mate of uncertainty is something
"Even if the scientific obstacles that deters many pharmaceutical planned to proceed with an addiwere surmounted, legal, social, and companies from being involved in tional 18 percent rate hike as well as
the surcharge plan. Although Evans
ethical factors could delay or limit AIDS vaccine research," he said.
the availability of an AIDS vacMany pharmaceutical firms self- approved the surcharge, he denied
cine," Dr. David Baltimore, director insure for liability up to certain lim- the 18 percent increase. When St.
of the Whitehead Institute for Bio- its but have trouble finding compa- Paul forged ahead with the increase
medical Research and professor of nies that will provide coverage anyway, Evans called for the public
biology at the Massachusetts Insti- beyond those limits, Widdus said. hearing to clear up the dispute.
"I hope the challenging of this
tute of Technology, said at a press "So, if they can't insure, they don't
rate filing will make it clear to all
conference at NAS.
develop the vaccine."
Firms also hesitate to develop companies that any proposed rate
Roy Widdus, project director for
the NAS report Confronting AIDS AIDS vaccines because the market is increases must be supported by a
— Directions for Public Health, not large enough to justify potential well-documented need for such an
increase," Evans said. •
Health Care, and Research, said liability losses, Widdus said. •
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Directors'

Governmental

Liability

TAKEOVERS SAID
TO INCREASE SUITS

Immunity

FIRE FIGHTERS SHIELDED, COURT RULES

Volunteer fire companies are en- Court, alleging that this procedure
titled to governmental immunity polluted nearby lakes, thus causing
LOS ANGELES — Directors who from suits over damage caused by the destruction of various fish and
worry about their exposure to liabil- chemical agents used to extinguish other aquatic life.
ity from shareholder suits can help fires, the Commonwealth Court of
The trial court sustained prelimithemselves by remembering that Pennsylvania ruled Oct. 16.
nary objections filed by the fire
they represent the interests of shareThe appeals court upheld a trial companies arguing that the comholders, not management, an attor- court's ruling that volunteer fire plaint should be dismissed as it inney told the National Association of companies are "local agencies" as volved them because they are entiCorporate Directors Oct. 21.
to
immunity
under
defined under Pennsylvania law, tled
Lowell E. Sachnoff, of Chicago's holding that volunteer fire compa- Pennsylvania's 1980 Immunity Act.
Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubinstein, nies act on behalf of local governIn performing public fire fighting
said the wave of corporate takeovers ment units.
duties, volunteer fire companies act
has generated the growth in suits
In this case, the Dravosburg Vol- on behalf of local government units,
against directors. "The courts have
unteer Fire Dept. No. 1 and the the court held. This conclusion is
recognized that takeover situations
Dravosburg Volunteer Co. No. 2 supported by the historical and
necessarily involve the possibility of
were summoned in April 1983 to structural relationship between volconflict of interest and implicate
clean up a diesel fuel spill on a unteer fire companies and the local
possible entrenchment motives and
highway adjacent to the lakes on municipalities and citizenry they
so are applying different rules to
which Beverly Wilson maintained a serve, it said, affirming the order of
defensive actions."
fishing operation. The fire compa- the Allegheny County Common
The business judgment rule,
nies applied a liquid chemical to the Pleas Court. (Wilson v. Dravosburg
which once extended almost comhighway to disperse the fuel. Wilson Volunteer Fire Dept. No. I, Pa
plete protection to the business decifiled a complaint of trespass in Alle- C m m w l t h C t , No. 2813 CD
sions of directors, no longer autogheny County Common Pleas 1984). D
matically applies in takeover
situations. To find shelter under the
rule, Sachnoff said, directors now Self Insurance
have an "enhanced duty" to show
good faith and lack of entrenchment REINSURER SOUGHT FOR NEW OIL CAPTIVE
motive during a hostile bid. The
LONDON — Lead underwriters
"OIL was formed to provide
initial burden of proof in showing
will
soon
be
approached
to
provide
seepage
and other pollution cover,
the reasonableness of defensive tacreinsurance
for
a
new
oil
industry
while
OCIL
has been formed due to
tics, in relation to the threat posed,
captive, a spokesman for the broker great difficulty obtaining umbrella
also lies with directors, he said.
The view that corporations should arranging the transaction told LIB liability coverage," the source at
Alexander Howden said. Some comnever be subject to a hostile tender Oct. 15.
The
captive,
Oil
Casualty
Insurpanies that were able to get coveroffer and should resist at all times
ance
Ltd.
(OCIL),
was
launched
age
found it inadequate and will use
has been rejected by the courts,
from
Bermuda
in
June
by
24
leadOCIL
for "topping up," he said.
Sachnoff said, adding that courts
ing
energy
groups.
Reinsurance
for
Most
of the companies that have
condone certain defensive tactics.
the
captive
will
be
arranged
by
brojoined
OCIL
are North American
Directors who want to keep themker
Alexander
&
Alexander,
a
firms,
including
Standard Oil of
selves and their pocketbooks intact
source
in
the
London
subsidiary
Ohio,
Sun
Co.,
and
Phillips. Some of
during hostile bids for the company
Alexander
Howden
Group
said.
them
might
have
"gone
bare" beshould be prepared with an in-house
The
founders
of
OCIL
are
all
fore
the
formation
of
OCIL,
he said.
defense team in advance of any
members
of
the
35-member
Oil
InOCIL
will
write
$100
million
exsuch bid, Sachnoff said. The direcsurance
Ltd.
(OIL),
one
of
the
bigcess
above
$20
million
on
general,
or
tors* and officers' insurance policy
gest
mutual
underwriters
in
the
inumbrella,
liability
risks.
It
will
cover
should be reviewed for complete
coverage, he said. Outside experts dustry. Despite the parallel up to $50 million excess above $20
(such as counsel, investment bank- membership of the two companies, million on directors' and officers'
ers, and proxy solicitors) should be OCIL is not a subsidiary of OIL, business but has an absolute exclusion on seepage and pollution. D
retained only as needed, he said. • and the two will run separately.
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Medical Malpractice

RISK MANAGERS TOLD TO STRENGTHEN REVIEW OF DOCTORS
Congress is more likely to pass
legislation aimed at disciplining incompetent doctors than at changing
the tort system, Edmund Rice, director of federal relations for the
American Hospital Association
(AHA), said Oct. 25.
Rice told the AHA's annual meeting for hospital risk managers that
broad-based "tort reform" at the
federal level is "highly unlikely,"
but he predicted some 20 states
would pass such "reforms" in 1987.
The Omnibus Health Package (S
1744), passed on the final day of the
99th Congress reflects legislators'
desire to deal with the medical malpractice "crisis" by strengthening
peer review processes rather than
shielding physicians and hospitals
from liability, Rice said. (See related
story, this issue.) He said AHA supports the bill because the alternative
is more "onerous."
The legislation, not yet signed by
President Reagan, would provide legal immunity for physicians participating in peer review and would
create a national information network to monitor physicians' records.
It would require hospitals to report
whenever a physician is disciplined.
Others also urged the risk managers to strengthen credentialing and
review procedures for doctors as a
protection against liability for hospitals in medical malpractice cases.
"The plaintiffs' bar is hauling
hospitals into lawsuits on the theory
of negligent credentialing," said
Patti G. Zimmerman, an attorney
with Baltimore's Smith, Somerville
& Case. "Thus 'reasonable' or 'ordinary care' is going to mean hospitals
must investigate all of the information they receive on a physician's
application."
Zimmerman, who has defended
hospitals in malpractice suits, said
each hospital must adopt a credentialing policy and follow it religiously when reviewing applications. "Set

a policy that requires a detailed investigation of the information provided and then follow it to the letter," she said. "The policy must be
applied in exactly the same way to
physicians who are seeking a renewal of the privileges," she said.
Hospitals must establish an annual
evaluation for practicing physicians
as well, Zimmerman said.
State statutes will not protect an
application or a risk manager's investigation of the application from
discovery proceedings, so the file
should be prepared "as if a plaintiff's lawyer is going to see it," Zimmerman said. Hospitals should include as many issues as possible

under the definition of medical review, she said, because medical review and quality assurance records
are protected by state laws.
The Risk Retention Amendments
of 1986, signed by Reagan Oct. 27,
should be seen as a "step forward"
because hospitals that participate in
risk retention groups will be able to
negotiate better rates with insurers,
Rice told the group. "Hospitals can't
be jacked back and forth with this
legislation," he said.
Rice urged hospital risk managers
to plan participation in risk retention groups soon, saying he expects
the legislation to go into effect by
mid-summer. •

Self Insurance
CONNECTICUT HOSPITALS BYPASS MARKET
HARTFORD, Conn. — Ten small, non-profit Connecticut hospitals have
formed their own insurance company, Connmed, to bypass the commercial
market for general and professional liability claims.
"We seemed to be at the mercy of the marketplace, and we all felt we
ought to gain some control over our destiny," said Alfred Lerz, president of
Johnson Memorial Hospital in Stafford Springs, Conn.
Connmed began operation Oct. 1, and Lerz said he is pleased so far with
the results. The annual premium for his 78-bed hospital dropped from
$500,000 last year to $330,000, he said. Some of that apparent savings won't
be realized, he said, because the new system shifts from an "occurrence" to
a "claims made" basis.
"In the first couple of years, we'll probably keep the premiums up to
build up a kitty," said Robert Boardman, director of Rockville General.
The hospitals will benefit by being able to control their investment
money until claims are actually made, said Albert May, spokesman for the
Connecticut Hospital Association. The association is managing the new
company, which offers its members coverage of up to $3 million. A
commercial firm, Trenwick America Reinsurance Corp., of Westport,
Conn., handles umbrella coverage over that amount.
Lerz, whose premiums rose 400 percent last year, said reinsurance has
not been as big a problem for hospitals as primary coverage. The other
hospitals now involved with the new company are: Bradley Memorial,
Rockville General, Windham Community Memorial, Winsted Memorial,
Griffin, Milford, New Milford, Sharon, and Park City.
Hospital officials said Connmed is the first such company in New
England for small institutions, although some of the major non-profit
hospitals have been taking steps toward at least partial self-insurance to
avoid the commercial market. Lerz said some small hospitals in New
Hampshire have expressed interest in joining Connmed when it accepts
new members next fall. •
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Municipal

VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS
• Manville Corp. has reached a $62.1 million settlement with a
group of syndicates at Lloyds of London and other firms participating
with its underwriters. Manville sued Lloyd's and 26 other carriers
seeking a determination of their obligations to pay for losses arising
out of asbestos-related and other claims. The settlement will be paid in
three installments. (Johns-Manville v. Home Insurance, et al., Calif
SuperCt (San Francisco), No. 765226, 10/24/86)
• A Los Angeles Superior Court judge has upheld a $23.7 million
award to Nichole Fortman, a 9-year-old whose fall out of a jeep in
1981 left her paralyzed and brain-damaged. Hemco Inc., which
produced the mold for the vehicle s fiberglass doors, must pay Nichole
$6 million for pain and suffering and $17.7 million for medical
expenses and lost earnings. No punitive damages were awarded.
Hemco's mold was allegedly defective because the doors were rearhinged. A separate settlement was reached with Jeep Corp. (Fortman
v. Hemco Inc., LA SuperCt, NWC 86375, 10/15/86)
m A New York Supreme Court jury has found tennis star Martina
Navratilova not liable for damages suffered by photographer Arthur
Seitz during a scuffle following her loss in a 1982 tournament,
although it awarded Seitz $50 for exposed film. Seitz sued Navratilova
for $2 million, charging that she struck him and caused him to
develop a calcium deposit on his arm that required surgery. Navratilova countersued for $4.5 million, alleging that the incident caused her
"psychological damage." The jury foreman said the panel did not
condone Navratilova's conduct but found Seitz too "pushy." (Seitz v.
Navratilova, NY SupCt, Suffolk Cty, No. 024672/84,
10/9/86)
• The Montana Supreme Court has ordered George Ellinghouse to
either accept $1 million in place of a jury's $5.2 million award against
an insurer or submit to a new trial. Ellinghouse, who provided
consulting services for a golf-course sprinkler system in 1974, was sued
when a man was electrocuted while digging near the system's underground wires. Safeco initially accepted coverage and defense of the
case but pulled out two months before the trial. While the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a verdict against Safeco, the court ruled, it does
not show a vindictiveness or ill will so extreme as to warrant the
"exorbitant sum " awarded by the jury. (Safeco Insurance Co. v.
Ellinghouse, Montana SupCt, No. 85-257, 9/17/86)

Coverage

WEST VIRGINIA
PLAN ENROLLS 115
CHARLESTON, WVa. — More
than 115 local governments have
joined West Virginia's new state-run
insurance program for liability coverage, according to Robert Corey,
director of the state's Board of Risk
& Insurance Management.
The government units and nonprofit organizations will pay $6 million in annual premiums, Corey
said, adding that he is now confident the state can successfully run
the insurance program.
Jim Mahurin, a consultant who
negotiated the policy for the Raleigh County Commission, said officials there expect to save $39,144 in
premiums the first year and receive
greater coverage as well. "But the
state needs to exercise extreme caution because it could be an extreme
money-loser," he said.
West Virginia has operated a pool
since 1971 for its state agencies, and
county school boards were allowed
to join in 1980, Corey said. The
plan, which covers 89,000 employees, could cover an additional
25,000, he said.
The state's new program will cover all claims, Corey said. If total
claims prove higher than premiums,
the state can always raise its rates or
impose deductibles, he said.
The program was required by an
executive order issued this year by
Gov. Arch A. Moore Jr. (R). •
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MEDICINE...
OESI6NEO FOR H E A L T H . . .
P R O D U C E D WITH C A R E

THE UPJOHN COMPANY
K A L A M A Z O O . MICHIGAN *©OOl
T E L E P H O N E (©16) 382-*000
PHARMACEUTICAL R E S E A R C H
AND DEVELOPMENT
FDA LIAISON
Officio/
O. J. MASON, PH.D.

September 10, 1970

Office of Scientific Evaluation
Bureau of Drugs
Food and Drug Administration
Rockville, Maryland
20852
Reference:

IND for Compressed Tablets U-33,030 (Original Submission)

Gentlemen:
We are submitting, under the provisions of section 505(i) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act and section 130.3 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, three copies of a Claim for Investigational Exemption for
Compressed Tablets U-33,030.
This filing is intended to cover Phase 1 studies of U-33,030 as an antianxiety agent.
Sincerely yours,
THE UPJOHN COMPANY

D. J. Mason, Ph.D.
DJM/mak

o
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THE U P J O H N COMPANY
KALAMAZOO. MICHIGAN *OOOt
TELEPHONE (016) 3 6 2 - 4 0 0 0

DRUG REGULATORY AFFAIRS
Pharmocwricoi Aescarch ond Dev«Jopm«nr
Ottictof
C L. S C H U M A N N . PM.D.

Oirtaor

May 4 , 1976

Bureau of Drugs
Food and Drug Administration
5600 Fishers Lane
Rockville, Maryland 20852
Reference:

New Drug Application for Compressed Tablets Halcion
(Original Submission!

(triazolam)

Gentlemen:
We are submitting under the provisions of section 314.1 of Title 21, Code
of Federal Regulations, a New Drug Application for Compressed Tablets
Halcion (triazolam). This drug is a benzodiazepine type compound intended
for the treatment of insomnia.
There are 147 volumes in this application; they are submitted as follows:
Three copies of the following:
Volume 1.1 - Part 1, Contents
Part 2, Optional Expanded Summary
Volumes 1.2 through 1.17 - Expanded Summary (continued from Volume 1.1)
Volume 1.18 - Summary of Dependence Liability Studies
(Note: In addition to the three review copies, 15
additional copies of Volume 1.18 are included for
your Drug Abuse Staff.)
./ Volume 1.19 - Part 4, Labeling
'*.%":"
Part 5, Statement
Part 6, List of Articles
Part 7, Composition of Drug
Part 8, Methods and Controls<^ w
;
Part 9, Drug Samples; Descry65a^>f
Referef5te*$tandard
\.
*&^})1Studies
Volumes 1.20 through 1.23 - Part 10, Pre
^/S^T*

l«SA
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&

NDA for C.T. Halcion (triazolam)
Page Two

Volume 1.24 - Part
Part
Part
Part

11,
12,
13,
14,

May 4, 1976

List of Investigators
Clinical Studies
Statement
Environmental Impact Analysis Report

Two copies of the following:
Volumes 1.25 (RRl) through 1.28 (RR4) - Drug Experience Reports (FD-1639's)
One copy of the following;
Volumes 1.29 (CI) through 1.129 (C101) - Patient Case Record
Volumes 1.130 (PSl) through 1.147 (PS18) - Computer Generated
Patient Summaries
Under separate cover, the following samples are submitted with this application:
Hew Drug Substance (Bulk Drug):

.

Lot 8257-CH-141, 1 bottle, 1 gram
Lot 11324-TGS-33, 1 bottle, 1 gram
Lot 11324-TGS-87, 1 bottle, 1 gram
Finished Product:

•

C. T. triazolam 0.25 mg Lot 17,543-2
Lot 17,543-5
Lot INV 2494

4 bottles
4 bottles
4 bottles

150 each
150 each
150 each

C. T. triazolam 0.5 mg Lot 17,544-2
Lot 17,544-5
Lot INV 2495

4 bottles
4 bottles
4 bottles

150 each
150 each
150 each

C. T. triazolam 1 mg Lot 17,545-1
Lot 17,545-2
Lot INV 2496

4 bottles
4 bottles
4 bottles

150 each
150 each
150 each

Control Reference Standard Issue A
Lot 8257-CH-86

10 vials

250 mg each
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The studies described in this NDA were conducted under IND-7231, C. T. U-33,030;
that IND may be referred to 1n the review of this submission.
Sincerely yours,
THE UPJOHN COMPANY
E. L. Schumann, Ph.D.
ELS/ekj
Attachments
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Servica
Food and Drug Administrate
Rockville MD 2 0 8 5 7

NDA 17-892

?W I 5 1982
The Upjohn Company
Attention: E.L. Schumann, Ph.D.
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001
Gentlemen:
Please refer to your nev drug application dated Hay 4, 1976 submitted pursuant
to section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Compressed
Tablets Ealcion (triazolam), 0.25 mg and 0.5 mg, NDA 17-892.
We also refer to our letters dated February 26, 1982 and October 25, 1982, and
to your additional communication of October 28, 1982.
We have completed the review of this application as amended and have concluded
that the drug is safe and effective for use as recommended in the submitted
labeling. Accordingly, the application is approved.
As detailed in our February 26, 1982 letter, and reaffirmed in our letter of
October 25, 1982, it is required that you perform a Phase IV dose
proportionality study in healthy volunteers as a condition of approval.
Also, it is understood that approval of this NDA is conditional upon the
announcement of the final scheduling decision in the Federal Register by the
Drug Enforcement Administration.
The enclosures summarize the remaining conditions relating to the approval of
this application.
Please submit one market package of the drug when available.
Sincerely yours,

(Z&4

Robert Temple, M.D.
Acting Director
Office of Nev Drug Evaluation
National Center for Drugs and Biologies

Enclosures:

Records and Reports Requirement (Reg. 310.300)
Conditions of Approval of an NDA

:!0;; i
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venting Reagan from being Reagan. The Administration was caving in on a tax hike. Violations of SALT
II were being ignored. Policy regarding Poland was an
enigma. Drift.
Well, Baker, Deaver, and Darman Are gone. Donald
Regan a)id even Pat Buchanan are in place. And here
we are, dismantling a Poseidon to conform with SALT
II. Not a thing was done about the murder of Major
Nicholson. Not a thing has been done about the murder of Robert Stethem by the hijackers. It's business
as usual in the terrorist, camps of the Bekaa Valley.
(Francois Mitterrand was tougher: The French bombed
the Bekaa and their nationals have since been let
•lone.) The Administration was strangely passive during the appropriations fight over Star Wars, funding
was reduced, and rumors circulate that George Shultz
and Robert McFarlane are going to sell out on Star
Wars in exchange for a' cosmetic reduction in Soviet warheads. The forthcoming summit meeting with
Gorbachev appears to be politically stacked in his
favor. He at least has an agenda: ending Star Wars.
Our agenda appears to consist only of a vague de-'
sire fori "peace.'*
I
' ,
The Pentagon issues ridiculous pronunciamentos explaining why it cannot ,use force here, there—anywhere? It seems to have a George McClellan complex.
Which brings us to Secretary of State George Shultz.
Now,. George Shultz has never been in danger of being mistaken for Julius Caesar. But Shultz has now
given a tough speech at Helsinki, and he was one of
the 'hard-liners within the Administration on the re-,
cent hostage affair. Shultz wants to hit back. So does
Secretary of Education WilliamK Bennett. Reflect on
that, The Secretary of Education took a tougher position than the Pentagon.! Shultz is entirely absorbed
by the State Department apparatus, but he is not the
source of. the trouble.
|
Someone is supposed to be in charge down there.

Liability Nightmare j

Union Carbides of the world. Even without a single
obvious disaster, the case-by-case costs of litigation
can drive small companies to the wall. Heritage analyst Milton Copulos says 20 ,per cenf of the cost of
an ordinary stepladder is traceable to past, present,
and future liability.
J
Skd to say, the horror stories are not mere flukes;
each one illustrates «a principle of law. The ceiling-fan
case is Just one example of how courts are disallowing the traditional defense of contributory negligence.
Another1 such case involved a man who strapped a refrigerator to his back and ran a stunt footrace! One
of the straps failed, and he collected SI million from
the strap manufacturer.
'
The textile-machinery case shows how a company
can be jttsessed damages for injuries caused by longforgotten, impossible-to-track-down products. The drug '
case typifies the new doctrine of generic liability, urider which a consumer who suffers side-effects after
taking a pill and cannot remember which prand he
took can successfully sue all the makers of the compound in question.
j
The tyg winners—did you havt any' doubt?—art
the lawyers. A Rand study found that a typical court
case cost $380,000, of which SI25,000 went to the defense lawyers, SI 14,000 to the plaintiff's lawyers, and
$141,000 in net compensation to the plaintiff.
One of the ironies of the liability spiral is that in
some areas it is making life more risky as well as
more expensive. Sears was sued by a heart-attack victim who claimed that its lawnmbwer starter cord was]
too hard to pull; but rectifying this "defect" would j
make it easier for children to endanger themselves by
activating the machines. Edmund Kitch, writing in a!
recent | issue of Regulation, tells bow liability for rare
side-effects is driving many manufacturers out of the
vaccine matket, even in case? where united medical
opinion agrees that the vaccines do more good than
harm overall.
j :
The diphtheria-tetanus-whooping-cough vaccine for
children now costs $2.80 a dose and rising, up from
ten cents a while back. Worse Jyet is the problem of
"orphan vaccines.*' Although medical research continues to progress toward the hope of vaccines against
AIDS and herpes, Kitch says (that "testing and ot*
taining regulatory clearance for such vaccines is not
currently of interest to any potential producer. Thosfc
invisible non-litigants Who would benefit from new
vaccines are probably the most dramatic victims of the
threat of product-liabilijy law.**

1 1 TEM: A mkn sticks his two-year-old son's head
I between tW running blades of a ceiling fan-Mmd
then sues the manufacturer for failing to warn him the
child might be injured. |
• |.
'item: A company that had ipahufactured textile
. machinery* for 136 years goes out of business because
•of the costs of liability j lawsuits over equipment it
had manufactured decades earlier, j 'item: A'fter deciding that a drug a woman had
. taken during pregnancy was. not responsible for her
child's birth defects, a jury awarded her damages anySmeal Time
way—to help defray medical costs of the child's fu•HE STRUGGLE for the presidency of the National j
ture care." *
. j .'
!j.
Organization for wjomen pitted Eleanor Smeal, a
&•., These horror stories, culled by a Heritage Foundathe incumbent, Judy Gofdtion researcher, show why;product-liability law has/
come a pienace to more than just the Manvilles/and I smith, a former Smeal Iprot6g6e. It turned oh degrees
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It is a pleasure to be here with you this morning to discuss a
topic which many Americans, especially in the business community,
consider the number one economic issue facing America today:
namely, the need for tort reform, particularly of our product
liability laws.
Some of you in this audience may not believe tort reform concerns
you. If so, well, you are wrong. As certified public
accountants, you are directly affected by professional liability
costs. Moreover, many if not most of your clients are affected by
numerous tort issues. Finally, each of you is a consumer, and
consumers as a group ultimately pay the costs associated with tort
losses.
For all these reasons, you should be concerned about -- and
involved in ~ the current public debate over tort reform.
I know that there is a tort crisis because in -the last few months,
1 have responded to literally hundreds of letters and spoken to
thousands in business and civic groups on this issue. All across
the country, people are unable to obtain liability insurance at
affordable rates and, in some cases, to obtain insurance at all.
Unlike a few years ego, when this problem affected only a few
small groups in our society ~ like doctors — today's crisis has
no bounds.
Manufacturers and sellers of virtually every product or service,
professionals, such as lawyers, engineers and ^- yes —
accountants, and municipalities of every size are encountering
serious problems arising from premium increases, policy
cancellations and refusals to underwrite certain activities.
While a number of causes have been suggested for these problems, I
believe the excesses that have crept into our legal system are the
single most important factor contributing to the liability
insurance crisis, particularly in the area of product liability.
The costs associated with tort awards, including the cost of
liability insurance, are passed along to consumers in the form of
higher prices, and in many cases result in the loss of socially
beneficial products and of jobs. So, our legal excesses have
clear and detrimental effects on our domestic economy and our
international competitiveness.
But before I go further into that side of the problem, let me take
a moment to explain how our insurance system affects and' is
affected by our legal system.
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Though severe injuries and losses rarely occur, they can be
devastating. For this reason, most people are willing to take on
a minimal, but certain, financial obligation in return for
protection against the unlikely, but potentially overwhelming,
one. That is why insurance exists. You all know this. You all
have bought insurance to protect against uncommon risks, be they
from natural disaster, theft, or a civil wrong.
Product liability insurance exists for the same reason. Some
companies will, despite quality control efforts, occasionally
produce a defective product which severely hurts a user. In many
cases, even such unintentional behavior will constitute the breach
of a legal duty, something we lawyers call a "tort." The cost of
compensating such tort victims can be many times company earnings,
especially in the case of small businesses. Such a result would,
be devastating to any company whether it is large or small.
By spreading this cost among all producers, product liability
coverage makes it possible for companies to manufacture and sell
despite the risk of liability for a defective product and the
costs associated with a lawsuit. This is why product liability
insurance is called "a linchpin in the operation of our economy."
Without it, the wheels of production would grind to a halt.
It is a system in which the onus to insure falls on the potential
tortfeasors and defendants rather than on the potential victims
and plaintiffs. Through our civil justice and insurance systems,
the cost of product harm is transferred from users to producers.
In this way, overall prices come to reflect the "social costs"
associated with the manufacture, use and sale of products, and
producers have a direct incentive to reduce the likelihood of
product-caused accidents.
Traditionally, insurance companies invest premiums until they must
be applied against claims. During the late 19709s, soaring
interest rates made it feasible for insurance companies to
undercharge for coverage in order to attract more cash for
investment. A price war raged for several years, with insurance
companies offering more and more coverage for less and less money#
You probably have all heard of this practice — It is commonly
referred to as "cash flow underwriting."
Y7hile this may have been a reasonable response to the short-term
incentives of the investment market, it disrupted the accidentreducing function of product liability insurance. Not only were
potential injury claims spread among more producers, but the true
costs of those injuries were masked by the interest rate subsidy.
Unintentionally, perhaps, the insurance companies were sending the
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wrong signal to manufacturers and to the American public• From
the prices charged for premiums, it appeared that injury claims
and the amounts awarded were declining when, in fact, they were
going up significantly.
This increase in claims and awards was fueled in no email part by
the fact that the common law of tort was undergoing radical
change. . Although the basis of tort law is fault, there is another
important theory — somewhat more recent ~ called "strict
liability." This theory holds that in certain cases, a party
should be liable for the consequences of his acts regardless of
fault.
Initially, this concept was subject to substantial legal
limitations. Strict liability was seen as an exception to the
rule, and therefore used sparingly. Beginning in the 1960fs,
however, legal scholars and judges expanded upon the notion of
strict liability and developed new theories of recovery, creating
new legal duties and additional categories of damages. Strict
liability began to be applied without regard to its original
limitations. In some jurisdictions, strict liability bordered on
absolute liability.
In part, these new interpretations drew upon the new dangers of
advanced technology and our growing ability to trace disease and
injury to chemical and other sources. In part, they reflected
confidence in our prosperity as a naticn and the view that we
could afford to compensate for every harm. And in part, I must
admit, they stemmed from the pressure generated by record numbers
of attorneys seeking to earn a living and exercise their creative
talents.
But more important, and to no small extent, these efforts
reflected a desire to achieve a particular ideological goal ~ a
risk-free society, or at the very least, a society in which no one
would have to bear, without compensation, what Shakespeare called
the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune." This was to be
part of the "great society:" every person entitled to be made
whole, regardless of the circumstances of his injury.
This legal policy was nothing short of an off-budget mechanism for
redistributing wealth in the United States. This policy
reflected, if not promoted, the belief that whenever there are
personal injuries, the people — "us" — are owed something by
institutions -- "them" .-- particularly by America's businesses and
governmental bodies. Regardless of the degree of fault
attributable to the injured or to third parties, those with the
deepest pockets are "expected" to fork over compensation.
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- 4 Furthermore our technological advances and new insights into
causes and effects make us more aware o£ the risks in daily life.
This awareness, coupled with subtle but real attitude changes in
our society, have made us less willing to assume many of those
risks. Where Alexander Woollcott could once quip, "all the things
I really like are either illegal, immoral or fattening,* today we
might say, without much humor, "everything we enjoy is either
infectious, carcinogenic or promotes hardening of the arteries"
— but we can sue!
This propensity to sue, coupled with the expansion of tort
doctrine and the willingness of juries and judges to award
spectacular damages, made the 970'& (and '80's) a time for
exploding tort liability. The inflation and interest rates whichlowered the cost of insurance, raised the amount of tort damages
and paved the way for the multi-million dollar verdicts which have
become almost commonplace.
The proverbial chickens have flocked home to roost since 1963 when
inflation and interest rates started their drop to the lowest
levels in over a decade under the leadership of President Reagan.
Of course, we can all be grateful for that. But a side effect has
been a precipitous decline in insurance company revenues. Thus,
as'tort suits and judgments have skyrocketed, insurance companies
have suffered staggering underwriting losses paying out record
claims.
Insurance companies have responded to this squeeze by tremendously
raising product liability premiums and reducing or eliminating
many forms of coverage. We have received reports of up to 1000%
increases! Though it is impossible to recoup past losses, those
companies appear to have decided not to make the same mistake
twice. This time they are pricing policies on the basis of the
costs of the tort system, rather than on the interest rate index.
Whereas their earlier undercharges masked the true costs of
coverage, today's insurance (including in some instances the lack
thereof) reflects the reality of the costs associated with the
tort system. As a result, the consumer and the manufacturer have
had to come to grips with the true price of the risk-free society.
We must remember that insurance is a consensual, commercial
arrangement which comes about as a result of needs. Coverage will
be available only as long as those who need it are willing to pay
premiums sufficient to pay for it — that is, to cover their
losses and allow a reasonable profit for those providing the
insurance.
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- 5 In some cases, however, realistically priced insurance will be so
expensive that manufacturers will not be able to afford to
produce. In theory, I suppose, that's not a bad thing: if your
product turns out to be harmful to the public, you should stop
making it. That's how fault-based liability increases consumer
safety.
But that's not always the way it works. Tremendous judgments are
being awarded even when products are not unreasonably dangerous,
even when the manufacturer or seller is not at fault, but simply
because he has a deep pocket. The result is that products which
are not unsafe, which consumers want and need, are pulled from the
shelves. And there are dozens cf foreign-made products waiting to
replace them.
A recent example of this phenomenon was the massive swine flu
immunization program. After e series of lawsuits, the
manufacturers announced that they could no longer afford to
produce the vaccine. Although it was clear that, on balance, the
risk of adverse reactions was small compared to the benefits, the
few harmed by the vaccine collected awards large enough to
endanger the entire program.
The government, including Congress, believed the vaccine was
essential to public health, and used taxpayer dollars to
underwrite the pharmaceutical companies so that production could
continue. But we can't afford to do that every time: moreover,
it goes against our grain to have Uncle Sam do so.
However, if our tort system continues in this direction, we will
find ourselves in situations like this more and more. As coverage
becomes increasingly unaffordable and even unavailable,
manufacturers and businesses will shut down: and the first to go
will be the small ones, the entrepreneurs whc constitute the vital
lifeblood of our economy.
It is utter nonsense to assert that the crisis will be cured by
government regulation of the insurance industry rather than reform
of tort law. Shall we require that industry to operate some of
its lines of coverage at a loss in order to subsidize the tort
system? I don't think so. Moreover, even to contemplate such a
result is to turn our free enterprise system on its head; but
someone has to pay the piper if we want to compensate all victims
generously.
Many people remark that Britain, France and Japan have less
litigious societies than America,' and that manufacturers in those
countries have far fewer problems with the availability and
affcrdability of product liability insurance. The key difference
is that the governments cf those countries undertake as a public
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6 function the underwriting of health care and other social costs
for their citizens ~ action that the United States has undertaken
only in exceptional situations, such as the swine flu case.
Those countries' governments underwrite the risks of modern life
by heavily taxing their people. Fortunately, we in America have
rejected the socialist notion that the central government knows
best and provides best, choosing instead the risks — but
potential gains — of free enterprise.
Of course in all countries, including the United States, consumers
as a group ultimately pay the costs associated with the suits of
the injured few. But there are two distinguishing features
between our policy and that of those other countries.
First, victims recover far less in those countries for their
injuries. And second, — and I believe it to be a very important
distinction — the incentive structures are different. With costs
spread through the tax system in the other countries, there is no
particular pressure applied to those in the best position to
produce safer products. But if a manufacturer in the United
States knows he will be sued if he produces harmful products, the
profit incentive motivates him to make his products safer. He may
spend a bit more on production, but he111 come out ahead in the
long run. Only in America is there this kind of direct feedback
to -fiianufacturers and product sellers.
However, when the system goes berserk and rewards and punishes
indiscriminately — as I believe our system now does —
manufacturers have less incentive to be careful . If
manufacturers know they are likely to land in court even if
they're not at fault, the system breaks down. The erosion of the
fault-based liability doctrine has blurred the distinction between
a safe and an unsafe manufacturer and thereby destroyed the
deterrence pillar of the tort law.
Our judicial system is largely responsible for this result.
Activist judges have ignored the common law of tort, choosing
instead to engage in a systematic re-interpretation of tort
doctrine. They have steadily expanded legal duties in line with
their own social/philosophical beliefs.
The American people should remind their judges that public policy
should be debated and established in our legislatures — not in
our court rooms. Moreover, both judges and juries must come to
understand that the tremendous sums they frequently award are not
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- 7 paid out of some secret corporate fund. Rather, the money they
hand out comes from all of us, as consumers, stockholders and
taxpayers.
Until we curb the excesses in tort litigation, costs will continue
to rise. This cannot go on. And it will not. A more rational,
predictable tort system is required. It is time we realized that
while there may be individual winners and losers in our present
system, the total costs are borne by society as a whole.
Recently, a number of states have begun to take steps to address
the excesses in their tort laws. Maryland has put a cap on
non-economic damages. Florida has capped damages (at a different
level) and has also modified its rule on joint and several
liability. California voters recently approved Proposition 51
which re-establishes the traditional connection between a
defendant's responsiblity for an injury and his obligation to pay
non-economic damages. These are important steps and should be
encouraged.
But each state addresses these problems in different ways. This
reflects, among other things, the historical fact that the common
law of tort has developed independently in each state. Because cf
this, the states are well suited to address most concerns in the
tort law, such as those associated with medical malpractice,
professional liability and municipal liability. These are issues
where local views can and must be primary.
The product liability issue, however, poses a different problem.
Because todayfs stream of commerce is apt to carry every product
beyond the state in which it was made, questions of product
liability inevitably raise interstate commerce concerns. Though
the recent tort reform efforts undertaken by the individual states
axe certainly welcome and necessary, and reflect a recognition of
the seriousness of the problem, we dc not expect the states, each
working independently, to produce a consistent product liability
system. Interstate problems call for interstate solutions.
Among the responsibilities our Constitution explicitly delegates
to the central government is the duty to regulate interstate
commerce for the good of the whole. That is why we have proposed
federal product liability legislation — to provide a predictable
set of standards upon which businesses and consumers alike can
rely. The Federal government cannot abdicate its responsibility
in this area and must take a leadership role •- which is precisely
what this Administration intends to do.
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- 8 In April, the President sent to Congress a bill which, as he
described it, "would set an example of simple good sense for the
rest of the Nation to follow." It will protect the free flow of
goods in interstate commerce by placing reasonable limitations on
the excesses of product liability law and returning it to a
fault-based system. And it will not preempt all state action:
the states would be free to adopt more stringent standards.
The bill would ensure that
compensate injuries caused
same time, it would reduce
associated with litigation

product liability law operates to
by the wrongdoing of others. At the
the unacceptably high transaction costs
and would limit excessive awards.

In addition to requiring that liability be based on fault, the
bill will limit the application of joint and several liability to
situations where persons have acted in concert to cause an injury.
The bill also reduces awards in cases where a plaintiff is
eligible for certain collateral sources of compensation, 6uch as
Social Security Disability Benefits, workers1 compensation or
employer financed health care benefits.
In the area of damages, the bill will place a dollar cap on
non-economic damages, including punitive damages. This cap will,
of course, have no effect on the award of economic damages, such
as medical care, rehabilitation costs or lost earnings. Awards of
future economic damages vhich are greater than $100,OCC will be
paid periodically rather than in a single lump-sum. Courts will
have the discretion to fix the level and schedule of payments at .
the time of judgment.
The bill also will help alleviate the enormous transaction costs
associated with litigation by establishing a "sliding scale91 for
attorney contingency fees that decreases as the amount of an award
increases.
The rising costs associated with product liability suits cause
negative effects which ripple throughout our society. They have a
detrimental effect on our country's productivity and competitiveness, and ultimately are reflected in the expenses of every
consumer.
Already we have seen the effect of this run-away system: dozens
of firms producing items ranging from health equipment to child
car seats are discontinuing the manufacture of their products.
This causes the loss of American jobs and hands our foreign
competitors — who are, by the way, far more difficult to sue ~
yet another opportunity to profit at our expense.
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Legislative action is needed — and needed now -- to deal
effectively with the situation.
The problems facing us today in our product liability system have
developed over years and have many different roots. There is no
quick fix. We must all work together, at the state and Federal
level, using all three branches of government in close cooperation
with business, consumer and labor interests to correct these
problems.
Your contribution to this effort is needed and appreciated.
Thank you.
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A rapid rise in the cost of medical services has placed the task of
financing and controlling medical costs near the top of the nation's
social policy agenda for the 1970s. Hospital insurance programs,
Medicare, and Medicaid have increased the use and the prices of
medical services, and enactment of a national health insurance
scheme could be expected to worsen the problem. The total cost of
medical care is approaching $100 billion and continues to rise.
The federal government supports and funds programs intended
to produce better medical care at more reasonable prices—programs
especially including health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Advocates of HMOs argue that greater use of such groups, which integrate health insurance with health care and reduce the fee for the
service component of medical costs, will limit the pressure for
overprescription of medical services. Overprescription tends to
cause overuse and increased prices.
Besides possible overprescription, an important reason for the
higher cost of medical care has been the development of new and
costly medical technology. Kidney dialysis, open heart surgery, and
coronary bypass implantation have added considerably to the burden
of medical costs. Ethical drugs, on the other hand, help to relieve
suffering at relatively small cost and, when they provide an alternative to expensive kinds of therapy, greatly decrease medical bills.
This study focuses on the cost of drugs—not out of a desire to
diminish their human benefits, but rather because the high costs of
* I would like to acknowledge the help of Merlon J. Peck, John McGowan,
John Owen, Solomon Fabrlcant, J. Fred Weslon, and Yale Brozen who saw earlier
drafts of the manuscript. The views expressed and any errors which might
remain are of course my responsibility.
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medical care are a matter of urgent concern and the costs of drugs
are part of the costs of medical care.
The Role of Drugs
Since ethical drugs are a relatively inexpensive mode of therapy,
it would seem clear that pharmaceutical industry R&D should be
encouraged in order to increase the production of new ethical drugs.
Paradoxically, the importance of the ethical drug industry in providing therapy has been neglected. Public attention has tended to be
fixed, instead, on the profits and selling costs of the ethical drug
manufacturers, even though profits and costs constitute a small
fraction of the nation's total medical expenditures. Currently, U.S.
sales of ethical drugs account for only $6 billion of total medical
expenditures of over $90 billion, and total selling costs and profits
account for very much less.
The opportunities for savings to be realized by a lowering of
the prices of drugs are much less than the opportunities for savings
to be realized in other components of the medical care industry. Any
apparent savings from the cutting of drug prices would be more
than counterbalanced if these savings had the effect of reducing the
number of drug innovations, and so raising the total cost of medical
care. In other words, when policy makers concentrate on correcting
the presumed inequity of high prices of the drug industry, they are
stressing a secondary problem, the remedies for which could well
undercut attempts to solve the much more important problem of
improving the quality and reducing the costs of medical care. Policies designed to decrease drug prices might produce some savings
for consumers in the form of lower immediate expenditures for drugs
but would risk the loss of much larger potential savings—both direct
and indirect—that might flow from the development of new drugs.
An emphasis on correcting high prices distorts any general economic
analysis of the functions and performance of the industry: it places
too much emphasis on the alleged monopoly problem, when other
problems including that of encouraging innovation are more important.
Better understanding of drug industry performance is aided by
viewing drug therapy as a relatively low-cost medical technology
that may displace other more expensive technologies. For example,
recent advances in drug research have promised drug therapies as a
low-cost substitute for surgery for treating gallstones. Although the
range of choice of technology may be limited for some diseases,
this is not always the case: different technologies (surgery, radiology,

intensive care, hospital care) may be used simultaneously or in
sequence.
In fact, medical practitioners are not accustomed to a cost-benefit
analysis of choices among alternative therapeutic methods. Their
stated objective is to provide patients with the best available therapy
regardless of cost. This approach has some moral advantages: a
doctor need not restrict expensive but effective therapeutic programs
to rich patients. But costs arc relevant to medical decisions, and
doctors should certainly choose an economical form of therapy when
it is as safe as other forms.
When we compare medical technologies, it is immediately evident that drug therapy is more widely applicable than some other
forms of treatment. More diseases can be treated by drugs than by
surgery and radiology. The use of drugs thus permits larger reductions in morbidity and mortality rales than are permitted by alternative forms of treatment and, as a result, can bring larger reductions
in the cost of disease. 1
Alternative forms of therapy are much more costly than drugs
because they rely on the employment of professional skills, costly
equipment, or a large labor input per patient. Surgery, radiology,
and intensive care require substantial outlays for both professional
skills and equipment, and psychiatry, physical therapy, and hospital
care demand large inputs of man-hours, whether professional or
unskilled. The care of coronary disease, for example, employs teams
of professional personnel and expensive equipment. The most
dramatic current example of this is the heart transplant, and considerable research is currently directed to the development of an
artificial heart. But expense prevents the use of heart transplants
for a large number of patients. The development of costly (though
successful) medical technology has contributed to the catastrophic
costs of certain illnesses for individual families and thus (among
other things) to current proposals for national health insurance. 2
Not only is treatment by drug therapy intrinsically more desirable, but also it is more economical than alternative treatment. First,
it is more economical because patients can usually take drugs without any assistance. In order to make self-administration easy, drugs
should be made up in oral dosage forms rather than those that
require injection; even though the development of an oral dosage form
may not represent an important medical advance over a parenteral
form, it may still be of economic importance. Second, it is more economical because most drugs are mass-produced rather than made up
as required for each patient. The fact that drugs are mass-produced in
appropriate dosage forms should not be taken for granted and is,
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indeed, a relatively recent development. Before the 1940s, pharmacists did their own compounding for each prescription. The pharmaceutical manufacturers took over the manufacture of final dosage
drugs in the 1940s and 1950s after the introduction of the sulfa drugs
and the antibiotics. This development has greatly reduced the cost
of operating a pharmacy and, to the extent that pharmaceutical retailing is competitive, has reduced the cost of prescriptions.
The introduction of mass production methods of drug manufacture represented a large increase in productivity. The new methods
displaced what was virtually a handicraft technology—one that, with
the increases in wages, had become quite expensive. The shift in
production methods reflected the same economic forces as the shift to
self-service groceries and the displacement of custom-made apparel
and shoes by mass-produced ready-to-wear clothing.*1 The growth of
the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry reflects two different
types of substitution: the displacement of compounding in the retail
establishment by a mass-production technology and the substitution
of low-cost drug therapy for more costly types of therapy.
Usually the growth of pharmaceutical manufacturing in the
1940s and 1950s is attributed to the introduction of the new sulfa
drugs and antibiotics since these were more difficult to manufacture
than many older drugs. While the new products did in fact contribute
to the change, the influence of general economic forces should not
be dismissed. The pharmaceutical manufacturers also took over the
production of dosage forms of virtually all the old drugs. Today,
the retail pharmacist does virtually no compounding at all.
The substitution of drug therapy for other medical technologies
has achieved significant economies, and the economics available
from the greater use of drugs have grown as a result of recent large
increases in the prices of other medical services. By contrast, the
prices of drugs have remained stable. Their relative prices compared
to those of other forms of therapy have declined, and it is the relative
prices that arc relevant in assessing the available economies. The
increase in the use of medical services has also increased the potential savings from the substitution of drugs for medical services. But
the development of drug therapy requires the discovery and development of new drugs.
The Need for New Drugs

illnesses reveals the need for additional pharmaceutical research and
the large potential contribution that can be made.
Infectious Diseases. Although the greatest pharmaceutical triumphs
have been in the field of infectious diseases, much remains to be
done. Antibiotics have greatly reduced mortality from pneumonia,
meningitis, tuberculosis and septicemia, among other diseases. Nevertheless, infectious diseases taken together still account for 7 percent
of all deaths 4 and a significant amount of severe disability. Furthermore, certain infectious diseases, once effectively treated with drugs,
have reappeared in recent years. For example, in 1970 venereal
disease was the most prevalent reported infectious disease, with over
2.8 million active cases. In part the problem has reappeared because
the bacteria have become resistant to penicillin, which is now effective against gonorrhea only in very large doses. A more important
factor, which is social rather than medical or bacteriological, is the
permissive contemporary attitudes toward sex/ 1
Some currently important bacterial diseases are the paradoxical
by-products of our therapeutic successes. For example, hospital gramnegative infections have now become a relatively common terminal
disease for patients who are alive because of our success in treating
their cancers or the injuries and burns they received in major
accidents. The incidence of these infections has also increased as a
result of the increase in the number of older people. The bacteria in
question usually do not affect humans but do cause disease in these
weakened patients. Unfortunately, the ability to treat gram-negative
infections is still modest. New drugs not yet known are required.
Mental Illness. Recent statistics on mental illness show that major
therapeutic advances have been made. New tranquilizers and antidepressants helped reduce the number of patients in mental hospitals
from 55B.000 in 1955 to 339,000 in 1970. During those years the
average hospital stay for mental illness dropped from eight years to
one and a third years. 0 Tranquilizers and anti-depressants had the
effect of decreasing the American mental hospital population by half
compared to what it would otherwise have been. Mental illness,
nevertheless, remains a serious burden. One estimate is that the total
cost to the U.S. economy of alcoholism alone is $15 billion per year,
consisting of $10 billion in lost work time, $2 billion in health and
welfare services, and $3 billion in property damage and medical
expenses. This estimate does not include losses from reduced life
expectancy, traffic fatalities, and arrests. 7 New drugs are needed to
help reduce this burden.
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Cardiovascular Disease. Cardiovascular diseases are the leading
cause of death in the United States, accounting for 53 percent of all
deaths in I960. 8 Part of the reason for this is the increase in the
number of those over forty-five years of age—the most susceptible
portion of the population.
Despite the rise in the proportion of older persons in the population, the annual death rate from cardiovascular disorders fell from
515.1 to 494.0 per 100,000 between 1960 and 1970.° Drugs doubtless
were a factor in this decline. The major drugs now in use against
this disease were first introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s
but few have been introduced since.
The reduction in the annual death rate from hypertensive heart
disease and hypertension has even more dramatic; from 44.1 to
11.0 per 100,000 between 1958 and 1967. The great improvement is
largely due to the use of anti-hypertensive drugs. Recently there
has been a growing use of drug therapy to regulate abnormalities of
lipid metabolism, and significant attention is now being given to
the identification of the causes of atherosclerosis.
Arthritis. About 50 million persons suffer from arthritis to some
degree. Approximately 17 million require medical care and 3.4 million are disabled. 10 Except for gout, the causes of arthritic diseases
are unknown, and current treatment provides only symptomatic
relief. The available drugs include steroid hormones and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory compounds such as phenylbutazone and
indomethacin.
Cancer. New drugs are needed for cancer. With federal support,
medical research has concentrated heavily on cancer and has succeeded in developing new drugs that have contributed to an increase in survival rates of patients with certain types of cancer.
In 1967, less than one-fifth of all patients survived for five years
after beginning treatment; by 1970 the five-year survival rate had
risen to one-third. Drugs, however, cannot claim all of the credit;
early cancer diagnosis and advances in surgery and radiology probably have been more important factors than drugs in the decline.
Viral Infections. Anti-viral drugs, although not of practical therapeutic use today, are clearly a promising field. The potential economic benefits arising from effective treatment of the common cold
alone are enormous. Interferon, which is a natural substance induced in mammalian cells by exposure to a virus, inhibits the
growth of the virus in the infected cells and prevents its appearance
R

in neighboring cells. But formidable difficulties stand in the way
of putting this knowledge to use in the development of a drug.
Interferon is difficult to extract and appears to be effective only in
the species from which it is obtained. Current efforts are directed
toward seeking a drug that stimulates the production of interferon
within the infected cells, rather than a method of extraction.
Can R&D Add to the Armamentarium?
Frequently the suggestion is made that additional R&D efforts are
unlikely to be productive because the major discoveries of the 1940s
and 1950s have exhausted the available opportunities. New discoveries, it is said, must await a major breakthrough of the magnitude of penicillin, and the prospect for a breakthrough of this
magnitude is dim. On the contrary, many new drugs introduced
since 1960 have proven to be therapeutically significant. Ampicillin
has a wider antibacterial range than either penicillin G or penicillin V
and destroys such penicillin-resistant, gram-negative organisms as
Salmonella, Shigella, Haemophilus influenzae, and some species of
Proteus. It is especially effective against urinary tract infections
which generally involve gram-negative organisms. Cephalosporins,
a family of relatively new wide-spectrum antibiotics, work against
penicillinase-producing staphylococci and streptococci that resist
older penicillins. Doxycycline, a new broad-spectrum antibiotic can
be safely used by patients suffering from renal insufficiency, who
risk serious side effects from the use of other tetracyclines. Other
important new antibiotics include gentamicin and carbenicillin which
are effective against severe infections caused by gram-negative organisms resistant to most other antibiotics.
In the cardiovascular field, the diuretic anti-hypertensive agent,
chlorothiazide, which was introduced in the late 1950s, was a major
therapeutic innovation, and a number of other anti-hypertensive
drugs have been introduced. More recently, innovation has been
slow, in part because the long-term use required of drugs such as
these increases the risk of toxicity, which in turn has made FDA
licensing especially restrictive. The importance of these new drugs
is demonstrated by the fact that physicians have shifted to them
rapidly and academic experts have endorsed them.
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Over the past two decades, pharmaceutical companies have been
withdrawing from vaccine manufacturing and marketing, increasingly,
the liability situation and its consequences (i.e., litigation costs
or difficulty in obtaining insurance coverage) have been cited as
major factors in the decision to withdraw. These decisions seem to
indicate that present or anticipated vaccine-related injury liability
expenses are seen as an unreasonable burden (or an unacceptably risky
gamble) in relation to the costs of product development and the income
from sales.
Manufacturers are apprehensive that without some means of
compensation for unavoidable vaccine injury and temporally related
conditions, the present unclear state of the law will continue to
allow them to be held liable for such conditions and penalized
financially.
The future behavior of the courts and the responses of the manufacturers cannot be predicted with certainty, but the committee is
concerned that the apprehensions themselves might have a negative
effect. Earlier withdrawals from the market have created a situation
in which the United States is almost totally reliant on one manufacturer for polio and DTP vaccines (Lederle), and on another for
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccines (Merck Sharp & Dohme). if
apprehensions about the current unclear state of the law caused these
manufacturers to withdraw, the vaccine supply and immunization
programs could be jeopardized, leading to possible resurgence of these
diseases. Also, the apprehensions discussed above are a disincentive
to investment in the development of new (or improved) immunizing
agents and to competition from new or foreign firms.
Proposals to remedy the compensation and liability problems
connected with vaccine injury are discussed below.

A NATIONAL VACCINE COMMISSION
The lack of a formal mechanism to promote cooperation in the
innovation, production, and use of vaccines limits the benefits
obtainable from existing immunization programs and hampers the
development of new programs. The problems associated with the absence
of such a mechanism are primarily those of omission rather than
commission: they include delay or inefficiency in achieving desired
outcomes and failure to tackle problems for which no existing group
has direct responsibility.
To overcome these difficulties, the committee recommends the
establishment of a national vaccine commission. This commission would
monitor all aspects of immunization efforts in the United States. One
of its primary responsibilities would be early identification of
potential problems affecting vaccine supply, it also would help to
educate and inform the public, physicians, and government decision
makers about the effects of various immunization actions and
policies, when necessary, the commission would become an impartial
broker to promote the availability of needed vaccines and to
coordinate collaborative activities for which no suitable mechanism
exists.
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